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As the Cold War ended, the international development establishment turned its 
attention to the challenges of protracted conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, among 
other underdeveloped regions of the world.  The realities of the Cold War had 
ruled out the engagement by multilateral and bilateral donors with the armed 
forces of aid-dependent countries. 
Following the East-West rapprochement, the armed forces were singled out as the 
major driver of conflict and insecurity and as an obstacle to economic 
development.  In order to engage with the governments of those countries, donors 
demanded that the professionalism and cost of maintaining armed forces be 
addressed through an initiative called as ‘Security Sector Reform’ (SSR), part of a 
normative agenda that marked a steady shift from project-focussed, to ‘sector 
wide’ approaches. 
It is argued that SSR remains a re-embodiment of civil-military relations (CMR) 
theories of the 1960s and 1970s and like them, it is equally beset by the normative 
bias towards liberalism and the disregard for the realities in pre-liberal and 
transitional political systems or countries whose historical experience differs from 
the Western setting which initially influenced the formulation of CMR theory.  It is 
further argued that the post-Cold War turmoil in the conceptualisation of security 
adds to the haziness of SSR both as a policy and as an analytical tool, in addition 
to the limits imposed by its normative orientation. 
It is argued that SSR is premised on a problematic conception of security that 
conflates it with immunity to violent attack or physical safety.  A conception that 
views security as a state of affairs in which groups and individuals are assured of 
sustainable and stable existence is suggested as the approach capable of capturing 
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the development challenges at the heart of the security predicament of Sub-
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 The Pedigree, Birth and Marketing of SSR 
1.1 Introduction 
The realities of the Cold War had meant that, for years, donor countries were 
limited on how much they could debate issues related to the armed forces of 
recipient countries or very close allies.  Following the East-West rapprochement, 
such constraints were eased and the veil on the armed forces of aid recipients and 
prospective allies was lifted.  This happened by way of direct demands for reform.  
These demands were inaugurated by the United Kingdom’s Secretary for newly 
created Department for International Development (DFID), Clare Short in a speech 
that first saw the use of the term Security Sector Reform.
1
   
The calls for reforming the ‘security sectors’ mounted particularly because 
the armed forces and security services were considered to be a drain on the 
resources of crisis-ridden countries and promoters of intractable conflict.  Those 
calls coincided with the realisation that traditional project models of aid provision, 
particularly to the dependent and weakly institutionalised countries mostly in Sub 
Saharan Africa were not yielding the intended results (Jones, 2000:1).  In light of 
that, a shift had to be made from the focus on projects to ‘sector wide 
approaches’, a move that was expected to enhance the effectiveness of aid by 
‘cutting down transaction costs, improving coordination between donors, bringing 
aid under the effective management of recipient governments and widening the 
involvement of stakeholders in decision-making.’2  Added to this was the general 
acknowledgement by the ‘development community’ that poverty eradication 
targets set by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) had some utility; and agreement 
                                        
1 Speech at the Royal College for Defence Studies (RCDS) on 13 May 1998. 
2 Jones, ibid. 
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that policy-based lending under conditionality had severe limitations in light of the 
failures of structural adjustment programmes.   
The events of 9/11 pointed out above also served to add new impetus to 
calls for reform and the rethinking of aid giving, but more importantly they 
terminated the relaxed attitude that had become a feature of the of the Cold War.  
The horror of 9/11 alerted the securitocrats and statesmen of the developed world 
to the security implications of the squalor, ‘state failure’ and endemic violence in 
the underdeveloped countries.  Regarding ‘state failure’, Ghani and Lockhart have 
observed that: 
 
As 9/11 and subsequent attacks showed people in prosperous countries can 
no longer take the security of their lives for granted.  This problem...is at 
the heart of the world-wide systemic crisis that constitutes the most serious 
challenge to global stability in the new millennium (2009:4).   
 
 
Aid giving and defence relations had to be put to the purposes of countering the 
new and emerging threats.  Security Sector Reform has since grown into a vibrant 
domain of policy, research and advocacy.  Governments and multilateral agencies 
have in place departments and bureaucrats dedicated to SSR, while academic 
institutions have integrated it into their teaching curricula and research agendas.  
Non-government research and advocacy organisations in the fields of conflict, 
security, peace and development have likewise embraced SSR as a key area of 
research and advocacy.   
Most striking however, is the relative indifference of much of Sub-Saharan 
Africa to the SSR debate.  What continues to happen is that, some governments 
may be compelled by aid donors to cast some light in the dark recesses of their 
establishment, and specifically, to lay bare their financial outlays.  Pressure is put 
on such governments to subject their defence and law-and-order institutions to 
reform to make them more transparent and accountable.  What has remained 
unclear is the actual success of SSR initiatives.  The broad aim of this study is to 
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examine the conceptual anchors of the security component of peacebuilding – 
understood as ‘action undertaken at the end of a civil conflict to consolidate 
peace and prevent a recurrence of fighting’ (Paris, 2004:38) – focusing on the 
reform of the ‘Security Sector’.  The study closely examines the objectives of SSR 
and its soundness, both as a concept and as a policy framework.  The key 
assumptions and premises of the SSR are explored in order to establish whether 
they lend to the framework the robustness that would enable it to meet its set 
goals; and whether indeed, SSR as an aspect of Western liberal theory has much 
to offer to the understanding of the security and development challenges of the 
war-torn and conflict-prone countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, as a representative 
case of the Third World.  The study draws on and seeks to contribute to the 
current literature on the nexus between security (or the lack of it) and 
development and the linkage between the two phenomena and conflict.  
1.2 Main Arguments of the study 
Certain common arguments run through this study and it is important that we flag 
them right at the outset starting from the next Chapter Two.  Chapter Two and 
Chapter Three explore the theoretical and conceptual concerns of the study 
respectively.  Chapter Two interrogates the philosophical basis of prevailing 
normative approaches highlighting the extent to which they continue to privilege 
prescriptions of values over empirical evidence derived from detailed analysis of 
the social, economic, political and cultural realities of the polities that are the 
targets for ‘post-conflict’ institutional reform.  It argues that the approach being 
taken by common normative approaches is that, what works in the developed 
countries now is the norm which should work in the underdeveloped countries 
now, irrespective of what worked in the developed countries when they were also 
still developing.  More than anything else, it is further argued, such a view 
amongst key sections of the international development establishment probably 
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stands out as the most insidious threat to the long-term security of developing 
countries as understood by this study.   
Chapter Three explores the various conceptions of security in the post-Cold 
War era highlighting their utility in shedding light on the security challenges of 
underdeveloped countries.  It builds on an existing view that the security 
predicament of the conflict-prone polities of the Third World – epitomized by the 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa – goes beyond the narrowly conceived concerns of 
physical safety but is primarily shaped by the crises entailed by the ongoing 
processes of political development in the form of state making and accessorily, 
nation building.  The chapter argues that the statehood and nationhood of the 
underdeveloped countries of Sub-Saharan Africa has been erroneously taken as a 
given, resulting in a misreading of the root causes of insecurity in those countries.  
Initiatives such as SSR are offshoots of that major omission.  It further argues 
that, contrary to common portrayals of security as a service, or as a commodity or 
utility to be purchased, provided, delivered and consumed, it is a state of affairs 
and an outcome of the provision of other services; in addition to the attainment of 
critical thresholds in the process of state making.  The chapter questions the 
common tendency in international development circles to conflate security, as 
defined here, with physical safety, understood by the study to mean immunity to 
violent attack.  The study argues that physical safety is only one out many 
elements of security and that the prevailing conception of SSR – which is in real 
terms is ‘Physical Safety Sector Reform’ – is premised on a category mistake which 
amounts to the trivialization of the broader debate on security and development.   
Chapter Four explores the linkage between the debates on what has been 
framed as ‘security sector governance’ and ‘democratic control of the armed forces’ 
in the 1990s with the debates on civil-military relations (CMR) theory especially in 
the 1960s and 1970s and argues that SSR is a latter-day reincarnation of earlier 
civil-military relations theories and further suggested that SSR is equally 
handicapped by the same limitations that invalidated CMR, namely the normative 
bias towards liberalism and the disregard for the realities in pre-liberal and 
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transitional political systems or countries whose historical experience differ from 
the socio-political contexts that influenced the original formulation of the theory.  
Those limitations do not portend well for SSR.   
Chapter Five uses the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
(DDR) in Uganda as a micro case study of the often-cited synergies between SSR 
and DDR programming in light of the latter’s chequered record.  Uganda is chosen 
in light of the fact that its armed forces are deemed to have undergone both DDR 
and SSR.  It is argued that the actual sense in which synergies between DDR and 
SSR can be realised is rendered questionable by the lack of clarity on what is 
meant by DDR even in countries that are commonly acclaimed to have 
implemented it with success.  Uganda’s experience in managing armed groups in 
the immediate aftermath of major hostilities is explored to identify the key features 
of the process from 1986 onward, with a particular focus on the donor-supported 
mass discharge of the 1990s, with the view of identifying whether as commonly 
suggested, that exercise was DDR as commonly suggested in policy and academic 
literature, and what this means for follow-on initiatives like SSR.   
Chapter Six examines the limitations of the rhetoric on four elements, that 
are deemed to be critical to the successful implementation of SSR and allied 
reforms,  These elements are local ownership, buy-in, political will and civil society.  
It is argued that, even if those terms and what they refer to was clear enough, the 
status of the institutions targeted by SSR as the cornerstone of sovereignty tends 
to automatically preclude the realisation of buy-in, ownership or political will.  It is 
argued that the non-inclusiveness and non-democratic nature of the process of 
conception and formulation of reform policies renders the rhetoric of ownership 
hollow, unwholesome and condescending and goes a long way to explain why the 
antipathy with which reform initiatives are received.  It is argued that, the surprise 
with which external actors view the lack of political will and commitment in 
underdeveloped countries is in itself paradoxical and deserving of further 
investigation.  It is argued that the tendency by the formulators of reform 
initiatives of putting civil society on a pedestal almost as the magic bullet in the 
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implementation of externally-conceived reforms overlooks the serious limitations of 
wider society in underdeveloped countries in its capacity to shape the public policy 
processes.   
Chapter Seven examines the common approaches to institutional reform in 
the context of peacebuilding and ‘post-conflict’ reconstruction focussing on the 
one-size-fits-all model approach that dominates those activities.  It argues that 
reforms such as SSR short fall of meeting expectations set for them because they 
fail to fit in the contexts of developing countries particularly those in regions that 
are afflicted by protracted conflict.  It is further argued that reform initiatives 
continue to be ill-formulated or are most times undertaken as a panacea even in 
contexts that call for more far-reaching interventions.  Reform pursued as a cure-
all or as a magic potion very easily degenerates into ‘business as usual’ dogmatism 
especially if it underestimates the real magnitude of the security and developed 
tasks at hand.  As is often the case in Sub-Saharan Africa, institutions must first be 
formed before they can be reformed or even re-formed; they must first come into 
existence before they can become unfit for purpose and therefore necessitate any 
form of reconfiguration.   
Chapter Eight builds further on the arguments in Chapter Four and argues 
that basing on a false theory of civil-military relations, of SSR advocacy of the post-
Cold War era has gone astray by falsely attributing the praetorian character of 
Sub-Saharan African polities to the armed forces – or the so-called security sector.  
It argues that, the symptomatology of political disorder, chronic instability and 
military intervention in politics is part of a much broader crisis in the functioning of 
affected political systems in which all other social forces apart from armed forces 
are galvanised haphazardly in politics, on account of the low level of the rate 
political institutionalisation being outstripped by the increasing levels of political 
participation.  It concludes by noting that the armed forces emerges on top only 
because it has more dramatic means of intervention in disjointed politics than 
other groups and therefore focusing on the armed forces like SSR does is 
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diversionary and only serves to conflate a complex syndrome with one of its 
components, albeit a dramatic one.  
1.3 Justification for the Study 
A closer examination of the policy and academic literature in the field of post 
conflict peacebuilding, more particularly in the areas of physical safety and law-
and-order, reveals a continuing oversimplification of the complex linkages between 
security and development; and a lack of nuance in the use to which the two terms 
are put.  Currently, there is limited effort to place the security and development 
challenges of the conflict-prone countries in their proper historical perspective of 
the ongoing processes state making. Our understanding of state making derives 
directly from the general conception of the state as adopted by this study.  We 
take the state to be the historically-determined mode of social organization in 
which a population, suitably a national one, occupying a given territory is presided 
over by a politically constituted government that claims internal and external 
sovereignty.  Following from that, state making is the more-or-less open-ended 
process that either results in, or is aimed at integrating communities, consolidating 
the territories they inhabit, constituting the political authorities that preside over 
them and imbuing those authorities with sovereignty.3  The deeper challenges that 
are entailed in those processes are currently either disregarded, or are taken for 
granted or are subject to misconceptions to an extent that undermines the 
wholesomeness of the peacebuilding orthodoxy.   
Analysts, commentators and practitioners remain disinclined towards drawing 
vital lessons from the historical experiences of the more developed countries, 
                                        
3 We do not subscribe to conceptions of state making that take any of the four components of the 
state as outlined above as a given.  Such conceptions would include Fukuyama’s in which the 
existence of government is taken for granted in his characterisation of state building as the 
‘creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones’ (2004:ix), or Call 
and Cousens who define statebuilding as ‘actions undertaken by international or national actors to 
establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of the state which may or may not contribute to 
peacebuilding’ (2008:4).  If at this stage nation building is not given prominence, the only reason is 
that it is implied directly as the core component of the broader process of state making.  The 
details of those processes are highlighted in Chapter Eight of this study.    
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which, albeit in different epochs, faced similar challenges to those faced by today’s 
developing countries (Chang, 2003b; Ayoob, 1995; Cohen, Brown and Organski, 
1981, Tilly, 1975 a&b).  The disregard of the insights of the latter analysts has 
given rise to an ahistorical, apolitical, overly technocratic and paternalistic narrative 
on the security of Third World countries.  This shortcoming can be explained by 
the sense in which the discourse on security and development has been shaped by 
the search for short-term quick fix solutions by technocrats and politicians.  This 
research will seek to examine some of those shortcomings by putting the common-
place conceptions in the security and development field under the spotlight with 
the aim of enabling scholars to regain the initiative of concept formation in the two 
vital areas, initiative that has been surrendered to practitioners.  Accordingly, the 
study will examine: 
 The conceptual assumptions of the SSR framework and interrogate the 
analytical vitality of its key terms and categories. 
 The epistemological assumptions of SSR with a focus on the normative 
thinking that continues to inform the framework.    
 The framework’s practical assumptions focusing on the limitations set by 
SSR’s genealogy and the operational obstacles to its implementation.   
This study revisits the hitherto disregarded studies on Third World security and 
examines some of the historical processes of state formation and nation building 
drawing on what can still be applied to contemporary development studies from 
theories on political development.4 By doing so, the study seeks to demonstrate 
that ultimately, security is a downstream derivative of development research will 
seek to tease out the sense in which ‘security sector’ reformism is an offshoot of 
the conflation of physical safety with security.   
 
                                        
4 Among these are Black (1967), Huntington (1968), Tilly (1975), Binder et al (1971), Finkle and 
Gable (1971), Huntington and Nelson (1976), Strayer (1970), Weiner and Huntington (1987), 
Kolodiziej and Harkavy (1982), Al Mashat (1987), Thomas (1987), Ayoob (1984, 1991, 1992, 1995), 
Job (1992), Azar and Moon (1988) and Graham (1994). 
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The key propositions of the research are as follows: 
 
1. Contrary to the common portrayal of security as a service, commodity or 
utility to be provided/delivered and consumed, it is a state of affairs and an 
outcome of the provision of other services and the attainment of historically 
determined socio-economic equilibriums in the overall functioning of a 
political community. 
2. Security is a state of affairs in which groups and individuals are assured of 
stable, safe and sustainable existence, phenomena whose attainment goes 
beyond the remit of instruments of coercion and the institutions of law and 
order, the targets of SSR.   
3. Given that security is a state of affairs, fencing it off as a ‘sector’ creates 
false categories such as SSR, itself a product of the ongoing conflation 
between physical safety (immunity from violent attack) and security as 
defined above.   
4. The ongoing conflation of ‘security’ with ‘physical safety’ only serves to 
contradict the two major claims by the advocates of SSR; first, that it is a 
holistic approach, second, that it goes beyond the cold War militaristic 
conceptions of security. 
5. Given the nature of security as a state of affairs that goes beyond physical 
safety, every sector of public policy formulation and implementation is 
essentially a ‘security sector’, hence, the continuing reference to the 
instruments of coercion as the “security sector” trivializes the security 
predicament of the underdeveloped countries of the Third World, the main 
targets of so-called Security Sector Reform. 
6. The security predicament of the conflict-prone countries of the Third World 
goes beyond the narrowly conceived concerns of physical safety but is 
primarily shaped by the ongoing processes nation building and state making 
that are either taken for granted or perceived perfunctorily by peacebuilding 
initiatives including SSR.   
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It is envisaged that the outcome of this research will be of interest for those 
specializing in the area of peace, conflict, security and development studies, 
political science and international relations.  It will also benefit scholars with 
interest in comparative historical analysis of the processes nation building and 
state making.  More particularly, the research will aim to show that, rather than 
being a service that can be provided or a commodity to be purchased, security is 
an end state and a downstream derivative of wider societal process that cannot be 
meaningfully grasped if they are subsumed under such simplistic short hand as 
‘security sector’.   
1.4 Research Questions 
The key questions that the study addresses are: 
1) What, if any, are the key conceptual anchors of the SSR framework 
and how well do they reflect the security and development 
challenges of the conflict-prone countries, the intended beneficiaries 
of SSR programmes? 
2) How does the genealogy of the SSR initiative as an externally 
originated and donor driven agenda constrain its advancement as a 
policy and analytical tool, and in the process, undermine the 
attainment of its declared goals?  
 
1.5 Review of the Literature 
The scope, and arguably the amorphousness of SSR as a field of policy, advocacy 
and analysis, makes the task of reviewing literature related to it a daunting one, 
particularly given the steady flow of books and pamphlets that have continued to 
issue from the many think tanks, advocacy groups and implementing agencies that 
have embraced what has clearly become an industry.  More than anything else, 
the multiplicity of the organisations, activists, practitioners and scholars involved 
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with the initiative account for the highly variable quality of the literature on SSR, as 
well as for the disparate conceptualisations of SSR.   
A closer examination of the objectives of SSR reveals that its broad aims 
across all contexts of its implementation are the recasting the relationship between 
the armed forces and civil authorities and the demilitarisation of target countries.  
Those have remained the main themes within civil-military relations and 
development studies, the fields from which SSR has drawn most of its assumptions 
and conceptual formulations.  For the beginnings of the theme of demilitarisation 
in general, Lamb (2000) shows that it first attracted scholarly attention in the first 
half of the twentieth century with as an avenue for the reduction of military 
capabilities, especially preferred by victorious parties on defeated nations and 
alliances following the end of major hostilities.  It became one of the major strands 
of the new field of Peace Studies dating back to the end of World War I.  SSR and 
most other peacebuilding frameworks and initiatives that have emerged following 
the end of the Cold War have maintained demilitarisation as a major component.  
Hutchful (1998) makes the most explicit link between demilitarisation and SSR, 
linking it directly to other measures that are common to post-authoritarian and 
post-conflict peacebuilding.5   
The civil-military relations (CMR) roots of SSR can be found in the writings 
pioneered by Huntington in his seminal work, The Soldier and the State (1957) 
which dwelt exclusively on the situation in the developed liberal democracies of the 
West.  One already notices Huntington’s ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ control of the 
armed forces and professionalism in the being put to use by the Bonn International 
Centre for Conversion (BICC) in its definition of the aim of SSR as the process 
intended ‘…to create armed, uniformed forces which are functionally differentiated, 
professional forces under objective and subjective political control, at the lowest 
functional level of resource use’ (Brzoska, 2000: 9).  Huntington later examined his 
original theory in his equally seminal Political Order in Changing Societies (1968) in 
                                        
5 Prominent among these measures is Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR), 
Defence policy review, budgetary review and civil military relations.     
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which he reflected on the nature of civil-military relations in the less developed and 
the communist states.     In those two works, Huntington makes six major 
observations five of which have remained the cornerstone of the theory of civil 
military relations as has been inherited by the SSR framework.  The sixth 
observation which derives from his 1968 publication is still absent from much of 
the scholarly and policy debate regarding the armed forces and of civil-military 
relations in general.   
First, Huntington advanced the view that the civilians and military officers 
make up two distinct groups whose existence he portrays almost in adversarial 
terms, which is the second major claim that is implicit in his views.  Third, he 
highlights the importance of ‘civilian control’ as the medium through which civilians 
maintain their hold on the overall polity by exercising supremacy over the military, 
though giving latitude in matters requiring their expertise, thereby forestalling the 
likelihood of conflict between the two groups.  Fourth, according to him, the 
effectiveness of ‘civilian control’ is directly related to shifts in civil-military relations 
over time.  Fifth, in a later examination of praetorianism in his 1968 work, he 
stepped outside the confines of the structure and functioning of the ‘civilian’ and 
military domains and advanced the view that the political and institutional structure 
of wider society has greater potential to fundamentally affect civilian control.6  
Specifically, he notes that the absence of political institutions capable of mediating, 
refining and moderating group political action is weak in praetorian societies.  All 
political groups are politicized as result of which ‘[E]ach group employs means 
which reflect its peculiar nature and capabilities.  The wealthy bribe, student riots; 
workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the military coup’ (1968:196).  The 
foregoing leads to Huntington’s sixth major observation on civil-military relations, 
namely, that civilian control is threatened not so much by the military per se but 
by the absence of or weakness of institutions.   
                                        
6 Political Order, pp. 192-263. 
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In The Soldier and the State, Huntington observes that it is the existence of 
the officer corps as a professional body that gives a unique cast to the modern 
problems of civil-military relations (1957: 7).  He traces the phenomenon of the 
professional officer to no earlier than 1800, further noting that by 1900, all major 
countries of the world could lay claim to possession of professional military 
officers.7  The emergence of the professional officer corps, further contends 
Huntington, resulted in the problem of the relationship between the politician and 
the expert, more specifically, the military and civilian spheres resulting in tensions 
whose resolution lies in ‘civilian control’.  Huntington gives the justification for 
‘civilian control’ as the lack of competence by the military outside their field.8  
Huntington refers to a balance of roles between the military professional and the 
statesman wherein the latter acknowledges the integrity of the military profession 
and its subject matter while the former accepts to remain neutral in political terms 
and accepts guidance from the latter.9  Huntington holds that, it is the 
maintenance of this balance that determines the integrity of civil-military relations.  
A negative balance is more likely to result if civilian control is based on ‘subjective 
control’ and a positive balance is assured when civilian control rests on "objective" 
foundations.   
In response to Huntington, several theorists have criticized his but not to 
the extent of debunking them.  Janowitz, has been the most strident of 
Huntington’s critics taking issue with most of his key claims ranging from 
professionalism to the taxonomy of the forms of civilian control.  While Huntington 
highlights the three essential elements of military professionalism as expertise, 
responsibility and corporateness, some of the key attributes that SSR seeks to 
achieve, Janowitz insists that professionalism is a concept that implies an element 
of desirable behaviour, hence, ‘[A]s it applies to the military, it represents an 
                                        
7 Ibid., 7 
8 Ibid., 70 
9 Ibid., 70-72 
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ambiguous topic’, further posing the question, ‘what is the import of ethics and 
responsibility for the professional combatant?’ (1971:6). He also takes issue with 
Huntington's reference to so called objective institutional constraints as a 
determinant of civilian control.  Like Janowitz, Abrahamsson doubts on the utility of 
the notion of objective control by questioning the connection that Huntington 
makes between professionalism and political neutrality and goes ahead to further 
question the suggestion that the maximization of professionalism enhances civilian 
control.   
Allbright makes note of writers such as Eric A. Nordlinger, Amos Perlmutter, 
and Claude E. Welch, Jr., and Arthur K. Smith who have adopted the position that 
the notions supplied by Huntington offer minimal insight into the behavior of 
military, or ‘praetorian’ governments once they emerge (1980:155).  In the 
process of distancing themselves from Huntingtonian concepts, some like 
Nordlinger do not take on board Huntington’s later insights on praetorianism.  
Nordlinger describes praetorianism as the antithesis of civilian control and has 
argued that it arises when there is conflict between soldiers and civilian governors 
that leads to a breakdown of civilian supremacy.  In other words, the defining 
feature of praetorianism is the breakdown of civilian control.  On the other hand 
Huntington conceptualizes praetorianism as a breakdown of civic order, and rather 
than viewing it as an antithesis of civilian pre-eminence, he looks at it as an 
antithesis of civic order and as an outcome of the levels of political participation 
outstripping the rate of institutionalization.10  Huntington’s initial disregard for 
nonwestern contexts in his pioneering work has compelled other analysts to assert 
that his theory lacks universal applicability.  To bridge that gap, some like Odom 
(1973) and Colton (1979) have articulated alternative views of civil-military 
relations for communist run states.  Odom proposed the institutional congruence 
approach to capture Russian historical experience, while Colton has come up with 
the participatory model.   
                                        
10 Political Order, pp. 78-82; 195-196. 
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Available literature shows that SSR became a feature of both academia and 
policy in the late 1990s.  It was popularised as one of the frameworks through 
which the aid donors could reorient their relationship with the aid recipients in the 
underdeveloped world as the need to target development assistance to what were 
considered to be priority areas became the preferred approach (Brzoska, 2003:2).  
Additionally, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, SSR became one of the 
policy innovations for framing the entry of Eastern and Central European countries 
into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
through liberalising their civil-military relations (Hadzic, 2004:11).   
The literature on SSR falls into three general categories.  First, are the 
analyses of the framework’s exponents, second are the writings of scholars and 
policy analysts that are sceptical about its efficacy and third is a small but growing 
group of its critics.   SSR exponents and experts trace the origins of SSR to a 1998 
policy statement by the UK government Department for International Development 
(DFID) (Short, 1998).  However, the term ‘security sector’ appeared as early as 
1983 (Ball, 1985: 44-48).11 Ball later makes extensive reference to the ‘security 
sector’ in a later publication also focusing on fiscal aspects of defense management 
(1988: 212-236).   
Literature that is sympathetic to SSR also uses other labels to refer to the 
related activities; amongst which is ‘Security Sector Transition’, ‘Security Sector 
Transformation’ (Chuter, 2000; Cooper and Pugh, 2002; Williams, 2001, 2005); 
Cawthra and Luckham, 2003; Dokos, 2007; Caforio, 2006; Gompert et al., 2007); 
‘Justice and Security Sector Reform’ (JASSR), Safety, Security and Access to Justice 
(SSAJ), Security Sector Governance and Security Sector Management (Cranfield 
University), Security Sector Development (Ministry of Defence, UK), Security Sector 
Transition (Hills, 2000), Security Sector Restructuring (Williams, 2005:45), Security 
Sector Reconstruction (UNDP, 2000).   
                                        
11 Ball has noted that the term was preferable to the more frequently used one, ‘military 
expenditure’.  It was hoped that it would be more inclusive particularly in regard to paramilitary 
forces (p. 44).   
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In terms of basic definitional issues, Hanggi and Scherrer have noted that, 
‘there is no generally accepted definition of the security sector or what SSR entails, 
with different actors embracing broader or narrower understandings of this 
relatively new concept’ (2008:4).  This is support of Hanggi’s earlier observation 
that ‘…it is a relatively ambiguous concept, which refers to a plethora of issues’ 
(2004:1), an ambiguity that may account for the several definitions of SSR one 
finds in the literature.  The ‘security sector’ is generally referred to as: 
[A]ll those organizations that have the authority to use, or order the use of 
force, or the threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as 
those civil structures that are responsible for their management and 
oversight (for example, the military, specialized peace support forces, 
intelligence agencies, justice and law-enforcement institutions, the civilian 
structures that manage them, and representatives of NGOs and the mass 
media). 
Chuter (2006) has compiled almost a dozen of conflicting conceptions, including 
the one by Women Waging Peace, according to which SSR is aimed at ‘…reducing 
the size, budget and scope of the security sector and reforming it to become more 
transparent and accountable to its citizens [sic]’
12
, while the United Kingdom's 
Department for International Development (DFID) refers to SSR as an activity 
aimed at ‘…helping developing countries improve the accountability and 
transparency of their security sectors’ (2006:2).  Others include the paper for the 
Stability Pact Working on Security and Defence defines SSR as ‘Right-sizing, re-
orientation, reform, and capacity-building of national defence forces (2001), while 
the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) defines the same process as 
intended ‘…to create armed, uniformed forces which are functionally differentiated, 
professional forces under objective and subjective political control, at the lowest 
functional level of resource use’ (Brzoska, 2000:9).  Other definitions also include 
DDR and promotion of regional security structures (Chalmers, 2000).  Other 
                                        
12 Cited in Chuter 2006 p.3. 
25 
 
exponents of SSR have gone further to characterize it as an initiative ‘needed to 
ensure sustainable development, democracy, peace and security’ (Hanggi and 
Scherrer, 2008: 4), ‘a central component of efforts to overcome fragility and 
conflict in a number of countries… ’ (OECD, 2007, p. 3); ‘a broad, holistic policy 
approach aimed at improving both the effectiveness and democratic control and 
accountability of the various institutions, ministries and actors involved in the 
provision (sic) of security…’ (Wulf, 2005).  Although Brzoska is a key SSR 
promoter, he has made reference to SSR’s initial popularity and the eventual 
wariness with the use of the category, which, according to him has resulted in the 
adoption of other labels for this unclear undertaking (2003).   
In an apparent throwback to Huntington’s affirmation of the role of the 
military in modernization, Hanggi presents SSR as an agent of a wider 
development agenda with the institutions of the security sector serving as vehicles 
by which to instill the values of democratic governance and public service 
transformation (2003).  The classifications of country contexts for implementation 
of SSR are as varied as the definition of the term.  Lilly and von Tongen (2002: 12-
13)13, one by Hanggi (2004: 10-14),14 while Hutchful and Fayemi delineate the 
policy contexts that make SSR relevant (2005: 74), further categorising the types 
of regimes and transitions that may dictate different approaches to SSR (2005:78). 
Greene identifies ‘situations’ in which SSR interventions take place basing on what 
he calls the conflict cycle (2006:3).   
Those diverse characterizations by SSR’s exponents have fed into the 
misgivings of skeptics and critics who view it as incoherent and ambiguous.  
According to Chuter, the incoherence of SSR ‘… can be explained by the parentage 
of SSR itself…as the bastard child of Civil-Military Relations and Development 
                                        
13
 Cited in Brzoska , 2003, p.40-41. This classification gives five categories of countries, viz., 
consolidating democracies, lapsing or stalled democracies, transitional democracies, conflict-torn 
societies and states under reconstruction.  
14 There are three categories under this by context: developmental context, post authoritarian 
context and post-conflict context. 
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Studies’ (2006:2).  Born et al. have been prompted to simply describe SSR as ‘an 
ill-defined concept’ (2003:3), supporting Chuter’s claim that, ‘a subject such as 
SSR, important and complex as it is, does not actually have a respectable, 
empirically founded, set of concepts from which to work.’  The most incisive 
critiques of SSR have been made by Peake and Scheye (2006) and Chuter (2006) 
who share the sentiment that, the framework needs to be reworked and be 
presented more pragmatically, in a ‘modest’, ‘moderate’, tone.  Scheye and Peake 
point to the ‘contextual-conceptual’ divide that dogs the concept, and the general 
lack of an intellectual foundation and practical guide.   
Other general criticism of SSR has come from Chuter according to whom, it 
is an attempt ‘…to remold military institutions in the world in line with the Anglo-
Saxon vision’ (2000:14), while Alao in comments on the development community’s 
SSR programs in Africa notes that, the term itself is rarely used in African 
countries, and that SSR may only be incidental to the need to meet a number of 
post-Cold War realities (2000:19).  Williams has simply discounted the utility of 
SSR by noting that, it is ‘fundamentally pejorative and borders on the offensive’ 
(Williams, 2000:7).15 
Also to be criticised are some of the key themes that constitute the major 
strands of SSR, among which is the concept of civil society, civilian control of the 
military, good governance, human security, people-centeredness and local 
ownership.  On the importance of civil society in implementation of SSR, Ball 
contends that, it (civil society) ‘….can actively monitor the security sector and be 
consulted on a regular basis’ (2000:14).  Anheier et al. query the theoretical 
wholesomeness of such use of the concept of civil society and claims that, it 
conflates an empirical category with a political project (2001:15).  Similarly, Caprini 
notes that the term ‘…tends to mean all things to all people, and the analytical 
benefit from a more rigorous use of the concept may be lost’ (2004:8). The 
employment of the concept has also been criticised on the grounds that, SSR 
                                        
15 Cited in Smith, 2000; p.16 
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practitioners continue to artificially appose Civil society against government, while 
at the same time denouncing the latter and in the process, creating antagonisms 
between the people and their governments, in the process, undermining intended 
reforms (Hendrickson, 1999:31).  Scheye and Peake question the Eurocentric bias 
of the term by referring to its definition by the United Nations and the international 
development community that excludes structures that are predominant in 
preindustrial settings (2005: 317).   
The term ‘human security’, a central theme in SSR literature also attracts 
criticism particularly for privileging the individual over the collective.  Buzan notes 
that, ‘...individuals are not free standing but only take their meaning from the 
societies in which they operate: they are not some kind of bottom line to which all 
else can and should be reduced or subordinated’ (2004: 369).  Newman has 
indicated that the term is ‘a normatively attractive but analytically weak concept’ 
(2004:359), while Suhrke describes its broader agenda as a stalled initiative 
(2004:365); with Buzan referring to it as a ‘… reductionist, idealistic notion that 
adds little analytical value’ (2004:369); while Paris wonders whether human 
security is a ‘Paradigm shift or hot air’ (2001).   
On ‘local ownership’ as a prerequisite for the successful implementation of 
SSR, Boughton and Mourmouras have pointed out that as currently conceptualised, 
the term is ‘…more akin to a rhetorical device than a guide for implementers’, 
further adding that,  
Finding empirical support for the role of ownership…is difficult because 
ownership cannot be directly observed or measured and because it is 
dynamic and often fragile. These features make assessment of program 
ownership a subjective exercise (2002:14). 
The foregoing view tends to support Peake and Scheye’s observation that what 
cannot be measured cannot be operationalised programmatically (2005: 318).   
The notion of ‘civilian oversight of the security sector’, one of the key goals 
of SSR has attracted extensive criticism from Chuter (2000), Hutchful (2003) and 
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Williams (2005) on grounds that, the desire to have the instruments of coercion 
placed under civil control is conflated with ‘civilian control’, yet civilian control is 
not necessarily a guarantee for sound government.  Williams notes that, the SSR 
framework’s insistence on ‘civilian control’ is ‘…a problematic and potentially 
divisive concept…’, noting also that, it ‘…confuses the civilian content of many 
democratic institutions…with the political principle of civil oversight over the armed 
forces’ (2005:9); a sentiment that is echoed by Chuter (2000:27-28).  
1.6 Methodology 
This study is a thematic critical inquiry that aims to examine the conceptual rigour 
of currently held views and assumptions about the nature and remedies of 
insecurity in the Third World with SSR in Sub-Saharan Africa as a focal point.  It 
involves an extensive theoretical investigation of the key themes that form the 
focus of the project.  The emphasis is on a comparison of the concepts and 
principles that form the core of the SSR framework and to scrutinise them against 
existing frameworks in the literature on security, development studies in general 
and political and institutional development in particular.   
The study relied on two major strategies.  First, being focused mainly on the 
analysis of conceptual categories, specifically a policy and academic category, the 
preferred methods of the study have been principally qualitative.  To achieve this, 
the study relied primarily on desk-based research and this involved archival and 
library study of published and unpublished literature.  The sources of Information 
were printed and online journals, online gateways and databases, publications 
from government, research institutes and think tanks, reference texts and books in 
the field of development, conflict studies and political science.  The techniques 
employed were basic and straightforward textual analysis followed by 
interpretation, explication and criticism. 
The second strategy hinged on the researcher’s first-hand experience on the 
research contexts which constitute the micro case studies, specifically on Uganda, 
and particularly on the military.  The writing of Chapter Five and the comments on 
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SSR in Uganda is based on the researcher’s direct participation as a member of the 
Ugandan Armed Forces for fifteen years of ‘field work’ from 1986 to 2002, serving 
as a staff officer in departments that oversaw the integration of former insurgents, 
the processing of personnel that were earmarked for discharge in the early 1990s 
and the co-ordination of the UK Government supported defence review from 1998 
to 2002.  Although the study is thematic, it has drawn on my personal experience 
as indicated above and comparative analysis of selected countries and regions of 
Africa.   
1.7 Chapter Overview 
1.7.1. Chapter Two 
Chapter two serves two major purposes.  First, it is a response partly to the lack of 
sustained debate on the important question of epistemology in the field of security 
and development; and partly also a reaction to the pre-eminence of normative 
thinking in the policy and academic debates on Third World security and 
development.  In highlighting that concern, Chapter Two implicitly critiques what 
can be considered to be a key deficiency of mainstream Social Science research, 
namely ‘methodologism’, or what Bakan (1973) has called ‘methodolatry’ or the 
‘methodological imperative’.  By ‘methodologism’ we mean the tendency by 
researchers to turn methodology into an end in itself when they overemphasize 
method at the expense of epistemology, ontology and practical considerations of 
the real-world applicability of research outputs.  Whereas social theorising is 
generally assumed to stand on three legs, namely, 1) claims in respect of the 
nature of the social world (ontology); 2) claims on the nature of knowledge that 
can be obtained on that social world (epistemology) and 3) the manner in which 
that knowledge may be obtained (methodology), it is mainly methodology that 
tends to be emphasized in most research undertakings.  The thrust and gist of 
Chapter Two is to highlight the auxiliary status of methodology and to bring to the 
fore the question to do with our claim to possess the knowledge that we profess 
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on the social world and how it is that we gain possession of that knowledge.  
Briefly, Chapter Two seeks to restore epistemology to its rightful place.   
Secondly, Chapter Two serves as a statement of the epistemological 
commitment of the rest of the study, namely positivism, or the philosophical 
position that knowledge derives from sensory experience of the world, as opposed 
to innatism,16 the view that knowledge derives not from sensory experience of the 
outside world, but instead arises from inborn ideas that become accessible through 
introspection and reasoning.  The position taken by this chapter is that certain 
aspects of international development thinking are representative of the latter, as 
exemplified by so-called Normative Theory.  In light of the study’s key finding that 
the term ‘normative’ has become a flag of convenience for claims advanced by 
certain scholars, commentators and practitioners in the area of international 
development, the second chapter proceeds by undertaking a philosophical 
unpacking of normativity and normative thinking in general, to lay bare its 
shortcomings.  This is achieved by situating normative thinking squarely where it 
belongs, namely, at the heart of the longstanding philosophical controversy 
between the ‘empiricists’ who hold that human knowledge is derived primarily from 
experience and the ‘rationalists’ who assert that we are born with all the stock of 
the knowledge we possess – hence our reference to the innate principle – and that 
by a process of reasoning (hence rationalism), we activate such inborn knowledge 
from its dormancy.  The common anti-empiricist arguments advanced by the 
rationalist school of thought are explored telegraphically to expose their 
shortcomings.   
A brief overview is made of the roots of the empiricism-rationalism 
controversy, followed by a detailed exploration of, and rebuttals to rationalist 
claims against empiricism.  This exercise is important for this study because the 
prescriptive approaches in the world of practical policy as exemplified by neoliberal 
reforms such as SSR are the direct descendant of the anti-empiricism and anti-
                                        




positivism (and by implication, rationalism and innatism) of the social sciences.  
Anti-empiricism constitutes the philosophical justification for the reluctance by 
international development practitioners to base their policy proposals on analysis 
of the concrete socio-economic, cultural and political realities in parts of the world 
where they seek to implement those policies.  According to that thinking, it is not 
necessary to base policy on existing reality or experience, let alone ‘...analytical 
and conceptual clarity about the challenges that need to be tackled’ (Berdal, 
2013:8).  In any case, reality is a social construct according to the constructivists, 
besides the fact that, ‘...there is no longer a universal test of what is probable or 
what is rational to believe on the basis of experience’ (Hollis and Smith, 1990:61).  
The extreme form of that position is the assumption that individuals, groups, 
classes, castes or races are inherently and naturally endowed with varying levels of 
knowledge, therefore requiring that those are more endowed innately with values 
and norms (hence those with ‘normative power’), or those that are naturally 
endowed with mores and progressive ideas should reform and civilise the less 
endowed.   
The chapter looks at the traditional anti-sciencism of rationalism and 
examines the recurrent conflation by the rationalists of science looked at as 
‘systematised knowledge’, with the layman’s view of science specifically as 
knowledge about the biophysical world.   Also examined are the fallacies of 
rationalist criticisms of empiricism relating to the knowledge acquisition process as 
it is understood by positivism in general. The link between rationalism and 
normative thinking is traced, followed by an examination of the main ingredients 
and problematic linguistic assumptions of normativity to expose the weak ground 
on which it stands, both from the philosophical perspective and on grounds 
whether normative statements can be considered to have any literal significance.  
The common antecedents of the normative impulse are explored followed by an 
examination of the limitations of one of the contemporary by-products of the 
nexus between normative theory and international policy as exhibited by the 
notion of ‘Normative power Europe’.  Later sections of the chapter sound a veiled 
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warning on the real implications of rationalist thinking for the wholesomeness of 
international development practice, particularly when views to the effect that, 
human knowledge is innate and that there are inherent group variations in 
endowment of that knowledge, a view that is held dearly by some practitioners 
and scholars as demonstrated in the study.    
1.7.2. Chapter Three 
Chapter Three closely follows the exploration of the epistemological deficiencies of 
the normative orientation of the SSR debate with a rough sketch of notable 
problems of the debate’s ontological framework.  The major theoretical 
frameworks that continue to structure the debates on post-Cold War security are 
outlined from their origins in the days of the Cold War to the events surrounding 
9/11.  It is argued that the end of the Cold War has engendered more of a 
meltdown than a blooming of a thousand flowers, as the longstanding ordering 
principle of the international system suddenly vanished sparking off an ontological 
fragmentation in the strategic environment, and a related epistemological 
fragmentation in the scholarly world.  SSR – just like any other post-Cold War 
framework such as the human security agenda, the debate on widening and 
deepening and so-called securitization theory – has suffered significantly from that 
era’s conceptual turmoil that has not been helped by the lack of initiative on the 
part of scholars.   
It is further suggested that much of the blame for the post-Cold War 
conceptual turmoil falls on the ‘idealist’ or the defunct ‘system-centric’ camp and 
not on the ‘traditionalists’ or state-centric camp.  While the latter stayed put after 
the collapse of the Berlin wall, the former went out of currency with the demise of 
systemic threat of nuclear conflagration.  This is the point that Buzan et al. are 
emphasizing when they refer to ‘a period of disorientation’ following the end of the 
Cold War, resulting in a situation where ‘[t]he function, and therefore the status 
and funding, of the entire edifice of strategic studies built up during the Cold War 
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seemed to be at risk...’(1998:3).  To find a new purpose for themselves, and a 
new lease of life and funding, the idealists or system-centric analysts of the Cold 
War era went behind the lines of the traditionalists, splintered into factions of neo-
idealists, and crafted a multiplicity of agendas (‘society-centred’, ‘human-centred’, 
‘environmental security’ or ‘feminism’, critical security studies, among others)  at 
the sub state level.17  Some of the agendas were based on the rebranding of 
societal vulnerabilities into threats, while others took on epistemological labels.  
The category that most dramatically epitomises the bewilderment that has been 
precipitated by the end of the Cold War is ‘Human Security’ particularly as it spelt 
out in New Dimensions of Human Security, the UN publication that inaugurated it 
(United Nations: 1994).  It implies a classification of security that points to the 
vagueness that has come to typify neo-idealist thinking. Unsurprisingly, it has 
found utility with the United Nations, some small and medium global powers and a 
vast array of NGOs and advocacy and other groups that stand to benefit from the 
term’s elasticity.  That elasticity, it is argued is a double-edged which will spell 
doom for the cliché in light of the specificity of the demands of policy practitioners 
whose reality always calls for precise answers to pressing problems.   
The chapter argues that, ‘Securitization theory’ further complicates the 
challenges of post-Cold War neo-idealism by superimposing the baggage of social 
conctructivist obscurantism on the already rudderless idealists who were, by now 
burdened enough by the crisis of lack of a mission in the wake of the demise of 
their cause.  It is argued that ‘securitization theory’ probably stands out as a 
paradigm case of the challenges entailed by the pursuit of sophistication just for 
the sake of it.  The major premises of Securitization Theory, namely the 
politicisation-securitization framework and Austin’s Speech Act Theory are 
examined in order to demonstrate that point.  It is argued that both those 
frameworks do not provide a robust enough ballast to enable the ‘theory’ to be of 
any theoretical or practical value.   
                                        
17 For details, see Figure 1 of this study (P.142). 
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It is further argued that that, ‘Securitisation Theory’ is constructed on a 
series of category errors all of which collectively degrade its theoretical and 
practical significance.  The errors include first, the politicisation-securitization 
continuum which is based on the false assumption that security falls beyond and 
outside of politics, and that the two are mutually exclusive; second, is the 
categorisation which implies that issues of security concern are not matters of 
public interest and third is the error that is common to all neo-idealist thinking 
based on a mistaken conceptualisation of the state that seems to imply that 
government and wider society are extra-state entities.  We argue that those false 
categories render ‘Securitisation Theory’ trivial and ill-thought-out. The reference 
to ‘security’ as a ‘move’ is queried especially when it is assumed by the theory goes 
to the extent of portraying security policy formulation essentially as an act of 
breaking the law.   
It is argued that the most significant failing of ‘Securitisation Theory’ lies in 
its misuse of Austin’s Speech Act Theory, mainly by failing to recognise that 
Austin’s theory is not merely premised on speech as an act of making an utterance 
but rather, it is constructed around the use of verbs whose action function lies in 
their utterance.  By interpreting the ‘Speech Act’ literally as the physical act of 
making an utterance, ‘Securitisation Theory’ goes ahead to substitute Austin’s verb 
as the principal figure of speech for his theory with a mass noun such as is 
security.  It is argued that this, among other theoretical errors made by the 
securitisation theorists reduces the worth of their framework.   
1.7.3. Chapter Four 
Building further on the discussion on the origins of SSR as outlined in the review of 
the literature, Chapter Four explores the linkage between the debates on what has 
been framed as ‘security sector governance’ and ‘democratic control of the armed 
forces’ in the 1990s with the debates on civil-military relations (CMR) theory 
especially in the 1960s and 1970s.  It is argued that SSR is a latter-day 
35 
 
reincarnation of earlier civil-military relations theories and further suggested that 
SSR is equally handicapped by the same limitations that invalidated CMR.  One of 
these limitations is the normative bias towards liberal idealism which remains 
oblivious to the reality that, like any other socio-political dispensation, liberalism is 
a qualitative manifestation of historically specific quantitative realities which it 
services, and which in return give it life.  The SSR debate shares the same 
weakness with civil-military relations in its disregard for the political realities of pre-
liberal and transitional systems or political systems with a historical experience that 
diverges from that which shaped the evolution of the theory.   
The chapter examines the extent to which the frequency of military 
intervention in politics of underdeveloped countries has unduly coloured common 
notions of civil-military relations and how in turn, those influences shaped to the 
framing of the SSR initiative.  It is suggested that military intervention in politics 
may have a lot more to do with the deficiencies of the civil domain than with the 
assumed robustness or presumed iniquity of the armed forces.  A model of civil-
military relations that takes an uncharitable stance towards military can only serve 
as a an unwelcome distraction from the more important concern of political 
development.  A framework of institution building that looks at the political system 
in its entirety is suggested as a means of freeing the debate on the relationship 
between the armed forces and the political system from an approach that is prone 
to being distracted by those structures and institutions via which the symptoms of 
systemic malaise are manifested.  
Chapter Four further suggests that the final solution to question of 
praetorianism in the conflict-affected underdeveloped countries may in fact lie in 
strengthening and not weakening the military; and strengthening the civil sector 
even more, with the aim of establishing a level of equilibrium in the input and 
output functions of political systems of affected countries.  It is argued that even 
where a critical threshold of political development is attained there will still be a 
residual level of military intervention in politics even if this does not necessarily 
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result in overturning the legitimately constituted political order.  Accordingly, it is 
suggested that idealist reform initiatives that aim to totally expunge the military 
from politics are as equally utopian as they are counterproductive.  A more 
nuanced understanding of some of the terms and dichotomies that structure the 
thinking on civil-military relations is suggested with a focus on the obfuscation of 
debate and avoidable utopianism that results from such terms as civilian control as 
contrasted with civil control; militarism as opposed to praetorianism and being 
partisan as opposed to being political.   
1.7.4. Chapter Five   
Using Uganda as a micro case study, Chapter Five examines the linkage between 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration (DDR) and SSR programming to 
explore the actual extent to which SSR programming can build on the successful 
implementation of DDR programmes in whatever sense that success can be 
measured.  It is argued that the realisation of synergies between DDR and SSR is 
often rendered questionable by the lack of clarity on what DDR actually entails and 
whether indeed its sanguine depiction in the academic and policy literature 
accurately mirrors its implementation.  The part of the study examines the case of 
Uganda, a country whose armed forces have supposedly undergone both DDR and 
SSR.  Uganda’s experience in managing armed groups in the immediate aftermath 
of major hostilities is explored to identify the key features of the process from 
1986 onward, with a particular focus on the donor-supported mass discharge of 
the 1990s, with the view of identifying whether as commonly suggested, that 
exercise was truly DDR and the implications of that for other follow-on initiatives.   
It is particularly stressed that claims that Uganda undertook DDR cannot 
easily stand up to scrutiny.  An analysis of the dynamics of the ‘DDR’ in Uganda is 
made to highlight in passing the aspects of the exercise that laid the ground for 
unsuccessful implementation of any future SSR.  Questions are raised on whether 
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indeed the Ugandan process amounted to DDR in whatever sense DDR is 
understood. It is suggested that the country adopted a much more complex 
process of managing armed factions than the linearly conceived model of DDR 
often encountered in the ‘peace building’ literature and that the logic of this 
process put in place major obstacles for any future reform process along the lines 
of SSR.   
1.7.5. Chapter Six   
Chapter Six examines the limitations of the rhetoric of four major elements that 
are deemed to be critical to the successful institutional reform, namely, local 
ownership, buy-in, political will and civil society.  It is argued that, even if the four 
were clearly understood, the fact that the institutions targeted for SSR are the 
cornerstone of sovereignty tends to preclude the realisation of buy-in, ownership 
or political will.  It is further shown that the non-inclusiveness of the processes of 
conception and formulation of reform policies renders the rhetoric of ownership 
hollow, unwholesome and condescending and furnishes the sole explanation for 
the much talked-about lack of political will and limited commitment.  It is 
suggested that, the surprise with which external actors view the lack of political 
will and commitment in underdeveloped countries is in itself paradoxical and 
deserving of further investigation.   
Using the example of Uganda, it is shown that an idealized notion of civil 
society as the magic bullet in the implementation of externally conceived reforms 
overlooks the serious limitations of wider society in underdeveloped countries, in 
its capacity to shape the public policy process.  It is argued that the considerable 
discrepancy between the unrealistic and uninformed expectations of external  
actors on the one hand, and the concrete realities in the countries targeted for 
institutional reforms such as SSR on the other hand, accounts more than anything 
else, for the poor performance of reform initiatives.     
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1.7.6. Chapter Seven 
Chapter Seven uses the case of SSR to look in deeper detail at the range of 
critiques of public sector reforms of the 1990s by policy and academic analysts in 
many fields, including economics, sociology and political science.  It explores the 
many explanations for the poor record of attempts at institutional reform in 
developing countries.  The chapter highlights the limitations imposed by the 
historical record of some of the Western countries that are key promoters public 
policy reforms.  That historical record, it is argued, impacts negatively on the 
credibility and moral mandate of the promoters of reform, and weighs heavily 
against their uptake of programmes they recommend.  The example of SSR it is 
shown, clearly overlooks the fact that many of the countries that are now 
vigorously campaigning for reform were instrumental in systematically entrenching 
the very practices that are now closely associated with the dysfunction that the 
reforms are intended to remedy.  It is suggested that any reference to context that 
disregards or discounts those historical factors only adds to the credibility 
questions surrounding the externally-inspired drive for reforms.   
It is argued that, while the focus of SSR and any other institutional 
development reform initiatives is organisational development and change, there is 
limited evidence to show that in putting it together, any effort was ever invested in 
making it a beneficiary of existing knowledge of organisational science in general 
and more particularly, available theory on the evolution of institutions that fall 
under the ‘security sector’.  As a result, it is hampered by the dearth of a theory or 
a model of organisational development or change.  The lack of a founding concept 
accounts for the haziness and lack of clarity of purpose that contributes to reform 
initiatives not being taken seriously by the countries where they are promoted, 
beyond considering them as an inconvenience to be instrumentally endured for the 
sake of accessing financial support.   
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Chapter Seven questions the judgment of external actors in their choice of 
one of the most sensitive arms of government and a key sovereignty domain, the 
armed forces, as an entry point for public sector.  It is argued in acutely praetorian 
and divided polities like those targeted for reforms, the armed forces are always 
the fulcrum of the calculations of contending political groups.   This makes the 
most highly sensitive and most closely watched player.  They are the razor’s edge 
on which balances the future survival of regimes and whole communities, or even 
continued existence of countries in question.  This part of the study questions 
whether external actors whose reform initiatives target that most delicate aspect of 
the politics of other countries are ever mindful of the associated sensitivity, 
rhetoric on conflict sensitivity notwithstanding.  In many of the ‘post conflict 
countries’, the cessation of hostilities is always a result of a settlement or 
settlements that put in consideration the ethnic composition of the armed forces 
particularly because most conflicts have an ethnic angle; making any intervention 
that will threaten to upset the closely-observed equilibrium appear at best 
presumptuous or ill-informed and at worst suspicious.   
It is shown that, under external pressure to effect institutional reform even 
against what they consider to their best interests, countries adopt a set of 
strategies of conformity particularly when there is a prospect of being denied 
access to much-needed financial resources, recognition or legitimacy and in order 
to accommodate external scrutiny and regulation.  The adoption of strategies of 
isomorphic conformity tends to contradict commonly held assumptions that reform 
is necessarily undertaken to enhance organisational efficiency or functionality as 
would be suggested by Weberian organisational theories, the basis of neoliberal 
institutional reform in underdeveloped countries particularly those that are afflicted 
by conflict.  Instead, organizations adjust their internal and external characteristics 
by superficial conformity in order to conform to the expectations and ‘best 
practices’ of those that control access to the tangible and intangible resources that 
they desire.    
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Chapter Seven further shows that the adoption of externally imposed 
institutional reforms by way of isomorphism often runs concurrently with other 
strategies by dependent countries aimed at counteracting or those reforms 
rendering insignificant.   To nullify what they consider as intrusive outside 
influences or interference with their sovereignty dependent governments, may 
delink the symbolically adopted policies and structures from internal operating 
processes and actual organisational practices through a process of ‘decoupling’ 
while at the same time being able to access the tangible and intangible resources 
they need from those external agencies and actors.  
1.7.7. Chapter Eight 
Chapter Eight seeks to look beyond the limitations of the approaches to 
institutional development examined in the last chapter by delineating the 
substantive criteria that will for a long time bear critically on the security and 
stability of the less developed countries as epitomised by Sub-Saharan Africa.  It 
examines a selection of earlier and more contemporary studies on comparative 
political development focusing on state making and nation building puts a spotlight 
on crucial dimensions of development which are often taken for granted in many 
developed countries, but still account for intractable instability in the less 
developed areas of the world, especially Sub-Saharan Africa.  Many of those 
concerns are to do with the attainment of socio-political integration and the 
development of the overall capacity of states.  It is argued that the pressure to 
increase economic output has overshadowed the need to address the severe 
deficiencies in polities as nations and as states.  The study shows that what is 
presented as the ‘security sector’ is in real terms a false category, and is merely a 
sub-aspect of a broader crisis area which continues to receive only disjointed 
attention.    
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The study gives an overview of crises of identity, legitimacy, distribution, 
socio-political integration, participation and looks in more detail at penetration and 
institutionalisation as the key variables.  It argues that, the more a polity 
successfully resolves those crises, the closer it should get to the attainment of 
security in a sustainable sense.  An argument is made against the conception of 
security that underpins the SSR debate in which security defined as the state of 
affairs in which groups and individuals are assured of sustainable existence, is 
conflated with physical safety, that is, immunity from violent attack.  It is argued 
that while physical safety may be a necessary condition for security, it is not a 
sufficient condition.   
Closer attention is paid to institutionalisation, which the study holds out as 
master imperative of political development and stability.  It is viewed both as an 
ongoing process and end state.  As a process, it is the ‘software’ that underpins 
the conversion and filtration framework within the political system through which 
the procedures and structures for mediating the interaction between diverse social 
forces are given stability, coherence and value.  As such, it is the process through 
which public interests are aggregated and the main avenue for depersonalising 
political action.  As a stabilising factor, it constantly bridges the gap between the 
ever-accelerating mobilisation of new social forces into political action, and the 
gradual development of the mechanisms for disciplining the interaction between 
those social forces.  Such are the conclusions that one draws particularly from the 
later works of Samuel Huntington on civil military relations and particularly on 
political development in the rapidly changing less developed countries.   
It is emphasized that any policy position or school of thought that 
disregards the state of institutionalisation, and instead goes on to attribute the 
broad symptomatology of disorder, instability and military intervention in politics to 
the armed forces is inherently fallacious and only serves to lay the ground for 
instituting measures that will in the long term worsen the socio-political 
disequilibrium of affected polities.  Military intervention in politics, it is argued, is 
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part of the broader crisis in the functioning of political system in which all other 
social and political forces intervene in politics, the military only being able to come 
up on top because it has more dramatic means of intervention.  As many cases 
across the Third World show, civilian political activists have on many occasions 
been able to access the same instruments of violence and managed to neutralise 
the formal military forces.  As such, seeking a solution to the chronic crises of 
insecurity and instability in the less developed countries from tweaking and jiggling 
the ‘security sector’ is at best diversionary.   
 The Epistemological Limitations of the Normative 
Bias of the SSR Framework  
2.1 Introduction 
Staking a claim to fundamentally transform the social world, whether nominally or 
substantially and the motivation for effecting such transformation is probably the 
most emphatic declaration an agent can make regarding their possession of 
knowledge, in the epistemological sense of ‘justified true belief’.  At the minimum, 
such an agent would be assumed to have internalised the basic attributes (in all 
their interdependencies) of the object of change, the trajectory of that change, its 
final outcome the potential for circular cumulative causation and unexpected 
outcomes.  That has to be said about the wide-ranging initiatives that up to the 
early 1990s came under the heading of ‘post-conflict reconstruction’, and have 
since taken on other labels including ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ and ‘conflict 
prevention’.  The emergence of the latter two terms also marked the founding of a 
comprehensive normative framework that centred on the promotion of 
peacebuilding as a field of international action, with what was from inception a 
limited and circular purpose, ‘…to identify and support structures which will tend to 
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’ (Boutros-
Ghali, 1992:11).   
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Normative theory, ‘…that body of work which addresses the moral 
dimension of international relations and the wider question of meaning and 
interpretation generated by the discipline’ (Brown, 1992: 3), has since emerged to 
furnish a conceptual prop for the policy and analytical approaches that fall under 
the rubric of peacebuilding, one of which SSR, the focus of this study.  This 
chapter attempts to examine that close linkage between normative theorising and 
peacebuilding and in doing so, it serves three main purposes.  First, it is lays out 
the theoretical framework and epistemological commitment of this study.  This it 
does by going beyond the standard statements on the variables to be measured 
and the statistical relationships to be looked for in understanding the phenomena 
under investigation as ordinarily required, and critically examining the pitfalls of 
the normative theoretical framework which, in our view, is antithetical to the 
empirical approach preferred by this study.  Second, and arising from the 
foregoing, this part of the study is intended to weaken the stranglehold that 
normative theorising continues to exercise over international development theory 
and practice.  Thirdly, it is intended to address what in our view, is a shortage of 
sustained debate on epistemological questions as they apply to the field of security 
and development, a fact that accounts for prescriptive approaches of 
contemporary international development practice many of which have limited 
relevance to the realities to which they are applied.   
The chapter examines the philosophical underpinnings of normative 
theorising, situating it within the context of the long-standing debate on the two 
major theories of knowledge, namely, empiricism and rationalism.  On the basis of 
the mainly anti-empiricist and anti-positivist claims of some of its key exponents 
prominent among whom are Brown (1992, 2000), Frost (1983, 1996), Hutchings 
(2010) and Smith (1992, 1996), the rationalist roots of Normative Theory are 
explored to highlight its inbuilt epistemological shortcomings and their theoretical 
and practical implications for its utility.   The much deeper debates on the theory 
of knowledge will largely lie beyond the scope of the issues that will concern this 
chapter, its main focus being only to clarify the essential outlines of the theoretical 
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and conceptual bias of prevailing thinking on security and development.  The 
diverse presentations of normativity in the policy and academic literature are 
examined with the view of pointing out the major shortcomings of normative 
thinking, particularly as it is applied to development theory.  
2.2 The Normative Bias of Peacebuilding: The Case of SSR 
The international peacebuilding and postconflict endeavour had its foundation as 
‘liberal peace’ with its origins as the long established tradition of Western liberal 
theory and practice according to which, political and economic liberalisation are 
antidotes for violent conflict.  In pursuit of this normative agenda, several activities 
have been undertaken, including the promotion of human rights, democracy, 
administering elections, writing and rewriting constitutions, tutoring police 
personnel and military officers, lawyers and judges, rule of law, property rights, 
good governance, formulating economic policies aimed at establishing the neo-
liberal economic order (Tshirgi, 2004:5; Paris, 2004:4).  With a focus on Security 
Sector Reform, our purpose here is to explore whether the normative orientation 
pointed out above is a facilitating or a constraining factor in the attainment of the 
goals set for international peacebuilding initiatives particularly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.   
The United Nations applauds its role in SSR programming by noting how it 
‘…has made significant progress in defining a normative framework and in 
providing technical assistance in this vital area’, directly implying the setting up of 
‘international principles and standards for support to security sector reform’ 
(2008).  The ‘source book of SSR’ notes that, SSR  
[S]uggests an explicitly normative direction for the concept in the sense that 
reform prioritizes the provision of security within the state in a preferred 
way. Therefore, a normative working definition of SSR is that it concerns 
‘the provision of security within the state in an effective and efficient 
manner and in the framework of democratic civilian control’ (Hadzˇic´, 
2004, p. 46) 
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That normative slant is characteristically dual.  On the one hand it is focused on 
recreating the institutional architecture and political culture of post-conflict 
countries in the image of their developed counterparts mostly in the West, as 
noted by the Sourcebook of SSR in its observation that, ‘[a]t the heart of this 
original conception of SSR lay a set of Western liberal values concerning 
individualism and democracy.  Implementation was understood as a process of 
adjusting….societies to modern norms’ (Hadzˇic´, 2004, p. 12).  And moreover, 
‘…SSR contains two key normative elements.  The first of these is the importance 
of democratization and civilian control in any process of SSR. The second is the 
importance of developing effectiveness and efficiency in SSR.’18  The other side of 
the duality normative bias of SSR and peacebuilding is the general emphasis of 
terms that give it the approximation of a moral awakening.  As often visible in 
much of the literature, the building of institutions in post-conflict settings is mostly 
referenced in notions that highlight value judgment, prescription and evaluation.  
Elsewhere return or restoration to a prior standard or one that is thought to be 
tested by its being a successful practice in more stable settings is emphasized.  
2.3 Positivism Vs Innatism and the Origins of Normative Theorizing  
By being characterised by their promoters as ‘normative’, the principles and 
methods of the initiatives that come under the heading of peacebuilding are placed 
squarely under the spotlight and at the centre of the longstanding debate on the 
fundamental question of epistemology: How do we justify the knowledge that we 
claim to possess?  This important question hinges on that great historical 
controversy in philosophy between the two conflicting schools of the theory of 
knowledge, namely, empiricism and rationalism and their divergent claims and 
interpretations of the sources human knowledge.  The empiricists, represented 
typically by the British philosophers, Locke, Berkeley and Hume have always 
maintained that all human knowledge is derived from experience while the 
                                        
18 Ibid, p. 46 
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rationalists represented by continental philosophers, mainly Leibnitz and Descartes 
maintain that there are certain innate principles and a priori ideas that the mind 
possesses independent of experience.
19
   
Secondarily, one has also to consider the associated question concerning 
the relationship between sensations and objects: whether sensations are images of 
objects, that is, the bodies and things that are extended in space and persist in 
time, or whether objects are complexes of our sensations, a claim that always 
comes in handy to bolster a variety of rationalist and normative assertions.  In the 
simplest formulation, the first school, empiricism, lays claim to sense experience as 
the source of genuine knowledge, acquired by means of sensations that are 
posited (hence positivism) on the mind from the world that lies without.  The rival 
school, rationalism, claims that ideas are inborn and are not a product of 
experience and are activated from their dormant state by reasoning, hence 
rationalism.    
A closer examination of the claims commonly made by those that uphold 
anti-positivism betrays an acute awareness on their part of the frailties of their 
assumptions about the sources of human knowledge.  What is particularly 
noticeable is an attempt by anti-positivists to refer to their position in other terms 
other than what sums up its real content and character.  Some of those labels, 
common among which are metaphysics, idealism, constructivism, ideationalism, 
critical theory, a priorism and normative theory are deliberately employed to 
obfuscate the real character of the the thinking that is based on the innate 
principle.  The common labels that are employed as substitutes for innatism 
include and of course, rationalism as already stated above.  Bertrand Russell 
alludes to the justification for the marginalisation of innatism as the label for the 
anti-positivist philosophical tendency.  He notes that,   
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 That list of the ‘un-empirical’ continental philosophers could be expanded to include Fichte, 
Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer, the philosophers that according to Fullerton, were ‘…ever 
ready to spread their wings and hazard the boldest of flights without a proper realization of the 
thinness of the atmosphere in which they must support themselves’ (1920:217). 
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It would certainly be absurd to suppose that there are innate principles in 
the sense that babies are born with a knowledge of everything which men 
know and which cannot be deduced from what is experienced. For this 
reason, the word 'innate' would not now be employed to describe our 
knowledge of logical principles (Russell, 1998:41). 
That underlying absurdity of anti-positivism indeed creates a sense of urgency to 
obscure any connections with innatism opting for what Fullerton has referred to as 
rechristening with a taking name.  In doing so, Fullerton’s verdict roughly mirrors 
Russell’s view above.  He refers to ‘…an ancient rhetorical device to obtain 
sympathy for a cause in which one may happen to be interested by giving it a 
taking name…’ further adding that, ‘…it is a device that is frowned upon by logic 
and good sense.’ (1920:181).   
As a philosophical position, positivism has received its most explicit 
expression from Auguste Comte; although it can be traced back mainly to Francis 
Bacon, among others, a point that John Stuart Mill alludes to in his observations on 
Comte’s contribution to positivism.  Mill notes that, the founding of positivism was 
‘…in no way peculiar to him [Comte] but, the general property of the age…’, 
adding further that, positivism ‘…is not a recent invention…but a simple adherence 
to the traditions of all the great scientific minds whose discoveries have made the 
human race what it is’ (1866:8-9).  Positivism then, is closely bound with the very 
process of the ‘making’ of modern mankind and has remained the leading light in 
‘The quest for certainty’, to borrow from the title of John Dewey’s Gifford lectures 
in which he sums up the quest for certainty as a contest between two tendencies, 
on the one hand, mankind’s ‘…attempt to propitiate the powers that environ him 
and determine his destiny’ and on the other, his will ‘…to invent the arts and by 
their means turn the powers of nature to account’ (1988:3).  It is, indeed within 
the bounds of those two tendencies that one can clearly discern the two major 
contending dispositions in our understanding of what is knowable and the means 
of attaining that knowledge.   
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It is when the etymology of the term ‘positivism’ is examined that its real 
significance as an approach to philosophy and social knowledge in general 
becomes clearer.  The underlying conflict between positivism and innatism is to do 
with how the source of knowledge can be accounted for.  As opposing approaches 
to understanding the sources of human knowledge, one asserts that perceptions 
and ideas are ‘posited’ onto the faculties of knowledge from without, namely, the 
realm of reality that resides outside the human mind.  While the innatists will claim 
that the human mind is, right from its inception and in its first being, endowed 
with primary notions, the positivists’ position is that knowledge is acquired from 
the reality that inheres outside the mind, by means of the sense apparatus through 
the medium of seeing, tasting, hearing, feeling and smelling.   
As a framework for explaining how sentient beings come to claim the 
possession of knowledge, innatism, along with rationalism gets its defence from its 
proponents through means that at best, weakens their cause.  The arguments in 
favour of innatism tend never to outline its merits, its explanatory coherence and 
its robustness as a theory of knowledge, but instead focus exclusively on 
discrediting positivism.  With justification, the rationalists’ defence of their cause 
through attempting to tear down positivism remains their major vulnerability, 
particularly when one notices the ease with of resort to the common logical 
fallacies in the attacks against positivism.  In what tends to become an exhibition 
of shortage of hinterland in the antipositivist argument, one notices a movement 
back and forth by the rationalist, from the straw man argument, to simple 
argumentum ad hominem, to the slippery slope argument and to the red herring 
and so on, much of it underpinned by a misreading of the real basis of the dispute 
between positivism and innatism.   
A similar approach can be observed in the way in which other antiscientific 
doctrines are often defended, mostly by ‘name calling’ the opposed doctrines.  As 
Fullerton has warned, ‘… philosophers call names much as other men do, and that 
one should always be on one’s guard’, for doctrines that ‘…should not be allowed 
to posture as saints merely because they are cloaked with an ambiguous name’ 
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(1920: 186-187).  ‘Idealism’ and ‘realism’ furnish a common example that 
Fullerton, among others, has aptly used to illustrate the point. In literature, 
‘realism’ as is commonly understood is ‘…the degradation of literature to the 
portrayal of what is coarse and degrading, in a coarse and offensive way.’  In 
painting, realism means ‘…the laborious representation upon canvas of things from 
which we would gladly avert our eyes if we met them in real life’, while idealism 
refers to the things we tend to associate with the possession of ideals, ‘…a regard 
for what is best and noblest in life and literature.’  
Likewise, Humean epistemology can easily be rendered unattractive by an 
account of ideas that links it with ‘sensation’, particularly by associations with 
‘sensationalism’ or even ‘sensualism’.  The defence of rationalism also takes on an 
ad hominem by its referring to empiricism as irrationalism, since the latter is the 
antonym of rationalism in ordinary language.  In the epistemological and 
methodological sense, empiricism, that is, the theory that all knowledge that is not 
purely analytic derives from and rests on sense experience, is opposed to 
rationalism, the theory that knowledge can be gained without reference to sense 
experience, for example by pure reasoning.  The rejection of the latter theory is 
anti-rationalism and it is quite obviously distinct from irrationalism, the pejorative 
epithet that the defenders of the innate principle often ascribe to positivism.   
2.4 The ‘Bunsen Burner Fallacy’: Rationalism Vs Science 
The catalogue of deprecatory characterisations of positivism and the empirical 
method in general has to be expected to grow, doing so in direct proportion to the 
pressure that rationalists will continue to face to distance themselves from 
innatism.  McCarthy has claimed that positivism now ‘…functions more as a 
polemical epithet than as a designation for a distinct philosophical movement …’ 
(1978:137); while according to Giddens, positivism ‘…has today become more of a 
term of abuse than a technical term in philosophy’ (1977:3), with Williams and May 
describing one of its more strident expressions, logical positivism, as ‘…one of the 
heroic failures of modern philosophy’ (1996:27).  Some of those references are 
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arguably straw man arguments aimed more at concealing the flaws of the 
epistemological approaches that espouse the cause of the innate principle in all its 
guises, than at discrediting positivism.  But what is even more striking anti-
positivism is its aversion to positivism’s close association science, particularly when 
the latter is construed not as it ought to be – as systematised knowledge – but in 
the narrower sense of the study of the natural and physical world through 
experimentation, observation and hypothesizing.  The reductionism that inspires 
anti-positivists to reduce all science to one of its subcategories, namely, the study 
of the natural and physical world, let alone, in some instances even conflating 
science with technology is what for our present purposes we shall call the ‘Bunsen 
burner fallacy’.   
The ‘Bunsen burner fallacy’ can be considered to be a collection of defective 
modes of reasoning and failures of argumentation by anti-positivists, aiming to 
question the validity of positivism in social science inquiry, but basing on a 
restricted, or even one would say, a layman’s conception of science.  The failure of 
argumentation and errors associated with that reasoning fall in the category of 
informal fallacies, encompassing the ‘…introduction of irrelevancies, failure to 
disambiguate terms, vagueness, misplaced precision…’ (Blackburn, 2005:130).  
The common feature of most of those claims is the direct association of the 
positivist methodology with the techniques of the physical sciences, hence our 
choice of the label.   
As pointed out elsewhere, the major concern for anyone examining a 
theory, a theoretical formulation or concept should be the question of the 
minimum justification or warrant required of it to count as knowledge.  In 
highlighting this concern, we hold that rationalism, the philosophical backbone of 
the predominantly normative prescriptions that feature prominently in the 
formulations for effecting institutional reform in the underdeveloped parts of the 
world falls short as an epistemological framework as can be seen from its three 
founding theses.  First, according to rationalism, knowledge of a particular subject 
matter, for example, the question of the development trajectory that a certain 
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country should take, or the dimensions of underdevelopment obtaining in a 
particular region or state, is underwritten by rational insight or intuitive judgement 
in addition to deductive reasoning; rather than experience or empirical examination 
of the reality in question.  Second, knowledge according to most rationalist 
thinking is as alluded to already, innate, being determined by natural factors to do 
with who ever chooses to reflect on the issue being examined and not by a 
particular course of experience.  Third, the very concepts and ideas that make up 
our capacities and abilities to reflect on any one subject matter are innate.   
There are obvious shortcomings – and one would even argue, dangers – 
with the rationalist mode of cognition of the social world as summed up that way, 
particularly when it is employed as the prism through which to perceive the 
challenges posed by underdevelopment and insecurity as normative theory 
supposes.   Looked at in the context of the way forward for the underdeveloped 
societies, those claims would appear to be nothing more than an elaborate excuse 
by development practitioners to abstain from facing up empirically to the 
challenges development and security directly by analysing the realities of the 
affected countries on their own terms.  The common practice of development 
orthodoxy is biased in favour of perceiving the challenges of the contemporary 
underdeveloped countries through the prism of prescriptions based on the 
achievements of the now developed countries, not even at the equivalent stage of 
development of the less developed countries, but in terms of the former’s present 
day accomplishments in political and economic development.   
It is for this reason that the rationalist epistemology in all its guises remains 
fundamentally incompatible with development theory and practice.  Most 
significantly, this tendency is typical of the longstanding failing of scholars 
especially within the rationalist tradition: they do not seem to be inclined to give, 
as Lasswell and Kaplan would put it, ‘…full recognition to the existence of two 
distinct components in political theory — the empirical propositions of political 
science and the value judgments of political doctrine. …’ (1950:xiii).  
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2.4.1. Assumed methodological distinctness of the social and biophysical 
sciences 
That the social sciences are radically different from other sciences on grounds of 
the distinctness of their methodology is a recurrent claim by those that question 
the validity of positivism and its value in the pursuit of enquiry in the human 
sciences.  On closer examination however, it becomes evident that the thesis of 
methodological distinctness of the social sciences is nothing more than an attempt 
by anti-empiricists to advance their cause by hiding behind the conflation of 
methodology with methods and techniques.  This is in addition to the very basic 
confusion in the taxonomy of knowledge; yet some are rooted in deliberate or 
inadvertent equivocation between differing conceptions of key categories in the 
philosophy of social science and general epistemology.   
Several arguments have been presented in support of the methodological 
thesis of anti-positivism, ranging from the bold to the subtle.  Of the more bold 
claims, one would include von Mises’ assertion in which he portrays positivism as 
an epistemology that:  
 [P]ostulates a social science which has to be built up by the experimental 
method as ideally applied in Newtonian physics…..to be experimental, 
mathematical and quantitative. Its task is to measure, because science is 
measurement. Every statement must be open to verification by facts.  Every 
proposition of this positivist epistemology is wrong (1990:4).  
Similarly, Frost discounts the utility of empiricism in the social sciences by referring 
to what he characterises as the ‘positivist bias’ and its reliance on ‘…such diverse 
theories of knowledge (according to which an item will not count as knowledge 
unless it corresponds to an item in the world), empiricist theories of science, 
verificationist theories of science, falsificationist theories of science’ (1986:37; 
1996: 17-18).  Apart from the false presentation of positivism as some kind of 
photographic art, one notices that such claims as the foregoing rely, whether 
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deliberately or inadvertently, on equivocating between the different meanings of 
science.  On the one hand, they conflate the physical and life sciences with all 
forms science; and on the other hand, they confuse science as a product with 
science as a process.  While science would ordinarily be taken to mean organised 
and systematized knowledge, all science according to common strands of anti-
positivism appears to refer to the physical and life sciences as they are commonly 
known, and not any other branches of systematized knowledge, be it in sociology, 
economics or politics.  ‘In other words’, writes Frost in respect of one such branch 
of knowledge, ‘there is no normal science in international relations’ (Frost, 
1996:17).   
Such views, I would argue, arise from identifying positivism too closely with 
the varieties of knowledge where the positivist epistemology first made its impact 
in its early strivings to free human thinking from obscurantism and mysticism.  Yet, 
indeed, it comes as no surprise that obscurantism and mysticism should still stand 
out as qualities – or even synonyms – of rationalism, as evidenced by the advent 
of what is being called constructivism.  This may not be surprising given that, it is 
within the realm of the physical and life sciences that theological and metaphysical 
explanations of the world were systematically repudiated and substituted with 
positive ones as Comte recounts.  What we seem to see then is the history of 
positivism seeming to tempt rationalists to conflate it (positivism) with the methods 
and techniques of the physical sciences, in addition to causing a mix-up of the 
physical sciences with science in general.20 
Similar views by other anti-positivists reveal what appears to be a disregard 
for or even what could be viewed as a misapprehension of the basic tenets of the 
empiricist method.  Echoing Frost’s assertion that an item of empiricist knowledge 
only counts as knowledge if it represents an item in the physical world, Hollis 
                                        
20 The emergence of Logical Empiricism in the 1920s may have helped to strengthen the false 
perception in rationalist thinking of the equivalence of positivism with the physical sciences.  Most 
of those who were to form the Vienna Circle that was responsible for developing and popularising 
Logical Empiricism were physicists and mathematicians.   
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observes that, empiricism is ‘…an epistemological doctrine to the effect that claims 
to knowledge of the world, including the social world, can be justified only by final 
reference to observation’ (1996:303).  This is stated in disregard of the convictions 
of leading empiricists who are clearly aware that, ‘…though all knowledge begins 
with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience’ (Kant, 
2003:1).   
 
2.4.2. Science as a Process vs Science as a Product 
Besides the mix up of science as systematised knowledge with some of its specific 
forms, anti-positivism also exhibits what has been called the ‘process-product 
ambiguity’.  This is closely related to what in ordinary discourse, has been 
described by Quine as ‘systematic ambiguities of verbal nouns’ (1960).  ‘Science’ as 
a term serves well to illustrate this phenomenon, among the many terms that are 
often subject to inadvertent, but in the case of common arguments against 
positivism, deliberate equivocation.  Generally, the terms that are associated with 
this ambiguity refer both to a process or activity as well as to its product, outcome 
or eventuation.  They include such philosophical notions as justification, deduction, 
observation, evaluation, perception, validation and other general terms such as 
vote, protest and education.  With specific reference to the ‘process-product 
ambiguity’ and its relation to the straw man arguments commonly advanced by 
rationalists against the use of ‘scientific’ methods in social inquiry, what has to be 
noted is that science-as-process refers not only to observation, quantification and 
experimentation as it is often cited by anti-positivist claims, but it also includes 
reasoning, reading, organising and implementing research processes and projects 
and other activities which when fully examined expose the futility of the anti-
science stance of anti-empiricism in general.   
It may not be necessary here to cite all instances in which anti-positivist 
arguments thrive on sliding between the two meanings of science.  All we need to 
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note is that science-as-product is as general to all forms of systematised 
knowledge, as is science-as-process, especially if one does not cherry pick some of 
the techniques of the physical and natural sciences in a bid to defend a flawed 
claim.  According to Rudner, science-as-product refers to ‘…a corpus of statements 
purporting to describe one or another aspect of the universe…’ (1966: 8).  The 
erection of a wall between the social and non-social science as often evident in the 
more vulgar anti-positivist arguments implies an indefensible duality within the 
realm of knowledge.  This seems to be counterintuitive in relation to the logic of 
such a universe as aptly referred to by Rudner, and this, in our view, necessarily 
implies some kind of unity of whatever it is that we can come to know about that 
universe.  This is additional to the degree to which the methodological arguments 
of the rationalists (which derogate from that universe, to imply a ‘duoverse’) may 
well be a case of the fallacy of composition, in which reasoning proceeds from the 
properties of elements or individuals in a set, to the properties of the wholes which 
they constitute.   
Even when the problem as we lay it out above has not been an outright 
conflation of science (meaning systematised knowledge), with the natural sciences 
– quite apart from the ‘concerns’ of the anti-positivists regarding the encroachment 
by ‘scientific’ techniques into social inquiry – the anti-positivists might benefit from 
noting that their own scepticism in respect of science is a double-edged sword.  
Doubts have in the past been expressed in relation to the utility and feasibility of 
the social sciences in general, testimony of the sense of terror which ‘science’ as a 
category and as an approach to the comprehension of the world, continues to 
inspire in the minds of groups and individuals, who, in one way or another, have 
historically benefitted from mysticism and superstition.  Anti-positivists have to 
take note that, critics of the same social science (from which natural scientists are 
now being elbowed off) have in the past remarked that ‘social science is not really 
possible’, and that ‘too much social knowledge will endanger human freedom’.21   
                                        
21 Cited in Rudner, 1966, p.68. 
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The claim of impossibility of social science is often supported by arguments 
relating to the complexity human affairs, the very same arguments currently made 
by the rationalists to advance their anti-positivist cause.  It is to that ‘complexity’ 
bogey that Rudner has responded by wondering about where we would likely end 
if the epistemic defeatism of rationalism was pursued to its logical conclusion.  For 
if that were to happen it would occur to us that,  
Not only is the behaviour of human beings too complicated to be captured, 
or accounted for by science …but also in the realm of the non-social, the 
intricacies of leaf patterns, the subtle play of light and shadow in a meadow 
on a partly cloudy afternoon, the purling waters of a brook – in fact, all 
phenomena of the physical and biological realms – must forever, on account 
of their infinite complexity and subtlety, elude the gross, distorting, pigeon-
holing of any scientific inquiry (1966: 68-69).     
Were that thinking to be embraced even in its mildest form, humanity would as 
soon embark on the journey of climbing down the Comtean tree of the evolution of 
knowledge, back to its twilight when that species was perpetually trapped in 
beliefs and practices that only amounted to placating the natural forces instead of 
being a master of his own destiny.  What is being highlighted here is a four-way 
conflation first, of methodology with techniques, second, of experimentalism with 
empiricism and third, of what we may call ‘quantitativism’ with behaviourism.  
That, we contend, is a mix up of means and ends, and of journeys with their 
destinations.   
 
2.5 Methodology Vs Methods 
In regard to methodology, developments in the philosophic orientation of the 
social sciences in the last few decades may have helped to accentuate the 
rationalist crusade against empiricism and in support of normative thinking.  As 
Pye has observed, the period following the end of World War II witnessed an 
increased awareness by social scientists that their branch of inquiry was coming of 
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age as a science, a point that would be supported by a luminary in the anti-
positivist camp.  ‘Perhaps social science has not yet found its Newton’ writes 
Winch, ‘but the conditions are being created in which such a genius could arise’ 
(1990:1).  Many social scientists are seeking, with justification, to distance their 
craft from loose and broad generalisations in favour of the merits of sophisticated 
techniques.  Thus, ‘…they tended to place a high value on precision, rigor, and 
exactness of measurement…’ (Pye, 1965:4).  It might be this turn towards the 
search for rigour that may have disturbed the anti-positivists.   
But even if that had not been the case, what remains clear is, that ‘…to 
become aware that various scientific disciplines employ differing techniques of 
investigation is not to become aware of anything significant about the nature of 
social science’ (Rudner, 1966:5).  In any case, the techniques of the social 
sciences as opposed to those of the natural sciences may differ from each other to 
a far less extent compared to the differences between the techniques of the many 
branches of the natural sciences.  As Rudner observes, there are no serious 
grounds that can be adduced to support the claim that use of a telescope in 
astronomy differs in any way from the use of a one-way mirror in a small group 
research more than it differs from the use of a bathysphere in ichthyology 
(1966:5).        
However, what is noticeable from all this is the absence of any claim to the 
effect that there are major differences in the methodologies of the social and non-
social sciences.  It is only certain specific approaches, such as experimentation, 
that continue to receive a lot of emphasis, even when it should be obvious that 
experimentalism is distinct from empiricism.  More to this, there is also a tendency 
in the anti-positivist crusade to equate general approaches to social inquiry with 
technique and to equate techniques with methodology.  It is only a major 
difference in methodology between approaches to inquiry that would amount to a 
bold statement on distinctness; and not an incidental matter of technique, because 
with a difference in methodology, we would be dealing with a fundamental 
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divergence in the logic of justification, to which we next turn our attention as one 
of the futility of buttressing normative theory through flippant anti-positivism.   
2.5.1. Conflation of the context of discovery with the context of 
justification 
Regarding that latter point of the uniformity of the logic of justification in all the 
fields of philosophical endeavour, when the anti-positivists mix up methods with 
techniques, they further weaken their position by confusing what has been called 
the ‘context of discovery’ with the ‘context of justification’.22 The importance of the 
distinction between discovery and validation was initially pointed out by John 
Stuart Mill in his work on Comte’s positivism and later developed by Reichenbach 
(1938).  At the heart of the distinction are the two principal components of the 
philosophy of science, namely, the methods of investigation and the requisites of 
proof.  While the methods of investigation include all the avenues via which the 
human intellect arrives at conclusions, the requisites of proof set out the methods 
of testing evidence.  In Mill’s language, the methods of investigation are the 
‘organon of discovery’ and the requisites of proof are the ‘organon of proof’.  More 
contemporary writers such as Ayer (1925); Reichenbach (1938); Rudner (1966) 
and Salmon (1973) have referred to them simply as the context of discovery and 
the context of validation/justification.  The blurring of the distinction between the 
context of discovery and that of justification remains one of the sources of 
avoidable confusion on which the claim of methodological distinctness of the social 
sciences is based.    
Already mentioned in passing are the claims by promoters of so-called 
critical theory to revamp Marxism by purging it of materialism.  This can only be 
explained by a very basic reluctance to pay attention to the very essence of 
                                        
22 Philosophers of science, among them Thomas Kuhn, Karl Polanyi and Paul Feyerabend have 
attempted to dismiss the significance of this distinction but it remains an important tool in 
understanding the broader process of justification of beliefs.      
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Marxism.  That too is evident in the claims by the proponents of Verstehen, which 
is supposed to be an alternative and counterpoint to positivism.  Against the 
aspirations of the logical empiricists for a unified science, the proponents of 
verstehen hold that empathetic knowledge marks them out as distinct from any 
form of positivism.  What remains unclear, however, is the problem that the 
rationalists find with the position of the positivists.    
The central dispute between positivism and rationalism hinges primarily on 
the claims advanced by the each of the two philosophies as to the ultimate source 
of what each of them calls knowledge: either sensory experience or from innate 
sources.  It then becomes puzzling why the rationalists should turn the question of 
empathetic knowledge into a source of fundamental divergence.  The fact is that 
possession of so-called empathetic knowledge does not tell us anything about the 
history of that knowledge.  As such, the attempt by promoters of the variety of 
obscurantism called versthen to advance empathy as a front for anti-positivism is a 
red herring argument.   
Either way, one is only left to wonder whether there is any conflict at all 
between positivism’s wish for a unified science – even when we take its more 
hard-line strain, namely, logical empiricism – and the desire by the rationalists to 
pursue social science enquiry under the aegis of verstehen, particularly seeking to 
gain so-called empathetic knowledge.   
2.5.2. Perception and interpretation 
Most rationalist criticisms of positivism tend to portray it as a passive state of 
mind, in which a non-thinking, ‘irrationalist’, knowledge-seeking agent imbibes 
sensory input from his surroundings.  By such an account, the positivist and the 
empiricist is made out to be a mere receptacle for ‘facts’, transmitted to his 
consciousness through the senses.  The typical output of empiricism and the 
positivist’s epistemology then becomes a residuum, Quine’s ‘unvarnished news’ 
(1960:2).  Therefore, in the positivist framework, ‘…facts are supposed to be 
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available to the senses as discrete entities – i.e. individual data that can be 
identified independently of theory and interpretation’ (Frost, 1996:27).  
Supposedly, ‘theory and interpretation’ are strictly unique to normative theorising 
or for that matter, any other school of thought other than positivism.  That view is 
as surprising as it unhelpful for rationalist thinking.    
That being the case, the rationalist is duty-bound to fashion new doctrines 
that can at last varnish the news, so to speak, and  free knowledge from the 
disfigurement to which it has been condemned by positivism’s rather perfunctory 
deposition.  The , Frankfurt School will thus grace philosophy with, ‘Critical Theory’ 
while others will develop ‘constructivism’,  ‘interpretivism’, ‘reflexivity’ and other 
recent doctrines that come under the umbrella of postmodernism.  What the 
antagonists of positivism seem to disregard is the commonality in the predicates 
from which the anti-positivist doctrines are derived and the core processes of 
knowledge formation as it is understood within the positivist tradition. 
2.5.3. The rationalist mix up of positivist knowledge with description 
That empiricism is all about mere description is one of the most frequently 
encountered rationalist claims, most commonly associated with the additional view 
that positivism merely mirrors sense content and does not involve in any form, any 
abstraction as would be necessary in the understanding of social reality.  In the 
words of von Misses, ‘[t]he elements of social cognition are abstract and not 
reducible to any concrete images that might be apprehended by the senses’ 
(1990:4), a view that partly echoes Frost’s reference to the reluctance by 
empiricism to prescribe, and its focus on explanation and description.  Frost writes:  
In international relations as a discipline it is generally taken for granted that 
the aim should be primarily descriptive and/or explanatory.  The focus is 
firmly on explaining what happened in the past, what is happening now, 
and what is likely to happen in the future.  Very little attention is paid to 
questions about what ought to be done (1996:12). 
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That the empiricist does not concern himself with ‘what ought to be done’ cannot 
be just a matter of paying ‘very little attention’ attention to that sort of activity as 
Frost has claimed.  This is not to mention that, it is never clear at all what is meant 
by the expression ‘what ought to be done’.  Looked at closely, the expression 
seems to imply that, all there is to ‘doing’ is political appraisal, evaluation and the 
stating political alternatives, tasks that would be suitably handled, at best by social 
engineers and political philosophers, and at worst, by the opinionated and seekers 
of political office.   
The point here is, that it is very much a question of a basic division of 
labour that empirical science should concern itself with ‘what is’ and not ‘what 
ought to be.’ There is a distinct realm of those that interpret the world, separate 
from that of those who change it.  This finds apt expression in Dahl’s observations 
on the predicament of the empirical scientist.  According to Dahl, the empirical 
scientist, 
[F]inds it difficult and uncongenial to assume the historic burden of the 
political philosopher who attempted to determine, prescribe, elaborate, and 
employ ethical standards—values, to use the fashionable term—in 
appraising political acts and political systems. The behaviourally minded 
student of politics is prepared to describe values as empirical data; but, qua 
‘‘scientist’’ he seeks to avoid prescription or inquiry into the grounds on 
which judgments of value can properly be made (1961:771).   
But even when we put aside the question of the division of labour between, on the 
one hand, describing or explaining the world; and on other, tendering political 
alternatives, the rationalists still remain faced with a major challenge.  By making it 
appear as if empiricism and empiricist knowledge is all about description, they 
(rationalists) betray a major incomprehension of what the empiricist method really 
entails.   This is particularly the case when we look closely at knowledge as 
understood by basic empiricism.  When we do so, we discover that the typical anti-
empiricist argument on descriptiveness disregards the distinctions between types 
of knowledge as clearly recognised by empiricism, namely, knowledge of truths, 
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knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description (Russell, 1998).  The 
first form, knowledge of truths applies to knowing that something is the case.  This 
is knowledge as opposed to error, in the sense of knowing what is true, as it 
applies also to beliefs and convictions, collectively called judgements. The second 
form, knowledge by acquaintance, applies to knowledge of things and this is to do 
with the sense of our knowledge of sense-data and would seem to be the 
interpretation into which rationalism falsely condenses all empirical knowledge by 
labelling it collectively as description.   
However, knowledge by description is understood differently by empiricists.  
In fact, what the rationalists seem to be calling description and knowledge deriving 
therefrom is, in the real sense, knowledge by acquaintance, that is, ‘...anything of 
which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference 
or any knowledge of truths’ (Russell, 1998:25).  Contrary to the rationalist view of 
empiricism, one can possess a true judgement without acquaintance; and that is 
the case in which reference is made to knowledge by description in the empiricist 
sense, contrary to the propensity for description, often attributed to empiricism 
and positivism.  Nor should rationalism take it that by acquaintance, empiricism is 
referring exclusively to being aware of objects with which we are in physical 
contact.  Amongst the ‘things’ that we get acquainted with are sense data, let 
alone knowledge about the sense data themselves and knowledge about the past.  
These are subsumed under knowledge of abstract ideas or universals, elements 
which in rationalist thinking, specifically to von Mises’ view on the incompatibility of 
empiricism with abstraction, would be considered outside the scope of empiricism.  
Similarly, Frost holds that, according to objectivist theories of knowledge, ‘…an 
item will not count as a piece of knowledge unless it corresponds to an item in the 
world…’ (1996:17).  That view is not supported by forms of acquaintance that do 
not involve physical contact with objects of perception, among which are included, 
acquaintance by memory, acquaintance by introspection, and acquaintance to the 
contents of our minds, or self-consciousness.  As Code has correctly observed, 
‘…objectivity requires taking subjectivity into account’ (1991:31).   
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It should not be understood that the anti-positivist habit of deriding 
descriptivism is anything that should elicit penitence even from the least 
committed empiricist.  In any case, as argued above, reducing empiricism to mere 
description only serves to betray a total disregard by the rationalist for what 
empiricism really entails, let alone demonstrating a lack of awareness that, 
description by and of itself, remains a key aspect of our claim to being a language 
bearing and knowledge producing species.  Ayer sheds light on this point in his 
succinct observation that,  
The fact is that one cannot in language point to an object without 
describing it. If a sentence is to express a proposition, it cannot merely 
name a situation; it must say something about it. And in describing a 
situation, one is not merely ‘registering’ a sense-content; one is classifying it 
in some way or other, and this means going beyond what is immediately 
given (1958:91). 
It is actually impossible to record what is immediately experienced without making 
reference to anything else beyond that experience.  Therefore, persistent 
reference to positivism, or for that matter, any other epistemology as mere 
description would erase from human language the notion of conception and of 
concepts, yet as should be known, our awareness of universals is what is called 
conceiving; and a universal of which we have gained awareness is how a concept 
has come to be known.  
2.5.4. Rationalist conflation of Prior impressions with innate ideas 
One of the most commonly encountered anti-positivist claims takes issue with what 
is referred to by its exponents as the theory-laden quality of observation.  That 
observation is theory-laden has indeed become a central question of philosophy of 
science and epistemology, but of primary concern here is the use to which the 
claim as to the ‘theory-ladenness’ of observations is advanced as grounds for 
invalidating empiricism and the positivist method by those who uphold the innate 
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principle in all its guises.  Theory-ladenness as an aspect of anti-empiricism sums 
up the view that sensory experience, observational statements/reports and 
empirical data are permeated with theoretical preconceptions and prejudices.  As 
such, any claim by empiricists as to objectivity of their approach to understanding 
the social world is invalid.  According to this view, in as far as observation is taken 
to be the starting point of the positivist approach it cannot prove the importance of 
experience in the formation of ideas since observations are not neutral 
adjudicators in theory testing.  According to Hanson, ‘[t]here is a sense, then, in 
which seeing is a ‘theory-laden’ undertaking.  Observation of x is shaped by prior 
knowledge of x’ (1958:19).   
Even if Einstein was to give credence to the thinking behind his oft-quoted 
statement that ‘[w]hether you can observe a thing or not depends on the theory 
which you use. It is the theory which decides what can be observed’23, he is also 
known to have later yielded to the demands of empiricism and observed that, ‘[a] 
man should look for what is, and not for what he thinks should be.’24 
Nevertheless, the recurrent references to theory-ladnness of observations in 
support of innateness and normativity can only be a diversionary argument in view 
of the fact that the pre-existence of one theory prior to carrying out an 
observation, or in advance of the formulation of a secondary theory does not 
establish in any way or sense that the prior theory or advance knowledge is innate.   
The critique of the reliance of empiricism on observation is probably one of 
the most frequently encountered contentions against the empiricist method and 
has varying strands two of which require highlighting.  First is the Popperian 
critique that does not deny observation per se as part of the investigative process 
but subordinates it to hypothesis, second is the critique advanced mainly by the 
so-called post positivists and normative theorists that single out observation as the 
Achilles heel of empiricism.  Of the luminaries of the philosophy of science, none 
                                        
23
 Quoted by Heisenberger, p.77 
24
 Quoted by Michelmore, p.20 
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has been referred to more than Karl Popper in support of the putatively anti-
positivist argument by him that the making of observations is driven by theoretical 
frameworks.  Popper has observed that,  
Sense-data, untheoretical items of observation, simply do not exist. For we 
always operate with theories, some of which are even incorporated in our 
physiology….This is one of the many reasons why the idea of completely 
untheoretical, and hence incorrigible, sense-data is mistaken. We can never 
free observation from the theoretical elements of interpretation (1968: 
163). 
That assertion is was re-echoed by another one expressing the view that science 
does not proceed from observation to theory, this time by making recourse to 
what can be fairly termed as reductio ad absurdum.  In a commonly-cited passage, 
he has noted that, ‘…the belief that we can start with pure observations alone, 
without anything in the nature of a theory, is absurd’ (1969:46).  He elaborates by 
noting that,  
Twenty-five years ago I tried to bring home the same point to a group of 
physics students in Vienna by beginning a lecture with the following 
instructions: “Take pencil and paper; carefully observe, and write down 
what you have observed!” They asked, of course, what I wanted them to 
observe. Clearly the instruction, “Observe!” is absurd . . . Observation is 
always selective. It needs a chosen object, a definite task, an interest, a 
point of view, a problem. And its description presupposes a descriptive 
language, with property words; it presupposes similarity and classification, 
which in its turn presupposes interests, points of view, and problems.25 
An initial criticism of Popper’s way of putting the problem as he does above would 
be purely on linguistic grounds, a criticism that could even have been advanced by 
any those students, requiring Popper to justify the literal significance of his 
instructions.  At the very minimum, a sentence conveying any sort of instruction, 
question, exclamation or declaration would have to be compliant with the basics of 





linguistic structure.  Popper’s famous instruction to his students would fall under 
the category of sentences called imperatives, and like all other sentences, it should 
have had to embody not only just a predicate (observe), but also a subject.  A 
chain of words lacking a subject or predicate or both is not a proposition and is in 
ordinary terms, not even absurd, as Popper describes the instruction to his 
students, but nonsensical.  That it is nonsensical cannot be blamed on any one 
subject or predicate of a sentence or an apology thereof, as Popper attempts to do 
with ‘observation’.  If ‘observe’ is substituted with any other predicate, such as 
‘eat’, ‘touch’ or ‘give’, Popper’s instruction will still remain literally insignificant.  
Anorexics would not do any justice to their cause if they launched a campaign 
against eating, mirroring Popper’s instruction and requiring their prospective 
proselytes to, ‘Take knife and fork; carefully eat, and swallow what you have 
eaten!’  If that instruction sounds absurd, it is not because of anything to do with 
the verb ‘eat’, but it is because of the choice by the speaker to utter an imperative 
sentence that makes no sense.  The ‘selectivity’ which Popper attributes to 
observation is not peculiar to observation, being rather an intrinsic characteristic of 
all predicates.  This point may sound inconsequential but it is important to 
highlight it given the trivialness that seems to characterise anti-positivism, but 
more so, the recurrence of Popper’s argument against observation in metaphysical 
and rationalist literature.   
Although Popper was only objecting to, or suggesting an alternative to the 
usual three-step scientific procedure of observation, hypothesis induction and 
hypothesis confirmation, his assertion that science does not begin with observation 
seems to have been construed, and indeed, to have been embraced as a 
repudiation of empiricism by those opposed to the positivist method.  Other than 
beginning with observation, Popper thought that the process of scientific 
investigation begins with a hypothesis.  Normative theorists, among other 
rationalists seem to base on the first assertion to discount the significance of sense 
experience and on the second to give credence to the innate principle and that of 
a priori knowledge; and on both, even Popper would never agree with them, much 
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as they would be inclined to cite the instruction to his students.  Indeed, scientific 
investigation begins with a hypothesis.  The epistemological question however is: 
Where does the hypothesis come from?  Without fearing that we may risk drifting 
into an infinite regress, we can assert that hypothesis originates from guesses we 
make about a puzzling aspect of our observations of the social and biophysical 
world (conjectures); or doubts we raise about certain claims and propositions 
(refutations).  The evidence of that purely empirical process of conjectures and 
refutations is Popper’s own work, Conjectures and Refutations which we quote in 
the foregoing passages.   
One cannot doubt that Popper did not intend to question the significance of 
sense experience.  However, it has to be pointed out that by prioritizing hypothesis 
formation over observation in the investigative process he was scaling the 
epistemological tree from mid trunk.  Popper’s assertion that the starting point for 
scientific investigation is hypothesis formation raises two related questions, the 
first to do with what is meant by a hypothesis; the second, to do with where it is 
that investigators derive their hypotheses from.  From whatever angle one may 
look at hypotheses, there will always be prior observation as their basis.  Bailey 
suggests a number of sources or inspirations of hypotheses (1987:42-3, 51-8).  
Investigators may observe evidence in their daily lives or in the course of research 
and data analysis, or even in the process of reviewing past research or formal 
theories.  The evidence may suggest that certain observed behaviours, events and 
phenomena are related requiring investigators to formulate tentative explanations.  
A hypothesis then becomes a provisional or proposed explanation for observations 
that cannot be supported by existing theories; or in the words of Kerlinger, it is a 
‘…conjectural statement of the relation between two or more variables’ (1986:17).  
So, the assertion by Popper that the scientific process begins not from observation 
but from hypothesis is a self-negating argument.  It has to count little in affecting 
the integrity of positivism so much so that anti-positivists should not hope to draw 
on it to bolster their position.   
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It is common also for anti-empiricists to cite the doubts that have been 
expressed by philosophers of science such as Kuhn, Hanson and Feyerabend 
regarding the objectivity of observational evidence, particularly in view of the 
influence of the biases imposed by the observers’ ‘paradigms’ and their other 
theoretical commitments.  This too cannot help to advance the rationalist cause.  
The dispute between the innatist and the positivist schools of thought is not one 
about the subjectivity or objectivity of the claims advanced by either school, for, 
the latter qualities are secondary to the manner in which the impressions that 
constitute the basis for knowledge were obtained in the first place.  The important 
poit that anti-empiricists need to keep in mind the priority (or ‘priorness’) of 
impression (or idea, or proposition, or observation) X over impression Y does not 
suggest that X is innate. That priority is more a matter of the history than 
epistemology.   
 
2.6 Reductionism and Dogmatism of ‘Ought’ in Normative Theory  
In spite of the lack of clarity as to its actual meaning, what is being called 
Normative Theory has since the early 1990s gained prominence in the field of 
International Relations as a key philosophical defence for the initiatives that aim at 
ensuring that liberal values can gain global reach.  At the heart of the notion of 
normativity lies what Mackie has described as ‘…a relatively weak auxiliary’ 
(1977:64), namely, ‘ought’; weak in comparison with others such as ‘must’ or 
‘shall’ which give clearer purpose, but strong enough to arm its users with 
sufficient scope for the kind of conceptual elusiveness that would appear to be a 
requisite for metaphysical argumentation.  While normativity stands out as the 
stamp of quality for the neoliberal development agenda, ‘oughtness’ represents the 
free pass of every prescription that constitutes that agenda.  In order to expose 
the limitations of that theoretical orientation, it is necessary to lay bare the 
shortcomings and dogmatism of the ‘ought’ around which normative prescriptions 
are erected.   
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To further highlight the challenge that rationalism will continue to face in its 
attempts to dissociate itself from the innate principle, we explore briefly the notion 
of ‘oughtness’ – if it may called so – as it has been presented in some of the 
leading writings on normative theory, particularly those by Frost (1996, 1983).  To 
borrow from Baginni and Fosl in their characterisation of reductionism, what is 
whole, complex, sophisticated and nuanced has been broken down into something 
that is simplistic, sterile and empty (2010:62).   It is from the etymology of the 
adjective, ‘normative’ that one can trace that reductionism.  ‘Normative’ derives 
from the Latin word, ‘norma’, or the carpenter’s square.  When adapted to and 
contextualized in the social sciences refers to anything that pertains to a standard, 
a model or ideal, and in most instances, a typical or preferable one.  Setting 
standards has now come to carry different meanings to different categories of 
people depending on the purposes intended by whoever seeks to employ the term.  
What cannot be doubted is the sense in which it is being turned into a cliché.  To 
some it simply refers to the setting of standards of conduct, or norms, while others 
interpret it as the state of being normal in contrast to being abnormal, while to 
those specialising in ethics, it refers to behaving not according to standards in 
general, but according to morally prescribed standards.  The latter notion is what 
one detects in some of the recent writings on international ethics and is one that 
we find problematic particularly when it is applied to the field of development.  As 
stated elsewhere, that interpretation of normativity turns underdevelopment and 
its numerous manifestations not only into a deviation from or falling short of a 
perceived or set standard, but also portrays it as a manifestation of immorality.  It 
is this notion of normativity that seems to underpin institutional reform as it is 
referred to in SSR.   
To illustrate the point further, we refer to Frost’s notion of the normative, 
i.e., conformity to moral standards, based on upholding one’s obligations by doing 
what one ‘ought’ to do according to ‘settled norms’.  Frost’s interpretation of 
normative standards and his notion of ‘oughtness’ turns all the general forms of 
obligations that agents owe each other into moral obligations.  What we see then 
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is a double conflation: Normativity is conflated with the setting of moral standards, 
while all obligations are turned not into those of a moral type.  Frost’s 
interpretation goes further by turning into a moral dilemma all scenarios requiring 
an agent to make choices or to make decisions on a course of action, to such an 
extent that the case for normative theory ends up looking contrived even in the 
most ordinary of instances.  Accordingly, even where the demands on an actor 
would take the form of ‘has to’, ‘should’ ‘shall, ‘must, ‘required to’, ‘is due to’ or ‘is 
to’, all those forms are turned into ‘ought to’.  While the latter is used in reference 
to moral obligations that are the intended subject of most studies of normative 
theory, the former are employed in relation to institutional obligations, meaning 
‘…those obligations that are created in the performing of an institutional act’  
(Cameron, 1971:309).  There should therefore be no justification to mistake one 
for the other.   
Moreover, the requirements placed on an agent by an ‘ought to’ imperative 
are not as straight forward as Frost has presented them in his case for normative 
theory.  Ordinarily, ‘ought-to’ requirements break down into the moral, the 
prudential and the instrumental.  The latter form, which as Cameron demonstrates, 
is essentially an ‘ought-as-a-means-to-a-desired’ form needs further emphasis 
given that according to Frost’s case for normative theory, it appears that deciding 
‘the right thing to do’ and making the choice of suitable technical means to policy 
ends are mutually exclusive on moral grounds (1996:11).   
What should be emphasized however is, that the argument for normative 
theory seems to subsume the prudential and instrumental instances of ‘ought-to’ 
scenarios under the moral one, a case of lack of nuance that goes a long way to 
severely undermine efforts for the promotion of normative theory.  This is 
important for us especially in light of the predicament of underdeveloped societies 
and that is why we invest some effort here to delve into the philosophical and 
linguistic detail of the terms that are used to buttress an epistemology that has a 
direct bearing on our thinking about security and development, let alone the major 
implications for security in the practical sense.  If Frost’s interpretation of 
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normativity is made part of the practice of international relations, it will only 
become a source of severe insecurity not only for the less developed societies, but 
also for those societies which for reasons other than underdevelopment will seem 
not to be complying with the standards or ‘practices’ defined by international 
actors such as those that are already referring to themselves as ‘normative 
powers’.  Normativity as is it is being presented in ‘normative theory’ and as it is 
being referred to in such initiatives as SSR seems to turn every instance of non-
compliance and any instance of falling short of expectations or non-conformity to 
certain standards and prescriptions for any reason whatsoever, into unethical 
conduct.  That in our view amounts to nothing less than ‘normative 
fundamentalism’.   
2.6.1. Normative blinkers Vs the linguistic versatility of ‘oughtness’ 
Moreover, the attempt to craft a case for the relevance of ‘normative theory’ 
basing on the supposed moral obligation of an agent as to what they ought to do, 
has disregarded important linguistic attributes, meanings and contexts of 
oughtness.  Two instances can be cited.  The first of these has been pointed out 
by Chrisman in his observation that ‘ought to’ statements that are commonly 
encountered in daily life are inherently ambiguous.  They carry both a normative 
(or deontic) as well as an epistemic meaning (2012:307-308).  The deontic 
meaning that all forms of the ‘ought’ auxilliary have taken on within the prevailing 
formulation of normative theory covers the strictly moral interpretation relating to 
duty or obligation.  The epistemic interpretation which tends to be unselectively 
subsumed under the former interpretation covers cases of possibility, necessity 
and certainty, and at times, advice.  For example, a statement such as, ‘humanity 
ought to sympathise with Somalia’ might mean that humanity is ‘obliged’ to 
sympathise with Somalia, this being the ethical interpretation.  It may also carry an 
epistemic interpretation to the effect that humanity is ‘likely’ to sympathise with 
Somalia, referring to a mere possibility, but implying no obligation.  The epistemic 
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form refers to our level of confidence in, or the degree to which we believe in the 
knowledge that forms the basis of whatever proposition is under examination.  As 
Mackie observes, ‘…epistemic ought-statements refer to what are or were the 
reasons for expecting such-and-such an outcome’ (1977:74).   
The second derives from the fact that the deontic ought is itself not as 
straight forward as the literature on normative theory tends to put it, for, while 
what is emphasised is its moral content, there are, as Chrisman shows, other 
senses of the normative ought, including the legal, teleological and the bouletic 
forms,
26
 all related to the linguistic use of ought as a modal auxiliary to express 
necessity or possibility, but not moral obligation as seems to be assumed in much 
of the literature on ethics.   
On the question of obligations in general, further reference can be made 
normative theory as it has been elaborately presented by Frost (1983, 1996) 
which, even on superficial examination seems not to give recognition to the 
distinct forms of obligations.  By taking all obligations to be ‘ought-to’ obligations, 
Frost reduces into a moral dilemma every situation in which an agent has to make 
a choice or select a course of action as we point out above.  This could also be 
extended to other situations such as living up to some expectation, bidding at an 
auction, promising, engaging in an institutional activity such as a game or a 
conversation or even making a simple decision.  By turning every question related 
to what one can do into an ‘ought to’, the presentation of the common case for 
normative theory appears to turn every matter one is faced with in life into a moral 
imperative.  In our view, this oversimplification of the complex realities and 
contexts in which agents have to make choices easily turns ‘ought-to’ into a dogma 
which, as Cameron has noted, may easily ‘…lead us to beg important questions by 
unconsciously reading a seriousness, and perhaps even a moral force, into 
institutional obligations’ (1971:312).   
                                        
26 Ibid, p.308. 
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2.7 Normative Assumptions and the Problem of Induction 
McIntyre has observed that, ‘…there are certain features of human life which are 
necessarily or almost inevitably the same in all societies and…there are certain 
evaluative truths which cannot be escaped’ (1967:95).   But he further cautions 
that, ‘…this kind of argument might be quite wrongly held to provide us with a kind 
of transcendental deduction of norms for all times and all places…’27  That latter 
caution by McIntyre is instructive for anyone who may wish to question the validity 
of the all-too-common tendency by some analysts and commentators in the field of 
international relations and strategic studies to cast their views, arguments and 
propositions using the framework – in as far as one can talk of one – of what we 
have identified already as ‘normative theory’.  Looked at closely, those norms 
present us with two major epistemological problems and one minor one. 
From the epistemological angle, it is important for us to establish the 
essential nature of normative statements as we see them being employed in 
ethical analysis, and specifically for this study, the manner in which they are put to 
use especially by global northern institutions and governments, in framing the 
proposals and initiatives that underpin the prescriptions for social and institutional 
change in the less developed and conflict-afflicted areas of the world.  It is 
therefore central to our inquiry to try to understand the sort of propositions we are 
expressing when we make normative statements.  The assumption of course, is 
that normative statements are actually genuine and verifiable propositions bearing 
in mind that ‘[t]he meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification’ 
(Schlick, 1936: 341).    Whether they really are is a matter that we shall seek to 
examine.   
We adopt Hume’s binary classification of genuine propositions, namely, 
those that are to do with ‘relations of ideas’ and those that concern ‘matters of 
fact’.  Basing on that classification, we shall subject normative statements to close 
scrutiny with the view of establishing whether they are genuine propositions or 




whether they are utterances that hold no literal significance.  While relations of 
ideas as identified by Hume are a priori propositions, normally to be encountered 
in logic and pure mathematics, matters of fact are a posteriori propositions or 
hypotheses relating to observable facts.  By their nature, and as common sense 
would show, matters of fact are always hypothetical, a quality that implies that, 
they can be probable but never certain.  This distinction is crucial for our 
examination of the statements made by proponents of normative thinking, or as 
we generally refer to them here, rationalists.  The crucial point here is that, by 
continuing to dissociate their views and beliefs from any form of empiricism 
normative theorists directly imply that their statements are a priori propositions, 
such as those we encounter in logic and mathematics.  If we successfully 
demonstrate that normative statements cannot be possibly be a priori then we 
shall be left with the option of considering them to either be empirical assertions 
but masquerading as normative principles or we shall dismiss them as 
metaphysical assertions, thereby qualifying them to be nothing more than 
nonsense, and as epistemologically inconsequential. 
2.7.1. The impossibility of normative judgments being a priori  
Our first task should be to establish whether normative claims as we commonly 
encounter them qualify, as their exponents intend them, to be a priori, in the same 
sense as the truths of logic and mathematics.  In performing this task, we put to 
use the simple tool that has come to be called ‘Hume’s fork’, an epistemological aid 
that identifies propositions as either analytic or synthetic.  For our present 
purposes we shall refer to the two classes of propositions as the a priori and a 
posteriori respectively.  In implying even remotely, that normative statements are 
non-empirical and therefore, a priori, their exponents seem to suggest that they 
are tautologies, that is propositions that are ‘…true solely in virtue of the meaning 
of [their] constituent symbols, and cannot therefore be either confirmed or refuted 
by any fact of experience’ (Ayer, 1958:7).  If they should be understood as such, 
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that makes them analytic judgments, a suggestion that we contest, basing on 
Kant’s familiar definition of an analytic proposition as one in which ‘…the predicate 
B belongs to the subject A as something which is contained covertly in the 
conception of A’ (2003:7).  Put differently, in analytic propositions, the idea carried 
by the verb is organic to the conception of the noun, compared to the synthetic 
propositions in which the idea of the verb lies outside, though in connection with 
the conception of the subject.28   
Thus, the nature of analytic judgements is such that they never state 
anything new – hence the common reference to their being tautological – but only 
decompose the subject into its constituent concepts.29  Ayer’s example of a typical 
analytic statement is ‘every oculist is an eye doctor’, similar to Kant’s ‘all bodies are 
extended’.  When we look closely at Kant’s example, it is clear that the predicate of 
‘extension’ can be directly obtained from the concept of ‘body’.  The same goes for 
a statement like, ‘a bachelor is an unmarried man’, in which, once one is equipped 
with the knowledge of what a bachelor is, it becomes unnecessary to resort to 
experience or observation to confirm what the predicate is stating.  This has 
serious implications for the acceptability normative statements of any sort.  When 
normative theorists and other rationalists assert that their methods are opposed to 
empiricism; and that their propositions are not empirical, they are at the same 
time suggesting that, in the epistemological sense their judgments and statements 
are a priori, and by implication, analytic.  However, as outlined above, the 
derivation and structure of normative statements as we commonly encounter them 
is quite unlike that of analytic propositions.  As already shown, analytic 
propositions require no resort to the testimony of empirical validation or to matters 
of fact for their verification.  If we establish that normative statements are non-
                                        
28 For obvious reasons, Kant also calls analytic and synthetic statements ‘explicative’ and 
‘argumentative’ respectively. 
29 We are using ‘tautology’ not as it is commonly used as a pejorative term referring to self-
repetition, but in the sense in which it is employed in logic, to refer to a statement that will turn out 
to be true in every circumstance, i.e., a necessary truth. 
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analytic – and by simple implication, synthetic – then we shall be left with no other 
option than to conclude that there exist no epistemological grounds for uttering 
such statements.  To illustrate this point, one can refer to Frost’s ‘settled norms’ in 
international relations (and in International Relations) given that they are held to 
be based on a firm anti-empiricist argument;30 but more importantly, that they 
stand out as one of the most elaborate presentation of the case for normative 
theorising that one can encounter in the literature.   
On closer examination, most of Frost’s ‘settled norms’ appear not to be 
norms at all, but rather, devices for enforcing conformity to certain norms, 
outcomes of compliance to certain norms, or even ideals from which certain 
guiding principles are derivable.  For example International Law ‘norm’ of economic 
sanctions stands out as a device for enforcing compliance to specified norms and 
international laws.  Sanctions are ‘[p]unitive diplomatic, economic and social 
actions taken by the international community against a state that has violated 
international law’ (McLean and MacMillan, 1996).  In so far as laws are essentially 
codifications of prevailing norms, it is within the body of international laws that we 
would search for norms, but not from sanctions that have been imposed on 
violators.  But our main question relates to the epistemological status of ‘settled 
norms’ especially given that they are being presented as the culmination of an 
elaborate anti-empiricist argument.  Each of the statements expressing norms as 
goods is in the first place (and by being a good) a clear reflection of the 
‘…supposed final end at which action must aim…’.(Blackburn, 1994).  In our view, 
an ‘aim’ is nothing but a purely empirical matter.  Moreover, the statements sum 
up desires that have not obtained in all time and do not obtain in all places, but 
have been moulded by certain historically specific empirical factors.  Indeed, it is 
unlikely that such key terms in the ‘settled norms’ as ‘sovereignty’ defined in the 
Westphalian (or in any other sense), or ‘patriotism’ will remain unchanged by the 
ever accelerating globalisation, assuming that they can be accurately characterised 
                                        
30 See especially Frost (1996), p.106-112. 
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as norms, and not as values, probably a more apt term.  Taking a phenomenon 
like patriotism to be a norm of international relations raises other questions related 
to the extent to which a purely intrastate and personal sentiment would be 
classified as an interstate norm, probably giving credence to Carr’s point that, 
‘…writers on international morality are not agreed among themselves – and are not 
always clear in their own minds – whether the morality which they wish to discuss 
is the morality of the states or the morality of individuals’ (1964:146).  In the most 
general sense, ‘norms’ are standards that govern behaviour defined in terms of 
rights and obligations and there is nothing supra-empirical or transcendental about 
the meaning and content of the latter two terms.  Even when looked at in those 
basic conceptions, it is clear that norm setting is an activity that sits squarely 
within the empirical world of social systems, structured by ‘…the effects of 
properties of the system on the constraints or orientations of actors; the actions of 
actors who are within the system; and the combination or interaction of those 
actions, bringing about system behaviour’ (Coleman, 1990:27).   
But even if one discounted all those misgivings and insisted that ‘Patriotism 
is a good’ as Frost makes it to be, a statement such as that one would still be 
devoid of any logical equivalence with what would be considered as a typical 
tautology, or analytical statement in the sense of ‘All bodies are extended’,31 as 
the archetypal construction of an a priori or analytic statement would be expected 
to stand.  The concept of ‘a good’ is not automatically implied in the mere act of 
thinking about patriotism, particularly when one reflects on the findings of the 
Correlates of War Project which demonstrate a clear link between the propensity 
for war and patriotism.  Clearly, normative propositions are not a priori or analytic 
statements.  What we are left to establish is whether, contrary to their exponents’ 
assertions, they are not empirical statements and what that implies for the whole 
project of normative theorising.   
                                        
31 Cited in Ayer, 1928, p.77. 
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2.7.2. Normative theorising: Metaphysics or positivism via the backdoor?  
What we therefore understand by the foregoing is, that if so-called normative 
statements and prescriptions are to continue to subsist as literally significant 
propositions, their exponents have to acknowledge once for all that their 
utterances are nothing but synthetic, or empirical judgments.  By the very nature 
of synthetic propositions, the idea of the predicate lies outside the conception of 
the subject, as in Kant’s example of ‘all bodies are heavy’, therefore making them 
a posteriori, or judgements of experience.  If it be denied that normative claims 
are empirical, and yet also as we have demonstrated, they cannot possibly be a 
priori, then our only resort is to class them (normative claims) as metaphysical 
utterances and with that, we would have dealt with them conclusively by classing 
them as nonsense.  Normative claims – in as far as they are portrayed by their 
exponents as antithetical to matters of fact and empirical truths – are metaphysical 
statements.  By being metaphysical, they suffer from the failings of any claim to 
the effect that that philosophy can ever possibly afford us knowledge of a reality 
transcending the world of science and common sense (Ayer, 1925:33).   
2.7.3. Normativity, ontophobia and the principle of induction 
Thus far, we can confidently affirm that normative claims cannot be a priori 
propositions in any sense of the term, the status that their anti-empiricist 
exponents would wish to ascribe to them probably to imbue them with a halo of 
sanctity and veneration that would enhance their acceptability and probably also 
immunise them against the strict requirement of verifiability.  If they are not a 
priori then we are only left to deduce that they are empirical facts, an unhelpful 
alternative for the normative cause particularly in the face of two challenges.  The 
first challenge arises from the avowed anti-empiricism of normative thinking.  The 
concession that normative claims are essentially positive propositions – if only to 
furnish them with a bit of mileage – would make normative theorists automatically 
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lose all credibility.  Yet the challenge that rationalists in general will continue to 
face is directly related to the source of the raw material of their rationalist activity.  
When that question is finally settled, the predicament of rationalism will be even 
starker than ever, and will probably be summed up best by Wittgenstein 
observation that, ‘…in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have 
to find both sides of the limit thinkable…’ (1974:3), our preferred reference being 
to positivist thought.  Ayer quotes Bradley as having noted that, the man who is 
ready to prove that metaphysics is impossible is a brother metaphysician with a 
rival theory of his own (1958:34).  This equally applies to the normative theorist 
wishing to discount positivism.  As the real content of normative claims 
demonstrates, the man who is ready to prove that positivism is impossible is a 
brother positivist with a rival theory of his own, but quietly handicapped by an 
antipathy for reality, what Ortega y Gasset aptly dubbed ‘ontophobia’.   
The second challenge to normative thinking arises from the principle of 
induction.  This, in our view, is fatal to the credibility of much of what is presented 
as normative development theory, involving the direct transfer of the historically-
contingent experiences of one culture to another as seems to be the common 
practice.  Briefly stated, induction is the process of reasoning that moves from 
premises about certain observations of matters of fact or from certain instances, to 
an inference or conclusion which is stated as a general principle.  Conclusions 
derived from that process of reasoning are essentially contingent truths, 
knowledge of which is attained a posteriori and that being the case, makes such 
truths only hypothetical.  One can take the example of Max Weber’s conclusions on 
the relationship between the development of capitalism and the existing spiritual 
order.  Drawing on the historical experiences of England and Germany, Weber 
went on to conclude that capitalism had a chance in India where Hinduism was 
practiced but not in other parts of Asia that were Confucian.  According to Weber, 
Asian religions did not provide ‘the incorporation of the acquisitive drive in a this-
worldly ethic of conduct.’  Regarding Confucianism he thought that it is a ‘this-
worldly’ religion, but not one which embodies ascetic values, compared to the 
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Calvinist ethic.  According to Giddens’ summary of Weber’s view, Calvinism 
accounted for a kind of activism in the:  
[B]eliever’s approach to worldly affairs, a drive to mastery in a quest for 
virtue in the eyes of God, that are altogether lacking in Confucianism. 
Confucian values do not promote such a rational instrumentalism, nor do 
they sanctify the transcendence of mundane affairs in the manner of 
Hinduism; instead they set as an ideal the harmonious adjustment of the 
individual to the established order of things.  The religiously cultivated man 
is one who makes his behaviour coherent with the intrinsic harmony of the 
cosmos. An ethic which stresses rational adjustment to the world ‘as it is’ 
could not have generated a moral dynamism in economic activity 
comparable to that characteristic of the spirit of European capitalism 
(1992:xv). 
Without knowledge of, or before the development experience of the Confucian 
countries of the Pacific rim, Weber’s observations could easily pass as ‘settled 
norms’ and the development orthodoxy to be derived from that norm would 
probably have been ‘protestantisation before capitalism’.  But as Weber himself 
would have learnt today, no matter how frequently capitalism and Protestantism 
were found to be associated in the past, there could be no logical guarantee that 
in future cases of capitalist development, that association would continue to hold.  
Current realities in Hindu India compared with ‘Confucian’ China or South Korea 
stand out as an indictment against Weber’s inductive propositions, even if one 
casts aside the less unfavourable assessment of Hinduism.  What has to be noted, 
indeed is that, what we often encounter as normative principles are empirical 
lessons derived directly from a restricted segment of the historical experience 
particularly of the developed western countries, lessons that certain universalising 
activists are interested in promoting.  To put it in the words that Mervyn Frost has 
attributed to the critics of so-called normative theory, ‘Theories about the way the 
world ought to be are produced by the world as it is.  They are epiphenomena of 
the way the world is.  They cannot guide the world, but rather serve as post hoc 
rationalisations’ (1996:42).   
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Even when normative are divested of their moralistic pretences and are 
acknowledged as plain empirical claims, the very act of employing lessons learnt 
from a particular historical experience to mechanically structure future experiences 
elsewhere in a different era is problematic.  Of necessity, doing so turns those 
experiences into immutable laws and principles and bestows on them such logical 
necessity and certainty as they cannot possibly be possessed of as a posteriori 
claims.  By their very nature, a posteriori claims can never be as easy to logically 
guarantee as the normative discourse may seem to imply.  By being empirical 
claims, they have, ultimately to be subject to the test of actual experience.  The 
reproduction of those experiences would require that the conditions under which 
they were observed are replicated, a requirement that is in fact never met.  Yet, 
even if normativist pretences were abandoned and normative theories were 
acknowledged as plain empirical propositions, that would not be enough to 
guarantee their certainty, as has been conclusively demonstrated by a wide range 
of empiricists, notably Hume and Ayer.  Ayer has noted that,   
[N]o general proposition whose validity is subject to the test of actual 
experience can ever be logically certain. No matter how often it is verified in 
practice, there still remains the possibility that it will be confuted on some 
future occasion. The fact that a law has been substantiated in n–1 cases 
affords no logical guarantee that it will be substantiated in the nth case 
also, no matter how large we take n to be. And this means that no general 
proposition referring to a matter of fact can ever be shown to be necessarily 
and universally true (1958:72). 
It becomes easy to understand why neoliberal development practitioners have 
found it urgent to want to distance their dearly-held axioms from the domain of 
matters of fact with the hope of turning them into transcendental truths.  That 
way, they would be shielded from the hazards of scepticism that is the bane of all 
hypotheses, including what may even be called truths of science.  One can add 
also that, the anti-science stance taken by many rationalists can be partly 
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explained by the determined avoidance of the tough environment in which 
scientific hypothesizing operates, always having to endure stringent verification.          
2.7.4. Normative claims: genuine propositions or naturalistic fallacies?  
A further epistemological challenge to rationalism and normative theorising 
generally arises from the problems associated with the ought-is or fact-value gap; 
and with it, the likelihood that once normative statements are shown conclusively 
not to be a priori propositions, then, their presumed utility in directing the conduct 
of human affairs is at best, tantamount to the commission of the naturalistic 
fallacy, and at worst, a case of uttering nonsense.  The core of the problem of the 
‘Is-ought’ gap remains that a prescriptive conclusion, that is, a conclusion 
containing an ‘ought’, cannot be deduced from premises not containing an ‘is’ and 
therefore stating knowledge of matters of fact or real existence.  Hume in his 
popular passage, observed that,   
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always 
remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of 
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations 
concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that 
instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with 
no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This 
change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as 
this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis 
necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time 
that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, 
how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely 
different from it (1978:69). 
Simply put, stating what the case is says, and should say absolutely nothing about 
how we ought to behave in relation to it.  This is the point where the ‘Is-ought’ 
problem meets with the problem of induction, particularly regarding the status of 
statements on matters of fact, which, as pointed out already, are always 
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hypothetical.  This, in our view, renders any attempt to derive normative claims 
from what are mere contingencies fallacious.   
2.8 Non-Cognitivism and the Validity of Normative Claims 
As noted already, normative statements express what is right or what is wrong, 
desirable or undesirable in a society.  They are expressions of value judgments 
based on a particular political, cultural or moral perspective.  As conveyors of 
moral judgments, normative statements are thought to be cognitivist by virtue of 
their being employed to express the view that moral judgments are capable of 
being objectively true and that there is objective moral knowledge.  That view is 
objected to by non-cognitivists.  According to non-cognitivism, normative claims 
have no cognitive status in that they cannot be known to be either true or false 
being so because they do not affirm or deny that something is the case: they are 
‘ought’ statements.  When an International Development Policy practitioner 
observes that ‘…an unreformed security sector represents a decisive obstacle to 
the promotion of sustainable development, democracy…’ (Bryden et al., 2008:7), 
he is not pegging any attribute or property of being reformed to the state of being 
democratic, neither does he even, in the most basic sense give any indication of 
what it is to be reformed or even unreformed.  All that is being conveyed here is 
approval of reformism, and expressing an ethical judgment that security sectors, 
however defined, should facilitate ‘sustainable development’ and democracy, and 
probably inviting others to share a similar view, irrespective of whether reform will 
have democratic or developmental outcomes or both.  Similarly, when it is 
observed that ‘…there will be the need to carry out professional training for the 
sector, including its oversight bodies, in order to ensure that it is responsible, 
accountable and transparent’ (Jaye, 2008:182), if one responds by noting that 
transparency, however defined, is not needed, or is not good, he in fact does not 
contradict the initial statement but merely puts across his own moral evaluation on 
his understanding or his opinion on transparency.  Disagreements between the 
International Development Practitioner and his interlocutor expressing their moral 
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stand end up being disagreements in attitude or belief, particularly when 
‘transparency’ is presented in gross terms, as is the case with other evaluative 
terms employed in the SSR debate, and indeed are the terms in which most 
normative statements are couched.   
Yet, in all their ubiquity, the status of normative claims as propositions has 
been put to question particularly by the proponents of emotivism.  According to 
Ayer moral exhortations ‘….are not propositions at all, but ejaculations or 
commands which are designed to provoke the reader to action of a certain sort’ 
(1958:103).  He goes on to note that,  
[I]n saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong I am not making 
any factual statement, not even a statement about my own state of mind.  I 
am merely expressing certain moral sentiments….If a sentence makes no 
statement at all, there is obviously no sense in asking whether what it says 
is true or false.32  
The main argument of the emotivists is that, moral language is a tool used for 
manipulation of behaviour partly because, ‘…our fellow men are conditioned to 
respond to words as instruments of our will’ (Reichenbach, 1951: 281).  Moral 
judgments only express feelings, emotions, attitudes, or stances, or they may be 
attempts to influence the attitudes and behaviour of others.  A leading advocate of 
normative theorising unguardedly gives away the real motivation of moralist 
thinking when he points at the ethical as being just a gloss.  Frost has observed 
that, ‘...where actors assess their own actions and those of others, they are doing 
more than putting an ethical gloss on the proceedings: they are determining how 
the action will be interpreted and responded to’ (2009:92).  That way, Frost sums 
up the kernel of the non-cognitivist claims advanced of the emotivists.  The point is 
that ethical admonitions only serve to express opinions that state the aversions, 
predilections, preferences, likes and dislikes or even commands that one may wish 




to give to others.  As Bertrand Russell put it, ‘[e]thics is the art of recommending 
to others what they must do to get along with ourselves.’33 (Mortimer, 1985: 118).   
In as far as most neoliberal formulations for tackling underdevelopment 
continue to be expressions of mere feelings and desires of the ‘development 
partners’, they are foredoomed to remain sterile, not so much because a feeling or 
desire says nothing about the object of proposed change, but also because, as 
Beardsley and Beardsley have put it, ‘Expressing a feeling is not to be confused 
with asserting that one has it.’ (1965: 530).  Second, ‘…moral theory is cognitively 
empty’ (McCord, 1985: 85).  This cognitive emptiness or non-cognitive status of 
moral claims probably stands out by far, as the weakest flank of the neoliberal 
initiatives that constitute peacebuilding and institutional reform in countries and 
regions afflicted with conflict.   
2.8.1. Cognitivist attacks against non-cognitivism 
Any discussion on the basic position of non-cognitivism in relation to normative 
statements is incomplete if it makes no mention of the counterattack by the 
cognitivists.  These counterattacks include the charges of irrationalism, relativism, 
immorality, nihilism or amoralism and even insanity, but we pay closer attention to 
the charges of irrationalism and insanity.   
The charge of irrationalism is probably the commonest accusation levelled 
against the opponents of normative theorising.  It entails the committing of the 
double fallacies of equivocation and argumentum ad hominem.  Non-cognitivism 
stands in opposition to value cognitivism, particularly of the intuitionist variety and 
given that value cognitivists are known to be rationalists, taking a stand against 
their views always risks being labelled as irrationalism, an equivocation between 
rationalism (the epistemological theory that affirms that substantive knowledge 
can be gained without experience, and only by reasoning) and rationalism as the 
                                        
33 Cited in Mortimer, 1985, p. 118 
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practice of basing one’s judgments on ‘good reasons’, or the theory that there are 
objective criteria for rational choice.  However, the contrary of rationalism in the 
first – epistemological – sense empiricism, and by being opposed to the view that 
values are a matter of knowledge, non-cognitivists can only possibly be referred to 
as anti-rationalist.  Because non-cognitivists abstain from providing guidance to 
ultimate standards such as those that normative theorists proclaim, they are at 
times dismissed as ‘irrationalists’, for shying away from an important question.  On 
their part, the non-cognitivists have attempted to deflect the charge of 
irrationalism back to the normative theorists.  In Oppenheim’s view, ‘[i]f intrinsic 
value judgements are but expressions of subjective tastes, feelings and 
preferences, then the most crucial and consequential moral decisions can only be 
arbitrary, capricious, and irrational’ (1968:169).   
The charge of insanity has been advanced by Frost in his work on normative 
theory, in which he refers to Bernard Williams’ (1972, 17-27) demonstration of 
how ‘…a consistent amoralist individual could hardly be considered a sane man, for 
a consistent amoralist may pursue his own whims but his philosophy precludes him 
from ever criticising the behaviour of others on moral grounds’ (1996:45).  It 
would have been instructive to explore how Williams defends the charge of 
insanity against the non-cognitivist, as referred to by Frost but for the absence of 
any reference by him to amoralism and insanity in parts of his work that are cited 
as carrying that claim. 
2.9 Sources of Normativity in International Development Policy 
We have already made note of the distinguishing feature of the policy prescriptions 
falling under the neoliberal development agenda: Their promoters continue to 
ascribe to them a normative status.  Noticeably, it is never clear from related policy 
and scholarly literature whether allocation of that status is based on a detailed 
consideration of what it means when a prescription, proposition or claim is 
described as being ‘normative’, leaving the way open for some to even suggest 
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that the label may simply one of the popular clichés of development speak.34   A 
feeling that development initiatives are nothing but mere dogma stands to devalue 
even those initiatives that may be potentially beneficial, an outcome that may have 
to be blamed less on those that have been driven to cynicism by what frequently 
sounds like dogma, and more on those described by John Stuart Mill as,  
[A] large proportion…who have laid claim to the character of philosophic 
politicians, have attempted, not to ascertain universal sequences, but to 
frame universal precepts…one form of government, or system of laws, to fit 
all cases; a pretension well meriting the ridicule with which it is treated by 
practitioners, and wholly unsupported by the analogy of the art to which, 
from the nature of its subject, that of politics must be the most nearly allied 
(1874:607). 
While the supposed end of the ‘forty years detour’ (Smith, 1992) of positivism 
continues to be emphasized and fresh arguments in support of normative 
approaches in the social sciences keep emerging, advocates of the normative 
approach have not pronounced themselves clearly or consistently as to the 
foundations and philosophical basis of their framework.  This poses potential 
problems for its usefulness in scholarly debate, as well as its application in policy 
formulation.  Indeed, questions can be raised as to whether there can be 
justification for referring to normativist formulations as theory, particularly when 
the latter is understood as ‘a systematically related set of statements, including 
some law-like generalizations, that is empirically testable’ (Rudner, 1966:10).   
What cannot be doubted is evidence of an attempt by the proponents of 
rationalism to continuously rechristen that doctrine in response to criticism from 
the empiricists.  It seems to be important – and indeed, so it should be – for the 
rationalist school to distance the sphere of its intellectual endeavour from the 
imperfections of innatism, as well as dissociating itself from the dilemmas of 
metaphysics in which it remains firmly steeped.  Here, we are referring to 
                                        
34 Amongst these one also finds ‘capacity building’, ‘mainstreaming’, ‘good governance’, ‘up-scaling’ 
and increasingly, institutional reform.   
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metaphysics as Fullerton has described it, as the reflective activity that does not 
represent ‘…an analysis of experience, but a groping behind the veil of phenomena 
for some reality not given in experience’ (Fullerton, 1920:249).  Attempts by 
rationalists to disown their founding credentials seem only to add to the conceptual 
haziness of the schools of thought which owe their parentage to the innate 
principle.  As would be expected, many of the leading writers on normative 
approaches make mention of how the dawn of the post-Cold War era marked the 
end of the ‘positivist bias’ in International Relations.  Prominent among them are 
Brown (1992, 2001); Cochran (1999); Smith (1992, 1996); Hollis (1996); Frost 
(1983, 1996), Nardin (1983) and Brown, Nardin and Rengger (2002).   
According to Brown normative theory refers to ‘…the body of work which 
addresses the moral dimension of international relations….At its most basic, it 
addresses the ethical nature of the relations between communities/states’ 
(1992:3).  Frost, on the other hand, does not offer a definition of normative theory 
in as succinct terms as Brown’s, instead listing what appear to be questions of an 
empirical nature in regard to which he remarks that, they ‘…are all normative in 
that they require of us that we make judgements about what ought to be done’, 
adding further that, ‘[n]ormative questions are not answered by pointing out the 
way things are in the world’ (1996:2); a claim to which one can legitimately 
respond by inquiring whether normative questions are answered by pointing out 
how things are not in the world, or whether indeed, they are answered by pointing 
out how things are in another location other than the world.  The near-celebratory 
tone of the declaration of the passing of positivism and the coming of age of 
normative theory would almost make it appear as if positivism was part of the 
armouries of the antagonists on either side of the Iron Curtain so much so, that 
now that the cold war is over, ‘[a]ll theory in International Relations (IR) is 
normative theory’ (Cochran 1999:1).   
As shown by Evans and Newnham, ‘normative theory’ as it is generally 
understood in International Relations ‘is about norms, rules, values and standards 
in world politics…’ (1997:382).  It purports to addresses matters relating to 
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standards of behaviour, obligations, responsibilities, rights and duties as they 
pertain to individuals, states and the international state system. It is claimed to be 
particularly directed at issues such as the moral significance of states and borders, 
the ethics of war and peace, the nature of human rights, the case for intervention 
and the requirements of international distributive justice.  What is to be noted is 
that almost all writers on normative approaches tend to claim that accounts of the 
theory of international relations are either empirical or normative.  As we point out 
later this is a false juxtaposition.  The incommensurability of the two notions 
simply means that turning them into each other’s antonym is probably intended to 
serve as a distraction from the pitfalls of empiricism’s actual antithesis, namely 
rationalism.  That false controversy tends to follow along the same lines as 
arguments in favour of normative approaches that start with a critique of the 
fact/value distinction but gradually turn into a debate over facts and theories, as if 
values and theories were interchangeable terms.   
In light of such gaps that a closer examination of the literature on 
normative theory reveals, it is in order that a critique of a social science or policy 
approach that is characterised as being ‘normative’ explores the common sources 
and bases of the normative impulse.  We will therefore attempt to outline some of 
the trains of thinking that underpin normative claims with the hope that we can 
come up with an argument that can bring those that have accustomed themselves 
to employing the ‘normative’ label as a stamp of quality for their frameworks, to 
reconsider their strategy.  Our focus is on intuitionism, religious insight, speculative 
idealism and power differentials as sources of normativity.   
2.9.1. Intuitionism as a Putative Source Of Normativity 
Schools of thought that stem from the rationalist tradition regard intuition in the 
Platonist sense as the source of all knowledge, including ideas on social norms, 
justice and goodness.  According to this thinking, propositions in a particular field 
can be arrived at by what Whewell has called ‘imaginary looking’ (1858:140), 
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‘creative thinking’ or ‘direct obtaining of the truth’ or direct apprehension with no 
mediated or sensory input; while others may become known through secondary 
intuition, or deduction from other intuitions that supposedly goes beyond 
demonstration by rational judgment or inference.  In order to be able to do that, 
so it is supposed, select individuals or groups are endowed with a faculty of ethical 
‘inner tutoring’ (hence intuition), which makes the discernment of the objective 
truth of certain moral principles, a priori.  Oppenheim, in his critical exposition on 
the limits of moral thinking in political philosophy has summed up the ethical 
theorist’s  understanding of intuition as ‘…a moral sense which is as capable of 
apprehending moral qualities as the five senses are in perceiving physical 
properties’ (Oppenheim, 1968:23).   
In elucidation of what is meant above by knowledge that is not mediated, 
Locke notes that the mind may perceive of the agreement or disagreement of two 
ideas immediately by themselves without intervention of any other idea or ideas, in 
what he calls intuitive knowledge, upon which all certainty depends.35   It has to 
be noted that according to Locke, an ‘idea’ is ‘…whatsoever is the object of the 
understanding when a man thinks…’ (1961:5), which also raises the question of 
how minds come to be in possession of the ‘object’, thus taking us back to the 
debate on the long-standing controversy between positivism and idealism.  It also 
now comes back to confront the intuitionists and to confirm that their doctrine is 
rationalism by the backdoor.   
For those who derive their normative impulse from the supposed existence 
of a faculty of intuition, it is a gift ‘…available to a small minority, and to them only 
after arduous training’ (Oppenheim, 56:1968), and most suitably, training of a 
moral nature.  According to that view, values and norms are objective entities that 
are comprehensible through insight that is rooted in morality of a select few.  To 
Carl Friedrich, 
                                        
35 This as opposed to demonstrative knowledge in which the agreement or disagreement between 
tow ideas can only be established by means of another intermediate or intervening ideas or a proof 
through the process of reasoning. 
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The valuer’s role is to discover the value not to create it…[values] are facts 
in the sense of being experienced as being there.  In other words, the 
values exist, whether there is someone to recognise them or not…An act of 
moral goodness is good independently of any persons present to appreciate 
it (62-64). 
Intuition, like religious insight and idealism is generally viewed suspiciously 
particularly by the empiricists as mere ‘…labelling of the place where the 
philosophical understanding of the source of knowledge stops’ (Blackburn, 
2005:190).   
2.9.2. Utopianism and normativity 
More than any other driver of normative thinking, utopianism or political idealism36  
– as opposed to political realism – stands out probably as one of the leading 
sentiments responsible for inspiring some scholars, commentators and 
practitioners to dispense what in their view are norms.  As an approach to political 
thought and action, utopianism emphasizes the primacy of morality, legality and 
harmony of interests in determining the standards of conduct.  Carr has summed it 
up as ‘…the inclination to ignore what was and what is in contemplation of what 
should be’, in contrast with its antithesis, realism, ‘…the inclination to deduce what 
should be from what was and what is…’ (1964:11). In Albert Sorel’s terms, 
utopianism partly symbolises the undying dispute ‘…between those who imagine 
the world to suit their policy, and those who arrange their policy to suit the 
realities of the world’ (1885:474).37   The words of Thomas More, a leading 
utopian have come to best sum up the utopian sentiment.  Echoing Aristotle, More 
ended his book by noting that ‘…there are many things in the commonwealth of 
Utopia that I rather wish, than hope, to see followed in our governments’ 
                                        
36 A distinction needs to be made between political idealism and epistemological idealism.  While 
the former generally refers to the prioritisation of ideals, principles, values, and goals over concrete 
realities, the latter is the doctrine that all existence resides in the world of ideas, i.e., it is mental. 
37 Cited in Carr, 1964, p.11 
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(2009:175). Examples of this kind of thinking can be found in the works of some 
contemporary thinkers on normative theory, mostly those with slant towards 
ethics.  Commenting on the content of normative theory, Hutchings has observed 
that it means: 
[E]xamining, assessing and defending judgments about what is morally 
right or wrong in our globalised world.  You cannot assume that the 
implications of ethical judgment will necessarily be easily realizable or in 
accord with predominant political realities.  When engaging in ethical 
argument, you need to step back from assumptions about what actually 
drives political decisions and focus on what ought to be the values and 
principles underlying human interaction (2010:9).   
Hutchings argues further that, any attempts to link policy with reality have to be 
fully justified.  ‘To the extent that you think those values and principles are related 
to politics’ she observes, ‘you need to provide an argument for why that is, or 
should be the case….’38  
Carr (1964) traces the origins of contemporary utopianism to the breakup of 
the philosophical and religious bulwark of the mediaeval system which persisted 
from the passing of classical pagan culture to the dawn of the Renaissance.  The 
main presupposition of that system was a universal moral code and with it, a 
political system that was based on ecclesiastical or divine authority.  By this time, 
as Strayer observes, ‘The church already had many of the attributes of the state – 
for example, enduring institutions – and was developing others – for example, a 
theory of papal sovereignty (1970:15-16).  Following from that development, in 
much of the expanse of Western Europe ecclesiastical authority of the Papacy 
became a universal reality, extending over Italy, France and Spain in the south; 
Germany, Scandinavia and Poland further north and across the channel in Great 
Britain and Ireland.   
The realist spirit of the renaissance swept aside the assumptions of the 
mediaeval universal ethic and insisted on the primacy of politics while at the same 




time relegating ethics to being one of the many instruments of politics.  Thus, 
state authority eclipsed divine authority as the deciding factor in contexts of all 
matters, moral ones inclusive.  In response, and in order to stave off the prospect 
of being rendered totally irrelevant, utopianism sought to accommodate itself with 
the tide of progressive thought unleashed by the Renaissance, doing so by 
attempting to reposition itself on a higher plane than both its predecessor 
(mediaeval ecclesiasticism) and its nemesis (renaissance realism), opting for a 
secular ethical standard based on the law of nature and individual human reason.   
Yet, utopianism should not be confined merely to the capacity of an agent 
to indulge in the act of reasoning or imagining.  What makes utopianism stand out 
from other forms of reason is its irrationality.  That is probably where Carr’s 
exposition fails to lay out the fundamental failing of utopianism, particularly, its 
inability to reconcile desire with attainability.  According to that measure, 
Oppenheimer describes utopianism as ‘…advocating or trying to pursue some goal 
which, on the basis of the available evidence, cannot be reached by whatever 
means…’ (1968:29).   
2.9.3. Speculative idealism and normativity 
We justify our choice of ‘speculative idealism’ as a term for characterising what we 
consider to be one of the major sources of the normative impulse on two grounds.  
First, it is necessary for us to constantly to re-emphasize the point of the complex 
journey positivist thinking has enabled the growth human knowledge to navigate 
from its theological beginnings through its midlife of the metaphysical and 
abstract, to the scientific or positive era.  Secondly, it is to point out that with each 
of the transitions that human knowing has had to undergo some schools of 
thought have tended to hold out and to maintain a commitment to world views 
that closely link them to earlier phases of the evolution of human knowledge in the 
Comtean sense.  So strong is that linkage that a close examination of some 
schools of social thought reveals those lingering residues even in the face of those 
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schools’ constantly changing labels.  Speculative idealism, one of the key pillars of 
normative theorising stands out in this regard.  As seen from the works of Hegel – 
upon whom normative thinking has tended to draw extensively – it professes to be 
founded upon transcendentalism, intuitive or a priori insight, particularly insight 
into the nature of the Divine or what Hegel himself called the ‘Absolute’.   
Normative theory – particularly when, for that brief moment it places aside 
the ‘settled norms’ as its foundation – is akin to Hegelianism in deriving its 
conclusions on social reality from a category similar to ‘die wirkliche Idee’ or ‘the 
very Idea’, the justification and of all knowledge according to the Hegelian system.  
According to Hegel’s logic, everything is the Idea or the Absolute, in its moment of 
fulfilment as ‘actual mind’ with the real world only playing the transitory role of 
being the finite phase in the process of the fulfilment of the ultimate ‘Idea’ or 
ultimate goal.  The empirical reality is finite and the Idea is infinite and 
transcendent, and is the determinant and motive force of human history.   
To Hegel and his followers, the task of the philosopher is fourfold.  First, is 
to shed light on the essence of the Absolute; secondly, to demonstrate the means 
through which the Absolute becomes evident in nature and human history; thirdly, 
to clarify the teleological nature of the Idea or Absolute, highlighting the end or 
purpose toward which it is directed and fourthly, to lay out how agents should 
conduct their affairs in a manner that is in accord to the teleological manifestation 
of the Idea.  Within Hegelian schematism, the Idea lies beyond the ordinary 
person’s comprehension and is cognizable only by a chosen few, whether a race, 
class or some other category of individuals, destined to shepherd everybody else 
to that goal.  Put it in Carr’s terms, the normative project is the sphere of action of 
‘…an enlightened despotism of philosophers who alone could be expected to have 
the necessary reasoning power to discover the good’ (Carr, 1964:24).   
        In one sense, normative theory harks back to, and still retains its thrust and 
logic of Aristotelian speculation particularly the manner in which it accounts for 
human action, amongst other natural phenomena.  According to that thinking, 
objects, process and phenomena are constantly ‘asking’ themselves about what 
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they ought to be in the same sense as Frost (1996, 1983) constantly poses the 
question in regard to ethical practice in international affairs.  To Aristotelian 
science, the answer was always simple: Everything was constantly striving towards 
some particular end determined by its constituent elements which had to be fire, 
air, water or earth singly or in combination, an idea that Aristotle borrowed from 
the pre-Socratic thinker, Empedocles.  The four elements have natural motions 
which they ought to follow to find their natural place.  Those made of earth have a 
natural motion downwards, fire upwards and so on.  The heavenly bodies are 
made up of the fifth element or essence (or the quint essence) and they follow 
circular motion which is supposed to bring them close to perfection.  According to 
that thinking, the motion detected in everything and indeed, all natural 
phenomena and processes are supra-empirical and transcendental and are simply 
the way they are in accordance with how things ought to be according to some 
‘settled norm’, to borrow from Frost.39 
Idealism has additionally drawn significantly on the Plato’s attempt to 
grapple with the longstanding philosophical problem of the nature of ‘relations’, as 
opposed to such other entities as physical objects, minds and sense data.  To 
summarise the problem as it arose for Plato, one can use as an example some of 
the key notions or declared goals of neoliberal reform, such as accountability, 
transparency or efficiency.  In asking oneself what each of those notions means 
and what their promotion is intended to achieve, one can proceed by looking at a 
collection of actions or policies with the view of identifying what they have in 
common in the context of those notions.  For example, for a selection of acts that 
are ‘transparent’, they should be of such a common nature that what identifies 
them as transparent will be identified in them and no other act.  The common 
nature that identifies them as transparent will be transparency, ‘…the pure essence 
the admixture of which with facts of ordinary life produces the multiplicity of 
[transparent] acts’ (Russell, 1998:54).  That would be the same case with 




‘efficiency’, or ‘accountability’: they will be applicable to a number of other things 
by virtue of what joins them in their common nature or essence. The pure essence 
is what Plato refers to as the 'idea' or 'form'. As an 'idea', transparency (or 
efficiency) is not identical with anything that is transparent (or efficient).  It is not 
a particular thing or act, though particular things or acts can partake of it; and not 
being particular, it cannot be thought as being extant in the sentient world, and it 
is not of a passing or changeable existence like sentient things: ‘it is eternally 
itself, immutable and indestructible.’  It is the ideal, or Hegel’s absolute idea, a 
fitting object of aspiration.  By way of that abstraction, Plato makes the transition 
to the transcendental, supra-sensible or supra-empirical or what is putatively the 
normative realm.  As Russell describes that move, Plato and his emulators is made 
to pass into mysticism and to hope, by way of mystic illumination, to envision the 
ideas just like the sense objects are pictured.  Plato creates a normative world and 
a world of ideals that is: 
[M]ore real than the common world of sense, the unchangeable world of 
ideas, which alone gives to the world of sense whatever pale reflection of 
reality may belong to it….for whatever we may attempt to say about things 
in the world of sense, we can only succeed in saying that they participate in 
such and such ideas, which, therefore, constitute all their character (Russell, 
1998:53). 
Plato seeks to make a distinction between the corporeal world, of concrete 
phenomena and that of the invisible and abstract forms or ideas or essences, with 
the latter being characterised by oneness and immutability, in the Permanidean 
sense of the eternal and timeless.  As is true of the anti-empiricism that cuts 
across much of the writing on normative theory, to Plato,  sense experience 
apprehends only appearances: Trusting sensation is inimical to authentic 
knowledge.  Comparing the real and the ‘forms’, Plato notes that, the former ‘…are 
seen but are not thought, while the Forms are thought but are not seen’ 
(1906:201[507]); also further stressing that,  ‘…when anyone tries by dialectic 
through the discourse of reason unaided by any of the senses to attain to what 
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each reality is, and desists not until by sheer intelligence he apprehends the reality 
of good, then he stands at the real goal of the intelligible world…’40    
2.9.4. Power differentials, exceptionalism and norm setting 
Even without putting in consideration Thrasymachus' doctrine that ‘justice is 
nothing else than that which is advantageous to the stronger’41, one never fails to 
notice that the inclination by certain groups to prescribe standards of conduct is in 
many ways – and one could argue, primarily – a product of power relations; power 
generally understood as the capacity to determine others’ behaviour.  Whether at 
the international or the subnational level, the ability to determine others’ 
behaviour, and with it, the urge to establish and enforce absolute standards or 
norms presupposes the existence of ‘…a dominant group which identifies itself with 
the community as a whole, and which possesses facilities denied to subordinate 
groups or individuals for imposing its view of life on the community’ (Carr, 
1961:79).  Political actors may go as far as holding the conviction that the 
interests, aspirations and moral values of their homelands as the universal 
interests of humanity; or considering their community to be providence’s gift to the 
rest of the human race.  It then becomes a short step from that the sense of being 
exceptional and preeminent, destined to set standards and adjudge all the rest.  
‘The greater part having chosen themselves, as at once, the judges and the 
models of what is excellent in their kind,’writes Ferguson, ‘are first in their own 
opinion, and give to others consideration or eminence, so far only as they 
approach to their own condition (1783:341).   
In the United States for example, one finds the notion of ‘American 
exceptionalism’ running through the country’s statesmen from the founding days 
to the modern period and observers.  McCrisken has described American 
                                        
40 Ibid, p. 227 [532]. 
41 Plato, Republic, Book 1 (338). 
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exceptionalism as the belief that ‘…the United States is an extraordinary nation 
with a special role to play in human history; not only unique but also superior 
among nations’ (2003:2).  A similar sentiment is identifiable in the views of one of 
the leading Puritan pilgrims John Winthrop who in 1630 would declare his newly-
established colony in biblical terms as a ‘shining city upon the hill’ for the rest of 
the world to emulate,42 a phrase that was to become a punch line for many 
American presidents over the years (Viotti: 2008). Much later, Woodrow Wilson in 
his 1914 independence talked at length about America’s duty to humanity 
emphasizing that ‘…her flag is the flag not only of America but of humanity’, 
further observing that, ‘I do not know that there will ever be a declaration of 
independence and of grievances for mankind, but I believe that if any such 
document is ever drawn it will be drawn in the spirit of the American Declaration of 
Independence.’43  In concluding his January 22, 1917 address to the Senate, titled 
‘A World League for Peace’, setting the United States’ war aims before its entry 
into the World War I, Woodrow Wilson enmphasised that,  
These are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no 
others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward looking men 
and women everywhere, of every modem nation, of every enlightened 
community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.44  
Similarly, George Bush, in his 2000 presidential campaign, would remark that, 
‘[o]ur nation is chosen by God and commissioned by history to be a model to the 
world…’45   The most stark expression of those sentiments, which can only be 
done justice by quoting it extensively is to be found in the words of Senator 
Beveridge who in his 9 January 1900 speech to Congress observed that,  
                                        
42 This was reference to Jesus’ sermon on the mountain as cited in Matthew 5:14, (New 
International Version), ‘You are the light of the world. A town built on a hill cannot be hidden’ 
43
 Hart (1918), Selected Addresses and Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, p.44.   
44
 Ibid, p. 179. 
45 Viotti, 2008, p.111 
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God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for 
a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-contemplation and self-
admiration. No! He has made us the master organizers of the world to 
establish system where chaos reigns. He has given it the spirit of progress 
to overwhelm the forces of reaction throughout the earth. He has made us 
adepts in government that we may administer government among savage 
and senile peoples. Were it not for such a force as this the world would 
relapse into barbarism and night. And of all our race He has marked the 
American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the regeneration of 
the world. This is the divine mission of America... We are trustees of the 
world's progress, guardians of its righteous peace (1995:514).   
Beveridge does more than merely exceed the benign words of a Woodrow Wilson, 
whose limited aim may have been just to appeal to his audience’s patriotism.  
Beveridge veers off into the realm of casual racism in the same manner as Cecil 
Rhodes whose views on the matter, he left to his last will and testament.  ‘I 
contend that we are the first race in the world’ noted Rhodes, ‘and that the more 
of the world we inhabit the better it is for the human race.’46  As contemporary an 
advocate of normative thinking as Chris Brown, echoing the thinking of those 
earlier commentators, finds it unsurprising that the sophistication of the seminal 
volume he edited should have no parallel in non-Western thought for the very 
reason that, ‘…for better or for worse, the modern world has been created by 
Western Europeans and their offspring, and thinkers of this part of the world have 
had a head start for the task of understanding their creation’ (1992:13).   
What appears to be the case then is that the core and ballast of what is 
passing as normative theory, or what has been dubbed as ‘normative power’; and 
indeed the normative basis of neoliberal interventionism is the shifting sand of the 
relative pecking order of national and supranational entities in the global ranking.  
When reflected upon with caution and a sense of history, it would be hoped that 
the ranking would demonstrate the extent to which, ‘[i]n dealing with national 
characteristics it is important to recognize that comparative evaluations are never 
absolutes, that they always are made in terms of more or less (Lipset, 1996:32).  
                                        
46 In: Stead, 1902, p. 58. 
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Thus far the framing of the idealistic crusades of the post-Cold War era remains 
averse to Lipset’s counsel.   
2.9.5. Latter Day Mission Civilisatrice : Europe as a ‘Normative Power’ 
Some comments are necessary at this point on the linkage between the 
epistemological questions explored in the foregoing sections of the study and the 
real world practices.  In doing so, we shall differ slightly from claims by some 
commentators and scholars regarding the existence of a chasm between 
knowledge and experience, and theory and practice particularly in contemporary 
statecraft and international relations.  For example, scholar and former diplomat 
David Newsom probably overstates the case in his observation that 
[M]uch of today’s scholarship [on foreign policy issues] is either irrelevant or 
inaccessible to policymakers.  Some of the more theoretical communications 
are filtered through think tanks or research staffs of governments...much 
remains locked within the circle of esoteric scholarly expression (1996: 138).    
In a similar tone, a serving Chief Inspector of the British diplomatic service is 
quoted as having stated that he was ‘…not sure what the academic discipline of 
IR—if indeed there be such a thing as an academic discipline of IR—has to 
contribute to the practical day-to-day work of making and managing foreign policy’ 
(Wallace, 1994:158).  What is apparent however is that there is a direct link 
between the foreign policy behavior of some countries and groups that directly 
derive from or are serviced by the philosophical claims that we seek critique.  In 
particular, we focus on what has been termed as ‘Normative Power’ Europe which 
has been formulated as a conceptual rationalization or even euphemism of a 
particular approach to international relations practice that seems to be identifiable 
with a rapidly changing balance of global power.   
As a characterization of the European Union’s foreign policy, the term 
‘normative power’ was coined and has been popularized primarily by Manners , 
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with other analysts whose contribution to the debate followed from his pioneering 
article published in 2000.  But even ahead of Manners, other scholars were already 
making hints on normative as opposed to empirical priorities, and the pursuit of 
the ‘ideational’.  In that publication Manners outlined, first, the characteristics of 
post-Cold War Europe as a ‘norms entrepreneur’ and a novel power pointing out 
that it privileges the spread of norms globally over geographical expansion and 
military hegemony.  He emphasizes that point by spelling out the differences 
between the EU the United States which is portrayed as a typical non-normative 
power, singling out differences in threat perception and foreign policy orientation 
between the European Union and the United States, with the latter being generally 
viewed as a military power in the sense that it privileges non-civilian over the EU’s 
preference, namely civilian policy instruments (2002).  According to this view, the 
EU is a normative power in the sense that it focuses on promoting the globalization 
of the so-called universal norms.   
The EU, he has observed, ‘….promotes a series of normative principles that 
are generally acknowledged, within the United Nations system, to be universally 
applicable’ (2008:65).  According to that thinking, the EU is ‘…neither military nor 
purely economic, but only seeks to work through ideas and opinions’, and has as 
its principal capabilities the capacity ‘…to shape conceptions of the ‘normal’,47 
while seeking to determine what should be considered as appropriate behaviour by 
other actors and to shape their values (2002: 239).  To some, that would probably 
akin to what Therborn has called ‘Scandinavian Europe’, constituting ‘a nice, 
decent periphery of the world, with little power but some good ideas’ (1997: 382), 
or ‘Swissified Europe’ (Telò, 2002), which is ‘rich, selfish, boring and essentially 
trivial’ (Moïsi, 2002)48, among other characterizations.   
As a ‘normative’ power, Europe, structured around the EU presents itself as 
being committed to the mission of ‘civilizing’ international relations as part of the 
                                        
47 Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 235-58. 
48 Cited in Obie, 2006, p. 125.  
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wider aim of transforming global society (Hill, 1990; Duchene, 1972; Manners, 
2002).  This new, Post-Westphalian Europe is according to some, the harbinger of 
a Kantian foedus pacificum (Hyde-Price, 2006:217).  As an analytical term, 
‘normative power’ is an offshoot of ‘civilian power’ coined the 1970s by Duchêne 
(1972) and later put in clearer terms by Hans Maull who was to define it as:  
[A] state whose conception of its foreign policy role and behaviour is bound 
to particular aims, values, principles, as well as forms of influence and 
instruments of power in the name of a civilization of international 
relations.49   
It may also be what Carr has referred to by drawing the distinction between 
economic power, military power and power over opinion (1962:108).  Following 
from those earlier conceptions, the European Union now refers to itself as a 
normative power, seeking to ‘… to work with others in an interdependent world to 
spread the advantages of open markets, economic growth and a political system 
based on social responsibility and democracy’ (EC, 2007:4).   
Of the norms that Europe seeks to globalize, there are five major and four 
minor ones.  The major norms are: 
 the centrality of peace 
 liberty 
 democracy 
 respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
 the rule of law 
 
The four minor norms are: 
 social solidarity 
 anti-discrimination 
 sustainable development 
 
                                        
49 Cited from Diez (2005:616)  
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Normative claims altogether ignore the empirical realities of the collective foreign 
policy of the EU or its individual member states, let alone the instances where the 
two even clash.  Beyond the flamboyant rhetoric of norms, in reality, ‘…foreign 
policy is invested with strategic calculations and that the material interests 
underpinning this calculus often trump the normative agenda…when the two clash’ 
(Merlingen, 2007:437).  The normative stance has also been criticised particularly 
by constructivists, for ‘othering’ non-European actors.  By portraying itself as a 
normative power and the crusader of universal values, Europe adopts a strategy of 
constructing ‘self’ and ‘other’ in international politics (Diez, 2005: 628-629).  The 
strategy includes among other approaches, what the Copenhagen School calls 
‘securitization’ by which issues are framed as existential threats, presenting the self 
as the referent object of the threat and therefore legitimizing and justifying the 
employment of extraordinary measures including war.  According to that thinking, 
the EU ‘others’ others through presenting them as inferior, the self is simply 
constructed as superior to the other. Diez gives the example of practices of 
Orientalism which involves the presentation of the ‘other’ as exotic, may be an 
object of condescending honour which masks an attitude of superiority and looking 
down upon those that are not part of the close community.  Other actors may also 
be portrayed as violators of universal principles, hence the use of terms such as 
‘pariah states’, ‘rogue states’, or its declared replacement, ‘states of concern’; ‘axis 
of evil’, ‘nuclear outlaws’, ‘outposts of tyranny’, ‘ungoverned spaces’ and other 
epithets. This is a stronger variation of the second strategy. As Diez notes,  
‘Here, however, the standards of the self are not simply seen as superior, 
but of universal validity, with the consequence that the other should be 
convinced or otherwise brought to accept the principles of the self.’   
The mere presentation of the other as different differs from the foregoing ones in 
that it does not place an obvious value-judgment on the other: the other is 
represented neither as inferior nor as a threat, but merely as different. While this 
is not an innocent practice (it still imposes identities on others), it is preferable to 
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the other three in that it reduces the possibility to legitimise harmful interference 
with the other.50  
While the EU’s distinct foreign policy orientation is deemed by some as a 
new kind of power in international politics, compared for example to the United 
States, it is also viewed by others as largely a reflection of the EU’s deficiency in 
power capabilities and an attempt to find something with which it can preoccupy 
itself, at a time of searching questions about old Europe’s future role in a world of 
emerging new powers.  In pointing out the extent of the divergence between 
Europe and the United States on the major contemporary strategic and 
international questions, Kagan has observed that while the latter is from Mars, the 
former is from Venus.  He illustrates this claim by referring to power noting that, 
with respect its efficacy, morality and desirability, Europe has withdrawn ‘…into a 
self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and 
cooperation…a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the 
realization of Kant’s “perpetual peace”’ (2003:3).   
Claims about normative power may then be viewed as a case of Europe 
trying to ‘…make virtue out of weakness’ (2003:13), a trait that took root in the 
two or so decades that followed the end of World War II, an era when America 
sought radically cut back the weight of its Transatlantic allies as a possible way of 
bringing about ‘...the retirement of Europe from world Politics’ (Harper: 1996:79).  
According to other analysts, claims by scholars but more so, the hope by European 
statesmen that a continental organization such as the European Union can exercise 
‘normative’ power globally may be based on a flawed conception of the dynamics 
power, particularly, its indivisibility, and the fact that power never seems to lend 
itself to compartmentalization.  ‘The laws of social dynamics are laws of which can 
only be stated in terms of power’, so Russell has observed, but more importantly, 
‘not in terms of this or that form of power’ (2004:4).   




Although classifications of ‘types’ of power abound, when looked at closely, 
they always seem to appear to be nothing more than its situational manifestations, 
or avenues for its exercise or even phases of escalation of the process of inducing 
compliance.  This becomes clearer when one looks at some definitions of power 
from a selection of analysts.  This point needs to be highlighted for the purpose of 
demonstrating the futility of the hope by some countries or alliances that, they can 
curve out a niche for themselves as specialists at determining the ‘normal’, or 
civilizing other countries and perform that role in isolation from other avenues of 
being influential.  That misperception appears to be the basis of the notion of 
normative power.   
In its most basic characterization, ‘power’ is all about an agent’s ability to 
realize its wishes and to produce those effects that it (the agent) wants to 
produce.  It is and always has been one of the many universal aspects of human 
experience, and probably the master of all aspects of human experience.  Bertrand 
Russell (2004:23) in his definition of power as, ‘…the production of intended 
effects’ sums up that characterization.  That definition forms the core of many 
others that have come before and after him.  To Thomas Hobbes, it is ‘…man’s 
present means to any future apparent good’ (1968:150).  Max Weber views power 
not as ability but as a potential in his observation that it is ‘…the chance of a man 
or a number of men to realize their own will in a social action even against the 
resistance of others who are participating in the action (Weber, 1998; Wrong, 
1995, p. 21).   
Lukes’ perspective comes closest to the notion of power advanced by 
normative theorists in general and more particularly by exponents of normative 
power.  Using Dahl’s notational form, Lukes notes that,  
A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to 
do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or 
determining his very wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power 
to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have - that 





Even if one used only those two characterizations of power, it is possible to identify 
its essential attribute as a relational phenomenon reliant on the means of an agent 
as they relate to the intended ends, the agent’s relative capabilities viewed against 
those of rival agents let alone the amenability of the objects of power to be 
receptive of the agent’s influence.  Power then becomes the ability and capacity of 
an agent to influence the behavior of others, determine allocation of resources, 
shape outcomes and influence the trend of events.   
Etzionni identifies three ‘types’ of power corresponding to the three kinds of 
means that can be used to induce compliance: coercive, remunerative and 
normative.  Coercive power, according to that classification, is based on the use of 
or the possible application of physical sanctions and force.  Remunerative power is 
based on the control over material resources and rewards through the distribution 
of alms, benefits or rewards; while normative power rests on the inducement of 
compliance through the allocation and manipulation of symbolic rewards, 
deprivations, esteem and prestige.  Etzioni’s tripartite typology bears parallels with 
Carr’s three categories, namely military power, economic power and power over 
opinion.  Carr notes that those categories are interdependent, with no one country 
existing in reality possessing on type in isolation from others.   
What becomes clear from that cursory examination of power is its 
indivisibility.  Indivisibility as a defining property of power seems to have been 
overlooked by the exponents of the notion of ‘normative power’ but crucially, its 
adoption as a strategy for influence on the global scene is bound to generate 
disillusion.  It is a distraction from a hard and long examination of the real causes 
and consequences of decline, and whether that decline is absolute or whether it 
arises from being overshadowed by emerging actors.  In the notion of ‘normative 
power’, what one sees is a strategy of adjusting to the dwindling (or the prospect 
of decline) of one’s status as a power by seeking solace from either a 
disaggregation of or, an alternative conceptualization of power; yet an actor or 
agent can only be possessed of power in its entirety, or have none at all, for it 
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would seem, power is an ‘either-all-or-none’ phenomenon.  In its essence’, Carr 
has observed, ‘power is an indivisible whole’ (1962:108).   
Therborn alludes to that indivisibility by pointing out the impotence and 
illusory nature of standalone normative power.  ‘[W]ithout the backing of force and 
the willingness to use it’, Therborn observes, ‘”Europe” is unlikely to become a 
normative power, telling other parts of the world what political, economic and 
social institutions they should have’ (1997:380).  Wood has pointed out the 
obstacles to the exercise of normative power and the blunting that the EU’s 
‘community values’ is destined to suffer in influencing the value systems of actors 
with strong bargaining tools.   
In the face of energy-rich international actors such as Russia that Europe 
depends on, Wood notes that, 
‘The EU’s mission civilisatrice is susceptible to a relatively straightforward if 
unpleasant realpolitik that can expose a rhetoric-behaviour gap…When 
faced with resistance to a (potentially) vigorous promotion of democracy 
and human rights…the EU appears a rather powerless normative power’ 
(2009:218). 
The pursuit of paternalistic initiatives particularly in the Global South derives more 
from fixation on a past when influence was assured than from a realistic 
assessment of the balances of force in an era of emerging powers whose arrival on 
the global scene is bound to reduce the leverage of the influential actors of a 
bygone era.  It is upon such factors that the durability of the drive for such 




 Mixed Conceptions of Security in the 
Peacebuilding Discourse 
3.1 Introduction 
Mearsheimer has observed that, ‘[w]e may...wake up one day lamenting the loss 
of the order that the Cold War gave to the anarchy of international relations’ 
(1990:35).  ‘Order’ in International Relations theory sense has a dual meaning.  It 
may be a social, political and economic system; or it may be a state of affairs in 
which things are more or less in their appropriate place or expected condition.  It 
is the latter sense that Mearsheimer was highlighting and that is the sense that 
interests us here.  We will call it ontological order: Certainty about ‘what is’, 
predictability of what is yet to be and the disciplining of collective actions and 
attitudes to guarantee that predictability.  Other observers have expressed 
sentiments similar to Mearsheimer.  ‘Between October 1989 and August 1991’, 
writes Chipman, ‘the world lost an international system that served as an ordering 
principle of international relations, but it did not gain an international society with 
a universal culture’ (1992:110).   
This chapter seeks to explore ‘the anarchy in international relations’ and the 
dearth of ‘a universal culture’ focussing on the scholarly traditions that have been 
spawned by the end of the Cold War and how they feed into policy debates, 
particularly in the fields of peacekeeping, security and development.  It outlines 
the point in post-Cold War international theory at which philosophical rationalism 
outlined in the previous chapter meets political idealism.  It builds on the picture 
emerging from Chapter Two, of a meagre epistemological trellis on which the 
normative approaches informing dominant international development approaches 
have flourished.  The chapter explores the varied practical interpretations of the 
notion of security that informs the SSR debate, many of them dating to the end of 
the Cold War.   
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3.2 Post-Cold War conceptual Turmoil and the Birth of Neo-Liberal 
Reformism   
One thing that cannot escape notice is the extent to which security as an analytical 
and policy category had over the period of the Cold War come to be equated with 
threats, yet indeed there is a lot more to security than just threats.  That fixation 
goes a long way to explain the framing of the post-Cold War debates on 
international security all of which remain fixated on threats even when they are 
referring to vulnerabilities.  This is what one observes with the human security 
agenda, ‘Securitisation Theory’ and the debate on widening, narrowing and 
deepening, which, in many ways constitute the conceptual backbone of the 
peacebuilding agenda.  The three approaches to security analysis are symptomatic 
of the persistent gap between scholarship and practice, as it has particularly 
become manifest in the post-Cold War era.   
The absence of a ‘clear and present danger’ has brought about an 
intellectual ferment – and maybe even intellectual risk taking – that goes further to 
expose the extent to which even during the cold war, scholars may have lacked 
the intellectual initiative in the formation of coherent categories and concepts in 
the broader field of international security studies.  It appears to remain the case 
that, practitioners tease out the parameters of policy and academics are invited to 
the table downstream to this process to provide an intellectualist sheen, even a 
dispensable one, to the needs of practical action.  ‘Purpose which should logically 
follow analysis’, observes Carr, ‘is required to give it both its initial impulse and its 
direction’ (1964:2).  Yet, when brought aboard, one would expect scholars to 
benefit their lot by capturing as much of the bigger picture as is perceivable to 
enable them to subsequently shape the trend of thinking.  One can with 
justification doubt whether this ever happens, as evidenced by the direction that 




What has further complicated the situation is the meeting point of the levels 
of security analysis with the varieties of referent objects of security (Buzan, 1985).  
The idealist school of the Cold War era viewed the international system as the 
principal referent of security with a focus on systemic threats.  With the ending of 
the Cold War and the relative subsidence of systemic threats at least for the time 
being, the idealists have found themselves without an agenda and this has caused 
them to suffer a crisis, with some of them insisting that the field of international 
security studies should be confined to ‘…anything that concerns the prevention of 
superpower nuclear war’ (Lebow, 1988:508), even when it had become clear that 
such a prospect had become ever more remote.  For both ‘traditionalists’ and 
‘idealists’, this was a time of disorientation, but particularly so for the latter, whose 
agenda was exclusively system-centric, as opposed to the state-centric focus of the 
‘traditionalists’.  The immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War rendered the 
supra state or system level of security analysis and advocacy irrelevant, putting in 
question the status and even funding of the idealists.  Self-re-invention was at this 
stage the only option the idealists were left with.  This they did by switching their 
energies to the level of analysis below the state, in a move that amounted to 
operating behind the realists’ lines.  The result of this has been the emergence of 
what one may call the ‘neoidealists’, comprising the schools of thought associated 
with what is being called the ‘human-centric’ or society-centred security, the 
wideners/deepeners, and the securitisation theorists, proponents of feminist 
security studies and various strands of what is being called Critical Security 




Figure 1: Post-Cold War Concepts of International Security 
PERSPECTIVE FOCUS COUNTRY/REGION 
Conventional 
constructivism 
Stresses ideational factors (beliefs, norms, 
ideas, identity, culture) as opposed to 
material factors,  
Mainly in the US 
Critical 
Constructivism 
Focuses on other collectivities other than 
the state, stresses military security, 






Constructivist counterpoint to realist 
approaches, proponent of the ‘widening’ 




Related to Peace Research in its normative 
stance, and its emphasis on human 




Cuts across the non-realist approaches 
(post-structuralism, peace research, 
constructivism etc), women’s advocacy in 
gender studies, identifies militarism and its 
sustenance with masculinity  
Originated from the US 
and Britain, currently 
global 
Human Security Overlaps with Peace Research, seeks to 
merge security studies with Development 
Studies, emphasizes humans as the 
referent object of security, emphasizes 
poverty, underdevelopment, food 
insecurity, disease and human rights 
issues 
Canada, Norway, Japan 
(and EU & UN) 






Critique of Western-centrism of security 
studies, seeks a platform for Third world 
state formations and the effects of their 
historical linkages to the First World 
Western Europe, Sub -
Saharan Africa  
Poststructuralist 
Security Studies 
Looks at discursive approaches (as 
opposed to the ideational), sovereignty 
and security are products of political 
practices,   
Originated in North 
America, now strong in 
Europe 
Strategic Studies The military, covers war, nuclear 
proliferation, deterrence, arms and arms 
control 
Britain, US, France 
Realism Power politics, polarity, with overlaps with 
the concerns of strategic studies 
Mainly US, also in 
Euirope 





The emergence of the ‘neo-idealists’ and their attempt to create a new role for 
themselves has arguably been the primary cause of much of the conceptual haze 
that has engulfed the field of security analysis in the last two decades.  There can 
be no doubt that for the duration of the Cold War, it was necessary to uphold the 
system-centric agenda: The spectre of a nuclear conflagration was a threat to the 
whole international system; not only just to the individual superpowers that were 
ranged against each other.  A system-centric agenda was a necessary counterforce 
against, and an anti-thesis of state-centrism and the two were mutually 
dependent.  Without one, the other is superfluous.  That superfluity is currently 
highlighted by the turning of various issue areas at the intra-state or sub-state 
level either into threats or into referent objects of security by the idealists of 
yesterday in order to create a new agenda.  Part of the problem has arisen from 
what we refer to as a category mistake elsewhere.  As an example, it is fallacious 
to create such a category as ‘societal security’ in contradistinction to state security 
when in fact societies are one of the key defining futures of states.  The same 
goes for ‘human security’ which is always opposed to state and even regime 
security, just as if the latter two are constituted by non-humans.  Whatever the 
point some of these agendas are supposed to be making, thus far they have been 
unsuccessful.  Part of the explanation for this may be failures to grasp the 
parameters of security particularly by non-practitioners who are invited to be part 
of analysis long after ‘purpose’ has been determined.  A closer examination of the 
outline of the processes and practice of state-centric security management lays out 
those parameters.  It is not surprising that initiatives such as SSR that are 
supposedly based on the new ‘holistic’ approach to security have found themselves 
reduced by the force of realism, to an interpretation of the ‘security sector’ 
exclusively in terms of instruments of coercion.   
Within the realist tradition of security management, one finds four major 
variables namely: threats, interests, vulnerabilities and capabilities.    
• Threats are the exogenous factors, actors, processes and phenomena 
whose impact on the referent object of security (at whatever level of analysis, 
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whether state, regional, international or systemic) may result in the impairment of 
the functioning of the physical base of the referent object, its damage or 
dismemberment.  In this case, ‘exogenous’ is in relation to the referent object of 
security analysis.  In case the referent object is the state, threats ‘…can result in 
the distortion or destruction of the institutions, and….can repress, subvert or 
obliterate the idea of the state’ (Buzan, 1991:117).  The most obvious threats are 
of a military nature, as those that preoccupied security actors during the Cold War.    
 
• Interests are the core values and collective aspirations of the human 
community that constitutes the referent object of security, which that community 
would be willing to uphold at all costs, if necessary by resorting to armed action.   
 
• Vulnerabilities are the endogenous weaknesses of the referent object of 
security which not only make it possible for the threats to have their negative 
impact, but will also render it difficult to mobilize the human and material 
resources needed to neutralise the threats and to overcome internal weaknesses.  
Under vulnerabilities, one would include such factors as weak distribution systems, 
deficient institutions and low policy capacity, low levels of socio-political 
cohesiveness and others that are looked at in later sections of the study as we 
propose an alternative framework for development-related security studies.  Many 
of these are what are being called non-military threats.   
 
• Capabilities are the tangible and intangible assets or instruments available 
to those charged with formulating and implementing public policy to enable them 
to neutralise external threats, overcome internal subversion and lessen 
vulnerabilities; and to take measures for further broadening the range of 









Much of the agenda of post-Cold War security activism is derived from the 
erroneous recasting of vulnerabilities as threats, as identified by the state-centric 
national security management model.  Interpretation of societal vulnerabilities as 
threats is what is generally referred to as deepening and widening.  While these 
are being referred to as new approaches to security studies, they still fall squarely 
within the ambit of the realist approach, albeit, by referring to societal 
vulnerabilities as threats, which in our view stands out as a major distortion.  This 
distortion underpins some of the new approaches to security analysis that provide 
the conceptual basis for mainstream post-conflict and peacebuilding initiatives.  We 
shall look in detail at three of them, namely human security, ‘Securitisation Theory’ 
and the widening/ deepening agenda.   
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3.3 Security Sector Reform and the Human Security Agenda 
3.3.1. Origins and purpose of the Human Security framework  
As would be expected, Human Security has remained a central theme of the SSR 
debate right from the latter’s inception in the late 1990s, as an approach to 
peacebuilding and a key goal for the reform of security institutions.  It is, has 
remained as prominent as a reference point for peacebuilding indeed as it has 
been in most other frameworks that have gained prominence with the winding 
down of the Cold War.  Linking the end of the SSR, ‘Human Security’ and the 
ending of the Cold War, a UK Government-linked network note that advocates for 
reform of security institutions notes that,  
Since the end of the Cold War concerns have changed and security 
challenges have become more complex…the security agenda has broadened 
to include the well-being of populations and human rights, SSR being part 
of the wider ‘human security’ framework (2007:7).  
In one of their capstone publications on SSR, the OECD DAC note similarly that 
‘[T]he concept of SSR was influenced by the broader “human security” agenda’ 
with its focus on ‘…the protection of individuals’, as well as ensuring that 
‘…conditions required by people for their development are not limited to traditional 
matters like national defence and law and order, but rather incorporate broader 
political, economic and social issues that ensure a life free from risk and concern’ 
(OECD DAC, 2005:57).  According to the UN, Human security refers to ‘…first, 
safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it 
means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—
whether in homes, in jobs or in communities’ (1994:23).
51
  
                                        
51 To demonstrate the versatility and probably vagueness of the term of Human Security, The 
Global Development Research Centre (GDRC) has compiled a collection of its definition, available at 
http://www.gdrc.org/sustdev/husec/Definitions.pdf (accessed on 29 August 2011).  
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In the main, ‘Human Security’ gained currency as an analytical and policy 
tool in 1994 when the United Nations put it to use as a catchword for that year’s 
edition of the Human Development Report, and a totally new way of thinking 
about security.  To demonstrate the sense in which the substance of the report 
represented a fundamental shift in thinking about security, its authors linked its 
framework to the events of 1944 which, in Albert Einstein’s opinion left 
‘[E]verything changed’.  Along those lines, the United Nations rated the new 
conception of security as nothing short of a paradigm shift that necessitated that, 
those concerned were going to ‘...require a substantially new manner of thinking if 
mankind is to survive.’ Taking 1994 as a baseline, the United Nations employed 
Einstein’s tone to demonstrate how ‘…five decades later, we need another 
profound transition in thinking from nuclear security to human security’ (UNDP, 
1994: 22), in a sense, turning the ‘human’ and the ‘nuclear’ elements into logical 
equivalents.  The UNDP’s enthusiasm for human security activism therefore stems 
directly from the euphoria over the end of the Cold War.   
Not many years later, it was adapted and promoted by the Canadian and 
Norwegian governments ‘…as a new leitmotif in foreign policy’ (Suhrke, 1999:265).  
Yet, to some, it is viewed as part of the effort to redirect the minds of actors and 
commentators on world affairs, away from the thinking that dominated the 
discourse on international relations throughout the Cold War Period.  Those new 
directions may be what Chandler highlights in his remark regarding the 
inauguration of the ‘Human Security’.  He has noted that, it ‘…is often written in 
terms that pose the centrality of the struggle between traditional, state-based, 
interest-based approaches and new, deterritorialized, values-based approaches 
that focus on individual human needs (2008:427).  But even that may not be new 
in International Relations debate.  Paris has likened it to other frameworks before 
it, including ‘common security’, ‘cooperative security’, ‘global security’, and 
‘comprehensive security’ to which one can add ‘responsibility to protect’, 
‘humanitarian intervention’, or Bigo’s ‘globalization of insecurity’ (2006: 389) and 
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Shaw’s ‘common-risk society’ (2000); referring to such formulations as part of a 
series of neologisms ‘…that encourage policy makers and scholars to think about 
international security as something more than the military defence of state 
interests and national territory’ (Paris, 2001:87).
52
   
In spite of its apparent novelty, the general substance of the human 
security agenda as it relates to the Third World was initially enunciated even much 
earlier than the UN.  In her 1987 publication, Caroline Thomas noted that,  
[S]ecurity in the context of the Third world does not simply refer to the 
military dimension as it is often assumed in Western discussions of the 
concept, but to the whole range of dimensions of a state’s existence which 
are already taken care of in the more developed states, especially those of 
the West…[F]or example the search for internal security of the state 
through nation-building, secure systems of food, health money and trade as 
well as the search for security through nuclear weapons (1987:1).   
 In what has to be an explicit reinforcement of the concerns of scholars who 
suggest that the widening and broadening of the security agenda ‘…runs the risk 
of making the concept too elastic as to detract seriously from its utility as analytical 
tool’ (Ayoob, 1991: 259), the UN report gives the major od human security ‘…how 
people live and breathe in a society’ (1994:22).  The UNDP gives a snapshot of a 
survey of people’s understanding of the concept of human security that sums it up 
as unmanageably relativist and dependent ‘…very much on their [respondents’] 
immediate circumstances.’  A sample of the notions of security that informs the UN 
human security agenda includes, the possession of friends, fear of foreign 
invasion; a case where ‘…security is only in the name of the Lord who has made 
heaven and earth…liberty to worship whom I like, how I like….’, liberty to walk the 
streets at night without being raped; enough for the children to eat; immunity to 
robberies, for a girl to be married and have someone to depend on, for one’s job 
                                        
52 Roland Paris (2001), ‘Human Security Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?’ International Security, Vol. 26, 
No. 2, pp. 87–102.  Other neologisms include common security, global security, cooperative 
security and comprehensive security. 
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and position to be safe,  faith in tomorrow, free education, greatness of god and 
his capacity to watch over people, among others.   
On their part, the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun authored a report 
entitled The Responsibility to Protect.  The report focused on the responsibilities 
states have for their citizenry.  It refers to human security as,  
‘…the security of people – their physical safety, their economic and social 
well-being, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the 
protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (2001) 
3.3.2. Human Security as an aspect of ‘state-centric’ security 
An examination of the literature on human security reveals how nearly every 
challenge that an individual or group can face, is characterised as a ‘threat’.  They 
are all placed on the same laundry list ‘…as if the costs (immediate and long term) 
and probabilities (present and future) of each were the same’ (Hampson, 2008: 
238).  Those ‘threats’ were summed up well by the UNDP: 
With the dark shadows of the cold war receding, one can now see that 
many conflicts are within nations rather than between nations.  For most 
people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than 
from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Will they and their families 
have enough to eat? Will they lose their jobs? Will their streets and 
neighbourhoods be safe from crime? Will they be tortured by a repressive 
state? Will they become a victim of violence because of their gender? Will 
their religion or ethnic origin target them for persecution? In the final 
analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not 
spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in 
violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern 
with weapons-it is a concern with human life and dignity (1994:22). 
For purposes of this study, and as  already stated, threats can best be understood 
in relation to a specific referent object of security, which, as it were, is being 
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threatened.  As noted, threats are those factors, actors, processes and phenomena 
whose impact or action on the referent object of security is such as to significantly 
undermine the stable and sustainable existence of that object.  According to that 
conception, threats are necessarily external to the referent object of security.  A 
key distortion in the post-Cold War. 
3.3.3. Limitations of the human security framework 
The human security debate, like much of the activism of the post-cold war era is 
influenced by the liberal assumption of the protection of individual rights to life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and their protection by what has come to be 
called the international community (Lauren, 2011; Morsink, 1998).  Within the field 
of security studies, the focus on the liberal doctrine of individualism is manifested 
by urge to shift the research, advocacy and policy focus from ‘state-centric’ to 
‘human-centric’ security, both of them equally hazy in conceptual terms.  This 
thinking finds succinct expression in the view expressed by Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy 
to the effect that,  
With human security [the individual ‘qua person’, rather than ‘qua citizen’] 
becomes the ultimate actor taken into account. His/her security is the 
ultimate goal, to which all instruments and political actors are subordinated. 
Elevating the person as the ultimate end is made possible by defining this 
new actor in terms of his/her vulnerabilities on the one hand, and his/her 
capacity to affect change on the other (2007: 13). 
That extreme expression of the liberal doctrine would make the whole notion of 
security an impossibility given the diverse security concerns of ‘Individuals qua 
persons’.  Standardisation and homogenisation of those security concerns is 
unattainable, so is the ‘ultimate actor’ to whom all ‘instruments and political actors 
are subordinated’, just as if the political actors themselves are ruled out as 
prospective ‘ultimate actors’ in their own right as individuals.  It is that underlying 
circularity of liberal individualism that renders it essentially nonsensical, a point 
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recognised by those like Amartya Sen who in his Development as Freedom takes 
note of the fact that although he advocates for the ‘human-centred’ approach, the 
real world will always involve political processes of collective decision-making, 
choices and policy trade-offs (1999: 32–33).   
Human security is an offshoot of that commonly talked about shift.  One of 
its major consequences has been the problematic and unrealistic presentation of 
the individual as a referent object of security in contradistinction to the state.  This 
is an obvious category mistake borne out of the tendency of liberal 
fundamentalism to overemphasis the individual even when the individual is 
logically subsumed by the categories that the liberal discourse attempts to run 
away from, that is, the state and the nation.  Overemphasis of the individual in 
human security activism has taken criticism from Buzan who rightly observes that, 
‘…individuals are not free standing but only take their meaning from the societies 
in which they operate: they are not some kind of bottom line to which all else can 
and should be reduced or subordinated’ (2004: 369).   
On the analytical robustness (or lack thereof) of human security, Newman 
notes that the term is ‘…a normatively attractive but analytically weak concept’ 
(2004:359), in the same vein with Buzan who views it as a ‘…reductionist, idealistic 
notion that adds little analytical value’ (2004:369).  Suhrke has simply described it 
as a stalled initiative (2004:365), while according to Chandler it is ‘...the dog that 
didn’t bark’ (2008:428).  Of broader concern, the term has been noted for its lack 
of a precise definition, in a manner that Paris has compared to another common 
neologism in development studies, ‘sustainable development’.  By encompassing 
an expansive assortment of issues, ranging from immunity to violent attack from 
whatever source, to sanity, the term has been rendered conceptually amorphous.  
As a result, ‘…it provides policy makers with little guidance in the prioritization of 
competing policy goals and academics little sense of what, exactly, is to be 
studied.’ (Paris, 2001:88).  Similarly, Suhrke notes that, ‘…the term permits many 
interpretations, and those who promote it are still struggling to formulate an 
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authoritative and consensual definition.  Yet, as Paris goes on to show, this 
amorphousness is not accidental.  The term is ‘slippery by design’ and strategically 
ambiguous, crafted as an expansible multi-hook rack capable of accommodating 
the diverse agendas of state actors, particularly the middle powers, single issue 
NGOs, and development agencies and advocacy of an idealist orientation, and with 
disinclination to engage issues on their own terms.  By eschewing precision, the 
crafters of the human security framework have rendered it capable of 
accommodating diverse perspectives and varied objectives, albeit at the cost of its 
utility as a conceptual and policy guide.   
The concept’s vagueness seems to be allowing – at least for the time being 
– for diverse and convenient interpretations by commentators, advocacy groups 
and academics, so much so that its role and resonance is likely to endure in those 
circles because of, rather than in spite of, its rather imprecise conception.  This 
may not easily apply to policy.  ‘Practitioners, hard-pressed to prevent the crises 
not already exploding on CNN, and to cope with crises under way,’ writes 
Hampson, ‘show understandable impatience with scholarship that renders any 
problem more complicated – or worse, that does not evidently address any 
problem at all (2008:243).   
Quite like SSR, human security activism has also been unfavourably 
described as a bandwagon whose promoters ‘…see an opportunity to capture some 
of the more substantial political interest and superior financial resources…’ that up 
to the end of the Cold War, were associated with more traditional, military 
conceptions of security, and now in a new era, were being redeployed to other 
purposes and new forms of campaigning.  In effect, the proponents of the agenda 
are seen to be pursuing a political strategy of deploying or even appropriating the 
term ‘security’ in a what may amount to a manipulative manner, that conveys 
urgency, demands public attention, and commands governmental resources, very 
much akin to what the term ‘National Security’ achieved during the Cold War, or 
‘Homeland Security’ in the wake of 9/11.   
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3.3.4. Human security and the limits of middle power diplomacy 
So appealing was the rhetorical power of the term that even the Group of Eight 
(G8) foreign ministers employed it in some of its declarations.  In June of 1999 
they affirmed that they were ‘…determined to fight the underlying causes of 
multiple threats to human security...’,
53
  but even in that case, this was the voice 
of a Middle Power representative.  Human security activism has indeed remained a 
foreign policy tool for middle powers.  Perhaps what stands out as one of its major 
irony is the promoters declared intent to promote ‘human-centric’ as opposed to  
‘state-centric’ security, yet in reality, and in realist logic, it is a bandwagon at the 
service of particular states in their search for a niche on the world stage.  What 
does not escape notice is the nature of the countries that have picked interest in 
the Human Security agenda as a foreign policy issue: They are mainly the middle 
and small powers.  In attendance at the bilateral meeting that formally launched 
the drive in May 1998 were foreign ministers of Norway, Canada, Austria, Chile, 
Greece, Ireland, Jordan, the Netherlands, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland and 
Thailand, with the first two as champions of the process.  Norway’s and Canada’s 
meeting of minds and their long-standing evocation of a foreign policy based on 
‘progressive values’, has been the driver of the agenda.  And this is not recent.  
From the 1960s, there was already Norwegian-Canadian co-operation on United 
Nations peacekeeping and the Oslo-Ottawa axis, while the 1970s saw the 
emergence of the so-called ‘like-minded’
54
 states of the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) that sought to compensate for their low rank 
in the international pecking order by asserting that for them, international power 
lies in the promotion of powerful ideas (Suhrke, 1999, p.266), and to be ‘…policy 
                                        
53 Lloyd Axworthy, "An Address On Human Security," Minister Of Foreign Affairs, To The G-8 
Foreign Ministers' Meeting, 9 June 1999. 
54 The intersection between the promoters of the human security agenda like-minded states is 
therefore not surprising.  The latter include Canada, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and 
Switzerland, all belonging to the Human Security Network. 
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entrepreneurs in pursuit of ethical outcomes in the international arena’ (Ravenhill, 
1998:309).  As would be expected, they are united by ‘…a considerable overlap of 
interests in their foreign policies’ (Kothbauer-Liechtenstein and Kongshem, 2005: 
90).   
In all this, the very future of human security activism (just like that of SSR 
with which it is linked by way of conceptual symbiosis) has to be doubted, 
particularly in light of the contingent factors that have contributed to its 
emergence.  As an initial concern, countries that are instrumental in promoting the 
human security agenda are doing so principally because of their power ranking 
globally.  It is conceivable that an agenda that is promoted on that basis could 
easily become an ‘orphan’ if the promoters’ priorities change, such as would 
happen if their ranking radically improved, therefore necessitating that the 
promoters will subsequently be preoccupied with concerns that are commensurate 
with their new ranking.  The same applies if the promoters suffer a slump in their 
global ranking, becoming lesser powers or to use Wight’s terms, if they become 
either vassal-states or jackal-states (1979:169).  It is not hard to imagine how 
many international agendas were smothered by the demise of the Former Soviet 
Union and with it, the Warsaw Pact; nor is it difficult to visualise how many of 
Beijing’s pet international concerns will be jettisoned as China’s global ranking 
soars.  Elsewhere in the study, we point out the sustainability risks faced by 
initiatives such as SSR that were inaugurated as part of the euphoria over the end 
of the Cold War.   
In the particular instance of human security, Canadian activism on matters 
of humanitarianism coincided with the country’s election as a non-permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council.  As Suhrke has observed, 
idiosyncratic factors add to contingent factors to account for the ebb and tide of 
human security activism.  Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy was an early 
advocate of ‘soft power’ from his days as an academic, an approach that he 
pursued as a legislator by advocating for economic sanctions rather force to be in 
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the world’s trouble spots, a view he backed up with demands for far-reaching 
defence cuts.       
3.4 Securitization Theory 
3.4.1. Debatable founding premises: security as non-politics  
‘Securitization Theory’ is a recent addition to security studies literature, having 
been formulated by a group of scholars focusing on a collective research agenda 
dubbed the ‘Copenhagen School’, based at the now-defunct Conflict and Peace 
Research Institute (COPRI) in Copenhagen.  As noted by MacDonald, the 
Copenhagen School ‘…constitutes the most concerted attempt to develop a theory 
framework for the study of security in the constructivist tradition’ (2008:68).  
Without explicitly acknowledging their constructivist roots, the proponents of 
Securitization Theory claim to have based it on linguistics, specifically referring to 
JL Austin’s ‘Speech Act Theory’, a claim that raises many important questions as 
we demonstrate later.  According to their questionable interpretation of ‘Speech 
Act Theory’, the Copenhagen School looks at security as a speech act.  To the 
Copenhagen School, the elite require emergency powers and in order to get such 
powers, they employ certain ‘speech acts’ to convince their audience, partly or 
wholly constituting the group whose security is presented by the elite as being 
threatened.  Threats and with them, insecurity, are subjective: ‘…the content of 
security is malleable….anything can potentially be viewed as a threat’ (McDonald, 
2008:71); all that is required is ‘…the designation of an existential threat requiring 
emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a 
significant audience’ (Buzan et al., 1998:27).     
While it would be considered natural and indeed, inescapable to situate 
security-related matters at the centre of politics and as would be expected, to 
conceptualise such matters as strictly political, the securitisation framework has in 
some way taken security a matter that is extra-political, or a breaker of rules of 
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politics; and a ‘move’ that places issues above politics.  According to the 
Copenhagen School, the ends of security policy seem to be the action of employing  
‘exceptional political measures’: ‘[w]hen an issue is successfully presented as an 
existential threat, it legitimises the use of exceptional political measures’ (Peoples 
and Vaughn-Williams, 2010:76)  In a similar tone, Buzan et al. note that, 
‘”Security”’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the 
game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics’ 
(1998:23).  To sum up the process of securitization, they observe that  
[A]ny public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from 
nonpoliticized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any 
other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized 
(meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision 
and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal 
governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential 
threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the 
normal bounds of political procedure).
55
     
Such an interpretation leaves unanswered many important theoretical and practical 
questions on the broader relationship between politics and security.  First, looked 
at in conjunction with the foregoing description of ‘securitisation’, that statement 
presents us with what is arguably a misleading continuum founded on a 
contestable assumption.   According to Securitization Theory, it would seem that 
when an issue is given priority or urgency by decision makers, or when an issue is 
placed high on the political agenda, then it has been, or has become ‘politicised’ as 
Figure 3 (below) shows. 
Figure 3: The Politicisation-Securitization ‘Model’ 





Even if we disregard what would otherwise be a valid objection to the use of the 
term ‘politicisation’, namely that, in its correct usage, it applies to the infusion of 
issues with emotive flavour, its general use in the securitization context is still 
disputable.  Secondly, implied in that false continuum is a false categorisation that 
assumes the existence of two classes of public policy issues: those that are of 
political interest and those that are of security interest.  As pointed out already, 
security lies squarely within the realm of politics and any attempt to set the two 
apart can only be fallacious.  Underscoring security concerns is as much of politics 
as organising an election just as prioritization of a security policy emergency is as 
much of mainstream politics as paying attention to any other policy concern in 
other areas of public policy.  To construe prioritization of a policy issue as 
politicisation, as is evident with the securitisation framework is above all else, 
misleading.   
Moreover, reference to ‘nonpoliticised’ issues that are not of state interest 
and politicised issues that concern government or communal governance interest 
also raises questions regarding how securitisation theorists conceptualise the 
‘state’ and ‘government’, especially given the understanding that government is a 
subset of the state.  Since, as already noted elsewhere, the state encompasses a 
population, the territory occupied by that population and the government presiding 
over them, there can be no issue worth talking about that will not be of state 
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interest, unless we are to adopt the rather common error of conflating government 
with the state and to subsume all levels of state government under the central 
government.  If the importance, urgency or scope of an issue is of such limited 
magnitude that it can be effectively handled by a local government, it does not 
exclude it from the list of issues handled by the government.  Local government is 
just one level of government, as opposed to central government.  By implication, 
all such issues as those handled government at whatever level are issues of state 
concern and just because they are handled by local government and not the 
central government, it does not make them non-political.  This securitisation 
framework seems not to consider that point as important.  
The framing of Securitization Theory would probably have benefitted from 
some consideration for the real-world setting in which policy issues are ranked in a 
hierarchy ranging from those that fall within the scope of what has been called 
‘low politics’ to those that belong to ‘high politics’.  This, in our view, is superior to 
the ‘politicised’/’non-politicised’/‘securitised’ sliding scale, which, in any case is 
logically incoherent.  By ‘high politics’ we mean matters to do with the existence of 
the state, particularly, ‘issues of state security and sovereignty’ (Clemens, 
1998:539), while ‘low politics’ involves issues that ‘tend to be dealt with by the 
bureaucracy employing standard operating procedures’ (Evan and Newnham, 
1998:310).     
3.4.2. Securitization or Threat Construction? 
Typical of all approaches to analysis that come under the rubric of constructivism, 
securitisation has also sought to stress the obvious that one would normally have 
expected to require no emphasis: that all social phenomena and all objects of 




One can view ‘security’ as that which is in language theory called a speech 
act:…it is the utterance itself that is the act… By saying ‘security’ a state 
representative moves the particular case into a specific area; claiming a 




He reiterates the same statement by noting that,  
The major premise of ‘Securitisation Theory’ is that security is a ‘speech 
act’.  Accordingly, the very uttering the word ‘security’ is tantamount to 
something being done.  ‘It is by labelling something a security issue that it 
becomes one’ (2004: 13). 
Wæver traces the emergence of the Copenhagen School to the debates of the 
1970s and 1980s dwelling on the question of wide versus narrow conception of 
security in which the so-called traditionalists insisted that ‘…indiscriminate 
broadening of the definition of security threatens to make the concept so elastic as 
to render it useless as an analytical tool’ (Ayoob, 1997:121; 1995:9-10).  To 
counter that view, the would-be founders of the Copenhagen School argued that 
the conception of security lay in understanding what makes a security issue a 
security issue.  Thus Wæver noted that, ‘[T]he real functions of the term, the 
powers of the concept, are found where it is employed in political 
practice….Language users implicitly follow rules for what is seen as meaningful 
statements’ (Wæver, 2004).  To understand what security is takes only 
‘…analysing actual linguistic practices to see what regulates discourse’, so he adds.     
What we have in Securitization Theory is a typical case of the pitfalls of the 
postmodernist, who one can easily fit into Phillip Guedella’s characterisation of 
Mahan innovative thinking on sea power: ‘…if Mahan discovered nothing in 
particular, he discovered it very well’.
57
  As part of the postmodernist discourse 
and when looked at particularly in the context of its usefulness in shedding light on 
                                        
56 Cited in Buzan, 1991; p.17. 
57 Cited in Millis; 1981, p.162.   
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the challenges of the underdeveloped countries of the Global South, Securitisation 
Theory fits in well with David Simon’s evaluation of Postmodernism as: 
[Y]et another fashionable Northern paradigm, which finds expression mainly 
in aesthetic/architectural terms, and as playful, leisured heterodoxes and 
new forms of consumption centred on individualism which can best be 
described as self-indulgence by the well-off.  Such pre-occupations are seen 
as irrelevant to the Global South, if not actually harmful in terms of 
distracting attention from survival and ‘development’ agendas and the 
macro-processes which impact on them (2008: 121).   
The Copenhagen School may only have managed to found an elaborate and quasi-
intellectual expression for the cynicism with which politically engaged constituents 
the world over, hold the elite who commit countries for all sorts of reasons to 
costly ventures, including warfare, that may have little to do with protecting broad 
national interest or even countering any specific threat.  A writer in the 
securitisation tradition has thus noted that, ‘…we think of something as a security 
issue because the elite, such as political leaders, have convinced us that it 
represents a threat to our very survival’ (Collins, 2007:6).  The question that 
should have been posed by members of the Copenhagen School is to do with what 
it is in the audiences of security elite that makes them sufficiently gullible as to be 
‘convinced’.  There are many ways of accounting for this without having to resort 
to abstruse theorising.  Partly, the reasons lie with the phenomenon that was 
summed up succinctly by Hermann Goering during the Nuremberg trials in his 
observation that, 
It is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a 
democracy, or a fascist dictatorship, or a parliament, or a communist 
dictatorship. Voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the 
bidding of their leaders. That is easy. All you have to tell them is that they 
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are being attacked and denounce the peacemakers for lack of patriotism 
and exposing the country to danger. It works the same in any country.
58
  
Waever and the Copenhagen School, just like Goering are simply shedding light on 
the credulousness or even passivity of political constituents, or even plain abuse of 
power by those entrusted with the management of public affairs, by the use of 
manipulation and fabrication of illusions of imminent catastrophe in order to satisfy 
certain agendas that may have little to do with the collective good, akin to the 
‘…insincerity in both domestic and foreign affairs which permeates not only 
avowed motives but also probably the conscious motives of the actors themselves’ 
(Schumpeter, 1951:51).  That is a timeless tendency as Schumpeter further notes 
in regard to the Roman Empire, in much the same way as he would if he observed 
the elite of any of the contemporary powers:  
There was no corner of the known world where some interest was not 
alleged to be in danger or under actual attack. If the interests were not 
Roman, they were those of Rome’s allies; and if Rome had no allies, then 
allies would be invented. When it was utterly impossible to contrive such an 
interest—why, then it was the national honour that had been insulted. The 
fight was always invested with an aura of legality. Rome was always being 
attacked by evil-minded neighbours, always fighting for a breathing-space. 
The whole world was pervaded by a host of enemies, and it was manifestly 
Rome’s duty to guard against their indubitably aggressive designs.
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It is according to that thinking that some have interpreted the ease with which, for 
example, the ‘Soviet threat’ of the Cold War era was very easily substituted for by 
the threat of ‘Rogue states’ following the former’s demise, let alone the envisaging 
of an approaching ‘clash of civilisations’.  Similarly, such terms as ‘the threat of 
peace’ have been coined by critiques of militarism and the Military-Industrial 
Complex to reflect the intricacies of the processes of decision making in the arena 
of strategic security that ‘Securitisation Theory’ accounts for only secondarily and 
                                        




even then, unintentionally.  At the same time, the process of governmental 
decision making is probably never as offhand as it is portrayed by securitization 
theory.   
3.4.3. Securitisation Theory as mutilation of the Austinian Speech Act 
Closer scrutiny of the basic outline of Securitization Theory reveals its exclusive (if 
contrived) link with Speech Act Theory (hereinafter SAT), from which it claims to 
derive its parentage.  It may not be far-fetched to suggest that that the academics 
of the Copenhagen School coined what they considered to be a novel analytical 
approach but found themselves faced with the difficulty of formalising it and 
lending it a modicum of theoretical clout.  The solution to that challenge seems to 
have been found in linking their new theory to an existing authority, preferably in 
linguistics, a field whose elasticity seems to serve the purposes of most theorists 
with connections to postmodernism.  We argue that the gist and thrust of SAT has 
little to do with the relativity of constructivism; as well as the subjectivism that 
characterises postmodernism, as exemplified by Securitization Theory.   
An examination of the underlying premises of SAT would enable one to 
establish whether its adoption to the purposes of the constructivism of the 
securitisation framework helps in any way to furnish it with a philosophical anchor; 
and whether indeed securitisation theorists have put SAT to legitimate use.  With 
‘Securitisation Theory’ in mind, it can be made as a general observation that the 
many schools of thought that come under the banner of constructivism will 
continue to face the insurmountable challenge of identifying an epistemological 
trellis on which to hang their theoretical formulations, a fact we can account for by 
pointing out the rationalist pedigree of constructivism and other approaches that 
lay claim to being ideational.  Whether they are aware of it or not, the subscribers 
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to those schools are, by virtue of their rationalist and by implication,
60
 their 
antipositivist roots, inherently eclectic, which condemns rationalism and all its 
offshoots, to clasping at any theoretical formulation in sight, that can provide a 
badly need conceptual bulwark, even when such a formulation may in fact be, 
sensu stricto, suited to a rival school of thought.   
SAT was initially developed by JL Austin over the course of his brief career, 
intending it to be an improvement on positivist philosophy of language and this is 
where one already identifies the fundamental pitfall of any rationalist formulation 
that seeks to appropriate SAT.  Austin’s effort to formulate SAT was focused on 
enabling positivist linguistics to cover additional uses of language other than the 
mere making of truth-apt factual assertions.  It was Austin’s view that up to his 
time, the exclusive employment of language was for purposes of description, also 
called by him the ‘communicative’, ‘declarative’ or ‘informative-reporting’ function.  
To Austin, this was an underuse of language.   He therefore set out to develop a 
theory that could account for other uses of language that fell outside the scope of 
communicative or informative reporting.  His most important statement on SAT 
appeared in a posthumous publication, ‘How to Do Things with Words’, which as 
we show, has been abused in the development of ‘Securitisation Theory’.   
SAT was designed to cover utterances that were neither descriptive 
(constative), nor nonsensical, such as those one would encounter in most 
metaphysics.  SAT covers utterances that ‘…have, as it happens, humdrum verbs 
in the first person singular present indicative active’ (Austin, 1955:5); but whose 
utterance ‘…is, or is a part of, the doing of an action…’
61
  It is important to note 
that Austin’ underlines the verb as the figure of speech around which his theory 
was centred, a point that has been disregarded in its entirety by the Copenhagen 
                                        
60 It should be noted that, by referring to rationalism here and elsewhere in the study we mean 
the view that ‘...the only necessary truths about the world which are known to us are known 




School.  The examples employed by Austin emphasize that crucial point; but 
interestingly, Waever employs the same examples as he outlines the background 
to ‘Securitisation Theory’ but only stops at that.  Waever, like Austin in his original 
statement on SAT uses such statements as 'I do’, as uttered in the course of a 
marriage ceremony, 'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth', 'I give and bequeath’ 
in making a statement of inheritance, 'I bet’, among other expressions.  By making 
those utterances, it is recognised that the speaker is not describing anything or 
merely announcing what is being done, but is actually ‘doing’.  By the act of 
speech, an action is being performed (hence the ‘Speech Act’); and just as well, 
since the very process of speech that interested Austin centres on an action 
symbol, or verb (‘give’, ‘do’, ‘bet’, ‘bequeath’) and no other figure of speech.  It is 
that which makes Austin call such utterances collectively, performative utterances, 
or just ‘performatives’, ‘…in which to say something is to do something, or in 
saying something we do something…’ 
62
  This is what Austin refers to as the 
illocutionary act, the building block of a speech act, to be distinguished from 
performing an act by saying or locution.  
 It is necessary to stress that distinction as a way of pointing out where the 
proponents of ‘Securitisation Theory’ start to misunderstand SAT.  What has been 
taken to be the ‘speech act’ is the mere physical act of saying something or 
making an utterance, or as Austin has called it, making a full unit of speech.  This 
is merely of interest for grammarians and phoneticians or even speech 
pathologists, but not in any way philosophers.  Moreover, the securitisation 
theorists further diverge from the real nature of the illocutionary act by applying it 
to a term such as ‘security’ that happens to be an inappropriate figure of speech, 
given that it is a mass noun, and therefore does not refer to any action.  As an 
example of the sense in which a speech act is misconstrued by securitisation 
theorists merely as the physical action of making an utterance, Waever writes that,   
                                        
62 Ibid, p.94 
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In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something 
more real; the utterance itself is the act.  By saying it something is done (as 
in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship).  By uttering ‘security’, a state 
representative moves a particular development into a specific area and 
thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block 
it (1995:55).   
 Clearly, there is no logical equivalence between uttering the symbol ‘security’ and 
uttering a statement such as ‘I bet’ or I suggest’.  It is important to highlight this 
point because by demonstrating the essential unseemliness of ‘Securitisation 
Theory’, it may be possible to eliminate it as a putative conceptual tool given that, 
just like the other constructivist approaches it only contributes to the cluttering of 
the field of security analysis.   
What we see then is that, for all cases of illocutionary acts which interest 
the speech act theorist, ‘…the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an 
action -it is not normally thought of as just saying something.’
63
 In line with that, 
Austin identifies two characteristics of utterances that fall under the category of 
performatives.  First, as hinted at above, those utterances do not 'describe' or 
'report' or constate anything at all and therefore, cannot be 'true or false'.  
Secondly, the uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, 
which again would not normally be described as merely saying something.  Looked 
at in basic linguistic terms, those two attributes shed some light on the kernel of a 
speech act as an embodiment of an action, a state or an occurrence, in other 
words, a verb.  In their urge to craft a sophisticated theory, the Copenhagen 
School have disregarded those two constitutive attributes of all speech acts.
64
  
                                        
63 Ibid, p. 7 
64 A later reformulation of SAT by John Searle, one of Austin’s students further highlights the 
shortcomings of the securitisation framework.  Searle furnishes a classification of illocutionary acts 
that literally eliminates the speech act as understood by the Copenhagen School.  His classification 
consists of five clusters namely,  assertives which commit a speaker to the truth of something as 
stated in a proposition such as reciting a creed; directives that require the hearer to take a 
particular action e.g., an order or a request; commissives, committing a speaker to a future action 
as would be the case with promises and oaths; expressives which carry the speaker's attitudes and 
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Given that SAT is not merely about playing around with words, but rather, about 
the effects on human behaviour of the deployment of certain verbs, ‘How to do 
things with Verbs’ would have probably been a more appropriate title for Austin’s 
book, not least, because it would have immunised his important work against what 
has now become widespread misinterpretation.   
In the process of extending the scope of SAT to make it cover the 
securitisation discourse, the Copenhagen School has in our view, erroneously 
assumed that Austin’s attempt to give conceptual life to utterances that fall outside 
the fold of the description of objective reality implies that he was attempting to 
craft a theory that can be put to the service of the relativist and subjective 
doctrines that dominate constructivism.  The Copenhagen School is not alone in 
holding this mistaken assumption but it even then it appears to have given rise to 
the most widespread gross misinterpretation of Austin’s theory, and to that extent, 
it may have no role to play in buttressing frameworks such as SSR.   
 
 SSR as the New Variant of Civil-Military Relations 
4.1 Introduction 
Although SSR has been generally promoted as a novel field of policy and 
scholarship, even the most cursory examination of the issues that dominate its 
agenda reveals it to be a rebranded version of the civil-military relations (CMR) 
discourse of the two decades spanning from the 1950s, but without the sparse 
theory that the latter had managed to garner during its heyday.  One can only 
speculate that practitioners and policy makers in the field of development seem to 
have wished to distance themselves from the many controversies and 
                                                                                                                        
emotions e.g. congratulations; and declaratives which have the impact changing the reality in 
accordance with the message declaration, e.g. christenings, solemnisations of marriages.  None of 
these cases is an act of mere of utterance of just any figure of speech as would be suggested by 
the Copenhagen School.   
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incoherencies of CMR theory.  However, the attempt by SSR promoters to distance 
themselves from CMR can only go so far, as evidenced by the similarity between 
the vision of standard SSR programmes and the goals that CMR was intended to 
achieve.   
Mission statements of the multitude of SSR-related NGOs that have 
emerged in the last decade and a half demonstrate overlaps with the issues that 
preoccupied civil-military theorists.  For example, the Geneva-based DCAF 
(Democratic Control of Armed Forces) one of the leading promoters of SSR lists 
among its areas of concern, civil society capacity building, intelligence governance, 
parliamentary oversight, defence reform and human rights and the rule of law 
among others.  Similarly, the United Kingdom Department for International 
Development refers to ‘….helping to secure a security sector of appropriate scale 
that is properly accountable to democratic, civilian authorities.’
65
  Such are the 
concerns that have lain at the heart of the civil military relations debate ever since 
it emerged as a field of policy and scholarship in the 1950s.   
As Chuter (2006) has observed, SSR ‘…is the bastard child of Civil-Military 
Relations and Development Studies’.  That parentage remains evident in much of 
the debate on SSR especially in its application to Sub-Saharan African countries 
that have been ravaged by long-term civil strife.  There is no doubt as to the 
inception and mission of development studies; however, it is questionable whether 
the socio-political circumstances and pressures that led to the emergence civil-
military relations as a field of policy and scholarship are ever put into consideration 
by those that continue calling upon its precepts and assumptions to fashion new 
frameworks in development policy.  It is therefore necessary to give a brief 
background of the early beginnings of the CMR debate to establish whether there 
will be much to gain by its direct importation in whatever guise, into the security 
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and development debate; and whether indeed that may not further compound the 
extensive conceptual muddle of the discourse on security and development.   
The civil–military relations debate made its initial appearance in the United 
States after World War II when political scientists started taking serious interest in 
the military institution.  That interest was prompted by fears over the likely 
consequences of a sense of triumphalism and self-assertiveness by the American 
military in the wake of their successes in Europe and beyond, but more so, the 
anxieties caused by the assertiveness of individual generals.  Closer to the 
American homeland, there was also the factor of the ubiquity of military regimes 
particularly in Latin America.  Furthermore, the years that followed the end of WWI 
saw the emergence on the world scene of a set of newly independent, if highly 
unstable states in Asia and Africa which did not take long to fall under the charge 
of military juntas, as civilian governments succumbed to coups d’état.  Under such 
circumstances, scholars and commentators grew curious over whether there was a 
global tendency for the military to aspire for political power.  It is then that policy 
analysts, scholars and practitioners in the United States were prompted to 
speculate that the spectre of praetorianism was hovering over their motherland.
66
  
The questions and soul searching prompted scholars to carry systematic analysis of 
the nature of the relations between the armed forces and the civil authority and 
hence, the inception of CMR as a branch of scholarship and public policy.   
From its birth, CMR has been saddled by major deficiencies, three of which 
need highlighting.  First, as Huntington (1957: vii) has noted, ‘[t]he study of civil-
military relations has suffered from too little theorizing.’    This view is supported 
                                        
66 In 1949, the first Hoover Commission noted that, one of the purposes for strengthening the 
‘means of exercising civilian control’ over the defense establishment was to ‘safeguard our 
democratic traditions against militarism', a tone that was reflected four years later by the warning 
sounded by the report of the Rockefeller Committee on defense organization in 1953.  That 
committee noted that, while it was important to devise means of securing the country in a cost-
effective way that had to be achieved ‘without danger to our free institutions, based on the 




by Bland in his observation that, if CMR theory is to have universal appeal and 
utility, it: 
Should address the problems of civil-military relations within one model; be 
transferable to any state/political model – e.g., democracy or autocracy; 
explain changes in civil-military relations within states over time and those 
caused by specific circumstances and events.  Finally the theory should be 
falsifiable (1999: 9). 
The paradox of Huntington’s observation though is that, it is him that has received 
most criticism over the deficiencies of his pioneering work on civil military relations 
which gave no coverage whatsoever for the reality in the countries whose 
historical experience was not in accord with that of the liberal democracies, most 
especially the United States, his major concern.  For example, Allbright draws our 
attention to Huntington’s ‘sketchy’ references to Japan.  He notes that,  
The concrete data base from which Huntington generalized was essentially 
Western, and especially American, experience. Although he did talk about 
civil-military relations in Japan, he used the Japanese case simply to show 
the applicability of his theory to non-Western contexts; he did not employ 
Japanese experience either to derive his conceptualization or to test it 
(1980:557).     
The same could be said of the coverage that Huntington gave to the communist 
states and others in the Third World (particularly states presided over by leftist 
guerrilla organisations) that got their inspiration from the ideals of Leninism and 
Maoism.  Huntington’s subsequent study of 1968 incisively addressed some of 
those initial deficiencies but that did not placate some of his determined critics.  
Odom (1973) and Colton (1979) went as far as suggesting alternative concepts to 
give coverage to the cases initially overlooked by Huntington.  Odom proposed the 
institutional congruence approach to specifically address the Russian historical 
experience while Colton proposed the participatory model in which civilian 





  The point here is that, any meta-theory or policy that is largely or 
exclusively informed by Huntington’s earlier notions of civil-military is destined to 
become a round peg in a square hole especially when it is applied to non-western 
contexts.  This is indeed the prospect that confronts SSR.   
Secondly, the CMR framework is largely informed by the notion of civilian 
supremacy over the military, a key principle of the Anglo-American system of 
government and an aspiration whose validity has been a subject of numerous 
questions both in the policy and scholarly domains in the Anglo-American world 
itself as will be demonstrated later.  Furthermore, it is based on the problematic 
assumption that all there is to statecraft are two main actors: the military usurpers 
and the civilian politicians, both locked up in a mortal standoff in a zero sum game 
over which camp has to be at the helm of politics.   Accordingly ‘civilian control’ is 
taken to be the norm, but also a conceptual substitute for civil supremacy while 
any contact that the military attempts to make with politics is relegated to the 
pathological.   
Thirdly, there is also the assumption that civil-military relations are 
controlled by a dichotomous and adversarial relationship between soldiers and 
elected politicians, or the civil authority.  This commonly-held view in does not 
reflect the actual dynamics in the real world, of the relations between the military 
and non-military bureaucrats, not least, the common purpose for which they exist, 
namely innovating and executing public policy.  Even in the mature liberal 
democracies, ‘…civil-military relations exist as a type of anarchy where neither the 
civil authority nor the military can dominate the other’ (Bland: 2000).
68
  Decision-
making about policy, defence management, the employment of forces, and in the 
                                        
67 Both cases are cited in Allbright, 1980. 
68 Rebecca Schiff (1995) has gone further to propose the ‘Concordance theory’ based on the idea 
of an emerging lack of distinctness between civilian and military institutions in the context of the 
United States.  She has suggested that separation of civilian and military structures is theoretically 
flawed and gone beyond the common dichotomy between the civilian and the military sector by 
introducing the citizenry as the third pole of civil-military relations. 
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control of armed forces among other activities, is a joint undertaking.  Current 
formulations of SSR have tended to disregard that reality and instead, portrayed 
the civil (or in their parlance, the ‘civilian’) and the military spheres as two 
opposing camps, or even political parties, relentlessly jostling for executive power.  
Chuter has summed up this assumption succinctly by observing that, the vision of 
old CMR  
[A]ssumes only two actors (the military, often in practice the Army, and 
civilian politicians), and it saw their relationship as adversarial, such that 
there is a constant battle by civilians to "control" the military. This in turn 
meant that the two played a zero-sum game, in which the essential premise 
for any system of civilian control is the minimisation of military power…It also 
assumed that there were only two possible states – civilian democracy or 
military rule (2009:4).  
Such questionable assumptions have generally been put to great use in the 
conceptualisation of SSR as an approach to institutional change and have without 
doubt and have contributed significantly to its deficiencies both as a policy tool and 
as an analytical category.   
4.2 Reflection on African Militaries: Analysis or Demonology 
Undoubtedly, the SSR framework’s conception of civil supremacy has been 
negatively influenced and probably, or even been distorted, by the history of 
prolonged military domination of politics especially in the less developed countries; 
yet that domination may not have much to do with either the strength of the 
military itself or the significance of the civil domain.  Whatever the actual drivers of 
that perceived or supposed dominance of the military, most attempts to move 
away from the resulting legacies have generally been deemed to imply or even 
necessitate role reversal: Yesterday’s master (if not monster) should be today’s 
bondsman.   
The frequency with which the armed forces of the underdeveloped world 
are characterised as detestable and beast-like partly reflects this trend as one 
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would notice from the captions of CMR analyses by Africanist scholars.  Ngoma 
talks of ‘Caging the Lions’ (2004), Kieh and Agbese (2004) talk of ‘The Military 
Albatross and Politics in Africa’ just as Omoigui in the same pages refers to the 
military as ‘the most perfidious institution ever created by humans’ (2004:141).  
Other unflattering epithets come from Nwagwu who characterises the civil-military 
predicament in Nigeria as ‘Taming the Tiger’ (2002), echoing Luckham’s ‘Taming 
the Monster’ (1998); while one colourful commentary on Nigerian politics makes 
references to how, ‘[A]cting as a mega-Godzilla edifice, the African military has 
become mainly transmogrified into a Frankenstein monster….’ (Afigbo and Falola, 
2004:44).   
Such bleak assessments as those above may be the result of a misreading 
of the actual content of civil-military relations of the Western democracies which 
have had a formative influence on much of the debate on the relationship between 
the armed forces and the political authority.  The point that is often missed is that, 
even in the West, the cradle of CMR theorising, there is no unanimity on the actual 
nature of the contours of that relationship particularly in regard to ‘civilian control’, 
one key element of the civil-military relations debate that has been assiduously 
elevated to the pedestal by the promoters of the SSR framework.  Bland’s remarks 
in that regard can shed some light.  He has noted that, ‘…contrary to the 
expectations of academics and most citizens, the armed forces….are not so much 
“controlled” by the civil authority as they are accommodated’ (Bland, 2000).   
Even as the notion of ‘control’ in civil-military relations continues to be 
questioned (Bland, 1999; Burk, 2002; Feaver, 1996; Schiff, 1995; Kemp and 
Hudlin, 1997), SSR promoters are still tied to its negative and adversarial 
connotation which implies feuding, subjugation or even taming as recounted 
above.  Any notion of civil-military relations that is couched in those terms can only 
be a source of deleterious pulling and hauling and turf wars between key sectors 
of the state which would at best create paralysis and at worst generate acrimony 
that would invite fresh rounds of even more determined praetorianism.  That can 
only accentuate the insecurity that programmes such as SSR promise to stem.  
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Those contentions are not helped in any way by the underlying view within CMR 
theory that assumes, as already alluded to, the existence of two varieties of 
statecraft: civilian democracy and military dictatorship.    
SSR has inherited wholesale those tensions and deficiencies from CMR.  To 
fully appreciate their impact, one has to look closely at the principle of civil 
supremacy, particularly its corrupted re-interpretation that refers to ‘civilian 
control’.  As Kemp and Hudlin have observed, the principle of civil supremacy has 
two angles to it and these do not receive due to recognition within the SSR debate.  
First, the ends of government policy are to be set by the political authority with the 
military being limited to decisions about means (1992:8).  According to that 
arrangement, the military are to be policy implementers and not policy makers.  
The second part reinforces the latter by emphasizing the role of the civilian 
leadership in deciding the boundary between ends and means, and hence the line 
between civilian and military responsibility.  It is within that context that the 
essential premise for any system of civilian control has become the minimisation of 
military power, and since military power is assumed to be a function of personnel 
strength and the proportion of national wealth that is allocated to the military, then 
civilian power can be bolstered by slashing personnel numbers and diminishing 
defence budgets.  As Chuter has pointed out,  
CMR theorists had, after all, seen the security sector as a threat, and once 
that threat was removed by making the military smaller and poorer the 
problem was essentially solved. Development theorists saw security 
expenditure as a drain on resources which could be better used elsewhere: 
that expenditure should be reduced or even eliminated. Neither group saw, 
except in the most abstract and theoretical of terms, any useful function for 
the security sector (2006:6). 
The foregoing premises of the notion of civil supremacy have an inherent fallacy 
that requires spotlighting.   In the first instance, ends and means referred to above 
are relative.  As Kemp and Hudlin have observed, ‘[t]he only absolute end of any 
individual or group is that chief end (whether simple or compound) for the sake of 
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which every other action is chosen’ (1992:9).  As Kemp and Hudlin further argue, 
means and ends form an interminable chain of interconnectedness that could 
almost leave no room for boundary drawing.  While raising a military force is an 
end relative to the means necessary to achieve it (levying taxes to finance it and 
recruiting personnel to man it) and a means to the ends for the sake of which an 
army is required, i.e., national defence.  This provides enormous leeway for 
military officials to take actions and defend them by arguing that they were doing 
their bit while leaving decisions about ends of policy to the civilian leadership and 
whatever decision they took were decisions about the most effective means of 
implementing policy and not a violation of the principle of civil supremacy or 
civilian control. 
4.3 SSR and CMR: Hide Bound Levelers or Normative 
Homogenizers?  
4.3.1. Diversity of Military Culture 
As Burk has written, ‘… war fighting still determines the central beliefs, values and 
complex symbolic formations that define military culture’ (1999).  As would be fair 
to expect, ‘…elements of military culture derive from the purpose or tasks for 
which societies raise, support, and maintain modern militaries, for instance, 
waging war on behalf of the nation-state and, if needed, enforcing domestic order’ 
(Snider, 1999:5).  In that sense, war fighting and the associated functional 
commitment of armed forces the world over, namely the management of violence, 
lends to all such organizations a level of isomorphism (Born et al., 2006: 243).  
However, that isomorphism together with the common cliché that ‘a soldier is a 
soldier’ has certain limits.  There are still important grounds to discourage the 
temptation to put all militaries on a par with each other. This is what we see in the 
form of the SSR framework’s broad statements on the character of military 
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organizations, their general taxonomy, organizational culture, discipline and 
relationship with other sectors of government.   
The character of armed forces of every nation is dependent on a range of 
factors, including the political history of host countries, the strategic environment 
and the general level of social and economic development, as already 
demonstrated.  On the question of history, Luckham cautions that, 
While borrowed categories may facilitate comparative analysis, they make it 
harder to understand African states and military formations in African terms. 
Moreover, they are symptomatic of the absence of a historical perspective in 
the work of the great majority of the social scientists (including the present 
author) who have analyzed contemporary African military establishments 
(1994:26). 
For those and other reasons, one has to be circumspect with any paradigm or 
project that purports to furnish a universal template for military reform particularly 
in conflict-ridden countries.  The very context of violent conflict or receding conflict 
that invites SSR amongst other ‘post-conflict’ interventions would require that the 
circumstances of target countries be looked at in their own specificity.  Even the 
peacetime military forces of the most developed nations display marked disparities 
that would make it inadvisable to bundle them into common categories be it on 
conceptual or management grounds.  For example, the traits of the militaries of 
countries that attained democracy over many centuries of political evolution and 
their relations with the civil authorities are distinguishable from those countries 
where political modernization has taken place over a short spell of time. Even 
when Russia attains the same levels of political liberalism as Britain, her recent 
history of revolutionary change will remain an enduring influence on that country’s 
institutions and politics for many decades to come.  The same applies with all 
other countries such as China whose path to modernity has been via the route of 
revolution.   
Within Europe, there are significant differences between the institutional set 
up of countries that underwent catch up modernization, such as Germany and 
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Italy, and those like Britain and the Nordic states that modernized their institutions 
over a period of many centuries.  Britain, France, Germany or Japan may share a 
common political heritage of liberalism but it does not follow that their civil and 
military institutions have common traits and it would be a misjudgment to bracket 
them in a single conceptual category.  It is such distinctions between the cultures 
and doctrines of armed forces that underpin concerns on the limitations of 
interoperability in multinational operations.  For similar reasons, placing the armed 
forces of several dozen African countries into a single category as is the case in the 
SSR debate and in civil-military relations literature makes gratuitous assumptions 
about the essential characteristics of those institutions and can only result in false 
inferences.   
To illustrate that point further, it is necessary to take closer, but general 
look at African military forces with the view of highlighting the variations in their 
cultural attributes at national level.  There are contrasts that arise from whether a 
particular country was colonized or not and for those that were, there are major 
dissimilarities that arise from which particular imperial power was the colonial 
master.   Those two factors have had a significant impact on the institutional set 
up and political evolution more especially for those countries that owe their 
existence to imperial expansion of European powers.  Within the armed forces, 
there are, as a result, country and regional variations in ideological orientation, 
post-colonial relations with the civil authorities, recruitment, training, combat 
techniques, organizational and operational doctrine and in some cases, their 
discipline.  These factors form the context of reform and cannot be treated as 
irrelevancies by any reform initiative that is worth the value that may be ascribed 
to it by its promoters.  Moreover, the colonial experience also varied.  While some 
countries were ‘protectorates’, others were settler colonies; while some especially 
in Francophone Africa were provinces of the metropolitan authority.  The point 
here is that, diversity of military forms and styles of civil military relations has 
arisen from the intensity of the colonization process, as much as it has, from the 
idiosyncrasies of the various colonial powers.   
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Regarding the intensity of the colonial enterprise and its implications for the 
future texture of civil-military relations, it has to be noted that while certain regions 
of Africa were preferred for settler colonialism particularly the semi temperate 
Mediterranean fringe and the Southern cone, others were simply referred to as 
protectorates.  The process of decolonization in the latter countries was occasioned 
by broad mobilization of local forces and in some instances, an intense military 
struggle against entrenched propertied settler classes which in all cases had their 
own military organizations.  That historical experience of armed national liberation 
has had a formative impact on the military institutions of countries such as Angola, 
Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa in the South.69  
Most of the countries in the former category (i.e., former settler territories) have 
relatively stable civil-military relations especially if the latter is judged in terms of 
the military’s disinclination to usurp political power.  It can be stated that the 
military coup d’état is an anathema in the southern cone of the African mainland 
and this tends to make redundant any reformist discourse such as SSR that takes 
for granted the existence of real or assumed acrimony between the armed forces 
and the political authority.   
On the other hand, much of East, West and Central Africa experienced 
protectorate or trustee-type of colonialism.  Most of the countries experienced a 
peaceable decolonization process and ‘…inherited soldiers, equipment, and 
organizational structures from Europe’ (Crocker, 1974:267).    It is these regions of 
Africa that have exhibited the most crisis-ridden civil-military relations, the highest 
frequency of military intervention in politics and the most intractable forms of 
instability.  These would probably be the regions from which to look for candidates 
for SSR.  A section of Chapter Seven takes a more detailed look at the factors that 
determined the style of recruitment into the colonial military forces and its 
implications for post-colonial civil-military relations; and indirectly, how recruitment 
philosophies set the stage for the future relevance (or lack thereof) of future 
                                        
69 In North Africa, Algeria fits the same pattern. 
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reform as understood in peacebuilding.  What is necessary at this stage is to lay 
out broadly a general typology of the armed forces on the African continent and 
point out generally what this implies for the external actors who wish to engage 
with those armed forces for whatever purpose, reform inclusive.   
4.3.2. Overlooked Contrasts: Anglophone Vs Francophone Africa 
Depending on which colonial power exercised overrule over any one Sub-Saharan 
African country, national armed forces have taken on distinct cultures, some 
reflecting even if superficially, the traditions and values of the former colony.  The 
historical and contemporary contrasts between the countries that were under 
British and French jurisdiction are a typical case.  As Luckham has noted in regard 
to the military, their creation was ‘…part of an institutional transfer of western 
paradigms of governance, along with the Westminster model and Gaullist 
presidentialism’ (Luckham, 1994:1).  Those legacies have had a lasting influence 
on the variations in the political stability and patterns of civil military relations of 
the former colonies.  The historical and empirical differences are, arguably, more-
than-subtle yet they rarely receive sufficient attention in the debates and initiatives 
related to the shaping of the trajectory of the economic and political development 
of the countries in question.  Commenting particularly on the armed forces, 
Crocker has observed that,  
[T]here are major and little-noted differences between the English- and the 
French-speaking African experience in the military….which have continuing 
implications, and….there is international significance in the background, 
nature, and functions of African armies (1974:266). 
One of the major calculations of the French as they created African national armies 
in the territories under their control was to ensure that even after independence 
they would work closely with French units and effectively serve as branches of the 
French army overseas (Martin, 1995:13).  Comparing the militaries of the former 
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British colonies in East and West Africa with those of the former French colonies, 
Gutteridge has observed, that, ‘[i]n the French-speaking Africa the situation was 
different.  Many Africans recruited in the different territories had in effect joined 
the French Army and were French soldiers’ (1969:41).  In some cases, they were 
even considered to be French citizens as it turned out for the Guineans who were 
demobilized at the end of the Algerian emergency.  Guinea refused to receive them 
and sent them back to France.70  It would therefore be reasonable to assume that 
the reform of the military forces of those countries would have to first-and-
foremost receive France’s tacit approval and co-operation.  The tone and spirit of 
current formulations of SSR does not seem to have been conceived with enough 
room to allow for that possibility.   
But further still, SSR does not seem to have been crafted with sufficient 
flexibility to enable its promoters to contend with the reality that it might be a 
therapy for a malaise which may in reality not be universal, thus making it likely 
that the initiative may be unwelcome in certain quarters.  Universalist and idealistic 
reform templates such as SSR have tended to disregard the impact, and enduring 
influence of diverse colonial experiences and how these have shaped prevailing 
institutional architectures.  This renders any talk about ‘context sensitivity’ hollow; 
but more importantly the overemphasis of the immediate context at the expense 
of the historical factors that account for present realities can only lower the 
chances for success of reformist initiatives.   
For those reasons, the contrasts between styles of colonialism need to 
receive due consideration.  We emphasize Britain and France because the two 
were the preeminent (if not rival) colonial powers whose extensive presence on 
the continent provides enough scope for comparison.  Bernard Porter (2006) has 
dubbed the British approach to colonialism and empire building as ‘absent-minded 
imperialism’, a term that mirrors Britain’s policy of ‘salutary neglect’ towards her 
American colonies as described by Edmund Burke in his 1775 speech in the House 
                                        
70 Ibid, p.43 
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of Commons.71  Much later, a key official of imperial Britain Lord Salisbury 
captured Burke’s and Porter’s characterizations of imperial Britain in his comparison 
of British and French approaches to Empire building in West Africa.  He noted that,   
 
The colonial policy of Great Britain and France in West Africa has been 
widely different.  France…has pursued steadily the aim of establishing 
herself on the upper Niger…by a large and constant expenditure, and by a 
succession of military expeditions.  Great Britain, on the other hand, has 
followed a policy of advance by commercial enterprise.  She has not 
attempted to compete with the military operations of her neighbour.72 
To Crocker Britain focus was on the need to ‘…minimize the costs of imperial 
policing through limited integration and standardization of African colonial units at 
the regional level.’
73
  France on the other hand pursued a policy of creating what 
has been dubbed in Parisian political circles as, ‘le pre carre’ or ‘our own 
backyard’.
74
  To borrow once again from Crocker, compared to the French colonial 
forces, those in the British jurisdictions were  
[L]oose amalgams of local militia and constabulary forces were not 
seen as a reservoir of imperial defence manpower, but as the 
guardians of a self-policing peripheral zone.  Integration with other 
colonial troops or with British forces was virtually non-existent.
75
  
 We stress the point of contrasting styles of colonialism because it had a far-
reaching impact on the professionalism of the armed forces much later on in the 
post-colonial phase; let alone engendering anxieties that have inspired many SSR 
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 The Works, 1834, p. 186. 
72
 Cited in Kanya-Forstner, 1971, p.409. 
73 Crocker, 1974, p.273. 
74 Prunier, 1975, p.103. 
75 Ibid.  
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initiatives.  If reform initiatives are to have the desired impact, some of those 
historical factors will require to be examined closely.  So far, that is not the case.   
As already hinted above, the form taken by the processes and struggles that 
preceded independence has had a crucial bearing on post-colonial politics in 
general and the armed forces in particular especially in cases where independence 
was the outcome of armed confrontation between nationalist groups and the 
colonial military.  The character of civil-military relations in the Lusophone 
countries, all of which experienced wars of liberation, differs sharply from countries 
where independence was attained through a peaceful transfer of power.  An SSR 
programme in Mozambique would have to recognize the fundamental differences 
between that country’s military traditions and the general institutional set up of a 
next-door neighbour like Malawi or South Africa.  Similarly, one would have to 
recognize the vast differences between Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo.  
In addition to the former Portuguese colonies, this category also includes 
Zimbabwe, Namibia, Eritrea, and Southern Sudan.  Perlmutter has categorized 
these countries as ‘national liberation movement nation-states’ in his classification 
of modern nation states and their military organizations (1977:29).  These are 
states that are led by a party-military alliance that overthrew non-indigenous rule.  
They are not characterized by the instability and state fragility that is implicit to the 
assumptions of SSR and related frameworks.  As Perlmutter notes, their regimes 
are fairly robust and are presided over by ideological movements whose elites 
straddle both the political and military arenas to the point of nullifying the 
Huntingtonian civil-military relations narrative on which the SSR framework is 
based.  Huntington’s earlier conception of civil military relations did not have in 
mind the party-military alliance that characterizes the regimes presided over by 
liberation movements.  Allbright’s indictment on Huntington with respect to 
communist states equally applies to post-liberation states.  He notes that ‘…the 
experiences of these states simply do not accord with Huntington’s conceptual 
notions’ going on further to say that, such states ‘…cast grave doubt on the 
comparative validity of the prevailing view of civil-military relations’ (1980:557).  
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That has a lot to say for SSR framework which owes its DNA to the notion of civil-
military relations that dates back to the theory’s initial launching.   
Note has to be made at this point on the characteristics of the post 
liberation regime which arguably invalidate the liberalist notion of CMR as 
ingrained in the SSR framework.  A principal feature of CMR theory is the supposed 
dichotomous and adversarial relationship between the military and civilians.  As 
Allbright (1980:560) has observed, post-liberation regimes are characterized by 
‘…a high degree of congruence in the political values of the military and party 
leaderships...’, which directly implies an ‘…absence of clear-cut distinctions 
between military and civilian roles [and] also removed military professionalism as a 
source of conflict…’.  Perlmutter and Leogrande have similarly characterized that 
arrangement as ‘coalitional, symbiotic or fused’ (1982:778).    That reality pulls the 
rug from under the feet of a reformist narrative that has as its cherished goal the 
attainment or enforcement of civilian control over the military.  Undoubtedly, 
donor-driven institutional reform initiatives, with their characteristic normative bias 
in favour of the rituals, and not the substance of liberal politics, and a disinclination 
to recognize the existence of other, albeit transitional political dispensations, are 
bound to encounter major challenges in states ruled by liberation movements as 
will be demonstrated later on in this study in reference to the United Kingdom’s 
attempts to implement SSR in Uganda.   
There is also the group of countries whose prolonged period of political 
turmoil resulted in the emergence of and ascendance to the political helm of 
mainly left wing guerrilla movements along the same lines as the national 
liberation movement.  In this category of countries, the politico-military 
organizations deposed regimes presided over by indigenous governments.  
Ethiopia is one such country, but not a typical case given that it is not an ex-
colony.  Typical cases in this category inherited colonially constituted military 
forces that disintegrated after being defeated either through foreign invasion or by 




In conclusion, it has to be noted that right from its inception, SSR has been an 
exercise in privileging values over facts.  Indeed, many of the SSR promoters 
credit it as being a normative initiative aimed at entrenching the Western liberal 
norms of individual rights, ‘good governance’ and the rule of law.  That approach is 
already being viewed with skepticism as has become clear within the SSR 
community.  Hendrickson and Ball who deserve to be quoted extensively have 
observed that:  
[M]uch of what has been characterized as SSR ‘research’ has in fact been 
more influenced by a normative framework and a standard set of 
assumptions about how ‘reforming’ countries should organise and operate 
their security sectors.  The strong emphasis on norms such as 
democratization, civilian control of the military, a clear division between 
internal and external security functions and a strong civil society role in 
management of security policy can detract from good (sic) empirical 
analysis of how security institutions actually function. As a 
consequence…has often been insufficiently sensitive to the complex 
institutional and political dynamics that affect reform processes.
76
 
Conscientious regard for such complex institutional dynamics would ordinarily be 
one of the initial steps in conceptualizing initiatives such as SSR, a conceptual and 
policy framework that promises to transform the political and institutional set up of 
whole countries and regions.  For its disregard of empirical realities and 
preoccupation with promoting preconceived values, SSR may have to either go 
back to the drawing board or await the epitaph of judgment of having been too 
ambitious.    
                                        
76 2005, p.25. 
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4.3.3. Implications of Diversity of Military Cultures for SSR and CMR 
Theory and Practice 
Something else emerges from the foregoing discussion, and this relates to the 
general thrust and decontextualised nature of the debate on reforming the 
institutions of coercion and law-and-order as it is presented within the SSR 
framework.  That debate is lacking in its appreciation of the variations in political 
culture and the profound sense in which the levels of political development of any 
polity shapes the character of the transactions between key sectors of the state, in 
this particular case, the relationship between the instruments of coercion on one 
hand and the executive, the judiciary, the legislature and the bureaucracy, on the 
other hand.  The principal frailty of many of the reformist initiatives embodied by 
the liberal mould of CMR is to take for granted the intense country variations in 
regard to political culture, but more importantly, in regard to the different levels of 
attainment with respect to achievement of statehood.  Most neoliberal reform 
initiatives, particularly those that have their origins in the global north are 
marketed as a one-size-fits-all that is generally insensitive or even blind to, the 
diverse reform contexts.  In this particular case of SSR, the initiative’s utility - and 
arguably, legitimacy - as a policy or as a conceptual tool is undermined by its own 
promoters, right from the start line.   
Apart from the general presumption of homogeneity of political culture of 
states across space and time, scholarly analysis and policy intervention in military 
institutions tends to assume a uniform pattern of policing or military forces not just 
amongst the developed western countries that play a leading role in championing 
reform, but also amongst those countries in the south that are the targets of 
reform.  In the case of the reform of police forces, it is not likely that even the key 
OECD/DAC partners would agree on a similar template for reform.  Each of them 
would probably wish to impose a policing model that they are accustomed to, or 
the donor country taking the lead in a police reform programme in a particular 
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developing world would wish to impose its own model mirroring the values and 
doctrines of policing that it is accustomed to back home.  As always happens, 
experts in form of police personnel from an individual donor country are 
dispatched to the country being targeted for reform to oversee the implementation 
of their own national policing traditions.  The same approach is employed also in 
reform of the military institutions.  At the end of such exercises, it is often 
assumed that such institutions have been fundamentally re-oriented and have 
therefore assumed the same monolithic stance as equivalent institutions in the 
country of origin of the reform consultants.   
Like CMR before it, SSR is at times wont to hold that the military is ‘…a vast, 
fearsome, trained, disciplined body which acted so much as a unit’, and 
accordingly, ‘was seen to be a valid subject of study from which general 
conclusions could be drawn’ (Chuter, 2006:6).  This perception of monolithic and 
homogenous armed forces overlooks the reality of factionalism and fragmentation 
of the military forces of conflict-affected countries and the manner in which the 
armed forces closely mirror the horizontal cleavages within wider society.  It is this 
wider society, under the label of civil society that, according to SSR, is destined to 
hold the military to account.  That ill conceived perception of a monolithic ‘security 
sector’ ranged against a homogenous ‘civil society’ that is destined to keep it in 
check stands out as probably one of the weakest flanks of the SSR framework.  
     
4.4 Military Involvement in Politics: Its Genesis and inevitability 
4.4.1. The Futility of a Blanket Veto on Military Involvement in Politics 
As already pointed out, the frequency of the coup d’état and its far-reaching 
impact on the image and viability of the African polity has caused it to be singled 
out as the sole pathology of civil-military relations on the continent and leading 
political challenge.  The staggering statistics of the overthrow of civilian 
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governments and their replacement either with outright military juntas or with 
civilian-military cliques partly explains the status that has been ascribed to the 
direct intervention by the military in politics.  Tracing the phenomenon through the 
decades that followed independence, Decalo notes that: 
If during the I960s the coup d’état emerged as the most visible and 
recurrent characteristic of the African political experience, by the 1980s 
quasi-permanent military rule, of whatever ideological hue, had become the 
norm for much of the continent. At any moment in time, up to 65 per cent 
of all Africa's inhabitants and well over half its states are governed by 
military administrators. Civilian rule is but a distant memory in some 
countries. Few at some stage or another have not been run by an armed-
forces junta, and fewer still have not been rocked at least once by an 
attempted coup, putsch, or military-sponsored plot… Rule by civilians is very 
much the statistical 'deviation' from the continental norm, as military leaders 
lay a permanent claim to the political throne in much of Africa (1989:547). 
Similar sentiments have been echoed by McGowan (2005), Chazan et al., (1999), 
Huntington (1968), Bienen (1968), Welch (1970), Jenkins and Kposowa (1990) 
among others, with Luckham (1994) highlighting the near-institutional role of 
coups d’état as the main mechanism of circulation of elites.  As the incidence of 
military intromissions into politics continued to escalate, hypotheses of causes 
multiplied.
77
  In the case of Africa, the commonly-held view of the political malaise 
turned the coup d’état into the be-all and end all of the continent’s security and 
development challenges.  According to one of the leaders in reform programmes, 
the Development Assistance council of the Organization of Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD/DAC),  
[I]n West Africa, an overriding concern has been how to end one of the 
most serious threats to democratic development in the sub-region: coups 
d’état and unlawful removal of elected authorities. This threat….further 
                                        
77 For a detailed explanation/taxonomy of coups d’état, see Luckham, 1994, pp. 28-31.    
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highlights the need to subject military institutions to democratic control 
(2005:50).
78
    
However, a closer examination of the literature and of historical cases reveals that 
the phenomenon of military intervention is more complex than how it is being 
portrayed in the SSR framework, and indeed, there is a lot more to military 
intervention than merely the direct action by the armed forces to displace the 
sitting government.  It is important to point out the gradations of military 
intervention and to weigh them against some of the standard goals that are set for 
reform programs, which implicitly and explicitly, tend to suggest that military 
professionalism as a product of reform, reduces the propensity for military 
intervention.  Countries at all stages of development and with varying levels of 
military professionalism experience military intervention of one form or another.  It 
would therefore be futile, as institutional reform programmes in the developing 
world tend to suggest, to attempt to initiate reforms that promise to permanently 
immunize a polity against military intervention.    
4.4.2. Political Culture and Military Interventionism 
Finer identifies three determinants of the levels of political culture of a political 
system which in turn shape the style of military intervention in addition to 
influencing the propensity for intervention.  What is questionable is whether reform 
initiatives such as SSR look beyond the superficial isomorphic jiggling of the 
organizational procedures and structures of the security institutions they reform, to 
reflect on the polity wide determinants of the character of key institutions such as 
the armed forces.  First of the determinants of the style of military involvement in 
politics, is legitimacy, i.e., the level to which the prevailing political order and the 
                                        
78 The same publication however goes on to take a critical and almost self-contradicting view of 
African and Africanist political scientists whose writings have ‘…largely been within the old coup-
driven civil-military relations paradigm (and now tends to be concerned with how the political 
power of the military might be curbed or contained)., pp 72-73.   
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public authority are accepted and acknowledged as the embodiment of the 
common will.   The second determinant is political institutionalization, that is, the 
level of development of the structures and procedures that mediate and moderate 
the transactions between the diverse political forces that make up the polity.
79
   
Third is the degree of popular participation, or, the extent to which the wider 
public is involved through popularly recognized institutions, in the crafting of the 
key decisions that have a bearing on their daily lives and destiny, in addition to the 
level of attachment to the public institutions that modulate that participation.  
Correspondingly, the operationalisation of those three determinants of 
political culture is mediated through a set of attributes against which the 
robustness of the political system assessed.  The first attribute is widespread 
approval (or lack thereof) of the procedures of transfer of power whose upholding 
or violation decides the legitimacy of the public authority.  Deriving from the latter 
is the second attribute, namely, the symbols or persons that are publicly 
recognized as the embodiment of popular sovereignty.  The third attribute is the 
proportion of the population that can be considered as the ‘political public’, i.e., 
individuals and groups that are part of private associations, such as professional 
organizations, trade unions, guilds, pressure groups political parties, industrial 
associations and other organizations, normally called civil society, that are not part 
of the government.  Basing on that classification of the parameters of political 
culture and the yard sticks for assessing each of those parameters, Finer, among 
other analysts of civil-military relations has classified country political systems into 
five clusters, each exhibiting a unique style through which the military may 
intervene or be involved in politics.   
The figure below summarizes the levels of political culture as they are 
determined by the stage of socio-economic development, and the corresponding 
styles of the military’s involvement in politics.  Most countries in Sub-Saharan 
                                        
79 According to North (2009), institutions are ‘…the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction….they structure incentives 
in human exchange whether political, social or economic’ (p.3). 
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Africa where most SSR programmes are concentrated belong to the fourth order of 
political culture, these being the countries where the political public is minimal.   
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Figure 4: Military Intervention and the Level of Political Development 
     
 
From Finer, 1962, p.139 
 
What is clear from the classification above is that, there is no stage of political 
development where the political system can be characterized as being free from 
any sort of military intervention whatsoever.  Even if we are to adapt a teleological 
view of sociopolitical development and assume that all countries are destined for 
the highest level of political culture as laid out by Finer, it is clear that military 
intervention in politics is part of the normal functioning of political systems.  
Accordingly, there is need to question the authenticity of any form of idealistic 
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1. There is a degree of military intervention in politics at all stages of political 
development and therefore, it is fallacious to premise reform programmes 
on the goal of expunging that phenomenon.   
2. Military intervention in politics is not a taboo and that there are even certain 
forms of the phenomenon that are constitutional and legitimate.   
3. Even where there are unconstitutional forms of military intervention, their 
drivers derive from factors related to the robustness or frailty of the wider 
political system and not from the makeup of the instruments of coercion in 
general and the military in particular.   
4. This therefore calls for a paradigm of reform that looks at the political 
system in its entirety, and not on the institutions via which the symptoms of 
systemic malaise are exhibited.   
5. Reforms such as SSR that focus exclusively on the instruments of coercion 
(or the so-called security sector) may therefore be inherently incapable of 
achieving the goals set for them and may be potentially counterproductive.  
As Huntington has aptly noted, such approaches to institutional engineering 
are bound to deepen insecurity in that they ‘…may help to aggravate the 
lack of balance between the input and output institutions of the political 
system’ (1968:192).  
4.4.3. Liberal Democratic CMR Vs the Party in Uniform 
Most of the questions raised thus far on the conceptual and practical 
wholesomeness of CMR theory are to do with the presumption that the political 
evolution of all societies has attained the equilibrium that ensures a clear 
differentiation between the military and the civil domains.  If that presumption was 
to hold some validity, there would be a sound basis to speculate on the likely 
occurrence of a dichotomous/conflictual relationship between the two domains as 
happens in the popular version of CMR theory.  But that clear differentiation 
between the military and other domains of the state as witnessed in the highly 
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developed political systems is not a universal phenomenon.  It is for this reason 
that an accommodation has to be made for political systems where the pinnacle of 
the civil authority is occupied by the military commander, as was the case in earlier 
stages of development of the major democracies and as indeed the case is in 
many contemporary pre-liberal polities.  It is inconceivable that a George 
Washington or Napoleon Bonaparte had to contend with the fractious bargains 
between civilians and military officials.  Similarly, civil-military contests may not be 
the major concern for many politico-military regimes in the contemporary 
developing world because they simply never arise anyway.  The same applies to 
the communist states where '…the military is an administrative arm of the party 
and not something separate from and competing with it.’, as Odom (1973) has 
pointed out.
80
   
The foregoing argument highlights a key weakness of CMR theory and other 
frameworks such as SSR that it has inspired: the prevailing conception of civil 
supremacy holds some promise only when the power of the military has been 
curbed but not where the military has been co-opted.  Questions therefore must 
arise as to what solutions SSR has to offer in praetorian polities where the military 
wields enormous power, let alone in polities that are in the transition to liberalism, 
from whichever direction of political differentiation.  Clearly, CMR theory is 
essentially normative, if not blinkered; and a normative epistemology is specifically 
suited for steady-state ontology.  It is devoid of any consideration for the realities 
of ongoing social change and it is therefore essentially blind to the imperatives of 
development.  Such is the parentage that CMR has bequeathed to SSR.   
Following from the foregoing observation, it has to be noted that the 
evolution CMR theory was largely shaped by the experiences of the mature liberal 
democracies where structures are clearly differentiated and institutions have 
attained a relatively high level of functional specificity, autonomy and coherence.  
As Huntington (1957:32) has observed, CMR theorising arose from the emergence 
                                        
80 Cited in Light, 1981, p.134. 
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of the military profession, which in turn was nurtured in tandem with the 
phenomenon of industrialism.  Emphasizing the recent origins of CMR and explicitly 
discounting the armed revolt as the reason for its emergence, Huntington suggests 
that, 
[t]he fundamental transformation in the first part of the nineteenth century 
[in Western Europe] makes it relatively profitless to go back before that 
time in search of light on modern problems... the problem in the modern 
state is not armed revolt but the relation of the expert to the politician. The 
cleavage between the military and civilian spheres and the resulting tension 
between the two are phenomena of distinctly recent origin (1957:20). 
This leaves us with only one conclusion to draw: the link between SSR and CMR as 
we see it in the literature appears to be contrived at least from the point of view of 
authoritative commentators on the former.  What we see then is that, the founding 
premises of CMR (and by implication SSR), are ‘…too narrowly conceived and miss 
critical aspects of the problem, and they are too bound to the culture and national 
politics of their proponents’ (Bland, 1999:8).  Such are the uncertainties and 
contradictions that CMR has passed on to SSR, in addition to the shared trait of 
lack of interest by advocates of both in the purpose for which the ‘security sector’ 
exists.   
4.4.4. The Desired End: ‘Civilian Control’ or Civil Supremacy? 
The leading concern for the SSR debate, just as the case was with first generation 
civil-military relations theory, is the age-old question of subordinating the armed 
forces to the control of the political authority, what Feaver has called the ‘civil-
military problematique’, i.e., how the fear of others means that ‘…we create an 
institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution we 
created for protection…’ (1996:150). As Kohn observes, subordination of the 
military to the political authority i.e., how a society controls those who possess the 





  Indeed, it is not just a challenge for democratic regimes as 
the promoters of SSR normally imply, but too, it is a challenge for all other forms 
of government.  Kohn further observes that,    
All forms of government, from the purest democracies to the most savage 
autocracies, whether they maintain order and gain compliance by consent 
or by coercion, must find the means to assure the obedience of their 
military -- both to the regime in power and to the overall system of 
government. 
Mankind has long freed himself from the natural state where life was ‘…solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish, and short’.  ‘Here’, notes Feaver, ‘the protector and the 
protectee are one and the same.’  The bearing of arms was not the responsibility 
of designated individuals or groups and therefore, there was no civil-military 
dilemma.  The result of collective evolution away from that primeval existence has 
brought forth a new challenge, namely, the relentless urge by sovereigns to found 
a stable balance not just with the ecclesiastical and judicial powers, but also - and 
most importantly - with the bearers of arms.   
 
In earlier times, emperors of the Byzantium sought to maintain a grip on their 
Strategos, just as the mediaeval knight’s relative latitude was moderated by the 
chivalric code in aid of the authority of the monarch or the prince.  So also was the 
case with the Roman Praetorian guard.  Much later, Clausewitz advanced one of 
the strongest justifications for civil control of the military.  In his well-documented 
view, armed forces are created by states to engage in war and war itself is an 
instrument of policy.  In accordance with that,  
The subordination of the political point of view to the military would be 
contrary to common sense, for policy has declared war; it is the intelligent 
faculty, war only the instrument and not the reverse.  The subordination of 
                                        
81 http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_3/kohn.html  
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the military point of view to the political is, therefore, the only thing, which 
is possible (1997:359). 
In more modern times, political control of the military has been a concern in 
democracies such as the United States and Britain, just as it has been for 
Communist China; or as it was for the Soviet Union.  Earlier in the twentieth 
Century, it was critical for fascist dictatorships in Germany and Italy and other 
states elsewhere in Africa, Asia, and Latin America all presenting with diverse 
political dispensations.   
The point here is that, over time, space and diversity in terms of political 
regime there is a noticeable universality in humanity’s urge to have their armed 
forces on a leash.  What has remained a principal feature of the SSR framework is 
its specific focus on ideal forms, such as ‘good governance’, ‘democratic control’ 
and ‘civilian control’.  Arguably, by restricting its conception of control of armed 
forces to particular form of political regime, system of representation and type of 
executive authority, the SSR framework becomes a hostage of a normative 
epistemology and automatically renders itself incapable of making any headway in 
the polities that it is intended to target.   
In its broadest sense, civil control means ‘…military responsiveness to the 
policies of politically responsible government’ (Lyons, 1961:54).  Much of the 
recent debate on rendering the armed forces as an instrument of policy has been 
narrowed down to ensuring ‘civilian control’ and as Williams has argued, the latter 
concept is ‘…a problematic, flawed and potentially divisive concept…’
82
   
Not only does the SSR framework lose sight of the principle of civil oversight 
of institutions of the state, be it the judiciary, legislature, bureaucracy and even 
the executive, it also mixes up that principle with the civilian content of those 
institutions.  Reducing the important question of the management of the armed 
forces as institutions of the state to an axiological contest between the military and 
                                        
82 Schnabel, Albrecht and Hans-Georg Ehrhart , eds Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding,  Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005…..p.49 
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civilians is a major disservice to policy and has contributed to the blunting the 
utility of SSR as an analytical tool.  The concept of ‘civilian control’ glosses over key 
questions on the diversity of regimes.  By turning the reflection on military regimes 
into an exercise in vilification, it obscures the reality of civilian autocracies that 
rely, just as military juntas, on armed repression and extensive surveillance by 
intelligence agencies (Luckham, 2003:3).   
Even if civilian control was accepted as the principle, there would still be 
major obstacles to its implementation given the limited civilian expertise in defence 
and security issues in SSR target countries.  Without the requisite civilian expertise 
to manage national security systems, attempts to control the military would only 
become a source of tension and in the long-term, of direct military intervention 





 Donor Approaches to reforming the Uganda 
Security Sector: A micro-study of the NRA/UPDF 
5.1 Introduction 
Using Uganda as a micro case study, Chapter Five examines the Implementation of 
SSR in Uganda in the context of ongoing conflict and against the background of 
the country’s protracted instability.  The historical evolution of Uganda’s ‘security 
sector’ is outlined to highlight the principles and assumptions that underpinned its 
composition during the colonial phase of the country’s history and the long-term 
effect of those principles on the country’s security.  The linkage between 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration (DDR) and SSR programming is 
explored to identify potential synergies between the two in Uganda’s specific 
circumstances.  It is argued that the realisation of synergies between DDR and SSR 
is often rendered questionable by the lack of clarity on what DDR actually entails 
and whether indeed its sanguine depiction in the academic and policy literature 
accurately mirrors its implementation.  The part of the study examines the case of 
Uganda, a country whose armed forces have supposedly undergone both DDR and 
SSR.  Uganda’s experience in managing armed groups in the immediate aftermath 
of major hostilities is explored to identify the key features of the process from 
1986 onward, with a particular focus on the donor-supported mass discharge of 
the 1990s, with the view of identifying whether as the literature that we examine 
below suggests, that exercise was truly DDR and the implications of that for other 
follow-on initiatives.   
It is particularly stressed that claims that Uganda undertook DDR cannot 
easily stand up to scrutiny.  An analysis of the dynamics of the ‘DDR’ in Uganda is 
made to highlight the aspects of the exercise that laid the ground for unsuccessful 
implementation of any future SSR.  Questions are raised on whether indeed the 
Ugandan process amounted to DDR in whatever sense DDR is understood. It is 
suggested that the country adopted a much more complex process of managing 
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armed factions than the linearly conceived model of DDR often encountered in the 
‘peace building’ literature and that the logic of this process put in place major 
obstacles for any future reform process along the lines of SSR.  The process of SSR 
as it was approached in Uganda is examined and an attempt is made to identify 
the unfavourable reception for the initiative within Uganda’s institutional context.  
The imposition of SSR as an aid conditionality  
5.2 Historical evolution of the state security apparatus 
Most attempts at assessing the institutions and governments of underdeveloped, 
conflict-afflicted countries through the normative lens have, in the view of this 
study fallen short of capturing the reality of those countries and we have broadly 
accounted for that deficiency by stressing that, in eschewing the understanding of 
social reality through examining matters of fact, or, ‘what is’, and instead, 
privileging values, or ‘what ought to be’, the normative lens is inherently flawed.   
Moreover, ‘what is’ has a dual character: It is as much a transitory 
culmination of ‘what was’ as it is the embodiment of the existing reality and the 
aggregate of historical development leading to that reality. By disregarding ‘what 
is’, normativity automatically discounts the historical evolution of countries and 
institutions in which interventions are sought, a point that is explored in deeper 
detail in Chapter Seven.   For our present purposes, we shall use the Uganda 
military after 1986 to highlight the implications of normativity’s insensitivity to 
historical change, and with it, the inherent incapacity to identify the symptoms of 
regression, or to acknowledge progress when it takes place, however modestly.  
That tendency, we argue, creates grounds for irresolvable tension between the 
external actor whose mind is set on a particular ideal; and the local actor who 
judges that his actions are yielding certain improvements that ought to be 
recognised.   
Historically, institutional dysfunction of the military in Uganda, in the 
broader context of the country’s political evolution, has been characterised by a 
very specific set of symptoms and traits whose persistence or recurrence should 
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constitute the benchmark for the evaluating improvement or lack thereof, or the 
efficacy of measures taken to effect transformative change.83  What remains the 
challenge for observers of the Ugandan military as an organisation is identification 
of the appropriate yardstick for realistically assessing robustness and functionality 
over a period of time without capitulating to the easier option of passing moral 
judgment.  It is this weakness that Berdal highlights in his general comments on 
observers and analysts who prioritize value judgement over the need to grasp local 
dynamics.  ‘All too often,’ writes Berdal, ‘the failure to grasp the underlying political 
economy of a conflict zone, relying instead on crude, value-laden and simplistic 
labelling of complex problems, has served to perpetuate and stimulate renewed 
violence (2010:8).   
One would expect that any evaluation of the NRA/UPDF, or any opinion on 
whether there has been progress, stagnation or regression in the stature of the 
Ugandan military over the last five decades of the country’s existence would have 
to be based on an assessment of the current force in relation to its predecessors, 
namely the Uganda Army under Milton Obote (1966-1971), the Uganda Army 
under Idi Amin (1971-1979) or the Uganda National Liberation Army, UNLA under 
Milton Obote/Tito Okello (1981-1986).  This part of the study seeks to briefly trace 
the historical development of the Ugandan ‘security sector’ focussing on the 
military in order to highlight the factors that have shaped its character.   
5.2.1. The Pre-colonial and Colonial back-drop  
 The establishment of standing military forces in modern Uganda can be 
traced back to the beginnings of colonial rule in the early 1890s.  However, large-
scale military structures existed in the pre-colonial societies particularly Bunyoro 
and Buganda, the two large centralized states in the South of the future country.  
                                        
83 A standard list of those traits would include corruption, incompetence, abuse of human rights, 
however defined, nepotism, propensity to depose governments, lack of respect of the territorial 
integrity of neighbours, disrespect for the law among others.    
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By the advent of colonialism, the two states commanded armed forces that had 
upgraded their armouries from spears, and bows and arrows to modern firearms 
(Doyle, 2006; Karugire, 1980; Reid, 2002 and 2007).  The powerful Omukama 
Kabalega, King of Bunyoro from 1870 to 1899, commanded a large standing army 
that was fully equipped with a variety of relatively modern weapons that included 
Remington rifles, percussion muskets, breechloaders and a large collection of 
muzzleloaders (Omara Otunnu, 1987:2).84  In the Kingdom of Buganda on the 
northern shores of Lake Victoria, Mutesa I, King from 1852 to 1884, also raised a 
standing army and a navy led by a general and several captains (Roscoe, 1911; 
Beachey, 1963:467). At its most powerful, Mutesa's military force consisted of 
several thousand warriors with more than 1,500 rifles (Ofcansky, 1992:196).  By 
the close of the 20th century, those military structures had ceased to exist as part 
of the turbulent process of ‘pacification’ that saw British colonial rule taking firm 
hold.   
 In the smaller scale, non-centralised communities, military organisation took 
on a form that reflected the segmentary nature of the communities, their low level 
of vertical stratification and resulting egalitarianism.  Unlike the more centralised 
societies, the smaller scale societies had no distinct military class (Reid, 2007:79).  
Defence and warfare in those societies – what Middleton and Tait have termed 
‘Tribes without rulers’ (1967) – was the responsibility of every able-bodied adult 
male member of the community, a fact that has accounted for the debatable 
notion ‘martial tribes’,85 upon which the military recruitment policy in the colonial 
period was based, with far-reaching implications for the country’s future.  The 
mainly pastoralist Nilo-Hamitic ethnic groups, the Iteso and Karamojong in the east 
and northeast of the country were marked by an absence of significant military 
                                        
84 Kabalega’s military is reputed to have been more multiethnic (and Pan-Africanist) than the 
militaries that modern Uganda has had.  Apart from the Banyoro, the ranks of his Kingdom’s 
military included Egyptian deserters, Baganda, Bari, Acholi, Alur, Langi and Madi (Casati, 1891: 61-
2, 80). 
85 Omara–Otunnu has equally debatably referred to those societies ‘military democracies’ (1987:4).   
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organisations.  When the need for warfare arose, warrior groups were constituted 
on the basis of the age-set system (Bernardi, 1952).  Driberg notes that the 
political organisation of the Lango before the establishment of colonial rule was 
‘essentially military’ (1923:205), terms akin to those of Middleton and Tait in their 
characterisation of the traditional system of the Lugbara of West Nile for whom, it 
is claimed, ‘...relations between groups beyond immediate neighbours were in 
terms of fighting’ (1958:219). 
 It is important that we flag the pre-colonial military military configuration 
because, as Omara-Otunnu (1987) argues, the colonial and early post-
independence governments drew their recruits into the armed forces from the 
smaller, decentralised with far-reaching implications for both intra-military and 
civil-military relations. 
5.2.2. The Colonial period 
 Following the Berlin Conference and the partition of Africa by European 
powers in the mid-1880s those events, the British government appointed a 
chartered company of merchants, the British East African Company, later the 
Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEACo), to manage Uganda, its new 
possession, with the primary brief of ascertaining the resources that existed in the 
area. 86  The IBEACo in turn appointed Captain Frederick Lugard to manage its 
affairs in Uganda.  The core of what was to become Uganda’s military was the 
contingent of guards, the Swahili askari, part of the private army of the IBEACo in 
the company of Captain Lugard on his journey from the East African coast to the 
hinterland in 1890.  Lugard expanded this core force by augmenting it with 
Sudanese Nubian soldiers,87 remnants of Emin Pasha’s military garrisons of 
                                        
86 A detailed account of the process can be found in Karugire (1980); Barber (1968) and Low and 
Pratt (1960). 
87 Some of the Nubian soldiers had seen combat in Mexico when the Khedive of Egypt had 
assigned them in aid of the French (Omara-Otunnu, 1987:14).  
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Egypt’s Equatoria province.  The Nubian soldiers had been cut off from Cairo by 
the 1881-1898 Mahdist uprising in the Sudan against Turco-Egyptian and British 
presence.88  Captain Lugard considered the Nubian people of Sudan to constitute 
the best material for soldiery in Africa;89 and it is them that enabled Lugard to 
defeat the monarchs of Bunyoro and Buganda, the largest states in Africa’s 
interlacustrine region in the 1890s, and helped in the many ‘pacification’ and 
punitive expeditions the British carried out in the wider East African region up to 
the outbreak of the World War I.   
In London, parliament passed the Uganda Rifles Ordinance of 1895 requiring 
the troops that Lugard had assembled to swear allegiance to the British Sovereign 
directly and secondarily, to the protectorate government (clause 13).  Clause 58 of 
the ordinance included a provision for the Uganda Rifles to take military action, 
against not only outside powers, but also any local groups in the protectorate that 
engaged in active opposition to the administration (Omara-Otunnu, 1987:19).  The 
suppression of political opinion disagreeable to the centre became the basic ethos 
of Uganda’s ‘security sector’ even after the departure of the colonialists.  It is not 
surprising that in March 1962 – six months before the formal declaration of 
independence – responsibility for the military was switched from the Ministry of 
Security and External Affairs to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in possible 
anticipation of the domestic role that awaited it (Omara-Otunnu, 1987:45-47).   
The 1898 Military Force Ordinance, that followed the mutiny of the Nubian 
soldiers allowed for the incorporation an additional two non-indigenous groups, 
namely the Indian and Swahili troops (Moyse-Bartlett, 1956; Karugire, 1980, 
Omara-Otunnu, 1987).  In appreciation of their role played by the Nubians in 
enabling him to consolidate his hold on the nascent Uganda protectorate, Lugard 
observed that,  
                                        
88 Egypt’s Equatorial Province covered the present-day West Nile and Acholi regions of Uganda.  By 
the time the Mahdists overrun Khartoum in January 1885 the Nubian soldiers were quartered at 
Wadelai in present-day West Nile region in north-western Uganda.     




The importance of this reliable force of seasoned and disciplined soldiers can 
hardly be overrated, in view of the responsibility which devolves on the nation 
to maintain its hold on Uganda and the neighbouring districts 
(Bentley,1892:41).90 
 
However, the view that the Nubians were ‘seasoned and disciplined solders’ was, 
not unanimous.  The explorer and adventurer Henry Morton Stanley characterised 
them as ‘evil men’ that were ‘…fawning, crafty rogues who have made perfidy their 
profession’ (1890:206); while Harry Johnston, Uganda’s Protectorate Commissioner 
from 1889-1900 observed that, ‘...themselves ex-slaves, they had all the cruelty 
and unscrupulousness of the Arab Slave traders, whose names, principles and 
religion they had inherited’ (Johnston, 1902: 238).  Before Lugard enlisted the 
services of the Nubians, Samuel Baker, General Gordon and Emin Pasha had 
employed them to man forts in Acholi from the early 1870s t0 around 1890 in the 
service of the Khedive of Egypt (Lwanga-Lunyiigo, 1987:25).  As Pain observes, 
their behaviour left a bitter folk memory among the Acholi.91   
What becomes clear then is, that the core of the colonial military in what was 
to become Uganda was an alien and mercenary force and it is on the basis this 
that the post-independence governments constituted the armed forces of the new 
country.  As many observers have noted, deployment of colonial troops was 
governed by the ‘principle’ that they should be of a race different from that of the 
people in the zone of assignment or from an ethnic group that is geographically 
remote to, and if possible, hostile to the inhabitants of the area of deployment 
(Gutteridge, 1969; Horowitz, 1985; Karugire, 1988; Kabwegyre, 1995).  Regarding 
the Lugard’s Nubian soldiers and their role in Uganda, Lwanga-Lunyiigo notes that, 
they were generally favoured ‘...because they were an entirely alien mercenary 
                                        
90 For details of the numbers of these soldiers and the phases of their incorporation into the 




element who did not have any sentimental attachment to Uganda and could be 
trusted to be brutal without any reserve or compunction’ (1989:28).  
Later attempts to indigenise and diversify the Uganda Rifles were in 
accordance with the principle of remoteness, to which was added the myth of 
‘martial tribes’ which favoured the Nilotic and Sudanic; and the Nilohamitics ethnic 
groups of north and east of the country respectively.  Accordingly, by 1914 Acholi 
region had become the recruiting ground for the armed forces.  By 1961, one year 
before independence, the Uganda military consisted of 1,000 personnel 
commanded by 50 British officers centred on a battalion (Mudoola, 1989:119).  
The reality of the absence of indigenous officers in command positions was 
summed by a British Marshal of the Royal Air Force in his comparison between the 
evolution of East African militaries with those of the Far East: ‘But in East Africa, 
we took it for granted for too long that the only possible officer material for African 
units was European’ (Slessor, 1962: ix).  In partly explaining the phenomenon, one 
of the British officers on the ground observed that:  
 
The policy of the Army during the 57 years of its existence had always been 
to enlist from Northern tribes…the entire cream of the force was composed 
of the most backward people of the country…we ourselves were prejudiced 
against the…educated’ (Grahame, 1980:5).   
 
 
In the event, on the eve of independence the need to turn this reality around 
through a process of ‘Africanisation’ arose but the authorities found it almost 
impossible to meet the requirements they had set.  When in 1960, the Queen’s 
commissions were made ‘...open to all persons of any race who are qualified by 
age and education, and who are of the necessary medical standard’92, only two 
individuals qualified for the commission to the rank of Lieutenant, one of whom 
                                        
92 Instructions of the Chief of Staff, East African Command, 02 January 1960, cited in Omara-
Otunnu, 1987, p.43. 
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was Idi Amin. On the eve of Uganda’s independence, it was evident that the 
foundation of the ‘security sector’ was for seven decades, systematically put in 
place an atmosphere of anti-intellectualism, remoteness and ethnic bias, factors 
that have made a significant contribution to the instability that has become the 
hallmark of the country’s post-independence history, to which we now turn our 
attention. 
5.2.3. Post-independence period : The Obote 1 Government, 1962-71 
The first post-independence administration maintained the composition of 
the armed forces instituted during the formative years of the country for much the 
same reasons as the colonial government had done so but with additional urgency.  
The ethnicity of the first Prime Minister, Milton Obote, coincided with the ethnic 
groups favoured for recruitment into the colonial military force. Obote was a 
Nilotic, belonging to the Langi sub-ethnic group of Northern Uganda.93 The 
character of the security forces reflected the tensions that obtained within 
Uganda’s fractious political class, torn apart by ethnic and religious sectarianism.  
Obote sought to resolve those tensions by the use of force, and therefore set out 
on a path of nurturing a partisan ‘security sector’.   
As a first step, he consolidated the ethnic bias of the colonial military force 
by enlisting more personnel from the North of the country.  Key members of his 
ruling UPC, among them legislators and government ministers seeking to justify a 
military recruitment policy that favoured the north of the country went on to give 
further credence to the ‘martial tribes’ principle enunciated by the British colonial 
authorities, what Mudoola (1989) has called the ‘doctrine of ethno-functionalism’.  
This thinking was passionately defended by the mentioned elite of Northern 
Uganda and it is necessary to cite them in detail to enable us to appreciate the 
future implications for the functioning of Uganda as national entity.   
                                        
93 Together with the neighbouring Acholi and Alur, the Langi are part of the Luo speakers.   
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In his contribution to a debate in parliament on the January 1964 mutiny by 
the Ugandan military, Gasper Oda a Member of Parliament from West Nile region 
in the northwest of the country observed that:    
There is one thing which should be taken into consideration, that not all 
tribes, not only in this country but also throughout the world, are born 
warriors or warlike people.  Some tribes are warlike people, and others are 
intellectuals, and are not prepared to face warlike people.94   
Those sentiments were re-echoed by Felix Onama, the minister holding portfolio.  
At the risk of sounding hyperbolic in respect of the Third Reich’s intentions in 
tropical Africa, he argued that: 
Thousands of northerners died in the two world wars to defend Uganda 
against Nazism and Fascism and if the young generation or their children 
who have grown up in the North would like to follow in the footsteps of 
their fathers, nobody is going to stop me recruiting them into the army…In 
the colonial times some tribes believed that the life of a soldier was a very 
low job unfit for people from certain tribes and that is why you find in the 
army the northerners….Because people think there is no war and these 
young men wear a very smart uniform, they want their weaklings from 
certain tribes also to wear this uniform.95 
 
o On his part, the Minister of Public Service, E.Y. Lakidi, representing 
Acholi North constituency had this to note: 
 
o Some people are born to be good traders, some are born to be very 
good civil servants, some are born to protect this country - The North 
has been heavily accused that the recruitment is all the time going to 
the North. I think many people should be grateful to the North, and 
particularly to my tribe Acholi. The Acholi have pledged themselves to 
                                        
94 Proceedings of the Uganda Parliament, Hansard 1963-64, Vol.35, pp. 3135-36. 
95 Ibid, p.3205. 
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protect this country. I f they are in the army they have- got to be 
supported.  If people are beginning to speak in this House to 
discredit them, their morale in the army, the police and prisons -
would be lowered.96 
 
With such thinking dominating the highest level of government, by 1969, seven 
years after the attainment of self-rule, 141 (88 per cent) of the 171 officers in the 
Uganda Army were from the Nilotic, Sudanic and Nilohamitic ethnic groups and 
while the population of the north was 19 per cent of the national total, 61 per cent 
of the military were from that region (Omara-Otunnu: 1988, 80-82).97  Following 
the mutiny of 1964 a paramilitary force, the General Service Unit (GSU), manned 
by Israeli trained agents was set up and was headed by a close relative of the 
president.  It was set up as a counterespionage agency on the administrative 
instructions of Prime Minister Obote and reported directly to him (Makubuya, 1987, 
145-147).98  Under the Prime Minister’s office also was a paramilitary unit, the 
                                        
96 Proceedings of the Uganda Parliament, Hansard 1963-64, Vol.23, pp. 959-960. 
97 The pitfalls of that line of thinking were laid bare by the national tragedy that unfolded in the 
decade and a half that followed the 1964 which was being debated in parliament when the 
statements cited above were made.  During that period, the regime presided over by the exponents 
those views was deposed by the military, headed by Idi Amin and the country endured a spell of 
unmitigated atrophy.  However, those same views were to resurface in 1979, in the interim period 
after the fall of Amin as the transitional legislative body, the National Consultative Council (NCC) 
discussed the reconstitution of the Uganda armed forces.  When a proposal to base enlistment of 
military personnel on proportional ethnic representation was tabled, an NCC member from the 
north of the country countered by observing that, ‘There are tribes which are much, much bigger 
than others, so you could expect about half of the army coming from that tribe or the tribe which is 
more fortunate or tribes which are related and in Uganda – I stressed this when I contributed to 
this debate much earlier in May/June – that there are sections of the population who just cannot 
fight even if they are soldiers.  And I will stress this that there is evidence to that effect.  Even in 
the recent fighting there is evidence that some people could not stand fires (sic).  This I am 
stressing because practice is different from theory’ (cited in Mudoola, 1989, p.133).    
98 The activities of the GSU featured prominently as one of the justifications of the coup d’etat 
against Milton Obote in 1971.  In the statement that announced the takeover, the military 
spokesman noted that:  ‘The cabinet office, by training large numbers of people (largely from 
Akokoro County in Lango District the home of both Obote and Akena-Adoko, the Chief General 
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Special Force dominated by personnel from Obote’s home district to supplement 
the GSU.   
Mention has already been made in passing of the 1964 mutiny; but given its 
future impact on civil-military relations in Uganda, it is important that we shed 
further light on that event.99  The 1964 mutiny affected all the three East African 
nations, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.  ‘Bound together by a common legacy of 
service in Britain's East African colonial army, the King's African Rifles (KAR)’, 
writes Parsons, ‘the soldiers demanded higher pay and the removal of expatriate 
British officers from the newly established national armies’ (2007:51).    
The handling of that crisis by the respective presidents reflected the internal 
politics and gave an indication of the future role of the military in each of the 
countries.  Tanzania’s Nyerere had the mutinying troops disarmed following which 
he disbanded the Tanganyika Rifles and rebuilt the military as the Tanzania 
Peoples’ Defence Forces (TPDF) and introduced the system of national military 
service ‘...[t]o demystify the monopoly of use of arms’(Mudoola, 1989:122).  The 
TPDF was manned it with a set of fresh recruits screened through the youth 
league of the ruling Tanzania African National Union (TANU).  In Kenya Kenyatta 
accused the mutineers of undermining the trust of the Kenyan people and rejected 
any possibility of negotiating with them.  The rig leaders were dismissed from 
service with disgrace.   
In contrast to the firm manner in which the leadership in the other two 
countries dealt with the crisis, in Uganda Interior Minister Felix Onama (shortly of 
Defence) rushed to the mutinying garrison to initiate negotiations and was 
promptly put at gun point and locked up by the mutineers upon arrival.  In the 
ensuing standoff, government granted the mutinous troops all their demands and 
increasing their pay depending on grade by 135 per cent to 300 per cent (Howe, 
                                                                                                                        
Service Officer) in armed warfare, has been turned into a second army.  Uganda therefore has had 
two armies; one in cabinet, the other regular.’ (cited in Makubuya, 1989, p. 147).  
99 Parsons (2003) gives a detailed account of the East African mutinies. 
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2001:47; Omara-Otunnu, 1988:61) in addition to elevating several officers and 
commissioning many non-commissioned officers to officer ranks.  Of the 19 officer 
promotions, 13 were from the northern districts (Mudoola, 1989:121).  Those 
measures had major budgetary implications: The allocation for the Ministry of 
Defence shot up to represent about 10.2 per cent of the budget, compared with 
6.9 per cent for Kenya and 3.8 per cent for Tanzania (Brett, 1995:136).  That 
increment represented 10 per cent more than the total defence budget of the two 
countries combined (Omara-Otunnu, 1987:79).  Idi Amin, the future Army 
Commander and future coup maker saw himself being elevated from temporary 
Major (substantively a Captain) the rank he held in January 1964 to Colonel by 
September of the same year.  Obote, the Prime Minister, summarily dismissed and 
then summarily reinstated 300 hundred personnel that had instigated the mutiny.  
The few that were locked up or dismissed were clandestinely re-instated by Idi 
Amin in the days that led to his coup in 1971.100  ‘Thus, in a sense the 1964 
mutiny realised its goals’ writes Decalo, further adding that, ‘...the army witnessed 
the government’s timidity under pressure’ (Decalo, 1990:159).   
The following year in 1965, Prime Minister Obote used the now pampered 
military to carry out an internal coup in order to forestall a corruption investigation 
and a potential vote of no confidence that members of his cabinet were agitating 
for against him. A year later in 1966, Obote used the military again to overthrow 
the independence constitution and depose the ceremonial President of the country, 
the King of Buganda, Kabaka Edward Mutesa.  Obote emerged from these crises 
as the President, with Major General Idi Amin as the Army Commander.  General 
Amin was by now a card-bearing member of Obote’s party, the Uganda Peoples’ 
Congress (UPC).  By 1971, the military and political class were deeply factionalised 
and a state of emergency had been declared in Buganda, the home of the capital 
following the deposition, exiling to Britain in 1966 and subsequent death in 1969 of 
the King of the Baganda and former president of Uganda.  There was pending 
                                        
100 Omara-Otunnu, ibid, p.59. 
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disciplinary action against the Army Commander, Idi Amin on several accounts.101  
These included the allegations against him for his involvement in smuggling gold 
and ivory from neighbouring Congo (now DRC), misappropriation of money 
allocated to the military, collusion with Israel in providing logistics to anti-
Khartoum insurgents in South Sudan and the murder of a prominent pro-Obote 
Acholi military officer and Amin’s deputy, Brigadier Okoya, who had insisted on 
Amin being investigated over his likely involvement in the failed assassination 
attempt on Obote in December 1969.  Factions of the military allied to Amin 
deposed Obote in January 1971 and proclaimed Amin as the next president.   
5.2.4. The Amin years, 1971-79 
Immediately after the successful execution of his coup d’etat in 1971, Idi Amin 
embarked on a three-pronged programme to ‘reform’ the military to suit it to his 
own worldview and to his understanding of what it meant to be a head of state.  
First, launched a massive recruitment drive in what almost amounted to a 
mobilisation for war; second, he carried out a bloody purge of the rank and file of 
the Uganda Army by systematically killing off or exiling personnel from ethnic 
groups that he deemed to have been closely associated with the Obote regime and 
third, he disbanded the paramilitary structures that Obote set up and scrapped key 
offices in the military that had been set up to check his powers.  The massacre of 
personnel from undesirable ethnicities was extended to all other institutions of the 
‘security sector’ including the police and prisons and intelligence organisations.   
Within three months of assuming presidency, Amin had implemented the 
equivalent of a mobilisation for war, more than doubling the strength of the 
military. This he did by recruiting close to 20,000 men in the first year of Amin’s 
presidency.102  The new recruits consisted of 4,000 ex-Anyanya fighters from 
                                        
101 For details, see Omara-Otunnu, op cit p.92. 
102 Omara-Otunnu gives a figure of 19,742 (op. cit. p.107). 
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Southern Sudan and some former Zairian Simba rebels (Mamdani, 1976:302; 
Omara-Otunnu, 1987:107-8).  The presidential bodyguard was consisted of about 
400 Palestinians.103  By 1978 the strength of the military was about 25,000 with at 
least 75 per cent of them being foreigners, a factor that contributed to major 
difficulties in communication, training and discipline (Byrne, 1992).  According to 
insider estimates, about half of the force were southern Sudanese and Nubians, 26 
per cent were from Zaire, and 24 per cent were indigenous Ugandans mainly 
Amin’s co-ethnics, the Kakwa, and members of other West Nile communities 
(Avirgan and Honey, 1983:7).  With this pattern of recruitment, the mercenary 
soldier reclaimed the space that had been created for that category of military 
service during the colonial days.104  The larger part of the remainder hailed from 
West Nile, Amin’s own ethnic base with at least 40 per cent of them being Moslem 
(Mamdani, 1976:303).   
The purge of the military had started within the first few days of Amin’s rule 
and initially targeted the Acholi and Lango.  Subsequently, the Lugbara of his 
native West Nile and the Itesot of the east of the country were to be targeted.  
Most of the killings took place in the main military installations around the country, 
with the highest incidence being recorded between 1971 and 1973 with a final 
purge being carried out in 1977.  Lango and Acholi servicemen were killed by 
being herded into rooms where explosives were then hurled; several were 
bayoneted and thrown into River Nile.105 Those who survived the massacres 
escaped with their military equipment, specifically small arms, to neighbouring 
Sudan and Tanzania to prepare to fight to reinstate Milton Obote.  Writing in 1974, 
David Martin noted that, of the twenty-three officers of the rank of Lieutenant 
                                        
103 Legum C., ed., Africa Contemporary Record, 1974-75 p.B309. 
104 Amin’s closest adviser was an English Mercenary, Bob Astles. 
105 In Obote’s home district, Lango, Amin’s soldiers burnt peasants in their huts and killed infants 
by placing them in mortars and ordering their mothers to pound them with pestles.  After that, the 
parents would be executed (‘One Day, Partyists will be Butchered’ The Monitor, Kampala, 
November 10, 1997).  Details of the methods used by Amin’s agents to liquidate those targeted for 
elimination can be found in Martin (1974) and Kyemba (1977). 
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Colonel or above at the time of the coup, only four, including Amin, were still in 
service.  Thirteen had been murdered, two had escaped into exile and four had 
been dismissed (1974:154).  The murdered officers were replaced by men from 
West Nile who were hastily commissioned and given rapid promotions.  Within six 
months of the coup, Collin Legum was to observe that, ‘[o]nly one of Amin’s 
commanding officers has had previous experience of command.  Not only have 
junior officers been made lieutenant colonels overnight, but similar high ranks 
have been given to warrant officers...’106  Horowitz (1985:491) shows that soldiers 
from parts of West Nle were not spared the purging in the course of time.  While 
the coup in 1971 may be viewed as an affair that involved conflict between the 
Sudanics of West Nile and the Luo of Lango and Acholi subsequent years saw the 
Sudanics turning against each other.  In 1972 there were purges of the Madi and 
Alur by the Lugbara and the Kakwa, and the yeas from 1974 to the fall of Amin in 
1979 were dominated by purges against the Lugbara by the Kakwa and Nubians.   
 
On the international scene, sections of the British press endeavoured to 
bolster Amin’s image and to urge governments to provide him with support in 
executing the changes he was undertaking in the military.  In a lead article, 
‘Commonsense Uganda’, The Daily Telegraph coverage of Amin’s visit to the UK 
captured the sentiments of Fleet Street:  
President Amin now on a visit, has much to commend him to the British 
public and Government.  He provides a welcome contrast to those African 
leaders who dedicate themselves to the elimination of white rule 
everywhere in the Continent but bring black rule into discredit in their own 
countries....Dr Obote who violates Uganda’s independence constitution, and 
was justifiably ousted by Gen. Amin, was in that category...Gen. Amin, 
always a staunch friend of Britain’s, has been quick to express this in his 
country’s policy.  His request for now for the purchase of equipment for the 
                                        
106 The Observer, July 25 1971, ‘Britain to discipline Amin’s mutineers’ 
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rebuilding of Uganda’s defences deserves the most sympathetic 
consideration from every point of view.107  
   
In November 1971 Amin carried out further reform by disbanding the General 
Service Unit (GSU) set up by Obote and replacing it with two internal security 
forces - the State Research Bureau (SRB) and Public Safety Unit (PSU).108 Apart 
from ‘intelligence gathering’ the SRB had no known functional brief, or code of 
conduct or financial support and had unlimited powers over the lives of any 
individual in Uganda. The Public Safety Unit (PSU) dealt with increased cases of 
burglary, highway robbery and general brigandage that resulted from the steady 
collapse of the economy.109 Through its ever-changing directors, it was 
answerable only to the President and its personnel found their way into many 
government departments, public and private institutions, including foreign 
diplomatic missions in Uganda.   
By 1979, 15,000 personnel staffed the three organisations of which 3,000 
were permanent and the rest were informers (Byrnes, 1992; Khidu-Makubuya, 
1989:148). The SRB and PSU were responsible for the murder of as many as 
300,000 people (Rummel, 1994:94; Kasozi, 1994:4). Amin’s reign ended in April 
1979 at the climax of a military campaign by a combined force of Tanzanian troops 
and Uganda exiles that was launched in response to the Amin’s invasion of 
Tanzania’s Kagera Salient in October 1978.  At least 10,000 soldiers of the 
defeated military retreated to Zaire and Sudan and many others who surrendered 
were taken prisoner and locked up in Tanzanian and Ugandan prisons.110  Those 
that retreated northwards to West Nile, Sudan and Zaire formed themselves into 
insurgent groups, prominent among which were West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), 
                                        
107 Daily Telegraph, July 12th 1971. 
108 Omara-Otunnu, op. Cit. p. 110. 
109 The PSU replaced the para-military Special Force of the Obote days.  It was at the expense of 
the civil police, the Uganda Police Force which suffered the same ravages as the Military in terms of 
purging personnel from undesirable ethnic groups.   
110 For details of the war that deposed Amin see Avirgan and Honey, op. cit. 
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Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) and Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) 
that continued to operate in West Nile region until they reached a final settlement 
with the Museveni government. 
5.2.5. The immediate Post-Amin Era, 1979- 85 
The politics of the immediate aftermath of the fall of Idi Amin revolved 
around the praetorian logic that had had taken hold of the country right from its 
early founding, gaining further prominence through the very process of forceful 
deposition of Idi Amin.  Real power lay in the hands of those that participated 
directly in dismantling Amin’s military machine, namely, the Tanzanian government 
whose military did most of the fighting; and the Uganda National Liberation Army 
(UNLA) consisting mainly of the Obote-allied Kikosi Maalum  or ‘special force’, and 
Museveni’s Front for National Salvation (Fronasa).  Then, as before, the military 
occupied the political centre-stage, and with even more decisiveness 
‘…demonstrated that it still had the veto power to determine which political rulers 
it preferred’ (Mudoola, 1988: 294).  The lack of effective executive control over the 
military did not end with the overthrow of Idi Amin in April 1979.  The first post-
Amin president, Professor Yusuf Kironde Lule was deposed only after 68 days in 
office because of his difficult relationship with the military, or with individuals 
within Military Council of the National Executive Committee who, according to the 
realities of the day, welded de facto power and for all intents and purposes took 
precedence over the president by virtue of their leading role in the military 
campaign against Idi Amin.   
President Lule’s difficulties with the Military Commission stemmed largely 
from his attempts to institute reforms in the defence sector.  This included giving 
instructions to Museveni, by then Defence Minister, requiring him to disband his 
(Museveni’s) 9,000 strong Fronasa – one of the major contingencies of the anti-
Amin UNLF – even as the war with the remnants of Idi Amin’s military was still in 
progress (Museveni, 1997:110).  Without consultation with the Military Council or 
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Minister of Defence, Lule further directed that he wanted to have what he called ‘a 
small professional Army’ of about 7,000.  He further sought to implement a quota 
system for military recruitment entailing that the number of recruits from each 
ethnic group would be in direct proportion to their representation in the national 
population, a move that would have favoured his own ethnic group, the Baganda, 
at the expense of the ethnicities of the members of the Military Commission.  
When eventually Lule ordered that the Chairman of the Military Commission, Paulo 
Muwanga and his deputy, Yoweri Museveni be moved from the Ministries of 
Internal Affairs and Defence to Labour and Regional Co-operation, the president 
had, as events turned out, overstepped the mark causing him to promptly ousted 
and replaced within 68 days of assumption of office.  The reversal of Lule’s 
transfers of the Military Commission strongmen did not even wait for the 
replacement president to take over office (Otunnu, 1987:149). 
The next President, Godfrey Binaisa, appointed in June, 1979 served for just 
under a year and was toppled as he attempted to limit the influence of military 
officers from Northern Uganda.  This was followed by a national election that saw 
Obote returning to power in a fraudulent election. During the elections he kept 
taunting his opponents to show him their generals. Several rebel movements 
emerged instead to challenge the outcome of the poll. The main group was the 
NRM under Yoweri Museveni.111  President Obote’s government and the military, 
the Acholi and Langi dominated UNLA failed to suppress Museveni and his 
guerrillas and as a result of the strains placed on the relations between the 
Northern Uganda factions in the military, Obote was once again overthrown by his 
generals, who were themselves overthrown by Museveni’s NRA. The government 
forces were ill-trained, poorly-clothed, irregularly paid and badly-led foot soldiers 
that lacked the discipline and endurance to execute a counterinsurgency campaign.  
                                        
111 Museveni’s Front for National Salvation, Fronasa was part of the UNLF/A.  He was a member of 
the military commission of the UNLF, the Minister of Defence and subsequently the Minister of 
Regional Co-operation in the transitional government. He contested and lost in the 1980 elections 
under his party, the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM).  During the campaigns, he persistently and 





5.3 Facilitating Vs False Starting SSR: The case of DDR in 
Uganda.112 
5.3.1. ‘DARRO’ or ‘DDR’: Incompatibilities between the Uganda process 
and SSR 
The linkage between Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration (DDR) and 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) is an obvious one and probably requires a lot less 
overstatement as tends to be apparent in the policy and academic literature: Both 
initiatives target the same institutions in countries emerging from violent conflict, 
or those drifting back and forth between peace and conflict.  That ‘...the two 
issues are often best considered together as part of a comprehensive security and 
justice development programme’ (OECD DAC, 2007: 105) is a straight forward fact 
that ought to go without being stated.  After all, ‘[i]t can also be argued that DDR 
is SSR to the extent that demobilisation is a form of defence reform’ (Bryden, 
2007:6).   
What remains unclear however is the actual extent to which SSR 
programming can to whatever degree, build on the outcome of DDR programmes 
in light of their chequered record.  But more significantly, the actual sense in which 
synergies between DDR and SSR can be realised is rendered questionable by the 
lack of clarity on what is in fact meant by DDR even in countries that are 
commonly acclaimed to have implemented it with success.113  This part of the 
study examines the case of Uganda, a country whose armed forces have 
undergone both DDR followed by SSR.  Claims that Uganda undertook DDR are 
                                        
112 Based on Mutengesa (2013). 
113 For examples from the 1990s, detailed analysis of Sub-Saharan African cases can be found in 
Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer (1996a and b). 
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examined to establish whether they can stand up to scrutiny and this we do by 
giving a rough sketch of the dynamics of the ‘DDR’ in Uganda to highlight in 
passing the aspects of the exercise which inevitably precluded the successful 
implementation of any future SSR.  Uganda’s experience in managing armed 
groups in the immediate aftermath of major hostilities is therefore explored to 
identify the key features of the process from 1986 onward, with a particular focus 
on the donor-supported mass discharge of the 1990s, and to identify whether as 
commonly suggested,114 DDR can lay ground for meaningful SSR. Questions are 
raised on whether indeed the Ugandan process amounted to DDR in whatever 
sense it is understood. It is suggested that the country adopted a much more 
complex process of managing armed factions than the linearly conceived model of 
DDR often encountered in the ‘peace building’ literature and that the logic of this 
process put in place major obstacles for any future reform process along the lines 
of SSR.   
A close examination of the DDR process implemented in Uganda from 1992 
to 1997, described as Dissolution/disbandment, Amalgamation, Reconstitution, 
Regularisation and Out-processing (DARRO) reveals that, contrary to common 
assumptions about that country’s post-1986 conflict management processes, the 
newly installed government deliberately eschewed the policy of demobilization and 
in the process, made disarmament unnecessary. It did this by resisting pressure 
from bilateral and multilateral donors to adopt policies that would effectively have 
subordinated the complexities of long-haul pacification to short-term fiscal 
considerations. The management of armed groups in Uganda since the 1990s 
reveals that it may have been premature to assume that that process was DDR 
and more premature even to hope that, the misunderstood process could have 
portended well for any future reform process such as the one initiated by the 
United Kingdom government in 1998.     
                                        
114 For example, Bryden (2007) and Bryden and Scherrer (2012). 
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5.3.2. Essence and Typology of DDR 
DDR has been variously presented as, ‘a vital step in the transition from war to 
peace’ (Hitchcock, 2002: 36), ‘one of the key components of conversion’ (Newman 
and Schnabel, 2002: 181), ‘a process that builds institutions and norms that help 
sustain democratic governance’, while helping to ‘exchange military capacity for 
political benefits’ (Stedman et al., 2002: 226).  It has also been characterised as a 
process that creates ‘…an environment in which the overall peace process, political 
and social reconciliation and longer term development can take root’ (Ball and de 
Goor, 2006:1).  Much in the same tone, the United Nations has proclaimed that ‘in 
the civil conflicts of the post-cold-war era, a process of disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration has repeatedly proved to be vital to stabilizing a 
post-conflict situation’ (United Nations, 2000: 1).   
 Elsewhere, Spear depicts DDR in similar terms, almost going so far as 
equating it with the absence of open hostilities. According to Spear, ‘[p]eace 
requires breaking the command and control structures operating over rebel 
fighters….thus making it more difficult for them to return to organized rebellion’ 
(Spear, 1999: 141).  This almost implies that the raison d’être for armed groups is 
the maintaining ‘command and control structures’ sufficiently employed, or that the 
dissolution of command and control structures results in the dissipation of the 
infrastructure of grievance and the incentive structure for rebellion.
115
 What is 
clear however is the overlap between the aims of both SSR and DDR, as much as 
the extent to which the utility and efficacy of DDR of the latter is overstated, all at 
                                        
115 The evolution of the insurgency in Northern Uganda from 1986 illustrates the pitfalls of 
investing hope in the dissolution of command and control structures as a means of laying the 
foundation for DDR and subsequently, SSR.  The military defeat of the armed groups that emerged 
between 1986 and 1992 was always followed by the dismantling of their command control 
structures and their incorporation into the government forces.  This did not deter the emergence of 
new forces under different commanders with a new membership, from the Uganda People’s 
Democratic Army ( UPDA) led by officers of the defunct Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), 
to the  Holy Spirit Mobile Force (HSMF) under Alice Lakwena, to Lord’s Army, Uganda People’s 
Democratic Christian Army (UPDCA) and eventually Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army, LRA. 
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the risk of downplaying the real dynamics of protracted conflicts in less developed 
countries, in addition to oversimplifying the varied motivations of individuals and 
groups that resort to arms as a means of pursuing their goals.  The disregard of 
those complex motivations can only generate unfounded optimism for the future 
success of closely allied or concurrent processes.   
Attempting to classify DDR into distinct categories can be a bewildering 
undertaking given the level of overlap in the factors that justify its implementation, 
but more so, on account of the diverse political, social and economic contexts 
within which DDR is often deemed to be a feasible avenue for stemming violent 
conflict. Nevertheless, it is possible to single out familiar categorisations.  The 
common ones are those that focus on the disposition of belligerents at the end of 
hostilities and those that prioritise the economic, political, and social benefits of 
conducting DDR. The classifications that easily come to mind are those advanced 
by Kingma (1994, 2000); Berdal (1996); Marley (1997) and Clark (2007).
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Kingma suggests seven factors that may determine DDR type, namely: the 
signing of a peace accord, the defeat of one fighting party, the perceived 
improvement in the security situation, a shortage of adequate funding, reduction in 
strength as a way of balancing military capability with security needs in accordance 
with a realistic threat assessment and as part of Security Sector Reform (SSR), 
perceived economic and development impact of conversion and changing military 
technologies and/or strategies (2000) while Marley classifies DDR programmes into 
what he calls ‘conceptual categories’, based on economic or political reasons and 
requirements for implementation of peace agreements (1997:138). Clark identifies 
two types of ‘demobilization’, first, where parties to a conflict have signed a peace 
accord with neither side achieving a military victory, second, when one party has 
won an outright military victory and demobilizes the losing party as in Ethiopia 
from 1991; or reduces the size of its own army as in Eritrea in 1997, and 
supposedly, in Uganda, from 1992 to 1995 (2007:2).  Mahling-Clark’s ‘broad’ 




categories roughly relate to Berdal’s in his delineation of three sets of 
circumstances of DDR implementation (1996: 10-11).  The first involves the 
termination of conflict through stalemate, compelling the war-weary adversaries to 
agree to a negotiated settlement. The second involves the collapse of central state 
structures and the emergence of warring factions, none of which is strong enough 
to impose order, thus attracting the intervention of third parties to effect ‘coercive 
disarmament’. Third are cases where one group or a coalition of several groups 
opposed to the government emerges victorious and installs a new government. Of 
all foregoing classifications, Berdal’s third set of circumstances is most 
representative of the Uganda process after 1986 and then between 1992 and 1996 
- the period most closely associated with DDR.  
5.4 The Uganda DDR Process and Its Implications for Future SSR 
It is generally understood that the 1986 respite in Uganda’s history of civil conflict 
was immediately followed by a process in which the new government of the 
National Resistance Movement disarmed rival groups and some of its own forces, 
and demobilised them as part of a ‘DDR’ programme (Colletta et al., 1996a).  
Accordingly, the country was set onto a war-to-peace transition.  However, this 
claim may be a misreading of the purely administrative nature of the steps taken 
by the Ugandan authorities between 1992 and 1995 to reduce the number of 
serving military personnel. The plainly administrative and instrumental nature of 
the Uganda ‘DDR’ was summarised by Museveni in his observation that,  
[I]f we were to maintain such a big force indefinitely, the welfare of 
everybody would deteriorate, and, at the same time, our combat 
effectiveness would decline because we would not be able to afford to buy 
new equipment (1997: 176).
117
  
                                        
117 Museveni is the current president of Uganda and was the founder and commander of the NRA 
guerrillas and Chairman of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and the brain behind the 
insurgency that enabled the NRM to ascend to power in 1986. The NRA has since been renamed 
the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF). 
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That statement sums up the Government of Uganda’s motivation to reduce the 
strength of the NRA and should have given the external actors a clear indication of 
what they should have realistically hope for in terms of coincidence between their 
wishes and Museveni’s long term plans.  This was to remain the case even in the 
SSR process that was initiated in 1998.  What is often never put in consideration 
by most commentators on the Uganda’s ‘post-conflict’ peace process however, are 
the measures taken between 1986, when the major civil war ended with the 
ascendance to power of the NRM, and 1992, when the supposed DDR was 
launched. Arguably, the significance of these measures in restoring the semblance 
of stability by far surpasses the benefits of the 1992-1995 ‘DDR’ exercise, let alone 
the attempts especially by the UK Government to promote SSR.  Those initiatives 
would not have been successful, for all that they achieved, had it not been for the 
actions taken in the late 1980s.  But even then, it is more important to note the 
extent to which those earlier actions tended to diverge in important respects from 
the logic of DDR, if vital lessons are to be derived by practitioners of the ‘peace 
building’ industry from the Uganda DDR and SSR.   
 
Emphasizing how the Uganda process of managing warring factions was a 
home-grown one, Museveni additionally observes that, ‘…some foreigners have 
begun to show interest in our methods and actions because ideas, not resources, 
seem to be the big problem in Africa’.118  The reference to the process as having 
been a home-grown one is not far-fetched, and partly serves to highlight the sense 
in which other models are external impositions.  With the exception of involving aid 
donors in funding the process, the Uganda process bore little resemblance to the 
three-step DDR that is typically associated with stalemated conflicts that tend to 
attract third-party intervention.  Instead, Uganda employed what can be perceived 
in retrospect as a five-stage process that involved first, the dissolution of fighting 
groups and disbandment of the defeated government military; secondly, the 




amalgamation of the members of all those entities into the victorious NRA; thirdly, 
the gradual reconstitution of the national military; fourthly, the regularisation of 
the new military force and finally, the out-processing of the backlog of personnel 
that would normally have been retired as part of the personnel management 
routine, but were instead maintained on the rolls because it would not have been 
to discharge them earlier.  Briefly, the process involved Dissolution/disbandment, 
Amalgamation, Reconstitution, Regularisation and Out-processing.  It is important 
that these processes are looked at in detail to give an idea of the future obstacles 
to the donor-inspired SSR-related programmes that followed in 1998.  
5.4.1. Dissolution and Amalgamation Vs Disbandment and 
‘Demobilisation’ 
In the last quarter of 1986, the Museveni government reluctantly sought the 
assistance of the International Monetary Fund to stem the deteriorating economic 
situation. Inflation stood at 237% and was rising; there was a marked 
deterioration in the balance of payments as external payments accumulated and 
the deficit in the current account rose,
119
 at the same time that insecurity in the 
north and east of the country escalated as former government forces regrouped 
and tried to make a comeback. Given this starting point, it seems clear that there 
was going to be lack of fit between the NRM’s vision of rebuilding the country, 
reconstituting public institutions and maintaining internal stability, on the one hand 
and the values of the IMF and multilateral donors on the other hand.   
Even at this early stage, there was already in existence, the typical 
ingredients of what the donor community calls ‘lack of political’ will and ‘lack of 
ownership’.  Regarding the timing and future programming of ‘demobilisation’, it is 
important to note that the donor community’s preference for small government 
                                        
119 For details of the state of the economy in this period and the relationship between the NRM 
government and the IMF, see Mugenyi (1991). 
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and military downsizing was fundamentally at odds with the NRM’s vision of 
building a broad-based government and constituting a nationally representative 
military force. Whereas donors favoured contraction at all costs, the Museveni 
government viewed expansion and inclusiveness as an indispensable undertaking. 
Expansion of the NRA through the integration of other armed groups was pursued 
with even more urgency than the co-optation of the political leaders of those 
groups, in part because of the pressing need to pacify the country. In any case, in 
the 1980s Uganda, the praetorian logic had escalated to such a point that every 
political outfit that had an interest in competing for state power possessed a 
military arm as part of its organisational setup.  Possession of a military force, 
however nominal, was key tool in political bargaining.  The willingness to submit 
one’s fighters and their equipment to the command and control of the NRA was 
the most credible way of expressing one’s commitment to being part of the new 
political order.   
Additionally, for the politico-military groups jostling for power throughout 
the early 1980s, co-optation and integration of their military wings was the 
principal means of reassurance that the new government would take care of their 
interests. That approach has remained the NRM’s primary avenue of managing 
armed groups.  As can be anticipated, the delicate balance within the military 
forces resulting from such bargaining is, at the outset incapable of getting along 
with externally conceived reforms that may be deemed to be insensitive to the 
internal dynamics of the military forces and the compromises that may have 
attended to the process of patching them together.   
Clearly, the government’s expansionary policy precluded ‘demobilisation’. 
What needs to stressed is that, in conditions of internal warfare, ill-timed attempts 
at ‘demobilisation’ are inherently inimical to long-term pacification. As it turned 
out, the NRM government viewed ‘demobilisation’ with suspicion and for six years, 
resisted donor pressure to implement such a programme, fearing that it would lead 
to the dispersal of former fighters throughout the countryside and beyond the 
reach of the nascent government. Thus, far from implementing donor-inspired 
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‘demobilisation’, the Museveni government instead converted the new national 
military force - the NRA - into a massive depot for groups and individuals that over 
the years of the country’s instability had acquired combat skills and amassed 
undocumented instruments with which to exercise those skills. In the Uganda of 
1986, the most logical means of ‘reintegrating’ fighters from various warring 
factions into society was by first upgrading them from being warriors and 
insurgents, and in some cases, social bandits living beyond the reach of civic 
control, to regular members of a unified national military force in a recuperating 
nation (Babiker and Ozerdem, 2003).  The most appropriate place where individual 
members of such diverse groupings could ‘decompress’ and make the transition 
back to civic life was, initially, within a formal military setting, under the control of 
a Military Police and a military code of justice. Integration into a reconstituted 
national military force was thus a vital step in the transition towards ‘reintegration 
into civic society’.
120
  In a 2005 study on the status of former abductees in Acholi 
region, Allen and Schomerus report that, incorporation into the military is as 
strongly held in the 2000s as it was in the early days of the NRA. They conclude 
that, ‘[w]ithin the UPDF there is a strongly held view that recruiting former 
combatants into the UPDF and giving them proper training is one of the most 
effective mechanisms of “reintegration”’ (2006:32). Despite the initial costs of such 
a process, its importance and benefits in the case of Uganda cannot be easily 
understood if it is perceived strictly through the lens of financial outlays on 
maintaining a military force that is larger than it would be under normal conditions. 
The foregoing observation may sound straightforward but it runs counter to 
the mainstream development doctrine, according to which military expenditure 
                                        
120 In conditions where civic order has virtually collapsed, it is counterproductive to emphasize 
‘reintegration into civilian life’ as DDR policy and academic literature tends to do: a preoccupation 
with ‘civilian life’ when civic order has been eroded by decades of violence is a misplacement of 
priorities.  When the urgent task is (re)establishment of civic institutions and minimum order and 
transforming insurgents into professional soldiers, the debate over what Colletta et al (1995) call 
‘unproductive (military) activities’ or ‘destructive investment’ can indeed be misleading.  Reference 
to demobilization and ‘reintegration into civilian life’ minimizes the importance  of issues at stake in 
countries affected by protracted violent conflict and which may still lack a military force from which 
to demobilize.   
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adds little or nothing to the needs of wider society. The pressure to make short-
term financial savings then makes it necessary to opt for a hastily conceived mass 
discharge of ‘former combatants’, even when such action may risk setting off new 
spirals of disorder and social breakdown. This does not come as a surprise given 
that most bilateral and multilateral aid organizations, especially those of the West, 
espouse a neo-classical economic doctrine according to which investment in 
productive capital is the engine for economic growth and development while 
military expenditure is a waste of investible resources (Malcolm et al., 1996; 
Davoodi et al., 2000).  In his reflection on the four steps towards the ‘tragedy of 
Uganda’, Wrigley sums up the sentiments of many neoclassical economists not just 
on the military, but more broadly on the state in Africa, where such 
characterizations as ‘fragile states’, ‘weak states’, ‘failed states’, ‘collapsed states’ 
among others, are applied to the same entities that are supposed to be overgrown 
and powerful, hence needing to be rolled back.  Wrigley writes that: 
The truth is that the soldiers are good at killing.  They have no other 
competence and no useful role in present-day Africa.  There will begin to be 
hope when they have retired, not just to their barracks, but to their villages.  
And the liquidation of the armies is just one, though the most urgent, 
aspect of a highly desirable development: the drastic reduction in the 
power, the cost and the pretension of the state (1988:34-35). 
 
Such a perspective towards the military and the common tendency by 
commentators and analysts to conflate increased economic output with 
development partly inspires the pressure donors put on aid-dependent countries to 
‘demobilise’ their armed forces even when the end result is 'reintegration into 
poverty' (Baare, 2001).
121
  While it may be important to prioritise fiscal matters, 
and advisedly so in ideal situations, it would be counterintuitive for the authorities 
of a country emerging from years of anarchy to discharge all at once large 
numbers of former insurgents and defeated government soldiers that are 
                                        
121 A World Bank study has shown that discharged veterans in Uganda were not coping with 
‘civilian life’, earning on average an income that was only about half that of the average Ugandan 
(Colletta et al, 1995, p.46). 
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unemployable, brutalised, disoriented and beyond the control and reach of the 
insubstantial civilian authorities. As Ball et al. put it, in Uganda’s case, demobilised 
troops would have had ‘…little civilian experience, no savings, and limited 
vocational skills with which to facilitate their reintegration into everyday life’ 
(1997:258).  
Moreover, the actual composition of the ‘former combatants’ ‘or ex-
combatants’ in civil wars often remains inadequately scrutinised.  As already 
recognised by many commentators, the term ‘ex-combatant’, particularly in the 
context of civil wars is shorthand for a heterogeneous groups of individuals who 
differ from each other depending on rank, political ideology of their group, type of 
military organisation they belong(ed) to, age, gender, war-related disability, 
educational and professional attainment and experience (Giustozzi, 2009; 
McMullin, 2013).  Even when serious attempts are made to study the composition 
of fighting groups, it often remains unclear whether detailed attention is paid to 
the wide range of needs of the diverse categories of former fighters, particularly 
their long-term future following discharge. For example, combatants in Uganda in 
1986 included uprooted youths and minors, some of whom were total orphans, 
who in the course of conflict had sought refuge with the insurgents, either after 
being disconnected from their parents or losing them in crossfire or at the hands of 
government troops.  As has been put succinctly by the 1996 UNICEF State of the 
World’s Children report,  
When schools are closed and families fragmented, there are few influences 
that can compete with a warrior's life.  Indeed, in these circumstances, a 
military unit can be something of a refuge—serving as a kind of surrogate 
family (UNICEF, 1996:17).  
 
In the case of Uganda, Kayihura has reported that by the time the NRA overrun 
Kampala in January 1986, there were 300 underage fighters, the number rising to 
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1,580 in 1991 as anti-government fighting groups surrendered (2000, p. 14). 
122
  
For that category of ‘combatants’ whose place in society would ordinarily have 
been an orphanage - none of which were functional - the victorious insurgency 
group was the only known family. For that group of combatants, ‘reintegration’ 
into economically productive life and a return to their homes was a clueless whistle 
in the wind, or worse still, a cynical gesture. On the part of the government, the 
hasty dispersal of such groups in the name of demobilisation would have 
amounted to dousing a smouldering fire with an explosive mixture, in addition to 
abandoning the vulnerable. Such ‘demobilisation’ was therefore never considered 
an option.  The decision not to ‘demobilise’ was influenced by several factors, 
some purely military/operational and others political. Many of these factors 
demonstrate the extent to which external actors on the one hand, and local policy 
elites in the Third World on the other, view crucial questions of security and 
development through opposite ends of the same lens.  
First, from the perspective of the NRM government, the decision to 
incorporate the fighters of other rebel groups and the soldiers of the defunct 
national military into the NRA was crucial for the attainment of short-term stability 
as well as for long-term pacification of the country (Museveni, 1997; Ondoga, 
1998).  As Babiker and Ozerdem, have observed, incorporation ‘…reduced the 
immediate danger posed by large numbers of armed men who had no source of 
livelihood other than their weapons in a devastated country’.  In the short term, 
‘…those with arms and grievances were not allowed back into society until the 
fruits of economic expansion became more available’ (Adams, 2002:3).   The 
negotiations between the NRA and the Acholi-based rebel Uganda People’s 
Democratic Army (UPDA) – the latter consisting mainly of soldiers of the UNLA – 
demonstrated the urgency with which fighters that had been soldiers in the 
national military force desired to be restored to paid employment.  Lamwaka 
                                        
122 In that report, Kayihura also disputes the claim by UNICEF (1996) that the NRA had an 
estimated 3,000 children, including 500 girls. 
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reports that the first meeting of the NRA/UPDA peace talks on 17th March 1988 
dwelt exclusively on jobs for the ex-rebel combatants, promotion and integration 
into the NRA (2002:30).   
Secondly and significantly for future prospects for post-1986 
‘demobilisation’, the NRM government generally converted the newly inaugurated 
national military force into a ‘holding bay’ for individuals that over the years had 
become insurgents or regular soldiers for reasons noted above. The orthodox DDR 
continuum was turned on its head with emphasis being placed on the need to 
‘reintegrate’ the insurgents who had spent years on the fringes of civic life, into the 
national military force. Additionally, unlike what followed after the collapse of the 
Idi Amin government six years earlier, the new government steered clear of the 
‘policy’ of ‘Bremmerian’ disbandment,
123
 whereby the military personnel of the 
deposed government were literally dismissed just because their tenure of service 
coincided with a discredited political regime.
124
  
Thirdly, at just about 14,000 strong in January 1986 (Mamdani, 2001:174),  
the NRA’s manpower base was, according to the group’s key leaders, not sufficient 
to minimally secure the whole country, a factor that automatically ruled out donor-
driven ‘demobilization’, but instead called for the rapid expansion of the force. 
According to Museveni, the NRA ‘…needed trained manpower quickly and we 
decided to utilize the existing manpower to consolidate security in the country’. He 
further adds that, the military leadership ‘took a positive decision to incorporate 
soldiers from other forces into the NRA’ (1997: 174).  This process of incorporating 
soldiers defecting from the government force and fighters of other insurgent 
groups began before the NRM gained full control of the government and climaxed 
                                        
123 The term ‘Bremmerian’ is coined from the names of Paul Bremmer, the first US civilian 
administrator of post-Saddam Iraq under whose brief the Iraqi military was summarily disbanded in 
the name of ‘debaathification’ contributing to the unstable conditions that continue to obtain in that 
country.   
124 In 1979, the joint Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces (TPDF)-Uganda National Liberation Front 
(UNLF) either summarily shot or, detained surrendering or captured Uganda Army (UA) soldiers and 
dispatched them to the maximum security prison within Uganda and other prisons in Tanzania. 
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in the second half of 1985, a period that coincided with the Nairobi Peace talks 
between the government and Museveni’s NRA.  Of the 18 combat battalions 
making up the NRA six months after the capture of power, seven were manned by 
personnel from other rebel groups that had crossed to the NRA or from soldiers of 
the deposed government.
125
   
Fourth, the NRM sought to incorporate the soldiers and fighters of other 
groups as a confidence-building measure, an opportunity that would have been 
lost if demobilisation had been implemented much earlier.  Confidence building 
was crucial for the new government, especially given the narrow geographical 
confines of the NRM/A’s politico-military campaign prior to its ascendance to 
power. By 1986, the organisation’s political base generally conformed to Uganda’s 
geo-ethnic fault-lines, with the group’s membership predominantly drawn from the 
central and western regions. Co-opting fighters from all parts of the country was 
viewed as a means of addressing that deficiency, and as key to boosting the new 
government’s appeal among the populations in those regions from which the other 
group’s fighters hailed, a point Museveni stresses when he observes that,  
[T]hese soldiers were already trained, and although they had been widely 
misused....we saw the problem as one of leadership, not the soldiers 
themselves.  At the same time, we were aware that incorporating these 
young men into our new national army would help build confidence among 
the population in the regions that they came from.  For those two reasons 




Fifth, by 1986 Uganda’s central state structures and much of the social and 
economic infrastructure had suffered almost two decades of unmitigated atrophy. 
The institutions of law and order – the police, prisons, courts system, and local 
government administration - had all virtually collapsed. All that was left of the civil 
police was a mere 6,000 demoralised personnel (Biddle et al., 1998:13), way 
below the 34,000 that the United Nations would have recommended for Uganda’s 
population of 15 million in 1986. The country was under-policed to the tune of 467 
                                        
125 Ibid, p. 175.  
126 Ibid, p.174. 
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per cent. In addition, there existed no viable economic activity to absorb the 
veterans of the myriads fighting groups and the soldiers and auxiliaries of the 
defunct national military force, the UNLA.   
Sixth and of major significance was the real meaning of the triumph of the 
largely southern NRA in terms of Uganda’s historical trajectory. The NRA’s victory 
upset Uganda’s longstanding politico-military tradition that up to 1986 enabled the 
elites of the North of the country to exercise unchallenged political dominance in 
relation to the elites from other regions. Such a precedent had to provoke a vicious 
counterattack against the new government - much as it did, just six months after 
the NRA/M overthrew the government of the short-lived military junta that had 
succeeded Milton Obote’s deposed UPC government. Under those circumstances, a 
drawdown in the strength of the NRA - as the aid donors were urging, purely on 
narrow pecuniary grounds - would have been self-defeating in the short to medium 
term, as events soon proved. Such pressing realities are often neglected as 
priorities by the ‘development partners’, as epitomised by Collier et al. in their 
observation that ‘demobilization in Uganda ….was initially delayed for the wrong 
reasons’ (2000:73).   
From the foregoing, the donor community’s drive for ‘demobilisation’ and 
the NRA/M’s pressing urge to gain legitimacy and acceptance by the country’s 
diverse communities, operated at cross-purposes.  The DDR process and whatever 
else was to follow thereon was therefore fraught with the seeds of future 
admonitions of ‘lack of political will’ and denial of ‘local ownership’ on the part of 
Uganda government by aid donors, not so much because it lacked either of the 
two, but because it had its own ideas as to what direction the management of the 
country’s affairs had to take.  In the process, the NRA had within the first six years 
of its formalisation as the national military, swollen in personnel strength by at 
least 400 per cent, from 20,000 in 1986 (Museveni, 1997:174), to about 100,000 
in 1991 (Hansen & Twaddle, 1991:14; Prunier, 94:71).   
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5.4.2. ‘Disarmament’ by unconditional incorporation 
According to Kingma, ‘…in Uganda, the disarmament took place in the 
barrack, before the soldiers were taken to the demobilization centres’ (Kingma, 
1997: 161), with Colletta et al. (1996) and Mahling-Clark (2007) holding a similar 
view.  However, there is limited evidence to show that the Ugandan authorities 
viewed the disarmament of the diverse armed groups as a viable option for 
pacification or even as a priority. Instead, the evidence suggests that the Ugandan 
government opted for a less direct approach to the problem of arms management 
involving the absorption of members of all armed groups into the NRA and 
regularising them as soldiers. Kutesa, one of the leading commanders in the NRA 
from its early days as a guerrilla force and currently in charge of the UPDF’s 
department of doctrine has written that, after defeating the UNLA: 
The next task the new government faced was building a new national army.  
There were many groups of armed people who had to be absorbed into the 
army.  The NRA policy was to incorporate anybody willing to cross, provided 
he did not have a criminal record and was fit for military service....The 
different had different backgrounds and ideologies.  Most of them were 
semi-trained while some had undergone military courses at diverse 
colleges....These officers and men who had different training and cultural 
backgrounds had to be merged into one national army (2006:255). 
   
For the last two decades, this has remained the prime method of dealing with and 
neutralising the insurgent groups that have kept emerging. The long-term merits 
of this approach may be subject to debate, but the practice needs to be recognised 
when seeking the correct lessons from the Uganda process. The NRA would have 
been the only actor at the time to have some aversion to unconditional 
incorporation, either to guard against infiltration and being subverted from within 
or to protect its well-established standards of discipline from being compromised.  
Kutesa further notes, ‘[t]his policy [of unconditional incorporation] might have 
seemed risky but we were in complete control of all the troops...’ (2006:255).  
Ondoga, also a veteran of the guerrilla phase of NRA’s existence has highlights the 
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implications for civil-military relations of the policy of unconditional incorporation in 
observing that: 
The indiscriminate incorporation into the NRA of these fighting forces and 
former armies was of course not without its problems.  The population, for 
one thing, loathed most of these groups and would rather have them locked 
up and brought to book. There was thus the danger that by incorporating 
them into its ranks, the NRA risked alienating itself from the masses 
(Ondoga, 1998: 150).   
 
Museveni (1997:175) and Kutesa stress the fact that, some of the groups were 
even left to deploy intact as units with their own commanders.  ‘At Frist’, notes 
Kutesa, ‘we had tried to distribute them among our existing formations but after 
some time, we just kept them as they came without even changing their 
commanders’.
127
  The policy did not pass without problems.  One of the battalions 
formed after the capture of Kampala was constituted out of the disbanded Uganda 
Freedom Movement (UFM) – an anti-Obote rebel outfit made up exclusively of 
Baganda – whose leader, Dr Andrew Kayiira had joined the Museveni government.  
The battalion, designated as 35 Battalion, was deployed in Kitgum where it 
immediately set out to carry out reprisals against the local Acholi because of the 
atrocities carried out in Buganda by their co-ethnics then manning the military of 
the deposed government of Obote and subsequently, Okello.  It is that battalion’s 
excesses that are questionably referred to as having sparked off the rebellion in 
Acholi in August 1986 by many including Behrend (1998) and Atkinson (2010).  
Upon receiving reports of the actions of that battalion Museveni ordered its 
disbandment and court-martials for many of its members followed by lengthy 
prison sentences.
128
  Opio-Epelu in his book on the Teso war, 1986-1992 also 
refers to the indiscipline of 73 Battalion constituted from former rebels of UNRFI of 
General Moses Ali,129 currently the First Deputy Prime Minister.  Upon being 
                                        
127 Ibid. 
128 Ondoga, Ibid. 
129 Gen Ali from Madi in West Nile also held the Finance portfolio in Idi Amin’s government before 
the political and military elite of his Madi ethnic group fell out with Amin (see section 1.2.2).  He 
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formed, that unit was deployed in Kumi, in Teso region where it is reported to 
have carried out revenge attacks on the local Itesot population because of the 
harassment they meted out on Nubians in 1979 when the Amin government fell 
(Opio-Epelu, 2009:43).  That battalion faced the same fate as 35 Bn referred to 
above.   
It would appear that the potential drawbacks of indiscriminate incorporation 
as the case of UFM’s 35 and 73 Battalion shows have generally been considered 
less risky than the alternative.  Even as the DFiD-funded SSR progressed, more 
fighters opposed to the Museveni government were still being incorporated into 
the UPDF.  In December 2002, the Government of Uganda signed a peace deal 
with the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II) that had ever since the fall of 
Idi Amin operated from bases in Southern Sudan against successive governments.  
According to the peace deal, 700 UNRF II were incorporated in the UPDF.
130
  The 
group was formed by soldiers who served under Idi Amin who were never 
resettled after their defeat in 1979 by the joint force of the Tanzanian military and 
Ugandan exiles.  Similarly, in April 2004 surrendering LRA fighters were formed up 
into 105 Battalion and incorporated into the UPDF.
131
  
The point that requires emphasis here is that, instead of simply focusing on 
controlling the weaponry of adversaries, the top priority of the Museveni 
government, as noted above, was confidence building, by managing the war-
fighters themselves rather than their equipment. The rationale was that it would 
not have been feasible to elicit the co-operation of those who viewed their 
weapons as their life if their surrender had been made a pre-condition for 
                                                                                                                        
formed a rebel group to fight the immediate post-Amin governments due to their indiscriminate 
persecution of those thought to have been associated with Amin.  He eventually made a settlement 
with Museveni in 1986.    
130 BBC News, Dec 26, 2002, ‘Uganda signs peace deal with rebels’, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2607683.stm, accessed on 29 July 2014.   
131New Vision, Apr 30, 2004 ‘Ex-rebel battalion formed’, 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/357238, accessed on 29 July 2014.  There are also reports 
that a second battalion, 106th was fromed to accommodate the defecting LRA (International Crisis 




integration into the NRA. Without a demonstrated willingness for co-existence and 
(re)conciliation, disarmament, if not weapon confiscation can undermine 
confidence and increase a feeling of vulnerability among the disputants – creating 
the conditions for a ‘security dilemma’. In any case, the withdrawal of weaponry, 
whether consensual or coercive, is not synonymous with pacification, especially 
when, as Berdal observes,  
[C]onditions on the ground are fluid, central authority is weak and country-
wide security correspondingly lacking, the ‘peace and reconciliation process’ 
is highly vulnerable to changes in local allegiances, as well as to any shift in 
the external balance of external forces (1996:28). 
Disarmament is based on the linear reasoning that confidence comes from 
knowing that one's adversary lacks the capacity to inflict harm. However, 
insurgents will in most cases have started off as unarmed civilians who after being 
drawn into rebel ranks acquired weapons by raiding government forces, or by 
purchasing them from licit or illicit arms traders. Even if such arms are confiscated 
or surrendered following the cessation of hostilities, hardened former insurgents 
will very easily replace them, especially if it becomes evident that they may still be 
needed, a reality that Spears highlights in pointing out that: 
When weapons are so widely available as they are in Sub Saharan Africa’s 
conflict zones and when it is so difficult to verify their eradication, greater 
confidence may exist when each group knows the other is armed than in 
disarming and having to live with uncertainty over whether an adversary 
can still attack them (Spears, 2000: 36). 
But quite apart from the futility of dogmatic disarmament in conditions of unlimited 
arms supply, it is also true that instruments of violence are mere implements, or in 
Possony’s words ‘nothing but a tool’; as he adds ‘nobody has yet been able to 
prove that weapons cause war and to disprove that, on the contrary, it is war or 
the danger of war which produces the weapons’ (1944:223).  This makes the 
insistence on dispossessing former insurgents of their tools a diversionary, even 
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counterproductive undertaking, especially when it has no impact on supplies; and 
when it amounts to merely lowering the level of technology of violence.
132
 What is 
being called into question here is the common view that ‘disarmament removes the 
means by which civil wars have been prosecuted and thus prevents re-ignition of 
conflict, and helps in confidence-building’ (Spear, 1999:2).   
It should be noted that the NRM’s bold decision not to compel fighters of 
other groups to surrender their weapons was made possible by the way in which 
the 1981-86 conflict ended.  The NRA emerged as the single decisive victor and 
this factor shaped subsequent events. The world’s relative disinterest in Uganda, it 
should also be noted, made it possible to ‘give war a chance’, thereby enabling a 
decisive winner to emerge without a stalemate.  This outcome gave the victorious 
group enough confidence not to insist on weapon surrender by other groups. In 
some instances, whole units of former opposing groups were left intact and 
absorbed into the NRA, some under their own command.  Once all the armed 
groups had the confidence that they would gain automatic membership to the new 
national military force, the rug had been pulled out from under the feet of the 
usual problems associated with disarmament. Subsequently, the management of 
arms became part of the broader and routine management of personnel bearing 
arms, including their assignment, training, promotion, disciplinary action and 
discharge. If a former member of a disbanded insurgent group is reassigned from 
one battalion to another, he turns in the weapon he may have acquired as an 
insurgent to the armoury of the unit he is departing, in addition to all other kit 
belonging to that unit. He then proceeds to his next unit where if necessary, he is 
rearmed and kitted up as required by his mission. If he becomes a motor vehicle 
operator, he is assigned a vehicle, if he becomes a clerk, he is assigned a word-
processing machine, and as a rifleman he is assigned a rifle, and so on. In other 
                                        
132 As the 1994 events in Uganda’s South-western neighbour - Rwanda - clearly demonstrated, 
once the stage for irreconcilable dissension has been set, there can be no limits to imagination and 
innovativeness on what to employ as instruments of violence.  
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words, the weapon, which he may have acquired during his days as a guerrilla 
becomes the property of the institution.
133
  
What becomes evident then is, that the unconditional amalgamation of 
armed groups into a unified national military force and their subsequent 
regularisation nullified the requirement for disarmament, and in fact provided a 
remedy to all the typical obstacles to disarmament. As Anton Baare – a former 
World Bank official closely associated with the Uganda ‘DDR’ – has noted the 
Uganda exercise targeted  
[S]oldiers in the national army who served under an effective and unified 
military command’; further emphasising that, ‘Disarmament, a crucial issue 
in other DRPs [Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes], was 
therefore never part of the Uganda exercise’ (Baaré, 2001).  
  
By the time the ‘demobilisation’ was initiated in 1992 six years after the NRA’s 
victory over the UNLA there were no fighting groups to disarm. 
5.4.3. Giving war a chance and nurturing a decisive winner 
The argument thus far may give the impression that by allowing fighters of other 
groups especially the former adversaries to keep their weapons, the NRA/M was 
taking a bold or even foolhardy policy position.  However, disinterest in weapon 
confiscation was secondary to the decision to incorporate those forces into the 
NRA at all.  That initial decision was made possible by the manner of termination of 
the 1981-86 conflict which saw the NRA emerging as the single decisive winner, 
enabling it to take charge of the talks – on its own terms and without third party 
intervention – with the many armed factions that had emerged on Uganda’s 
political scene in the 1980s.  The world’s relative disinterest in Uganda made it 
possible to ‘give war a chance’ – to borrow from Luttwak’s highly perceptive 1999 
                                        
133 Similarly, if such a soldier is due for discharge – like the NRA mass discharge that has been 
passed off as ‘demobilisation’ – he would be subjected to the out-processing routine that includes 
turning in non-personal military stores, weaponry inclusive. It may be a misrepresentation to 
portray this as a case of disarmament, as Kingma does when he refers to disarmament ‘in the 
barracks’ (Kingma, 1994:17).     
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article – allowing a decisive winner to emerge and force other groups to negotiate 
their surrender.  This is the point that Baaz,and Verweijen tend to overlook in their 
examination of the obstacles to rebel integration in Forces Armées de la 
République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC, Armed Forces of the DRC) leading 
them to predictably conclude along the post hoc logic of rational choice theory, that 
‘...failed military integration – like slow progress with SSR generally – is a result of 
the government cunningly masquerading as genuinely committed to reform, while 
consciously sabotaging it’ (2013:577).  In the very same paper, they correctly point 
out that ‘...government negotiated from a position of weakness...’134 and go on 
further to substantiate by spelling out the predicament of the DRC state:  
 [T]he CNDP was awarded an impressive number of important command 
positions within newly created operational structures. They also obtained 
privileged access to lucrative areas of deployment, like those rich in natural 
resources, important trade routes, and border crossings. 
 
Ceding the monopoly of coercion and the power to extract resources to an armed 
faction is a symptom of a malaise within the DRC polity that by far, goes beyond 
the minutiae of integration or the cunningness by the DRC government to obstruct 
SSR.  To that extent, the integration-related arguments by Baaz,and Verweijen are 
diversionary and emblematic of the title of this study.   
To shed more light on the point that Baaz,and Verweijen are overlooking, 
we need to recapitulate the three common scenarios of civil war termination as 
they are implied by Berdal’s classification of the sets of circumstances in which 
DDR takes place (1996:9-11).  First, is termination of conflict through a stalemate 
necessitating a negotiated settlement; second, is termination of conflict following 
the collapse of central state structures and the intervention of third parties to 
impose peace; and third, is when one armed group or a coalition emerges 
victorious and installs a new government on its own terms.  DRC oscillates 
between the first and second scenario while Uganda conforms to the third 
                                        
134 Ibid p. 570. 
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scenario.  Because of the way in which hostilities have tended to terminate in 
Uganda, none of the two dozen or so armed factions that were integrated in the 
NRA/UPDF have deserted to resume warfare against the government.  Three 
Leaders of some of those factions who after joining the government contemplated, 
or were deemed to be contemplating subversion against the NRM from within were 
arrested and tried in courts of law; and when that happened, their armed followers 
– by then fully integrated into the NRA/UPDF – were never reported to have risen 
up in aid of their former leaders.135  Their loyalties lay elsewhere.  New armed 
movements may have emerged after 1986 (Appendix A), but there is no evidence 
to show that they were re-incarnations of any of those that had in the past been 
integrated into the NRA/UPDF.  Museveni has maintained the approach of being a 
decisive victor and compelling his armed opponents to lose the will to fight before 
negotiating with them or integrating them into the military or having their political 
wings co-opted in government.  He highlights this point in his paper on protracted 
war in which he observes that,  
[I]n the end, for the cause to win, you must fight conventional warfare. 
Unless, of course, you weaken the other side through guerrilla warfare and 
then the other side negotiates, and you get a political settlement. There is 
also that possibility, when the other side does not wait for the conclusion of 
the whole affair militarily (2008:7).   
 
The negotiations the NRA/NRM undertakes are negotiations for the armed 
opponent to surrender when he has been weakened.  If during the course of 
negotiations the adversary demonstrates that he has not yet lost the will to fight 
but is only buying time to rest, reconstitute and rearm, the tendency for Museveni 
has been to issue an ultimatum for surrender or to resume hostilities for as long as 
                                        
135 These were Dr. Andrew Kayiira of Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), Dr. David Lwanga of 
Federal Democratic Movement (Fedemo) and Brigadier (now General) Moses Ali of UNRF.  Moses 
Ali, at the time, minister of youth, culture and sport was arrested in April 1990 on treason charges. 
He remained in prison for twenty-six months until his acquittal in June 1992, when it was confirmed 
that the allegations against him were based on intrigue connected with the power struggles that 
had earlier led to the split of the UNRF into UNRF I and II.  He was brought back in government 
and is currently a deputy Prime Minister (See HRW, 1999, Hostile to Democracy, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/u/uganda/ugan998.pdf, accessed on 20 September 2014).  
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it takes to exhaust the adversary.  Even during the ‘bush war’, he only 
contemplated negotiations when the NRA started to demonstrate that it was strong 
enough to make the transition from guerrilla tactics to larger scale mobile warfare 
and to launch decisive attacks against major government military installations in 
broad day light.  In his autobiography, Sowing the Mustard Seed, he observes that, 
‘...towards the end of 1984...we started exploring the possibility of talks with some 
of Obote’s commanders.  It was becoming clear to us that Obote would soon be 
defeated...’ (1996:160).  Obote was to be deposed in July 1985.    
That approach has been in evidence in talks with the LRA.  Writing about 
the 1993/94 talks between the NRA and LRA, O’Kadameri refers to a point in the 
talks when Otti Lagony, the LRA negotiator started demanding for uniform ‘since 
we are almost one’, whereupon he was asked by one of the NRA representatives, 
Brigadier Joram Mugume: ‘If you are negotiating a peace deal to come out of the 
bush, why do you need uniform?’.  Mugume is reported to have further told the 
LRA negotiator that he (Mugume) ‘thought you had come here to negotiate 
surrender’ (2002: 40).   
Even at the point in his career when he seemed most vulnerable, Museveni 
never sought to negotiate settlements with his military adversaries if such 
negotiations were not going to be on his own terms.  Less than a month following 
the 25 July 1985 overthrow of Milton Obote, the instigators of the coup invited all 
armed groups that were fighting against the deposed government to sign an 
agreement to become part of the ruling Military Council.  The groups that joined 
the post-Obote government were the Federal Democratic Movement (FEDEMO), 
Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) and 
Former Uganda National Army (FUNA).136  Subsequently, the unsuccessful Nairobi 
Peace talks of September to December 1985 were initiated to find an 
accommodation with Museveni’s NRA/M in a power sharing agreement.  Both sides 
violated the agreement and in the event, the NRA advanced on Kampala and 
                                        
136 Otunnu, op cit. p.166. 
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deposed the military council and emerged as the decisive winner.  Tandon sums 
up the fate of the Nairobi peace negotiations, and with it the government of the 
Okellos, by observing that: 
 
The negotiations lengthened into months until Museveni was strong 
enough in the south to call all the shots. By the time agreement was 
reached on power-sharing, it was already dead. The NRA simply 
marched over the ramshackle and internally divided armies of the 
"broad-based" government of Lutwa, took over power, and now, 
from a position of strength, began to negotiate with each of the 
other parties and "armies" separately to see how they could be 
"accommodated" in his "broadbased" government, and on his terms 
(1987:87).    
 
Studies on the relationship between the manner of conflict termination and the 
likelihood of relapse consistently vindicate those that pursue the strategy of 
ensuring decisive victories, however long it may seem to take for observers.  It is 
repeatedly observed in the literature that peace tends to be more stable and 
durable following decisive military victories than following armed conflicts that end 
in stalemates, whether in civil or in interstate conflicts (Maoz, 1984; Licklider, 
1995; Stinnett and Diehl, 2001; Toft, 2006; Fortna, 2004).  Toft found that wars 
ended by military victory were nearly twice as likely to remain settled than those 
ended by negotiated settlement following a ceasefire or stalemate. She finds that 
whereas only 12 percent of wars ending in military victories recurred, 29.2 percent 
of wars ending in negotiated settlements recurred and 33.3 percent of wars that 
ended in ceasefires or stalemates recurred. She sums up her findings by observing 
that, wars ended by negotiated settlement are three times more likely to re-ignite 
than those ended by military victory (2006:16).  She is supported by Fortna’s 
finding that the hazard for another war drops by 70-90% when war termination is 
by way of a decisive military outcome (2004:286).137  Similarly Licklider reports a 
                                        
137 Toft further notes that indecisive military outcomes leave all sides capable of resuming the 
fight, and no one fully satisfied with the terms of the peace, a finding that is particularly consistent 
with the pattern one observes in Lusophone Africa.  In Mozambique every so often, Resistência 
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strong statistical correlation between military victories and stable peace.  He has 
observed that civil wars did not occur in 85 percent of the countries that 
experienced decisive military victories while there was a resumption of hostilities 
50 percent of the conflicts settled by negotiated settlements (1995:685).  Those 
patterns are overlooked by those like Baaz,and Verweijen (2013);  Verweijn (2014) 
among many others who do not look for deeper empirical regularities but instead 
opt for turning correlation into causation, as evidenced by the attempt to directly 
link integration of rebel forces and reversion to hostilities; or even the post hoc 
inferences characteristic of rational actor model theorists in their analysis of the 
relationship between protracted warfare, such as that conducted by those who 
hold that decisive military victories, and such common human traits as corruption.   
5.4.4. Regularisation as a requisite for regulation 
Upon assuming state power, the NRM faced the challenge of reconfiguring itself 
into a government and institutionalising its military arm, the NRA, into an organ 
that owed allegiance not merely to the NRM, but to the state. The pressure to 
adjust to the new role of being a national military force, the need to disentangle 
the dual or even multiple roles of key commanders, coupled with the rapid 
absorption of other fighting groups called for the process of regularisation, i.e., the 
standardisation of organisational and operational doctrine. Without an idea of how 
the armed forces - and indeed any other organisation - should be structured and 
resourced in relation to its current and anticipated missions, any attempt to make 
a definitive stand to alter the structure and personnel numbers of such an 
organisation could   only have been conjectural, and thus essentially flawed. This 
stands out as the key weakness of public sector retrenchments (including military 
                                                                                                                        
Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) keeps threatening the government, part of which it is, with war; 
or with splitting up the country.  RENAMO resumed armed hostilities in April 2013 and signed yet 
another deal with government in September 2014 (BBC News ‘Mozambique rivals agree ceasefire 
ahead of elections’, 25 August 2014; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-28923524, accessed 
on 20 September 2014).  Such a scenario is unlikely in Angola where MPLA won a decisive victory.   
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demobilisations) inspired by technocrats of the international financial institutions 
such as the World Bank.  The insistence that Uganda needed to downsize its 
military is even more puzzling when looked at against the background of the 
events in the decade leading to 1986.  That period saw two national Armies being 
overrun, one in 1979, by the military of neighbouring Tanzania and the other in 
1986, by the NRA guerrillas. Donor insistence on downsizing of the NRA as early as 
1986 would almost suggest that the previous two official militaries – Uganda Army 
(1971-1979) and Uganda National Liberation Army (1980-1986) – underperformed 
because they were oversized. It is equally curious that the donors never make 
recommendations for an increase in the size of the military forces of a Third World 
country even when there may be compelling reasons to do so. One can only 
conclude that downsizing is an arbitrary and dogmatic formulation with little or no 
bearing on the security interests of aid-dependent countries.   
On the question of ranks, it is important to note that, throughout its 
existence as a guerrilla force, the NRA did not adopt conventional military ranks, 
principally, to avoid internal tensions and to maintain coherence and camaraderie 
amongst fighters. This continued to be the case throughout the first two years of 
the NRA as the government military force and the amalgamation of other armed 
groups. The formal rank structure was eventually introduced in 1988, two years 
into the life of the NRM government, the only exception being August 1986 when 
officers and men of disbanded government forces were allowed to revert to their 
officially gazetted ranks.
138
 In the interim period, those holding command positions 
at all levels were simply addressed as ‘commander’, and only five ranks were used 
amongst officers to recognise seniority in command and length of service in the 
NRA and its predecessors.
139
 Even for the seemingly simple matter of computing 
‘retrenchment’ and ‘reinsertion’ packages, one has to clearly set out the ranks of 
personnel affected by discharge, given that military privileges and benefits are 
                                        
138 Kutesa, Ibid. 
139 The ranks were, Provisional Junior Officer, Junior Officer II, Junior Officer I, Senior Officer I 
and Member of the High Command. 
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pegged to rank.  The process of screening and grading of NRA personnel before 
formal ranks were announced took two years (Kutesa, 1988:261; Mudoola, 
1991:242).   
There is also the question of the factors that prompted the ‘demobilisation’ 
exercise and the considerations that affected its timing. What remains questionable 
is the claim that the reduction in the size of the NRA was prompted by an alarm 
made by the World Bank to cut back on military spending. For example, Colletta et 
al. indicate that, ‘[f]ollowing a World Bank Public Expenditure Review, the 
government's attention was called to the fact that inordinate defence expenditures 
were seriously crowding out other sectoral development efforts, particularly in 
education and health’ (Colletta et al., 1996b:220).  But as already pointed out, the 
government’s primary concern seems to have been the extent to which the military 
wage bill was crowding out capital expenditure on weaponry in particular, as well 
as the general welfare of the soldier. As Ball et al. have observed that immediate 
savings for re-allocation to the social sectors were never realised because, ‘...one 
of the aims of the demobilization program was to create a more professional 
standing army, which required raising the salaries of the soldiers who remained on 
active duty’ (1997:258).  It is important to draw attention to this point so as not to 
give the consultations with the World Bank undeserved importance. For the 
government and military leaders, the utmost priority was the reconstitution of the 
national military and this involved, among other things, the formulation of an 
organisational structure and the translation of that structure - particularly the 
armament component - into a budget. The new structure was basically an 
organisational model stating the minimum essential requirements for personnel 
and equipment needed for the accomplishment of unit missions. It also set out the 
wartime mission, capabilities, structure, and the basic operational requirements in 
personnel and equipment for all unit types.  
The process of crafting the NRA’s organisational structure began in 1986 
and lasted up to 1992, when the new structure or ‘Army Establishment’ was 
launched (Rwamirama, 1999).  This is also the time when the government 
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supposedly approached the World Bank requesting technical and financial support 
to help ‘demobilise’ part of the military. Formulation of an organisational structure 
was carried out by a committee - the Establishment Committee - set up to study 
the organisational doctrines of the militaries of other countries with the view of 
developing the most appropriate format for the Ugandan armed forces. The 
committee also formulated the terms and conditions of service for the soldiers of 
the NRA and the duties of commanders and staff officers at all levels and 
appointments. The launch of the Establishment led to an extensive restructuring of 
the NRA following which it was decided that surplus personnel were to be 
discharged into the National Reserve.  It was at this point that the so-called 
demobilisation was conceived.  As one observer has noted,  
[T]he Museveni government made clever use of its good relations with the 
donors. One could even argue that the donors have assisted in modernizing 
Uganda’s armed forces, by providing alternatives for many soldiers that 
were in any case not up to the quality required for a modernized force 
(Kingma, 2000:217). 
That way, the Uganda government authorities forced the hand of bilateral and 
multilateral donors to fund what would otherwise have been a routine military 
activity, namely, continuous discharge of personnel that have requested to be 
retired on grounds of old age, ill health or in the hope of pursuing other career 
goals; in addition to those whose services may no longer be required and are 
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5.4.5. The Twin Myths Of Uganda’s DDR: Retrenchment of Resources and 
Personnel 
In a 1991 address to the UN Economic and Social Council, the IMF Managing 
Director Michael Camdessus stressed the benefits of reducing what he called 
‘unproductive spending’, emphasizing  that countries running the fund’s programs 
had to lower military expenditure to the 1988 average of 4.5 per cent of GDP, 
what has been dubbed as the ‘Camdessus line.’
140
  When Camdessus came up 
with what was clearly an arbitrary expenditure cap, IMF structural adjustment 
programmes had not yet been sufficiently discredited.  Aid dependent countries in 
the global south were still required to cut back on public expenditure by 
retrenching public employees, among other measures.  As already noted, the early 
1990s witnessed a general drive by the donor countries of Western Europe to 
compel the aid dependent countries to shrink the size of their public sectors with 
the armed forces topping the list.  The drastic change in the strategic environment 
in the developed donor countries in the 1990s allowed for steep decreases military 
expenditure which among other things encouraged the donor country development 
institutions to have the justification to push aid dependent countries to also reduce 
their military expenditure, particularly through downsizing.
141
    It is necessary to 
reflect briefly on the success of aid donor pressure on reduction of expenditure in 
Uganda by means of supporting DDR and whether subsequent initiatives were 
destined to build on any such success.   
The installation of the NRM government created the hope – particularly 
among the donors – that 1986 would mark the termination of widespread civil 
violence in the country. With the end of conflict, there would therefore be no 
                                        
140 MacDonald, 1997, p. 185.  Uganda has since had a defence expenditure cap of 2 per cent of 
GDP being slapped on it as a condition for international aid.  
141 For example, between 1987 and 1996, OECD member countries reduced their military 
expenditure by almost 22 per cent, compared to developing countries, which as a group reduced 
theirs by only four per cent over the same period of time (Brzoska; 2003, p.7).  
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justification for defence expenditure to remain at the same level seen in the five 
years of the civil war.  It may also have probably been assumed that there would 
be no future justification for it to exceed pre-1986 levels. The pre-NRM defence 
outlays, both capital and recurrent, averaged about 25 per cent of total 
government expenditure,
142
 but in spite of donor optimism the first two years of 
the NRM government saw defence spending rising to 43 and then to 48 per cent of 
total government expenditure.
143
  Recurrent expenditure increased from 28 per 
cent in 1986 to 43 per cent in 1988 and capital from 18 per cent to 38 per cent of 
the government’s contribution to development expenditure.
144
 Those increases 
alarmed the donors who responded by seeking to put pressure on the new 
government to restore military spending to its pre-1986 levels.
145
 The 
‘demobilisation’ initiated in 1992 was one of the measures devised to achieve this 
goal.   
Following the initial phase of the exercise, defence expenditure as a proportion of 
total government expenditure dropped to 20 per cent and subsequently to 14.8 
per cent, giving the donors the hope of a ‘permanent reduction in defence 
expenditures’ (Colletta et al., 1996:223).  However, even the most detached 
examination of Uganda’s history would have predicted the possibility of significant 
instability following the emergence of the NRM. Predictably, the 1990s decade was 
marked by episodes of internal violence in most regions of the country.  First, in 
the Central North of the country, there was a marked upsurge in the levels of 
armed violence in the Acholi region, made easier by Khartoum’s support to the LRA 
                                        
142 By 1986, nearly 30% 0f the operating budget and 20% of the capital budget was allocated to 
the armed forces (Colletta et al, 1996, p.219) 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Even without making a possible causal link between the meagre accomplishments of the 
defence sector in dealing with the high levels of insecurity in the early 1980s, with levels of 
spending on that sector, donors insisted on reducing the level expenditure to pre-1986 levels.  
During the first half of the 1980s, two regimes collapsed under the pressure of insurgency.  In all 
likelihood, limited resources played a role in making it impossible for the government to muster 
sufficient capabilities to combat the insurgents.  Therefore, spending levels of the period of failure 
cannot be realistically used as a standard for prudent resource management.   
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in form of logistics and rear bases and diplomatic support in retaliation for 
Uganda’s tacit support to the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement and Army 
(SPLM/A).  Second, there was a similar resurgence of rebellion in the Northwest 
due to increased activity by the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRFI) and 
West Nile Bank Front (WBNF).  Like the LRA, the two groups received support from 
Khartoum.  Third, in the West, part of the Southwest and Central regions, the 
Islamist Allied Democratic Front (ADF) rebel group, with bases in Eastern DRC, 
and, like the LRA, also receiving support from Khartoum stepped its campaign of 
urban terrorism and rural insurgency.  From 1997, the gradual collapse of the 
government in neighbouring Zaire and the continuing use of rebel ADF of the 
country’s eastern territory as a rear base gradually sucked Uganda into what was 
to become a long war that also led to the intervention by the militaries of at least 
five other countries African countries.  In the central region, there was the short-
lived rebellion by the Uganda national Democratic Alliance (UNDA) operating in 
Buganda region and in the North, the equally short-lived Citizen Army for 
Multiparty Politics (CAMP) led by the last Chief of Staff of the defunct UNLA.   
Those factors dashed any hopes of reducing the government's military 
spending in line with bilateral and multilateral agency expectations.  Figure 2 
clearly demonstrates the surge in military expenditure following the ‘DDR’, and 
throughout the time when SSR was being implemented.  
5.4.6. Incorporation of former fighting groups and the character of the 
NRA/UPDF 
Any seemingly commendatory assessment of the post-1986 attempts by the 
Ugandan authorities to reconstitute the military institution by incorporation of a 
multiplicity of fighting groups into the armed forces is likely to provoke observers 
of the events of the last two and a half decades to respond by cataloguing 
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accounts of NRA/UPDF’s role in the events in Rwanda in the early 1990s,146 its 
intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan from the late 1990s, 
reports of abuses and resource plunder in those countries,147 reports of corruption 
by the military,148 or even those of alleged abuse of populations in zones of 
operations.149  Much as those reports may have received wide coverage in the 
media and in the writings of advocacy organisations and scholars, it is important 
for us to note that, by outlining the way the Uganda military has been managed 
post-1986, we are addressing a very specific concern: We were seeking to 
discount the claim that at the end of the NRA/UNLA war in early 1986 such a 
process as DDR took place as the literature we cite tends to suggest; and to stress 
that, by misconstruing what had happened earlier, external actors laid the ground 
for the difficulties faced by those that subsequently attempted to implement SSR, 
even if the latter initiative was not inherently encumbered with its own weaknesses 
related to the manner in which it was initially conceived.  The task we set out for 
ourselves was to attempt to summarize the ‘DDR’ process as it took place, 
contrasting it with how the process is thought to have taken place: We were 
making a distinction between the empirical and the normative.  The question of 
the value judgements that one may wish to make on the conduct of the military 
force that resulted from that process of reconstitution by incorporation is a 
separate one from the matter of clarifying whether the NRA underwent 
disarmament and demobilisation in 1986, or whether instead it underwent 
expansion.  The view that the NRA/UPDF may subsequently have become abusive 
or turned into anything else whatsoever does not change the fact that, at the end 
of the 1981-1986 civil war it underwent expansion and not disarmament and 
demobilisation.  It is the latter purely empirical question that we set out to address 
in addition to highlighting our view that, its disregard by the implementers of SSR 
                                        
146 Adelman and Suhrke (1999), Keen (2012). 
147 For example, International Court of Justice (2005), United Nations (2002).  
148 Mwenda and Tangri (2001, 2003, 2013). 
149 Dolan (2009). 
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had to result in the latter initiative’s failure.  We argue that the culprit of that 
failure is the dogmatism of normative thinking.   
It is particularly necessary that the foregoing point is emphasized because 
none of the stated aims of reconstitution of the Uganda military by the method of 
incorporation were meant to be, or could even possibly have been an automatic, or 
logical guarantee that the composite force arising from the process would in future 
not invade other countries or be abusive locally and abroad, in whatever sense 
abuse is understood,150 or on whatever standards military conduct is judged to be 
abusive.  It does not even seem to be the case that incorporation of former 
adversaries by any one military force anywhere in the world is a standard or 
universal practice or doctrine with a set of guiding principles or moral purposes 
that one can cite as a reference point against which to judge the success or failure 
of the process.  Countering the description of such an empirical process with 
normative questions is, in the epistemological sense that has partly preoccupied 
this study, an example of what Hatchett has called the ‘fallacy of metaphysical 
questions’, described as ‘…an attempt to resolve a non-empirical problem by 
empirical means’ (1970:12).  In its most ubiquitous format, the fallacy involves 
framing questions which cannot be resolved before the researcher settles some 
central metaphysical or normative conundrum such as our understanding of such 
value-related concerns as corruption, or the nature and meaning of human rights 
or their abuse and other matters that actually lie at the heart of our critique here.  
As Hatchet warns, ‘…these are questions which will not be resolved before the 
oceans freeze over’.151  
On the question of the relationship between expansion of military forces by 
incorporating former adversaries and abusive behaviour, even within the narrow 
scope of Uganda’s history, one finds that during the formative phase of country, 
the branch of the King’s African Rifles (KAR) in the territory that was to constitute 
                                        
150 The question of abuses and how they are understood by a selection of those that have 




Uganda was not put together by augmenting the Swahili levies of the IBEACo with 
the defeated forces of Kabarega of Bunyoro or those of Muwanga of Buganda in 
1897 when the two monarchs finally surrendered: The early British administrators 
and military commanders either killed off the defeated indigenous forces or 
dispersed them into the countryside in what was to remain standard practice until 
1985.152  The fact that the KAR did not consider it necessary to incorporate 
elements of the forces it defeated did not prevent it (the KAR) from, concurrently 
and subsequently, carrying out actions that would be adjudged as abusive.  As a 
matter of historical fact abusiveness was so central to the doctrine of the KAR that 
its dominant operational engagements were called ‘punitive expeditions’.153  The 
KAR’s successor, the Uganda Army – the immediate post-independence force – 
consisted of two, later expanding to four ethnically-homogenous battalions 
(Omara-Otunnu, 1988:12; Stapleton, 2013:89).  When that level of manning is 
looked at against the NRA’s personnel strength in 1992 of more than 100 
battalions, one can conclude that the early post-independence Uganda Army was 
‘unexpanded’.  However, its order of battle as a miniscule organisation did not 
deter it from being abusive or predatory as demonstrated by the events in 
Buganda region of Uganda and in Congo, from 1964 to 1966.154   
Later in the country’s history, the reconstitution of the armed forces after 
the defeat of Idi Amin in 1979 never relied on expanding the Uganda National 
Liberation Army (UNLA) – the post-1979 military – by incorporating the forces that 
served under the outgoing regime.  Many of those who served in the military and 
paramilitary forces from 1971 to 1979 were rounded up and shot, or were locked 
up locally in Uganda, or in prisons in Tanzania.155 The incorporation of ‘Amin’s 
soldiers’ in the post-1979 military remained out of the question.   Those that were 
                                        
152 For details of the events Stapleton (2013), Colville (1895) and Moyse-Bartlett (1956) are good 
sources.   
153 Ibid. 
154 Details of these events are covered in Ibingira (1973), Sathyamurthy (1986), Mamdani (1976), 
Kirunda-Kivejinja (1995) and Mutiibwa (1992). 
155 For details of this process, see Avirgan and Honey (1982).   
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not captured escaped to neighbouring Sudan and then-Zaire together with much of 
the population of West Nile resulting in the situation that led to the creation of 
insurgency groups such as the WNBF I, WNBF II, UNRF I, UNRF II and FUNA.  The 
fact that defeated forces were not integrated into the immediate post-1979 
military, the UNLA, did not deter it from being abusive as was the case in Luwero 
Triangle between 1981 and 1985, where at least 300,000 people died (Kasozi, 
1994:4); in West Nile and Karamoja during the same period and in the Southwest 
of the country especially in 1982.156 As already noted, the seven years of the 
existence of the post-Amin military were marked by a brutal but unsuccessful 
campaign against six guerrilla groups in the centrally-located Buganda region and 
in West Nile region.  There is no evidence to show that at any time, the Obote 
government sought to negotiate peace with any of those groups or too integrate 
them into the government armed forces as a pacification measure.157  In 
September 1982 the UNLA overrun the forest camps of the UFM after the latter’s 
failed assault on one of the Obote regime’s largest military garrisons in Kampala.  
Several hundred of UFM guerrillas were captured and presented to the press and 
following the well-established pattern of dealing with defeated adversaries, they 
were locked up at the country’s high security jail.158  Those that did not die in jail 
were subsequently freed when the NRA overran Kampala in January 1986 with 
some being eventually integrated into the ranks of the NRA.159  No correlation has 
                                        
156 For an account of the abuses of the UNLA, see Kasozi (1994) and Minority Rights Group 
(1989). 
157 An attempt by Museveni’s NRA/M to respond to offers of a negotiated settlement by Baganda 
and Acholi elements of the Obote government ended with the murder of the NRA emissary in 
Kampala in November 1984 (Museveni, 1997: 160).   
158 Minority Rights Group (1989) and Bwengye (1985) provide details of related events. 
159 On the arrest and incarceration by the Obote government (1980-1985) of UFM fighters see 
Bwengye (1985:380).  Among those that survived prison life is the former UFM Chief of Staff 
Captain Mark Kodili, currently a UPDF Colonel; then Chief of Operations of UFM, Major Hussein 
Adda, now a UPDF Brigadier, a sergeant Kasirye Gwanga, now a UPDF Brigadier and presidential 
advisor.  One Captain Ndugute Stephen also joined the NRA and was among those who crossed 
over to Rwanda in 1990 to fight the Habyarimana regime.  By the time of his death in 1997 he had 
risen to the rank of Colonel (The Observer, 08 July 2009 ‘Open Secrets: Museveni’s untold role in 
RPF war’; Tarehe Sita (UPDF Journal), Volume 16, p. 47). 
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been observed between UNLA’s policy of non-incorporation of adversaries and its 
human rights record; neither was the UNLA ever able to transform itself into a 
functional military force.  Under sustained pressure from the NRA, the leaders of 
the UNLA seem to have been unable to keep in check the internal power struggles 
between the Acholi, Lango and Teso officers leading to factional fights that 
resulted in the crumbling of the force, the overthrow of Obote by his Acholi 
generals in July 1985 and the eventual overthrow of the remnants of the regime 
by the NRA six months later.160   
The point is that, whatever demerits one may wish to ascribe to the policy 
of incorporation of defeated armed groups, it is the case that first, all pre-1986 
Ugandan military forces did not pursue that policy; second, they were also not 
known for a high standard of observance of human rights; third, they are not 
known for having been functional particularly in the very basic sense of being able 
to subsist as coherent organisations with a unified command able to deliver on 
their basic mission of neutralising internal subversion and warding off external 
aggression.  The NRA/UPDF has been the first military force in Uganda’s history to 
be able to neutralise all its internal armed adversaries – at least two-dozen of them 
– and to effectively degrade their capability without suffering from internal strains 
that in the past caused mutinies and even overthrow of governments.  In the 
context of Uganda’s history, normativist judgments on functionality or the lack of it 
can carry sense if they are made (if they must be made at all) against that 
benchmark and indeed the problem we are faced with in respect of normativity 
and ethical judgments is related to the criteria for benchmark selection.  The 
Uganda Army of 1962-1971 was faction-ridden and it is that factionalism that 
caused the coup d’état of 1971 that led to the emergence of Idi Amin.  The 
reorganisation of Uganda Army by Idi Amin resulted in the massacre of scores of 
Acholi and Lango soldiers to give way to Amin’s own kinsmen.  The confrontation 
between Uganda Army under Amin and the Tanzanian military and a coalition of 
                                        
160 For an overview of factional infighting in the UNLA see Minority Rights Group, 1989, p.9. 
223 
 
Ugandan exiles following Amin’s ordering of the occupation Tanzania’s Kagera 
salient late in 1978 provoked a Tanzanian counterattack that resulted the total 
defeat of the Uganda military within six months.  Therefore, if 1986 is to be used 
as the watershed for determining how functional or dysfunctional Ugandan 
militaries have been in the different eras of the country’s 52 years history, 
consideration to be compulsorily made of the empirical record of the pre-1986 
military forces as we try to do above, on the basis of which meaningful 
assessments can be made of the post-1986 military and the wider political system.  
In any case, ‘post-1986’ as a temporal marker for judging functionality or the lack 
of it logically implies comparison with ‘pre-1986’ local realities in Uganda.  In 
seeking to judge the post-1986 military against the pre-1986 military in the context 
of the Ugandan polity, we would have to be guided by the words of Ogle et al that,  
 
Within a political system, any institution, practice, activity, or pattern of 
behaviour can be said to be functional if it helps to preserve the system.  
And if it has a tendency to undermine or destroy the system it can be said 
to be dysfunctional (Ogle et al, 1954:70). 
 
Further to that, a closer examination of the Ugandan military in the second half of 
the 1990s when the UPDF started to get seriously involved in Eastern DRC and 
Southern Sudan shows that by then, it was no longer the expanded force of the 
late 1980s when, as already shown, the strength had shot up to 100,000 (Hansen 
& Twaddle, 1991:14; Prunier, 94:71).  By the end of 1996, the strength had 
dropped to about 34% of the early 1990s levels to 34,142 regular personnel and 
2,979 auxiliaries.161 Just that fact invalidates linking abusiveness – in whatever 
sense it is understood – with expansion.  While the relative size of military forces is 
assessed in terms of the indicators of social militarisation such as MacDonald’s 
Spartan Index (SI) or the number of personnel per 1000 of the population 
(1997:21), much of the literature on SSR and DDR emphasizes such vague terms 
                                        
161 Annex E of Lavender et al (1997). 
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as ‘bloated’, ‘over-established’ or ‘oversized’ without stating the empirical standard 
against which such judgements are made. 162  To illustrate the point, with a 
population of 22 million in 1996 and a military strength of 34,142,163 Uganda’s 
Spartan Index of 1.66 was just over a half of MacDonald’s computation of the 
mean of 3.20 for Sub-Saharan Africa for that year.164  Data for 2012 basing on the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) annual publication, The Military 
Balance show that the mean SI for Sub-Saharan Africa has dropped to 2.72 from 
3.20 of 1996 with Uganda’s dropping to 1.4,165 the median for the continent; and 
significantly lower than that for conflicted-impacted regional neighbours such as 
South Sudan (3.4),166 Rwanda (3.1)167 or Democratic Republic of Congo (2.1)168.  
Given that even with that relatively low SI Uganda maintains a peacekeeping 
contingent in Somalia, one in South Sudan with more than twice its SI; and an 
expeditionary force in Central African Republic, one would be justified to judge its 
military force as anything but dysfunctional.   
  
                                        
162 See for example Bryden and Hänggi (2004) and Short (1999).  
163 In 1996 Uganda has a population of about 22 million (Index Mundi: Uganda population, 
http://www.indexmundi.com/uganda/population.html , accessed on 20 November 2014).  The 
military strength is based on the figure stated above.   
164 Ibid, p. 190. 
165 International Institute for Strategic Studies ( IISS), 2012, pp. 458–459. 
166 Ibid. pp. 454–455. 
167 Ibid. pp. 448–449 




5.5 The Future Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) and the Timing of 
‘Demobilization’ 
Any debate on the timing of the Uganda ‘demobilization’ remains incomplete if no 
mention is made of the presence of Rwandan citizens within the ranks of the NRA 
from its early beginnings until late 1990 when they ‘deserted’ en masse.  From its 
early days as an insurgent force, the NRA attracted Rwandan youths mainly from 
refugee camps in the West of the country.
169
  By January 1986, when the NRA 
overran much of the country and deposed the government in Kampala, there were 
at least 3,000 Rwandans in its ranks, with their number having increased to 4,000 
by October 1990 when they left the NRA to launch their armed invasion of Rwanda 
as the RPA (Mamdani, 2001:174).
170
 Of the 27 fighters who under the command 
of Museveni made the first attack on a government military installation in 1981 to 
set off the 5-year guerrilla war that brought the NRM government to power, at 
least five, including Paul Kagame, the current President of Rwanda and Fred 
Rwigyema, the first commander of the RPA were Rwandans (Ondoga, 1996:234-
241). 
Because of the pressure the NRM government was facing from sections of 
the public on the prominence in high positions in government of non-citizens, 
particularly Rwandans, especially in the military and some public offices, 
‘demobilisation’ of the military or any other far-reaching related reform would have 
disproportionately targeted Rwandans. The discharge of as many as two brigades 
of those personnel back into the UNHCR camps in parts of rural Uganda, where the 
majority had flocked from to join the NRA would have been a political time bomb 
for the NRM government. It was therefore always unlikely that the NRM 
government would have sought to initiate a massive discharge on the scale of the 
                                        
169 For details of the factors that influenced the influx of Rwandan refugees into the NRA, see 
Mamdani (2001); Ondoga (1998) and Prunier (1995). 
170 Prunier estimates that by 1990 the NRA had up to 8,000 Rwandans (1995, p. 71). 
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1992-96 ‘demobilisation’ without first resolving the fate of Rwandan NRA soldiers. 
Contrary to Collier’s assertion referred to earlier, that the demobilisation was 
initially delayed for the wrong reasons, it has to be noted that any mass discharge 
of NRA personnel as witnessed in the period under discussion had, of necessity, to 
wait for a viable outlet for Rwandan soldiers, both out of the NRA and out of the 
country.  
 
Figure 6: Uganda Military Expenditure, 1997-2006 
 
Data source: SIPRI Yearbook, 2007, p. 304 
5.6 Discharge of Regulars and Upsurge of Irregulars  
The donors premised their pledge to support the ‘demobilisation’ program on a set 
of conditionalities. First, the discharged soldiers were to represent a permanent 
strength reduction; second, reduction-in-force ‘would not be offset in part, or in 
total, by additional recruitment’ (Colletta et al., 1996:223); third, the government 
would not reabsorb the discharged soldiers into the public sector or the military's 
commercial activities. In light of the deterioration of the security situation as 
shown already, by the end of the last phase of the ‘demobilisation’ exercise - 
































sometime in 1996 – some of the personnel that were discharged in the earlier 
phases were already being remobilized, either directly into the UPDF or into the 
local defence units and Home Guards. This was especially the case in the Acholi 
region where up to 8,000 Home Guards were enlisted.
171
 Some personnel are 
known to have marched straight from the discharge centres of the World Bank-
supported ‘demobilisation’ process to the UPDF mobilisation centres.   
Earlier on, in 1989 a National Reserve Force had been established as the 
home of retired personnel. The reserves additionally consisted of paramilitary 
forces financed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the majority of them having 
proliferated in the wake of the World Bank-supported ‘demobilisation’. They 
included the Vigilantes of Karamoja region, Home Guards in Acholi region, Anti-
stock Theft Unit, Arrow Boys, Special Police Constables, Local Administration Police 
and Local Defence Forces. These developments did not escape the attention of the 
donors who, at the appraisal of phase III of the demobilisation exercise raised 
concern about how recently demobilised soldiers were either being directly 
reenlisted or getting employed by government in paramilitary roles. At about the 
same time, a number of analysts allied to the donor community observed that, 
[T]here is concern among donors including the World Bank that some 
Ugandan military veterans are training militia or local defense units in the 
use of arms against remaining rebel groups. Some of these veterans are 
paid by district governments and act as civilian police forces, causing donors 
to suspect that the Ugandan government is merely replacing some official 
military spending in the 1980s with unofficial spending on covert military 
activity in the 1990s (Ball et al., 1997:259).  
The government insisted that it had ‘the right to take temporary and localized 
measures in the interest of national security’ (Colletta et al., 1996:225).  With such 
divergences in the perspectives and analysis of the key issues, the donors 
remained constrained in terms of what they could achieve in stopping the 
Government of Uganda from doing what it thought it was obliged to do in the face 
                                        
171Ibid, p. 224. 
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of a festering security situation, especially in the north of the country. Viewed 
against its impact on military spending (Figure 6), the demobilisation exercise may 
not be judged to have achieved its stated goal.  From the foregoing examination of 
the management of the ‘security sector’ by Uganda government since the political 
changes of early 1986, there may be good grounds for external actors to keep 
their idealism within bounds.  Calls for realism are already emerging from some 
sections of the international development and peacekeeping established as one 
reads from the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) in 
the position paper on the nexus between DDR and SSR:  
In some cases, a growth of the security sector may be vital to absorb 
categories of armed personnel that would otherwise constitute a significant 
threat to security and stability....The temporary absorption of larger 
numbers of personnel will lead to significant pressure on the national 
budget, as salaries will need to paid to all soldiers for the duration of their 
service in the armed forces. At the same time, an early demobilization of 
large numbers of soldiers may put a strain on resources available for that 
purpose. It is therefore important that SSR and DDR decisions be made 
bearing in mind any financial constraints that may exist for both 
undertakings (2003:4-5).  
   
5.7 Management of the ‘security sector’: Background legislative 
and statutory processes. 
One point that has not received close attention from outside actors and 
commentators is the significance of the specific context in which ‘post-conflict’ 
policy reform interventions take place.  In Section 1.2, reference was made to 
Berdal’s   delineation of the three sets of circumstances in which DDR takes place.  
Sensitivity on the part of outside actors as to the exact set of circumstances in 
which reforms are being are being attempted will determine the level of receptivity 
by local actors and will shape the chances of success of the intervention.  For 
example, major difficulties are bound to arise if external actors approach reforms 
in a country in which the termination of a major civil war was associated with the 
emergence of a decisive winner as they would approach a country where civil war 
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ended in a stalemate, and third party imposition of peace.  Rwanda, Ethiopa or 
Uganda as well as Liberia and Sierra Leone may all be Sub-Saharan African 
countries but they cannot be bracketed together in terms of how their 
governments might be approached by outside actors seeking to impose or 
implement reform.  In a Saferworld paper on DDR in Uganda, Finnegan and Flew 
point out that, the interventions are:   
[T]aking place within a country with a strong and powerful army, in contrast 
to many DDR contexts where the army, and other national institutions, have 
suffered serious erosions of capacity, strength and/or authority. These 
factors appear to have reduced the incentives or imperatives for the GoU to 
undertake substantive defence reform, and as such integration between 
demobilisation of reporters and reform of the military has not been possible 
(2008:12). 
The measures that we have discussed thus far were taken within the broader 
framework of prior and ongoing attempts by the GoU, and more particularly the 
military authorities, to streamline on their own initiative, the structure and 
management of defence and security establishment.  Some of the legislative and 
statutory measures taken to put the ‘security sector’ on a legal and regularised 
footing include:    
o Enactment of Legal Notice No. 1 of January 1986 which formalised 
the NRA as the national military force following the defeat of the 
UNLA and the deposition of the short-lived government of General 
Tito Okello. 
o Enactment of the Security Organisations Act 1987 providing the 
framework for the establishment of security organisations,172 their 
constitution, management and functions; 
                                        
172 The ‘Security Organisations’ meant by this act are the Internal Security Organisation (ISO) and 
external Security Organisation (ESO) established as Government departments for collecting, 




o Enactment of the 1992 NRA Statute providing for the establishment, 
organisation and regulation of the military; 
 
o Drawing up and implementation of the NRA Establishment, 1992 
prescribing the organizational structure, staffing and equipping of the 
military’s constituent commands, units and formations; 
 
o The Police Statute, 1994 providing for the structure, organisation and 
functions of the police force, a police disciplinary code of conduct, a 
police welfare fund and a police tender board; 
 
o Promulgation of the Uganda Constitution 1995 providing the 
framework for governing the armed forces including the military; 
 
o Enactment of the 2000 National Security Council Act,173 in line with 
the constitutional requirement for a body to advise the presidency on 
matters relating to national security; 
 
o Enactment of the Amnesty Act 2000 a conflict resolution device 
aimed at encouraging members of armed groups in opposition to 
                                        
173 The National Security Council Act 2000 was established in accordance with article 219 of the 
Constitution, to advise the President on all matters relating to national security.   
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government to give up rebellion and be re-integrated into their 
communities free from prosecution.174   
 
Much earlier, in December 1981 with the NRA in existence for hardly a year, 
Museveni had drafted and issued to all units of the rebel force two sets of codes, 
namely, the Code of Conduct and the Operational Code (Museveni, 1997:146-147).    
The codes dwelt on, among other things, the relationship between members of the 
NRA and members of the public, the relationship between individual fighters, 
especially that between officers and other ranks, the command structure of the 
rebel force, disciplinary and justice structures including offences and 
punishments.
175  The UPDF continues to use the same set of codes.   
Together with those legislative measures, the 1990s were marked by the 
launching of policy initiatives of an administrative nature in the management of the 
armed forces, particularly the military and the Ministry of Defence.  The major 
initial phases of the Reduction in Force and the reorganisation of the military 
through the implementation of the new organisational structure were followed 
closely by the Logistics and Accounting Reform Programme (LARP) conceived in 
1994 and commissioned in January 1995 with an initial study of the civilian 
component of the Ministry of Defence and its relationship with the military.  This 
was the second home-grown reform initiative instituted and financed by the 
Government of Uganda with assistance of International Development Agency (IDA) 
of the World Bank.  The programme had two aims; 1) to resolve tensions between, 
on the one hand, officers in the military chain of command and on the other hand, 
the career civilian executives of the Ministry of Defence; and 2) to introduce 
                                        
174 The Amnesty Commission indicates that as of May 2012, 26,288 rebels from 29 different rebel 
groups had received amnesty and of these, 12,971 formerly belonged to the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (See: Agger K (2000), The End of Amnesty in Uganda: Implications for LRA Defections at 
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/GuluDispatch.pdf, accessed on 29 May 2014).   
175 For the full text of the Code of Conduct, see Ondoga, 1998 (pp.246-251).  
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mechanisms and structures for tightening the ministry’s budgetary, accounting and 
other financial controls (Rwamirama, 1999:17).
176
  
5.7.1. Donor-driven ‘Pro forma’ Reform, 1998-2006: The politics of SSR 
Direct external actor involvement in the post-DDR phases of the reconfiguration of 
the Ugandan military and the Ministry of Defence started in 1997 in the form of an 
arrangement Museveni made with the UK’s Secretary for International 
Development for a study of the budgeting and programming process Ministry of 
Defence to identify ways ‘…to maximise the efficiency of defence expenditures and 
to identify economies in resource use and to establish the scope for redeploying 
resources at the margin for priority civil expenditures necessary for 
development.’
177
  Among the ‘civil expenditures’ for which savings were being 
sought was improvement of health service delivery, primary school enrolment and 
upgrading rural roads and the main network, the ‘donor-favoured’ sectors.  The 
study was initially conceived of as the Uganda Defence Expenditure Efficiency 
Savings Study (UDEESS) but later vaguely renamed as the Uganda Defence 
Efficiency Study (UDES).  What should be clear at the outset is the instrumental 
nature of the intended reform.  Their primary focus was the realisation of savings 
for redeployment to the ‘favoured sectors’.  Any improvements in the ‘security 
sector’ appear to have been largely secondary.   
In broad outline, the task set out for the UDES as one of the first steps in 
the reform process was to remain at the heart of the minimalist approach of the 
                                        
176 The programme was managed by a team of two consultants; a financial management analyst 
and a computer systems analyst supported by a four-member task force consisting of two UPDF 
Officers, One Senior Officer from Tanzania People’s Defence Forces (TPDF) and a senior auditor 
from the Auditor General's Office.   
177 Uganda Defence Efficiency Study (UDES)—Main Study, July 1998, Annex A, Terms of 
Reference.  Although the TORs of the exercise called it the ‘Uganda Defence Expenditure Efficiency 
Savings Study’ (UDEESS) demonstrating the purely pecuniary and non-holistic focus and motivation 
of ‘security’ reforms, it was later renamed as the title of the report shows as the Defence Efficiency 
Study.   
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UK government’s policy interventionism in Uganda’s ‘security sector’, even as the 
normative reform crusade of the early 2000s gathered momentum under the 
auspices of outfits such as the Global Facilitation Network for SSR (GFN/SSR), 
African Security Sector Network (ASSN), African Security Dialogue and Research 
(ASDR), Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) among others.  For those 
organisations like others that rely on funding from the UK government to advance 
the cause of reform, the concerns they are required to address have been summed 
up in the DFiD issue paper outlining the UK government’s basic guidelines on SSR, 
listing four ‘defects’ that SSR is envisaged to address: 
 
 Government unable or unwilling to control the military and other 
security actors; 
 Government unable or unwilling to control military expenditure and 
defence procurement; 
 Governments enact repressive internal security measures for narrow 
political gain; 
 Defence strategy based on unreal or inflated estimate of threats; 
As can be seen from the UDES Terms of Reference, the focus of the intervention in 
Uganda became military expenditure, defence procurement and threat assessment.  
As a major donor of development assistance, the UK government was thus laying 
the ground to tie aid to Uganda to control or even reduction of military 
expenditure, reinforcing the notion of the 'defence conditionality' (McNamara, 
I992).  According to the 1993 OECD 'Development Cooperation 1993 Report', 
donor understanding of good governance implied 'encouraging the reduction of 
excessive military expenditures by helping to ensure transparency and proper 
control of military budgeting, to develop effective and efficient security strategies 
and to implement reductions in the size of military forces' (OECD, 1994:30).  In 
Uganda, the process of realigning the defence sector to realise OECD thinking was 
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based on the initial findings hinging on 69 recommendations for guiding the reform 
exercise.  The recommendations were clustered around six issues areas:   
 
 Defence Policy, Organisation and Roles (13 recommendations) 
 Defence budget and controls (9 recommendations)  
 Procurement and purchasing (14 recommendations) 
 Personnel and Pay (13 recommendations) 
 Logistics (11 recommendations) 
 The way forward for reforms (9 recommendations)   
On the timing of the UDES initiative, it most likely aimed at enabling GoU to ward 
off aid donor objections to increased military spending in the budgets proposals in 
the short and medium term.  By opening up the accounts and processes of the 
defence ministry for external scrutiny by donor-appointed agents, it is unlikely that 
the donors would object to increases in defence spending until at least they 
received the feedback from their consultants.  Indeed, for the period that the 
UDES team had set itself up in the finance and defence Ministries, the donors 
agreed with GoU to increase defence expenditure by 26 percent in the 1998/99 
budget.
178
  This process of buying time is well recognised in the literature.  In the 
case of Uganda, Mwenda characterised it as ‘playing the game of cat and mouse’ 
(2003), while The Economist (1995) has dubbed it as the ‘dance’.
179
 To assure the 
donors that the 1998/99 increase was a one-off, in the lead up to the reading of 
                                        
178 ‘Defence Spending Increases’; The New Vision, June 12th 1998. 
179 Cited in Kanbur, 2003, p.323.  The Economist article cited by Kanbur describes five steps of the 
donor-recipient dance using Kenya as a case in point: step one, Kenya wins its yearly pledges of 
foreign aid. Two, the government begins to misbehave, backtracking on reform and behaving in an 
authoritarian manner. Three, a new meeting of donor countries looms with exasperated foreign 
governments preparing their sharp rebukes. Four, Kenya pulls a placatory rabbit out of the hat. 
Five, the donors are mollified and the aid is pledged. The whole dance starts again.  Such is the 
cycle of acrimony and approbation that has characterised the relations between the donors and 
Museveni’s Uganda with concessions for reform serving as the ‘placatory rabbit out of the hat’. 
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the 1999/2000 FY budget the Minister of Finance announced government plans to 
cut defence spending by 22 per cent to fund education, health and poverty 
alleviation, the principal priorities of the donor community.
180
 Earlier on in FY 
2000/01 a decision had been taken to slash the Defence budget by 22% but in the 
subsequent year, cabinet took the decision to slash the budgets of other 
departments by 23% to supplement the Defence budget, in effect reversing the 
widely publicised cuts in defence spending.  For 2002/2003 FY defence spending 
was increased by 13%, from UGX 231bn to 261bn.  Uganda Government placated 
the donors into living with the increment by committing to implement one of 
recommendations of the UDES study and taking the first steps of the defence 
review.   
At the reading of FY 2003/04 budget estimates the defence review was still 
in progress and since its initiation had been the previous year’s ‘placatory rabbit 
out of the hat’ to enable an increase in spending, a new device had to be sought 
to justify increases for the subsequent budget year.  A long standing source of 
acrimony between government and donors remained the question of auditing 
classified expenditure on security by the country’s Auditor General and GoU 
concessions on this sticking point had to come in to mollify the donor community.  
Accordingly, the offer to disclose classified expenditure became the bargaining 
point for increases in defence spending for 2003/04 FY.  The Prime Minister 
pledged that with effect from 2003/04 FY government was going to put in place ‘a 
special, efficient and effective mechanism’
181
 to enable the Auditor General to 
audit classified security expenditures for the first time ever. To give credibility to 
this commitment, a new statutory instrument, ‘The Public Finance and 
Accountability (Classified Expenditure) Regulations, 2003’ 
182
 was passed in August 
                                        
180 The New Vision, May16th 1999, ‘Defence Spending to be Cut by 20%’. 
181The New Vision, May 21st 2003; ‘Donors Back Sh330b for Defence Spending’; ‘The East African, 
April 21st 2003 ‘Uganda to Audit Classified Accounts.’   
182 Available at http://www.ulii.org/ug/legislation/statutory-instrument/72, accessed on 24 June 
2014.  The objects of the regulations are stated in its text.  They are: to provide for the control and 
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2003, but deemed to have come in force on 1st July 2003, the first day of the 
financial year in question.  This underscored the fact that the promulgation of the 
regulation may have been more of a result of conditionality and the beating of 
deadlines, than the ostensible purpose of enhancing accountability.  The 
manoeuvring by the GoU is testimony to the reality that aid recipients are fully 
aware of donor preferences:  
Aid bureaucracies prefer to support changes that can be instituted rapidly 
and be easily used as benchmarks for dispersing funds and assessing 
outcomes. This emphasis on swift and measurable results creates a bias 
among aid staff towards pro forma rather than de facto change. De facto 
change is often slow and sustainability can only be measured after the 
project is ended, if at all (Shirley, 2008:62). 
The process that followed UDES study (mentioned in Section 1.6.1) and its 
recommendations culminated in the formulation of the Uganda Defence Reform 
Programme (UDRP).  Phase 1 was comprehensive Defence Review on the basis of 
which the framework for defence reform was to be formulated.  To manage this 
process, a Defence Reform Unit was formed in the Ministry of Defence, later to be 
renamed as the Defence Reform Secretariat.  Technical assistance for the Review 
was provided by the UK’s Defence Advisory Team (DAT), a researcher from from 
King’s College London and Makerere University in Kampala and some local 
consultants.  The purpose of the Defence Review,183 as outlined in the Project 
Document, was:  
[T]o re-assess Uganda’s central security interests and to consider how the 
roles, missions, and capabilities of the armed forces should be adjusted to 
meet them. The aim is to make the UPDF and their supporting structures 
                                                                                                                        
management of classified expenditure; to ensure transparency in the system of classified 
expenditure, while limiting accessibility to the information and reporting in order to preserve the 
secrecy requirements inherent in classified expenditure; to provide for the handling and reporting 
on classified expenditure by the Auditor General; and to provide for the consideration by Parliament 
of the report of the Auditor General concerning classified expenditure. 
183 For further information, see ‘The Uganda Defence Review: Learning from Experience’, 
published by King’s College London and Makerere University, September 2007 (available from the 
Conflict, Security and Development Group, King’s College London). 
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modern, professional, accountable and efficient. They also have to be 
affordable within a medium-term economic framework’184 
The Security Policy Framework (SPF) and the Defence White Paper were the key 
outputs of Phase 1 of the Defence Review. They were intended to provide the 
basis for development of framework from broad articulation of key policy areas of 
domestic, defence and foreign relations into a national security strategy. 
5.7.2. Never-ending studies and reform fatigue 
Apart from the foregoing measures, between 1986 – when the Museveni 
government came to power – and 1998 the beginning of deeper donor 
involvement in the ‘security sector’, four other studies of the government 
procurement system, or lack thereof, had been carried out by a range of external 
consultants.185   
The first such study was in 1988 and was financed by the same World Bank’s 
IDA that funded the 1997 LARP study to which we have already made 
reference.186  That first IDA-sponsored study was carried out by the International 
Development Business Consultants of New York in 1988 and resulted in the 
establishment of The Central Purchasing Corporation (CPC).  The second study 
started a year later in 1989 and was undertaken by the UK Crown Agents.  The 
objective of this 3-year consultancy completed in 1992 was strengthening the 
operations of and developing new guidelines and regulations for the Central 
Tender Board (CTB) and the CPC also covering the Military Tender Board.  The 
third study came two years later in 1994 and was undertaken by the United 
                                        
184 Uganda Defence Review: Project Document, April 2002. 
185 These four studies are explored in detail in World Bank (1998b). 
186 To highlight the level of reform fatigue discussed in Chapter Seven, Matt and Bategeka (2013) 
have examined externally-driven reforms in Uganda and their limits and in the study they explore 
the history of project engagements with the World Bank, one out of several ‘development partners’ 
since 1990.  They shows that, Uganda has partnered with the Bank on at least 20 projects focused 
on administrative and civil service reform, 14 projects addressing public financial management 
reform, 15 aimed to foster decentralization, and seven targeting improvements in tax policy and 
administration.   
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Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) International Trade 
Center (ITC).  It centred on government procurement and the logistics of import 
operations and it made recommendations for streamlining the operations of CTB 
and CPC.  The fourth study was financed by Switzerland the and GoU contracted 
the UNCTAD/ITC to review the current procurement systems and propose reforms 
to promote economy, efficiency, and transparency. The ITC issued a draft report 
on August 22, 1998, which is being reviewed by a government task force.   
It has to be noted that many of these consultancies run concurrently and 
duplicated each other’s aims and made limited reference to each other. The Swiss-
sponsored consultancy sought to promote economy, efficiency and transparency in 
public sector procurement, aims that coincided with those of the UDES study, 
which as noted, sought to maximise the efficiency of defence expenditures and to 
identify economies in the use of resources.187  The reports of those particular 
projects were submitted within a week and a half of each other (on the 12th of 
August 1998 for the UK-sponsored UDES study and on the 22nd August 1998 for 
the Swiss-sponsored consultancy).  The question as to what it is that necessitates 
this never-ending reform activity continues to exercise the minds of scholars and 
academics.   In regard to the integrity of public financial management which is 
central to SSR, the recent comments made by Roberto Ridolfi, the Head of the 
European Union Delegation to Uganda sum up the reality of those that continue to 
be the purveyors of reform initiatives: ‘Uganda has the best Constitution and some 
of the best procurement laws, a robust public finance management system and 
institutions capable of administering sanction. Why are all these not working?’188   
                                        
187 As Lavender e al (1998) and World Bank (1998b) show, the reports of the two projects were 
submitted with a week and a half of each other (on the 12th of August 1998 for the UK-sponsored 
UDES study and on the 22nd August 1998 for the Swiss-sponsored consultancy). 
188 The East African, May 11  2013 ‘Donors: Uganda Reforms ‘not good enough’, 




5.7.3. UK-GoU divergent visions on Reform 
From the start of the process, donors – particularly the United Kingdom – and the 
Government of Uganda held divergent views on what ‘reform’ was supposed to 
entail. For the donors, it meant ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ in how defence 
resources are used, but for GoU reform was about modernising the military, 
primarily through the purchase of new military hardware to increase the military’s 
operational capability particularly in the counterinsurgency campaign in the North 
of the country.  Ugandan officials perceived the modernisation of the UPDF in the 
same terms as other countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom 
itself, in terms of building capabilities basing on periodic assessment of threats and 
capabilities.   
Museveni’s 2001 election manifesto highlighted the theme of modernisation 
of the UPDF and referred to equipping the army and ‘...addressing inadequate 
training through recruitment and systematic training to transform the UPDF from a 
guerrilla army into a professional army’ (2001:106).  Similar pledges were made in 
2006 with the 2011 manifesto giving the most explicit indication of future capital 
development plans and potential for disagreement with aid donors particularly in 
respect of the budgetary implications of the implementation of the Defense 
Strategic Infrastructural Investment Plan’ (2011:25).  Museveni’s ministers made 
public pronouncements reflecting his vision of modernisation.  In his address to a 
gathering of diplomats, local dignitaries and military personnel on the UPDF’s 21st 
Anniversary on 6th February 2002, the Minister of Defence commented on the 
ongoing Uganda Defence Review by stating its purpose as the re-assessment of 
Uganda's security interests and to professionalise the Uganda Peoples Defence 
Forces and other armed forces.  He noted that ‘[t]he rationale is to re-assess 
Uganda's central security interests and how the roles, missions and capabilities of 
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the armed forces should be adjusted to meet them.’
189
 Later in the year, a junior 
minister in the defence ministry observed that the reform programme in the 
Ministry of Defence partly aimed at producing what she called an ‘aggressive’ and 
‘security-driven foreign policy’ that would see the country’s military carrying out 
more hot pursuit operations into the territory of neighbouring countries that were 
seen to be dissident sanctuaries.  
Media reports quoted the minister as stating that the reforms were to 
oversee the creation of specialised units such as a special mountain brigade, air 
force, marines and mechanised units and a command and control system along 
American lines.
190
  Similar reports were carried by the Paris-based Indian Ocean 
Newsletter edition of July 23, 2005 which quoted a leaked military strategy 
document as stating that in addition to restructuring the military command and 
reviewing the military doctrine, implementation of the donor-supported Defence 
Reform Programme (DRP) would include a major expenditure of Uganda Shs 353 
billion for the creation of six mechanised battalions with a view to setting up a 
mechanised brigade.191 The items to purchase include tanks, computer-guided 
amphibious combat vehicles and armoured personnel carriers. 
Predictably, the first national budget to be drawn following the completion 
of the defence review fully reflected the monetary implications of the re-equipped 
and re-configured military as was being portrayed by defence officials.  In the 
proposed budget of 2004/05 budget the Government requested a 30% increase in 
defence spending.  The donor country representatives’ response summed up the 
purely monetary motivation underlying the pressure on the GoU to reform the 
military and the fact that such reform was a precondition for continued budget 
support.  Representatives of donor countries issued a joint statement unanimously 
                                        
189 ‘Uganda: Museveni to Launch Plan on UPDF’ The New Vision, 11 February 2002.  The theme of 
the celebrations for that year was "Rebirth Of The UPDF: Retracing Our Steps as We 
Professionalise." 
190‘Uganda Seeks Military Interventionist Policy’, Pambazuka News, Issue 67, June 6, 2002. 
191 The Indian Ocean Newsletter  N°1144, July 23, 2005: ‘Uganda: Massive military expenditure’. 
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rejecting the budget on grounds that ‘...though there was a defence review, we 
aren't convinced that the budget really reflected it’, further adding that,  
We are not yet convinced that these large increases in proposed defence 
spending are sufficiently justified, or that the relevant management changes 
identified under the Defence Review will be in place to effectively manage 





By this point it had become clear that the pro forma reforms carried out as a way 
of ‘playing cat and mouse’ was inherently self-limiting.  When government officials 
at ministerial level run out of means of soothing the donor community on the eve 
of each budget reading, they were only left with the option of calling in the 
presidency to directly engage the donor community.  In response, to donor 
objections particularly to the escalation of defense spending, Museveni insisted 
that only the parliament of Uganda could reject the budget, noting that the budget 
was not for donors to approve or disapprove.  He pointed out that:   
We get support from them. If they don't agree, the only thing that they can 
do is to withdraw their support but our budget will go on.  In the event that 
we don't agree, we will stand on our own resources. We can stand on our 
own if necessary because that is what we have done in the past when we 
had serious problems...what you call donors are in fact people who are 
bringing back some of the resources that they have been taking out of 
Africa for a long time. In fact Uganda has been the real donor. We lose 
more money through unfair trade than we get from aid.
193
   
 
                                        
192‘Donors Reject Proposed Budget on Grounds of Defence Spending’: United Nations Integrated 
Regional Information Networks, IRIN; May 14, 2004, 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/49877/uganda-donors-reject-proposed-budget-on-grounds-of-
defence-spending , accessed on 14 April 2014. 
193 ‘Donors Cannot Reject Budget, Says Museveni’: The New Vision; May 15, 2004. 
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5.8 The Politics of Uganda’s ‘security sector’ reform 
5.8.1. The limits of SSR as a conditionality 
As demonstrated above, SSR has been attempted in Uganda as the so-called 
‘defence conditionality,’194 and this may only have served to expose donor 
inconsistencies especially regarding the ‘security first’ rhetoric, the ‘…recognition 
that a secure environment is a necessary foundation for sustainable development’ 
(CSDG, 1999:1).  The donor community, particularly the UK Government in the 
case of Uganda, sought to enforce SSR as a pre-condition for the disbursement of 
loans and grants, a self-defeating conditionality which has not differed radically 
from the punitive or negative conditionality of the era of structural adjustment.  
What makes the punitive intent of the ‘positive conditionality’ futile is that it 
amounts only to flogging a dead horse.  ‘Good polices cannot be bought’, Stiglitz 
notes, adding further that in the past, ‘while conditionality did engender 
resentment, it did not succeed in engendering development’ (2003:46).  With no 
strong commitment to these reforms as there certainly shall not be with security 
related reforms which aid supplicants often perceive as unduly intrusive, they can - 
and likely will- be reversed at the end of the program (World Bank, 1998: 51).  
Even where there may be acquiescence to donor reform pressures, it may only be 
because it is the only insurance by aid recipients to meet their short-term aim of 
mollifying their external backers.  In spite of the potential advantages of acceding 
to reform, some governments may consider acquiescence to be inimical to their 
autonomy or even unworkable and may therefore be unwilling to ‘own’ them 
without major modifications as we have seen in the case has been with the 
Museveni government, particularly in response to reform proposals affecting the 
more sensitive institutions of state.  As we see in the process described above, the 
Uganda government has been keen to express its own stand or in Oliver’s words, 
                                        
194 McNamara (1992), Murshed and Sen (1995).  
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to ‘balance, pacify, or bargain’ and generally seek to compromise with their outside 
backers (2997:153).  Moreover, it is not also the case that aid recipients such as 
Uganda have no room for manoeuvre.  Whitfield and Fraser outline what they call 
the ‘structural conditions’ that affect donor-recipient bargains, referring to those 
conditions as ‘...the ever-changing global and national economic, political, 
ideological, and institutional contexts within which donors and recipients define 
their preferences and select their strategies’(2010:346).  The changing global 
balance of power as evidenced for example, by the increasing prominence of the 
so-called non-traditional donors has obvious implications for the kind of 
conditionalities that ‘traditional’ donors can set in the face of availability of 
alternative backers some of whom offer untied aid.  The opening up of the donor 
ranks also creates room for dependent parties to play donors off against each 
other.  In a manner similar what has been observed in studies of institutional 
conformity and convergence, a broad range of institutional constituents impose a 
variety demands, expectations and conditionalities resulting in a collective 
normative order that is not necessarily unitary or coherent.  The likelihood for 
conformity or compliance is reduced when dependent countries like Uganda gain 
support from such diverse backers (Oliver, 2007:162).  In response to Western 
pressure the Government of Uganda has over the last three decades been known 
to take a defiant stance and sought support from non-Western sources such as 
North Korea and Russia especially in the reconstruction of the armed forces.  
‘Russia has worked in Africa since 1917, meaning they have been here for more 
than 100 years. I want to work with Russia because they don’t mix up their politics 
with other country’s politics’, so Museveni is quoted as having remarked most 
recently in a veiled reference to aid conditionalities of Western donors. 195    
                                        
195 The Monitor, 23 February 2014, I’ll work with Russians, Museveni tells Obama’, 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/I-ll-work-with-Russians--Museveni-tells-Obama/-
/688334/2217532/-/w6gkn6/-/index.html, accessed on 20 November 2014.  See also The Monitor, 





5.8.2. Aid dependence and the emasculation of Uganda’s legislature 
When the stand-off explored in the foregoing sections is looked at from the angle 
of the politics of defence reform and GoU-donor relations in general, what is 
striking is the absence of the voice of Ugandan parliamentarians in the debate and 
the extent to which they have abandoned their role as a counterforce to the 
executive, and in Uganda’s case, the powerful presidency.   In a meeting with a 
delegation of officials from African Caribbean Pacific-European Union parliamentary 
group headed by co-president Glenys Kinnock, Ugandan parliaments criticised the 
donors ‘...for merely looking on as government cuts budgets for important 
ministries in order increase defence expenditure.’196  On her part (and to their 
discredit), Kinnock reminded them of the existence of local institutional avenues 
including the Constitutional Review Commission for addressing their concerns.  
Much later in 2004, the legislators reduced themselves to aid donor cheerleaders 
when the latter refused to endorse Uganda's proposed budget for 2004/05.  The 
New Vision quoted one Uganda parliamentarian as remarking that ‘...the firmness 
the donors exhibited had been lacking for a long time.’197  In a tragic sense, it 
would appear that the legislators have abdicated and relinquished their role 
oversight of the ‘security sector’ to the donors.   
Those limitations of the legislators closely mirror the deficiencies of 
Uganda’s civil society in the policy formulation process as the thinking of the 
country’s leading political parties on the oversight of the armed forces 
demonstrates.  In its presentation to the Constitutional Review Commission – 
which they made a submission to after being reminded of its existence by  Glenys 
                                                                                                                        
unification-south, accessed on 20 November 2014 on military and police training and equipment 
support of Uganda by North korea.   
196 The Monitor, 30 October 2002, ‘Sabiiti, Oulanyah attack donors over budget cuts’ 
197 The New Vision, May 17 2004, ‘MPs Back Donors on Budget’. 
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Kinnock – all that the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) had to propose in its 16-
page memorandum was that the UPDF should be placed under the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs – the equivalent of the UK’s Home Office – just like the Police and 
Prisons, ‘[s]ince the army (under the Ministry of Defence) is recruited in the same 
way as the Police and Prisons…’
198
  It has to be noted that the UPC has been in 
power twice from 1962 to 1971 and 1980 to 1985, on both occasions leaving 
power prematurely after being deposed by the military.  Given that experience, 
one would have expected the party’s leadership to have the most incisive views on 
oversight of the military, defence and national security and civil military relations 
generally.  The robustness of such structures continues to be taken as a given in 
the normative discourse of the international development establishment.  It is 
against that background that the policy processes in the underdeveloped world 
ends up being overshadowed by dominant individuals, in most cases, simply by 
default as is indeed the case with Uganda where the controversies over the 
defence reform process remained the preserve of the president.  
  
5.8.3. The predominance of the presidency in policy formulation and 
decision-making 
For the last three decades the Ugandan political system has been centred on the 
NRM and the UPDF (formerly the NRA), two organisations that have been single-
handedly moulded and nurtured by Museveni from the early 1970s to the years of 
the emergence of the NRM as a major political force in the 1980s and its 
ascendance to power in 1986.  Museveni’s personal dominance over the Ugandan 
state can be traced back to his early guerrilla days when he doubled as the overall 
field commander of the National Resistance Army (renamed the UPDF after 
promulgation of the 1995 constitution) and the Chairman and chief publicist of the 
                                        
198 New Vision, 13 May 2003, 'Put Army Under Internal Affairs' 
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political wing, the NRM.  As would be expected with any guerrilla organisation, the 
NRA’s early years were clandestine and secretive, conditions that naturally dictated 
the over-centralisation of decision making.  Those legacies of centralisation, tight 
control and fusion of authority subsequently became a major feature of the 
management style of the NRM and have continued to linger on long after the 
former rebel organisation assumed state power.  As Leys and Saul have observed, 
‘…the very process of struggling for liberation especially by resort to force of arms 
may generate political practices that prefigure undemocratic outcomes in the wake 
of revolutionary success’ (1994:146).  In the general case of post-insurgency 
regimes, that would invariably be avoidable given the extent to which 
organisations with guerrilla origins tend to:  
 
[O]we a great deal to individual initiative and….allow their leaders a great 
deal of choice over how they should be organised and how they should 
operate’.  In many cases the leader and the movement are so closely 
associated that it is hard to conceive one without the other (Clapham, 
1998:9).   
 
The over-centralisation of political authority engendered by the guerrilla origins of 
the NRM has been reinforced by Uganda’s constitutional tradition in which 
executive power is patterned along the presidential (as opposed to the cabinet or 
parliamentary) system.  Like all presidential systems it provides significant latitude 
for concentration of decision-making authority and what has been called creeping 
authoritarianism (Barrington, 2012:168).  Although policy making power is 
theoretically divided between the two directly elected bodies, the presidency and 
the legislature, executive authority – administrative, managerial, law making or 
decision-making – is vested in the President.   This point continues to receive 
minimal attention from those wishing to effect institutional reform through formal 
structures such as parliament or even civil society, while paying limited attention to 
the skewed distribution of decision making authority, much of which may be 
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entrenched in national constitutions or have its origins in the political histories of 
particular country being targeted for reform.    
In his address to Uganda’s parliamentarians in February 2012, Museveni 
attributed the delay in the equipping and professionalization of the UPDF to 
external interference, particularly the insistence by donors on a smaller budget as 
a condition for external financial support. This, according to Museveni, resulted in 
the prolonged suffering of the population in country’s north on account of Kony’s 
terrorism in addition to the continued damage by the Karimojong cattle-rustlers 
inside Karamoja and in the neighbouring districts.  As far as he is concerned the 
conditionalities set by donors undermine Uganda’s national security.  He noted 
that,  
 
In 2001, I could no longer tolerate the sabotage to national security caused 
by the under-funding of the army. I called an emergency Cabinet meeting in 
Gulu. We decided to cut 23% from the budget of each Ministry to cure this 
mistake. Using the savings, we bought helicopter gunships and other 
equipments that should have been bought in 1991 when we reduced the 
Army from 100,000 to 40,000 but which were not bought because of 
external pressures.199 
 
Clearly, the donors and Uganda’s political leadership were, throughout the motions 
of the reform process looking at the same issue from opposite angles.  Museveni’s 
heartfelt verdict on the reform process and on aid donor policy interventionism 
came in form of his letter to the UK Secretary for International development at the 
height of the acrimony over defence spending and the defence reform (Appendix 
A).  Among other things, he pointed out that:  
 
Rt. Honourable Benn, I want you to know that I have a real problem with 
this paternalistic arrangement...What I find unacceptable, however, is for 
some of you to continue to think (and, even say) that because of the 
modest sums you give a country like Uganda, you are entitled to exercise 
                                        
199 YK Museveni, Address to Uganda Parliament, 10 February 2012, at 




suzerainty over our sovereignty issues (foreign affairs, politics and defence) 
– our persistent but polite rejection of that position notwithstanding. 
 
The background of the NRM government as a politico-military organisation was 
hinted on in Chapter Four in the general exploration of the diverse military 
traditions of Sub-Saharan militaries that have continued to be disregarded by the 
SSR framework.  The impact of the guerrilla origins of the regime in Uganda 
means that the armed forces remain a very sensitive constituency.  They are:   
 
[An] integral part of the state that it is almost impossible to distinguish 
between different actors.  A major overhaul of one part of the state has 
such an impact on other parts, those informal networks that hold the state 
together and sustain the more formal structures are at risk of being ripped 
apart.  A perilous road most politicians would not be ready to take (Jorgel, 
2013:245).   
 
In Uganda’s case, the special place occupied by the UPDF as a critical pillar of the 
NRM government was given prominence by Museveni’s response to claims by one 
of his political opponents, a former UPDF officer, that he had 90% support in the 
military.200  In the 2000 National Conference of the ruling NRM, he warned that 
those that intended to divide the army would ‘go six feet deep underground’.  
Urging the over 2,000 delegates to look directly into his eyes, he went on to warn 
that: 
 
"Who can divide the UPDF? Anybody who tries to divide the UPDF will be six 
feet underground. You can play around with other things. You can abuse 
Museveni on FM stations. If you try to divide the army... Don't waste your 
time and calories thinking about nonsense."201   
 
                                        
200 The political opponent in question is Colonel (Rtd) Kiiza Besigye.  He made that remark earlier 
in 2000 and has kept repeating it during every electoral season (see: The Observer, 24 January 
2008, ‘Besigye - Army Support Now Above 90 Percent’; and 22 December 2010, ‘I’m better soldier 
than Museveni, says Col Besigye’). 
201 The New Vision, Uganda, 27 November 2000 ‘Museveni declares candidacy’ 
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It is that sensitivity that is further explored in Chapter Seven, but also highlighted 
by Museveni’s views in his letter to the UK Secretary for International Development 
(Annex A).     
5.8.4. Anglo-Uganda relations 1971 to 1985 and the politics of post 1986 
defence co-operation 
Of the factors that have shaped the texture of Anglo-Uganda relations in the last 
three decades two that have had a long-lasting effect on the UK as a credible 
partner in shaping Uganda’s ‘security sector’ stand out.  First is Britain’s direct and 
indirect association with the armed forces of the 1971-1985 regimes; and the 
second, the extent to which that association operated at cross purposes with the 
aspirations the individuals that have dominated Uganda’s politics since 1986, most 
particularly Museveni.  The decade and a half from 1971 to 1985 saw Museveni 
emerging as a figure in the politico-military campaigns to oust the regimes of Idi 
Amin, that of Milton Obote and subsequently the short-lived one of General Okello 
Lutwa while Britain directly or indirectly supported the ‘security sectors’ of those 
same regimes.  British policy in Uganda remained – as Furley has summed it up – 
guided by the notion that ‘…the legitimacy of any particular regime in her former 
possessions – whether democratically elected, or installed by a coup or by war – 
was not a question for Britain to judge’; and as such, Furley goes on to say, Britain 
‘…recognised many de facto governments in Africa, usually with the minimum of 
delay once it….ascertained that the new regime was established’ (1987:276).  In 
1971, even as some Eastern African heads of state like Julius Nyerere of Tanzania 
and Siad Barre of Somalia rejected Amin’s coup d'état, Britain became the first 
country to recognise him, with the High Commissioner in Kampala assessing him 
as ‘[p]opular and a natural leader of men, but simple and practically illiterate; a 
man of the people....Well-disposed to Britain perhaps to an extent damaging to 
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him in the African context.’202 In recognising Idi Amin as de facto ruler of Uganda, 
the United Kingdom’s main interest was continuity in trade (Nabudere, 1980; 
Mamdani, 1983; Furley, 1987; Tandon, 1987).  By placing commercial interests at 
the helm of her relations with Uganda, the UK created grounds for the legitimacy 
of her stand on other policy initiatives especially in what Museveni has called 
‘sovereignty issues’203 to be questioned as one sees with the attempts to reform 
the defence sector.  
Throughout the first year of Amin’s rule, Britain remained Uganda’s chief 
trading partner, even as the bloody purge of members of the Acholi and Lango 
ethnic groups from the ‘security sector’ as already shown, started to become 
evident.  Some of those trade links remained strong even as late as February 1979 
when Idi Amin’s government had only two months to fall,204 even in spite of the 
fact that Britain had broken off diplomatic ties with Uganda in July 1976 (Furley, 
1987:279).205  Britain sold to Amin’s regime radios and other communications 
                                        
202 Cited in The New Vision, July 29, 2003; Uganda: ‘Amin's Economic War Left Uganda On 
Crutches.’ 
203 See Annex A. 
204 A Parliamentary Undersecretary of State of the UK government, Baroness Stedman reported to 
the House of Lords that, for 1978, United Kingdom exports to Uganda were £19 million.  Upon 
being pressed on the need to cut off commercial ties with the Amin regimes, she observed that, 
‘[w]e need to keep the trade lines open for various other reasons.’ (Hansard HL Deb 05 February 
1979 vol. 398 cc451-3, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1979/feb/05/tanzaniauganda-
dispute-and-whisky-exports, accessed on 30 July 2013.)    The Minister of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs and Deputy Leader of The House of Lords Lord Goronwy-Roberts had also 
earlier defended trade with Uganda in similar terms, pointing out that, ‘[i]t would however be a 
very serious step to embark upon general trade sanctions, with implications for our policies in other 
areas’ (Hansard HL Deb 31 January 1979 vol. 398 cc137-40, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1979/jan/31/uganda-suggested-trade-embargo, 
accessed on 30 July 2014).  To many observers and commentators, Baroness Stedman’s ‘various 
other reasons’ and Lord Robert’s ‘policies in other areas’ referred to the precedent that sanctions 
against the Amin government would set for apartheid South Africa.  See for example New African, 
February 2001 ‘Uganda: The making of Idi Amin.’  
205 Much of the trade was being conducted through the infamous Stansted Shuttle or ‘Whisky run’, 
consisting of biweekly flights from Stansted Airport in Essex to Uganda’s Entebbe airport.  
Commenting on the Stansted shuttle, an exiled former aide of Amin noted that, ‘[t]hese flights, 
each said to carry goods to the value of $70,000, keep Amin supplied with the equipment and 
commodities necessary to maintain his regime.  None of the goods reach the ordinary people of 
Uganda.  The imports, which go directly to the Army shops, are intended for one thing only – to 
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equipment, Range Rovers and Land Rovers fitted with advanced eavesdropping, 
radio detection and communication technology and spare parts for the regimes 
intelligence system; in addition to luxury goods for Amin’s entourage and the 
military.206  Although claims that trade between the United Kingdom and Uganda 
excluded supplies to the military and police, by July 1977, the Amin regime was 
still receiving police and military trucks and spares;207 and as close to Amin’s fall 
as February 1979 when exile forces including Museveni’s Fronasa were fighting 
their way towards Kampala, Pye Telecommunications of Cambridge was still 
arranging a shipment of further equipment.208 Prime Minister James Callaghan 
justified the export of specially-kitted vehicles by stating that they were designed 
to detect television licence dodgers.209  That recent history, added to the role 
played by the United Kingdom in instituting and entrenching a less-than-beneficial 
politico-military tradition of differential ethnic recruitment in the colonial period 
places the United Kingdom in an untenable position in respect of being an initiator 
or, even participant in Uganda’s civil military relations reform.  Museveni’s 
reference in his letter to Hon Hillary Benn to being a ‘freedom fighter’ should be 
understood in this context.    
UK support to regime forces that were broadly deemed to be abusive did 
not cease with the fall of Idi Amin in 1979.  From 1981 Museveni was once again 
on the receiving end of Britain support to a military force, the UNLA, against which 
                                                                                                                        
keep Amin’s thugs happy.… As long as the ‘whisky runs’ continue, Britain’s denunciation of Amin 
seems, at the very best, hollow (Kyemba, 1977:253).     
206 For a detailed account of the dealings of British companies with the security services of the 
Amin government see Harriman, 1979. 
207 Hansard HC Deb 07 July 1977 vol 934 cc615-6W, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1977/jul/07/uganda, accessed on 30 July 
2014. 
208 Harriman, Ibid 
209 Ibid.  Mamdani (1983:82) gives an account of similar denials following the sale of Bedford 
trucks and Land Rovers through the Crown Agents.  While the UK government argued that it was 
powerless to stop the transaction because it did not involve military equipment, the reality was that 
those vehicles passed through the hands of a local company, Reynolds Boughton for retrofitting en 
route Uganda.  By the time they arrived at Entebbe, they were complete with ‘artillery guns to fit’.   
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he was fighting.  Technically, Museveni’s NRA/M and the UK were enemies.  Even 
as the international media (including the British press) were reporting on incidents 
of widespread violence and massacres by the post-Amin military, the UNLA in its 
hunt for Museveni and his guerrilla force,210 Britain was in November 1981 
dispatching a team of military personnel to assess the training needs for the UNLA, 
followed by the assembling of the 36-member Commonwealth Training Team for 
Uganda (CMTTU).211  While the CMTTU trained the UNLA, Obote hired a private 
British Company, Falcon Star, partly composed of ex-SAS personnel to train the 
‘Special Forces’.  By early 1984, Falcon Star had trained a special unit of 3,000 
men many of whom were to be assigned to counter Museveni and his NRA, in 
addition to more than a brigade that had been trained by the CMTTU by March of 
the same year (Africa Contemporary Record, 1985:B298).  Recently released 
official documents show that Prime Minister Thatcher gave full backing to UNLA 
training.212  In April 1982, The Times, citing Amnesty International was reporting 
on ‘Uganda’s deepening anarchy’ and referring to how Uganda under Idi Amin was 
better than that of the 1980’s under Obote.213  The London-based then leader of 
the NRM Yusuf Lule pointed out that the United Kingdom’s efforts to train an 
ethnically-biased UNLA, dominated by the Acholi and Lango as did the colonial 
Army, was futile and a disservice to the country, noting that, [i]mposing discipline 
on such an Army will merely serve to make it a more efficient instrument of 
                                        
210 The Observer edition of November, 15th 1981 went on to suggest in vain that, ‘Britain and 
other Commonwealth countries would certainly hesitate to send troops to train an Army set to 
crush a popular rebellion sparked by its own brutality.’ 
211The team comprised trainers and advisors from Australia, Britain, Canada, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania, commanded by Colonel J. H. Clavering of Britain.   
212 In a 30 September 1983 letter to Prime Minister Thatcher Falconstar Director noted that his 
company was ‘...completing a major contract with the Government of Uganda, where we have 
trained over 1,500 Special Force constables in two years’ which had ‘…made a large contribution to 
internal security and to foreign investors' confidence in Uganda’.  In response, Thatcher's private 
secretary, David Barclay, wrote: ‘Mrs Thatcher was most interested to read about Falconstar's 
services, and sends her best wishes for continued success’ 
(http://www.corporatewatch.org/news/2014/may/29/thatcher-backed-ugandan-crackdown-worse-
amin-era, accessed on 20 January 2015). 
213 The Times, 24th February 1982. 
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Obote’s oppression and entrench still further his dictatorship’.214  Ingham, Milton 
Obote’s biographer, mirrored similar sentiments in his description of the UNLA as:   
An armed rabble, with each component part inadequately officered and 
owing loyalty to different political leaders; while all were prepared to use 
their arms to loot or to take their reprisals against anyone they or their 
sponsors deemed to be their enemies (1994:159).  
 
In the face of increasing reports of severe dysfunction and indiscipline within the 
UNLA, the Commonwealth training team sought not to renew its contract from 
Uganda on March 15th 1984.215  Importantly, while all the rest of the countries 
withdrew their personnel, the United Kingdom, which was by now supplying more 
than half of the team stayed on and continued training the UNLA as the British 
Military Training and Advisory Team-Uganda (BMATT-U) in a joint effort with North 
Korea (Furley, 1987:287). 
Throughout this period reports of increasing UNLA abuses kept emerging 
followed by condemnation by major Western governments including West 
Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark and particularly by the United States.216  
The US Ambassador in Kampala, Allen Davis and the US assistant Secretary for 
Human Rights, Elliot Abrams who at the time estimated up to 200,000 deaths in 
the Luwero Triangle only.  Britain poured cold water on the US’ unequivocal 
condemnation of UNLA and set up a special investigation whose conclusions 
roundly dismissed the US’s reported numbers of fatalities in the Luwero Triangle as 
groundless.  Bill Kirkham, a British national personally appointed by Obote to head 
relief operations in Luwero dismissed the US figures and stated that ‘they have no 
foundation and are simply outrageous.’217  By the time the UK-supported UNLA 
started crumbling under the pressure of Museveni’s NRA, and with the likelihood 
that the rebels were going to overrun the country’s capital anytime, it had become 
                                        
214 The Times, July 12th, 1987.  
215 Earlier on, the Royal Mounted Canadian Police had responded to the violence by withdrawing 
its contingent of trainers for the Uganda Police Force (Furley, 1989, p.285).   
216 Minority Rights Group (1989) summarises those reports. 
217 Furley, 1989, p. 289. 
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clear that ‘…the British position, with its record of support to two previous regimes, 
would need serious review, and new approaches would have to be made 
cautiously’ (Furley, 1989:292).  When the BMATT contract expired in November 
1986, 10 months into Museveni’s rule, it was not renewed. Museveni's argument 
was that the NRM’s approach to reorganisation of the NRA was different from that 
of the British (Mukwaya, 2003:11), but what could not be stated explicitly was the 
fact that the NRA had defeated the UK-trained UNLA, and in the process, had also 
dislodged the last remnants of the King’s African Rifles.  With the fall of the Okello 
regime in January 1986, and the emergence of Museveni one would ordinarily 
have expected Britain to take a step back and reflect on how it was going to relate 
with a government that it worked so hard to keep out of power.  Over the years, 
relations between the UK government and Uganda in the field of defence and 
security have been restored to a certain degree.  However, questions related to 
Britain’s stance towards Uganda in the 1970s and 1980s will remain a critical 
undercurrent in the two countries’ defence relations as long as the individuals and 
organisations they adversely affected remain on the political scene.  The difficulties 
associated with the implementation of SSR in which the UK sought unsuccessfully 
to assume moral high ground are just an aspect of that reality. 
 
5.9 CONCLUSION 
While the analysis of policy interventionism in Uganda to recast the 
country’s ‘security sector’ in the last three decades may not provide a universal 
picture of the challenges and opportunities that such an undertaking provides, it 
demonstrates the necessity for external actors to pay close attention to the 
specificity of each case.  The indicators of underdevelopment or patterns of 
instability may bear close resemblance across a number of cases; but the historical 
realities and internal dynamics of each case may require that policy-related 
interventions are implemented shy of the kind of standard prescriptions that have 
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come to characterise the normative agenda of the peacebuilding industry.  From 
the foregoing survey of the reconstitution of the armed forces in Uganda in the 
wake of the political changes that climaxed in the fall of the short-lived Military 
Council government on 26th January 1986, external actors do not appear to have 
fully appreciated the real significance of the evolution of Museveni’s NRA as a 
locally-grown rebel force with no external backers or patrons set its agenda.  
Neither was the significance of the NRA’s emergence as a decisive victor in its war 
against the Obote government appreciated, particularly in light of the common 
tendency of civil wars in the Sub-Saharan subcontinent to end in stalemates. For a 
long time to come those two factors were set to limit the freedom of action of 
external actors in shaping future events in the country, more so their role in 
determining how the military, the main pillar and sentinel of the new order, was 
going to be managed.     
As shown, some years before SSR was initiated Uganda’s donors 
participated in the implementation of so-called DDR.  The realisation of potential 
synergies between that ‘DDR’ and the subsequent SSR were, at the outset, 
rendered questionable by a lack of clarity on the part of the donor agencies on 
what Uganda’s ‘DDR’ actually entailed and whether indeed its sanguine depiction in 
the academic and policy literature was an accurate representation of its 
implementation.  The examination of Uganda’s ‘DDR’ as we consider it to have 
happened leads us to the following three conclusions: First, the ‘DDR’ in Uganda 
actually entailed a more germane and complex process than is often described in 
the literature examined.  The little-acknowledged nuances of the Uganda what was 
in essence a five-stage process summed in this chapter as ‘DARRO’, as opposed to 
the normatively-conceived DDR, have remained at the heart of the management of 
warring factions in the last three decades.  Secondly, any attempt to impose some 
narrowly conceived, overly technocratic and linear framework such as DDR onto 
the Uganda process makes the security and development practitioner not only 
overlook vital lessons on the social and political balancing with which the local 
actors had to contend in reconstituting the armed forces, but also the sense in 
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which the pressures of local necessities, particularly the urgency to build broadly 
inclusive armed forces, were inherently at odds with the desire of the 
‘development partners’ to reap the peace dividend.  Thirdly, the seeming urgency 
by donor agencies to provide mileage to DDR as a policy orthodoxy not only ill-
prepared them for coming to grips with process as it actually unfolded as opposed 
to how it ought to have unfolded, but also subsequently made it difficult to 
meaningfully build on the gains thereof as indeed the attempt to carry out SSR 
attests.   
Externally-derived attempts at SSR in Uganda may not have been served 
well by the fact that the process was inspired by the United Kingdom whose past 
links with Uganda’s ‘security sector’ may not have bode well with its desire to play 
a leading role or any role whatsoever as a reformer.  Apart from the apparent 
disregard for the ideological implications of the unique history of the UPDF right 
from its early associations as Fronasa with  the anti-colonial liberation movements 
of the southern African subcontinent through to the war against Idi Amin, for 
reasons probably related to the importance it attaches to being a major donor or 
simply out of a proprietary attitude towards Uganda, Britain seems to have treated 
as insignificant its past role in shaping the character of the military tradition whose 
antithesis the NRA/UPDF considered itself to be.  As pointed out, Britain played a 
major role in entrenching what turned out to be a non-beneficial military tradition 
in the colonial days and further beyond that period, it identified itself closely with 
‘security sectors’ that proved to be abusive and incompetent especially from 1971 
to 1985.  This was always bound to undermine Britain’s credibility as an initiator of 
a morally-couched reform exercise such as SSR, targeting the very force that 
considers itself as having provided the vanguard for dismantling the same order 
that was Britain’s brain child, an order that Britain nurtured and supported to the 
very end.  That after NRA’s triumph Britain presented itself as the champion of the 
reform of the NRA, a force that was technically its enemy throughout the years of 
the ‘bush war’ was always bound to be questionable, awkward and fraught with 










5.10 APPENDIX A: Letter from President Museveni to Secretary 
Hilary Ben218 
PO/11 
Rt. Hon. Hilary Benn 
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Right Honourable Hilary Benn 
 
I have received your letter of 21st March, 2005 in which you say that you will 
withhold some amount of money that you had promised to us following a 
"governance assessment" after your High Commissioner’s meeting with our 
Ministers, including our Prime Minister. 
 
Rt. Honourable Benn, I want you to know that I have a real problem with this 
paternalistic arrangement of the so-called "donor" and "beggar" relationship. As I 
told the G-8 Group in Sea Island, where your Prime Minister, Rt. Hon. Tony Blair, 
was present, the real "donors" to the Western countries are the Africans who sell 
their unprocessed coffee, cotton, leather, gold, etc at 10 percent of their 
supermarket value. 
 
In other words, in every kilogram of coffee, we donate, at least, US$9 to Western 
countries, including Britain, which hosts the Nestle factories that use coffee of the 
backward countries to generate money and employment for your people.  It is not 
entirely the fault of the former imperialist countries that backward states like 
Uganda were colonised. It is also the fault of our Chiefs who so divided our people 
that they could not defend our sovereignty. It is also the fault of many of the post-
independence  leaders of Africa that have failed to transform our economies and 
end Africa’s balkanisation in order to create power blocks on our continent 
with global influence when it comes to our legitimate interests.  What I find 
unacceptable, however, is for some of you to continue to think (and, even say) 
that because of the modest sums you give a country like Uganda, you are entitled 
                                        
218 New Vision Dec 23, 2005, ‘Budget cuts: Museveni writes to UK’ 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/22/472671, accessed on 23 July 2014.  
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to exercise suzerainty over our sovereignty issues (foreign affairs, politics and 
defence) – our persistent but polite rejection of that position (notwithstanding. 
 
When we met in Bombo last, I told you that much as we may need some aid in the 
short run, support will not be productive if we do not insist on our independence in 
decision-making. If we continue accepting positions we know are wrong, we would 
be committing other people’s mistakes in our names. I must have told you, then, 
that if dependence and subservience were to be factors in development, then 
Black Africa should be the most developed part of the globe since we have had the 
greatest dosages of that debasement (slave trade, colonialism, etc.). Point out one 
single Black African country that has transitioned because of "aid" from the West in 
the last 48 years since Ghana’s independence in 1957. 
 
I have always felt that we should put the nasty history of the relationship between 
Europe and Africa behind us. I have, however, told all of you repeatedly that, 
"trade, not aid will develop Africa". I was most pleased when the USA presidents, 
H.E. Bill Clinton and H.E. George Bush, working with our supporters in the USA 
(the Black Caucus, Senator Bill Frist, etc.), finally promulgated the AGOA law. I 
have described that law as the greatest act of solidarity between Africa and the 
West in the last 500 years. 
 
This is not an extravagant statement. The EBA of the EU is also a good initiative. 
You refer to the 800 million British pounds that you have contributed to Uganda’s 
recovery since 1986. Thank you very much. You need to know, however, that on 
account of the decline of coffee bean (raw material form) prices, Uganda has had 
a cumulative loss of US$16bn in coffee export earnings alone. In 1986, when our 
export crop was 2 million bags, we earned US$ 500mn. Our export crop is now 4 
million bags. But we are earning only $100mn. I am here talking of coffee beans 
(raw materials). I am not talking of unprocessed coffee, which, at the minimum, 
earns ten times the value of the raw materials at the supermarket stage. 
 
Who is impeding the industrialisation process in Uganda? The meddling by donors 
is part of the problem. They interfered with our counter-terrorism effort by 
constraining our modest defence expenditure, they forced us to scrap tax holidays 
on which we had agreed with them before, they constrained, if not 
banished altogether, our State’s possible intervention to kick-start the  industrial 
enterprises and yet foreign investors have now the whole globe open to them. 
They interfered with our energy development by forcing us to sequence the 
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construction of dams rather than our preferred option of building two dams 
simultaneously.  You talk of "governance assessment" after your High 
Commissioner meeting with our ministers, which resulted in the arrogant 
statement by your High Commissioner: "The beggar has not qualified for his next 
meal". Did our ministers endorse this assessment? Obviously not. It is 
therefore your unilateral assessment of us. Who assesses your performance in the 
UK? What rights do the British have to assess governance in Uganda? You 
were here for 70 years as colonialists, the first very poorly organised 
general elections was in 1961. Idi Amin, the monster that caused so much damage 
to Uganda after almost 70 years of using our people in imperialist adventures, was 
among the first two Ugandans to go for junior army training in 1958. What, then, 
gives credence to your position of assessor?  Right Honourable, I have tried in the 
past to be polite (obufura). It seems, however, politeness is not well understood in 
the West. In fact some of the words do not exist in our languages. 
 
Since you are spending British tax payers’ money, you are of course entitled to 
know that the money is not stolen by the officials of the recipient country. That is 
why I do not mind discussing with you corruption issues, either privately or in 
public. Extra-judicial killings by state officials would also not be acceptable to any 
civilised community. If I had aid, I would not extend it to such a government. A 
government that does not practice democracy by having regular elections on the 
basis of universal adult suffrage by secret ballot would not merit my support if I 
had aid to give. Economic management, leading to inflation, would not endear an 
aid recipient to me. 
 
Beyond those four reference points, I would not be wise to interfere in the internal 
affairs of other people. One of the American politicians almost got into trouble on 
account of a rumour that his campaign had received a donation from the 
government of China. It is not correct to interfere in the internal affairs of other 
people. What would you say if I were to fund the Conservative Party candidates in 
your elections using financial support. Would they be representing the British 
people or my interests?  Yes, governance can influence development. The question 
is: who is qualified to judge what is or is not good governance? Does a freedom 
fighter like myself have the ability to know what good governance is or is it 
a monopoly of British Ministers and the British High Commissioner in Kampala? 
 
Since you are in the habit of cutting off aid after your unilateral assessment, why 
don’t you cut off aid for our delay in adding value to coffee, cotton, beef, milk, 
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cereals, gold, cobalt, etc? This is the real bad governance; leaders continue 
donating the wealth of Africa to outsiders while people are wallowing in poverty 
without employment etc. Why do your conditionalities for aid not include 
chastising leaders who are so myopic that they do not see the fallacy of 
only exporting raw materials? 
Our Movement has never made a strategic mistake in the last 35 years. We have 
made some tactical mistakes mainly because of the pressure of others. We always 
recover from those mistakes. If we made a tactical mistake in thinking that 
countries like Britain were interested in a new relationship with African countries 
based on partnerships rather than suzerainty, then it is time to review that 
relationship. What Uganda and Africa need most is independence in decision-
making, not subservience or a satellite or dependency status. 
  
 Yoweri Kaguta Museveni 
 PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA 





5.11 APPENDIX B –Rebel Movements in Uganda, 1986-2006 
 ORGANISATION ZONE OF OPERATION PERIOD OF 
EXISTENCE 
1.  Uganda People’s Democratic Army 
(UPDM/A) 
Central North (mainly Acholi 
Region) 
1986-1987 
2.  Uganda People’s Army (UPA) Eastern Region (Teso) 1986-1992 
3.  Ninth October Movement/Army (NOM/A) Eastern Region (Tororo, Mbale) 1985-1996 
4.  Equatorial Nile People’s Liberation Army 
(ENPLA) 
Eastern and North Eastern Region 
(based in Sudan and Kenya) 
1996-1997 
5.  Uganda Mujahdeen Movement (UMM) Western and Central regions 1996-2001 
6.  Allied Democratic Front/Force (ADF) Western and Central regions, 
currently in Eastern DRC 
From 1996  
7.  Ugandan Islamic Jihad (Merged with ADF) 1993-1996 
8.  Force Obote Back Army (FOBA), Eastern (Tororo, Mbale) 1986 
9.  Federal Democratic Movement (Fedemo) Central (Buganda) Region 1981- 1987 
10.  Ruwenzururu Kingdom Freedom 
Movement 
Ruwenzori region  1960s-1994 
11.  Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) Central (Buganda) Region 1981-1988 
12.  West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) I &II West Nile region 1979-2003 
13.  Uganda National Democratic Alliance 
(UNDA) 
Central (Buganda) Region 1994-1995 
14.  National Army for the Liberation of 
Uganda (NALU) 
Kasese District From 1986 
15.  Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) I 
&II 
West Nile region 1986-2003 
16.  Holy Spirit Movement/Holy Spirit Mobile 
Forces (HSM) I & II 
Central North (mainly Acholi 
Region) 
1987-1988 
17.  Citizen Army for Multiparty Politics 
(CAMP), 
Central North (mainly Lango 
Region) 
1997-1999 
18.  Action Restore Justice (ARJ)   
19.  Former Uganda National Army (FUNA), West Nile region 1979-1987 
20.  Anti-Referendum Army (ARA),  1997-? 
21.  Uganda Federal Democratic 
Front/Movement 
 1987-? 
22.  Peoples’ Redemption Army (PRA) Western and South-western  2001 to c.2006 
23.  Uganda Salvation Force/Army (USF/A) Kenyan Border Region 1998-? 
24.  Lord’s Army Central North (mainly Acholi 
Region) 
1988-1989 
25.  Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Central North (mainly Acholi 
Region).  From 2005, operating in 
Central African Republic and 






 Local Ownership, Political Will and SSR: Myths 
and Realities 
6.1 The Illusion of Local Ownership in the Implementation of SSR 
6.1.1. Introduction 
The enthusiasm with which ‘local ownership’ is given prominence in the promotion 
of outsider interventions masks the deeply-held conviction of key constituencies in 
underdeveloped countries that, donor-driven reforms are external impositions.   
For many of the countries that are targeted for institutional reforms, the primary 
pre-occupation is always access to the funding for which the reform is always 
presented as a conditionality.  While it is often the case that outside intervention is 
prompted by internal crisis and a situation of a ‘policy vacuum’ in which the 
recipient may lack the capacity to design its own programmes, many aid recipients 
will have a modicum of functionality and will either show outright resentment for 
intrusive reforms or they will endure them for the sake of gaining access to badly-
needed financial resources.  In whatever state the recipient may be, external 
involvement in the making of choices regarding institutional architecture is always 
viewed as an irritant and an infringement on sovereignty.  This is particularly the 
case with proposals for reforming departments of government such as defence 
that are considered critical to sovereignty, which even for countries that propose 
reform would be off limits for outsiders.  It is in such circumstances that, quite 
apart from ownership being a desirable expectation and an ideal state of affairs, it 
is instead ‘…invoked defensively, asserted in order to avoid the appearance of 
paternalism or neo-colonialism’ (Chesterman, 2007:9).  This may be the rationale, 
albeit at the rhetorical level, for attempts to give the appearance of the primacy of 
the authorities and civil society of countries targeted for reforms.   
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In the particular instance of SSR, it is deemed that local ownership is crucial 
because it ‘…is both a matter of respect and a pragmatic necessity. The bottom 
line is that reforms that are not shaped and driven by local actors are unlikely to 
be implemented properly and sustained.’ (Nathan, 2009:20).  But as that 
statement shows, even those who deem ownership to be indispensable declare 
that indispensability in the same breath in which they remind their audiences that 
guaranteeing local ownership is not a matter of principle, but rather, it is ‘a 
pragmatic necessity’.219  That contradiction notwithstanding, it continues to be 
impressed upon those that are involved in the implantation of SSR that, it ‘…should 
be a nationally owned process that is rooted in the particular needs and conditions 
of the country in question’ (United Nations, 2007); a message that United Nations 
Secretary General has reinforced by stressing the need to ‘…learn better how to 
respect and support local ownership, local leadership and a local constituency for 
reform, while at the same time remaining faithful to United Nations norms and 
standards’ (UN, 2004: para.17).  In similar terms’ the Secretary General’s report on 
SSR stresses that ‘…broad national consultation lies at the heart of national 
ownership’ further noting that, success in the implementation of SSR is possible 
‘…only if it is a nationally led and inclusive process in which national and local 
authorities, parliaments and civil society, including traditional leaders, women’s 
groups and others, are actively engaged’ (UN, 2008: para. 36).  On its part, the 
OECD DAC notes that SSR should be ‘…people-centred, locally owned and based 
on democratic norms and human rights principles and the rule of law’ (2007: 21); 
while to the IMF it is  
                                        
219 Pragmatism as opposed to principle is directly alluded to by OECD.  While emphasizing the 
importance of local ownership and co-ordination, the OECD notes that ‘When considering co-
ordination mechanisms at ﬁeld level, it is important to retain the key factor of local ownership as a 
point of departure and to ensure that, where possible, the partner country government leads on co-
ordination (2007:244).  In a sense similar to Nathan’s statement above, the OECD casually 
contradicts itself by asserting that local ownership is a ‘key factor’ which should be adhered to only 
‘where possible’.    
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[A] willing assumption of responsibility for an agreed program of policies by 
officials…who have the responsibility to formulate and carry out those 
policies, based on an understanding that the program is achievable and it is 
in the country’s own interest (2001) 
In spite of those lofty claims, in reality ‘…a minimalist approach is often taken in 
practice, reducing ownership to consultation with the political and security sector 
leadership (Mobekk, 2010:231), which, by limiting in advance what is often 
referred to as ‘empowerment’ serves well the purposes of some key players in 
international development, such as the World Bank, whose internal actions 
necessitate that official references to ownership have to be received with some 
reservations given that in reality, such references are often accompanied by 
practices that contradict the declared ends of ‘participation’ and 
‘empowerment’.220   
Participation has tended to remain at the level of projects; but even at then 
level, exclusively within a narrow circle of bureaucrats and not communities, as 
references to the involvement of civil society organisations may cause one to 
believe.  Questions on how much real empowerment is generated in civil society 
consultations aimed at achieving ownership remain (Houtzager and Moore, 2003).  
This is particularly in light of the deficiencies of civil society groups, a problem that 
we shall explore shortly.  What remains unclear is the actual interpretation of local 
ownership on both sides of the aid giving and aid receiving divide.    Many analysts 
have highlighted this problem, amongst them, Chesterman who has noted that, 
‘…ownership is frequently asserted in both political and economic processes of 
                                        
220 Wade (2001) points out the controversies surrounding the publication of the 2000–01 World 
Development Report in which two opposing camps, the ‘finance’ and the ‘civil society’ group 
disagreed on the extent to which the draft report excessively made ‘empowerment’ centre stage.  
One of the key controversies was on democracy and the empowerment of the poor, i.e., how to 
create or strengthen the organizations of the poor, including networks, cooperatives, unions to 
articulate their interests in the political and market realms, and how to generally make the state 
responsive to citizens.  The initial criticism of this approach was  ‘Why is this stuff being given 
priority over growth?’, growing to ‘get rid of this stuff’  especially when the US Treasury stepped 
into the controversy; later becoming ‘these chapters pander to noisy and nosy NGOs’ and ‘the Bank 
should not be in the business of empowerment’.  That draft report was eventually withdrawn and 
its director, Ravi Kanbur resigned.   
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transition, though its meaning is often unclear and may have more psychological 
effect than political’ (2004:196).   
 
In a study of the relationship between a Sub-Saharan African country and its aid 
donors, representatives of aid agencies were asked about their understanding of 
local ownership (Helleiner, 2000:85-86).  Their responses give an indication of the 
lack of clarity on what the term refers to and probably also, the reasons why it is 
preferred.  The responses included: 
• Ownership exists when they (recipients) do what we want them to do but 
they do so voluntarily; 
• We want them to take ownership. Of course they must do what we want. If 
not they should get their money elsewhere;  
• We have to pressure the local government to take ownership; 
• We have to be realistic. Our taxpayers want to be sure their money is being 
used well. They want to know there is someone they can trust, a national of their 
own country, in charge;  
• I routinely instruct my staff to draft terms of reference for technical 
cooperation projects and then spend half an hour with a local government official 
on it.   
If externally derived initiatives involving governments are to gain 
acceptance, outside actors will out of necessity have to acknowledge that the 
central state authorities or the national governments of the countries where 
reforms are sought have to be held as the primary and legitimate local owner.  
This may have to be the case even where control over the instruments of power is 
being violently contested.  If there is no distinct power centre in target countries 
with which outsiders can engage in establishing whether there is a requirement for 
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institutional innovations like SSR, then it may well be the case that what needs to 
be addressed is being misdiagnosed: more than being merely diversionary, 
emphasis on reform of the so-called security sector may in fact be a misplaced 
effort.  This may be what Scheye has suggested in his comments on the general 
silence of SSR literature on the question of local leadership.  He has observed that, 
‘local leadership may be the single most important variable in determining whether 
an SSR project is effective and sustainable, for without a local leader or cohort of 
leaders, there is no one to drive a project forward to completion’ (2010:6).  Even 
when it is acknowledged that the SSR debate unduly narrows the parameters of 
our understanding of security, it will still remain that with respect to addressing the 
concerns of physical safety, the aim has to be the reinvigoration of states and 
governments in conflict afflicted areas of the world, with the view of enabling them 
to first restore their monopoly over the instruments of coercion in the basic 
Weberian sense before any other matters such as reform can be hoped to receive 
sustained attention.   
6.1.2. SSR as a hard sell: supplicant ownership of benefactor’s national 
interests 
On another level, it has to be understood that the practice by any country or 
alliance of cultivating relations with other countries, whatever their level of 
development, is and has always been a matter of self interest.  The conditions that 
dictate the giving and receiving of aid can very easily obscure that reality, 
particularly when they are looked at exclusively through the lens of the 
paternalistic proclamations by administrators of aid projects and the research 
bureaucrats that provide intellectual justification for external interventionism.  Even 
where self-interest is the principal driver of external involvement, the justification 
for involvement will still be couched in quasi-altruistic terms.  The 2003 European 
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security strategy expresses the point of common interest succinctly in its emphasis 
that, for the countries of Western Europe,    
[O]ur traditional concept of self-defence – up to and including the Cold War 
– was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of 
defence will often be abroad…. State failure and organised crime spread if 
they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we 
should be ready to act before a crisis occurs (2003:7).   
The reality of those concerns and the fact that they are never expressed as shared 
problems tends to make the promotion of institutional reform initiatives along the 
lines of ‘local ownership’ more than a hard sell.  The saliency of national interest in 
seemingly altruistic pursuits has been expressed starkly by Greene in his 
observation that,  
[S]ome potential violent conflicts are of more direct concern to the UK than 
others, for reasons of foreign policy or national interests but also more 
contingently because of domestic political lobby groups or media coverage. 
There is a natural tendency for the UK to focus support for SSR and other 
conflict prevention measures to address the conflicts that concern it most. 
However, it is important to recognise that UK’s priorities will not necessarily 
be shared by the government concerned or by its people.’ (Greene, 2003:6).   
The condescension of donor country statements further works against the reality 
that they also have their own concerns and vulnerabilities, encouraging the 
mistaken view that external intervention is a one-way street, involving a supplicant 
who has to take ownership of the benefactor’s policy proposals and offers for help.  
References to ‘local ownership’ and ‘political will’ on the part of the aid recipients 
and target countries for reform originate from that flawed thinking.  The specific 
countries which donors single out for promotion of institutional reform 
programmes further highlight the real motive for implementation of those 
programmes.  More significantly, they raise doubts about the validity of any 
references to ‘local ownership’, and the related notion of ‘political will’.  As Scheye 
notes, ‘…there is no mistaking the coincidence that the predominant British and 
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French SSR involvements are in former colonies and in conflicts that are deemed of 
vital national interest’ (2010:7).   
A closer look at the programmes of choice also reveals a similar pattern.  
Scheye notes further that, ‘…approximately 65 per cent or more of the EU’s SSR 
expenditures target support for police development and border management, 
subjects that are judged to be of key supranational and national interest.’221  One 
exception that comes to mind is that of the Government of the Netherlands aiding 
and promoting SSR in Burundi, a country with which there are no historical ties like 
those Britain and France have with their former colonies.  The Netherlands can 
advise on ‘local ownership’ in Burundi with more moral authority than Britain or 
France in their former colonies.  Those practices indirectly point to the additional 
limitation of country level approaches to reform.  The realities like for which SSR 
and other peacebuilding initiatives are formulated are always aspects, or even 
mere overhangs of wider dynamics of collusions and collisions of national armed 
forces, militias, insurgents and warlords in conjoined conflict formations that 
transcend ‘national’ borders, yet the dominant orientation of interventions remains 
country-focused.  As Tschirgi notes,  
It is increasingly recognized that focusing narrowly on country-level peace-
building efforts is unlikely to yield significant changes in peace-building 
outcomes—especially in regions where conflicts have interlocking political, 
security and economic dynamics (2004:13).222    
What remains in question is whether the core interests of the outside actor who 
initiates institutional reform in a conflict prone country can be reconciled with the 
interests of key constituencies in the country that is targeted for reform.   
                                        
221 Ibid 
222 This point is further supported by the UK Department for International Development, DFID at 
least in theory.  DFID notes that, ‘The persistence of regional tensions may make governments 
reluctant to reduce military spending and the size of unaffordable standing armies, for fear of 
undermining perceived defence needs’ (2002:15).   
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6.1.3. Imagining ‘local ownership’ and ‘buy-in’ through participatory 
approaches 
Even with all the gains that are supposed to accrue from institutional reform in the 
politics of the countries that are normally targeted for SSR, the fact that it is an 
externally derived initiative remains its soft underbelly.  To alleviate that weakness, 
attempts have been made, mainly through participatory approaches to give reform 
programmes a semblance of being home-grown and developed by local 
‘stakeholders’.  According to that assumption, the OECD in its flagship publication 
on SSR claims that, ‘…more inclusive, participatory and transparent process can 
help ensure that the security needs of the different groups within a country are 
heard and can change the nature of security sector reform…’ (2007:130).  
However, development practitioners are becoming increasingly critical of 
participatory methods because they have been turned into a ‘flag of necessity’ 
without which development oriented ‘research vessels’ cannot acquire sea 
worthiness certificates and a ritual by research bureaucrats and an excuse to limit 
further investment in in-depth studies of social change (Richards, 1995).  Rather 
than being the liberation tool that it was originally conceived to be, the 
participatory approach is  ‘The New Tyranny’ that masks oppression behind the 
rhetoric and techniques of  empowerment and democracy and largely maintains 
existing power relations while suppressing local power differentials (Cooke and 
Kothari, 2001).  Questions over participatory approach become more apparent 
their intended purpose, namely, buy-in and local ownership is scrutinised further.   
As noted already, ‘buy-in’ and ‘local ownership’ are the putative requisites 
for the initiation of SSR.  Whether they are present or not is deemed to be a factor 
that ultimately determines whether a drive for reform will succeed or fail.  
However, the use to which those two terms are normally put in policy and 
academic literature does not seem to suggest that what they denote is fully 
recognised, as evidenced by the manner in which they are used interchangeably.  
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Whatever explanation can be given for this mix-up, it sheds light on the extent to 
which development orthodoxy drifts into dogmatism in which the latest buzzwords 
generated by the international development community are put to unselective and 
at times contradictory usage.  This is bound to lead to questions over the 
credibility of policy pronouncements that are dressed in those terms.  In a few 
cases, advocacy groups, activists and donors seem to appreciate the implications 
of any reference to ‘buy-in’ and what it may mean for the legitimacy of their 
initiatives, hence the use of ‘ownership’ as an alternative; but in most cases, the 
terms are used interchangeably as pointed out, even when in reality they are 
antithetic.  The lack of clarity on the two terms is evident in the writings of some 
of the key promoters of SSR.  For example, Hendrickson and Ball have noted that:  
[A] strong case in Africa for closer engagement with the African Union to 
heighten its profile on SSR and provide it with the capacity to push for more 
broad-based continental buy-in of the SSR agenda. This would likely involve 
close collaboration with sub-regional organisations, governmental agencies, 
and civil society networks to develop a culture of SSR research that is seen 
to be truly African in origin (2005:28)   
In this case, it would not be easy to reconcile ‘a culture of SSR research that is 
seen to be truly African in origin a culture’ with ‘broad-based continental buy-in’.  
Given that the former implies ownership and the latter implies external imposition, 
that statement is self-contradictory.  Seeking clarity between the two terms is not 
just a lexicographical or semantic exercise but helps to shed light on how much 
serious thinking goes into the debates and prescriptive analysis on SSR and related 
initiatives; but also the inherently undemocratic nature of the processes that are 
the reputed progenitors of democratic governance in countries whose institutions 
and practices are targeted for reform.   
In ordinary terms, ‘ownership’ is a state of affairs where an individual or 
group can lay claim to conceiving of, and participating in the development of an 
idea, a project, a commitment, a decision or a plan of action.  As such, the owner 
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has an attachment to the object of ownership that supersedes mere endorsement, 
but understands and believes in it and is willing and ready to implement it.  On the 
other hand, ‘buy-in’ refers to a group or individual, on their own, going through all 
pre-implementation steps as listed under ownership and afterwards seeking to 
convince, inspire or induce others who have not been party to the initial phases 
the inception of an idea or plan to partake of implementation.  The key decisions 
are taken without those that are crucial for successful implementation but as soon 
as it is realised that those great decisions are not worth anything until they can get 
implemented, their initiators have to sell them and the implementers have to ‘buy-
in.   As noted by Ball and Hendrickson,  
[D]onor and Northern institutions have generated most of the research and 
policy paradigms in the area of SSR. This has served to limit buy-in to SSR 
thinking by.…governments, for whom there are often insufficient incentives 
to undertake SSR in the OECD-DAC sense of the word (2005:28). 
This has become the general trend in the promotion of institutional reform by 
donor countries in aid-dependent countries.  As hinted at in the foregoing quote, 
there are obvious limitations to that essentially dictatorial approach.  The 
‘customers’ that have buy into the ideas and plans cannot be expected to identify 
with a vision when they have been excluded from its formulation and inception; 
and are unacquainted with whatever alternative options may have been available 
to choose from,  and the justification for zeroing on the option they have to adopt.  
As such, the plans based on those ideas may be strange or incomprehensible from 
the outset even for those that may be inclined to implement them.  In cases where 
‘buy-in’ is attained, it may be for purely for instrumental reasons: The 
implementation of the plans may be a prerequisite for the disbursement of badly-
needed aid or other forms of intangible support and legitimation.   There may be 
appearances of agreement with the plans and those imposing the plans may feel 
content that their initiatives have been accepted but such plans tend to be 
disowned at the earliest opportunity.  
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6.2 Local Ownership as the Incarnation of the Civil Society Myth in 
Underdeveloped Polities  
Of the terms that have come to dominate post-Cold War debates on the security 
and development challenges of the underdeveloped countries, ‘civil society’ stands 
out as prominently, and probably as equally overused as others like ‘good 
governance’ and ‘capacity building’.  Civil society is hailed as the element upon 
which rests great hope for resolving the social, economic and political ills of 
countries and regions afflicted by chronic instability and as ‘…a crucial agent for 
limiting authoritarian government, strengthening the empowerment of the people, 
and enforcing political accountability ….improving the quality and inclusiveness of 
governance’ (Caparini, 2004: 171).  More broadly, ‘civil-society’ as a term has 
grown into an all-purpose byword in common employment by scholars and 
analysts on all sides of the political spectrum in their reflection on a host of issues 
confronting an increasingly globalising world.  But as Purdue has observed, the 
concept remains contested and ‘...has a complex genealogy of shifting meanings, 
according to the rhetorical needs of the day’ (2010:1).   
The period from the early 1990s has witnessed an increased interest mainly 
by Western governments and NGOs, in funding, if not also finding the continent’s 
civil society (Barkan 1994; Diamond 1995; Hutchful, 1996; Mark Robinson 1995, 
1996a, 1996b; Carothers 1997).  More specifically for Sub-Saharan Africa, the high 
expectations of the utility of the term appear not to be confined only to the reform 
of the ‘security sector’, but also to the righting of politics in general, leading to the 
assumption that, ‘…the political reform of the [sub] continent may depend on the 
extent to which civil society is able to counteract the stultifying weight of the 
oppressive state’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999:19).  It is n the context of SSR, it is 
hoped that civil society can:  
[C]ontribute positively to SSR by facilitating dialogue and debate on security 
issues, assisting in security-related research, training in legal and human 
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rights issues, advocacy and awareness raising, security budget analysis and 
monitoring and evaluation of security policy (Mlambo, 2011:180).    
There are many ways in which the category, ‘civil society’ has been defined and 
described but all tend to point in the direction of its unselective employment in 
reference to the pre-industrial countries like those in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
According to Shaw, civil society is the ‘…network of institutions through which 
groups in society in general represent themselves – both to each other and to the 
state (1994:647), while Norton has defined civil society as that space where one 
would find a '…melange of associations, clubs, guilds and syndicates, federations, 
unions, parties and groups come together to provide a buffer between the state 
and citizen' (1993:206).  Elsewhere, he reinforces that statement by emphasizing 
an important attribute that by far highlights the key limitation of associational life 
in Sub-Saharan Africa by noting that, civil society is '…literally and plainly at the 
heart of participant political systems’ (1995:7).  On his part Stepan views civil 
society as the  
[A]rena where manifold social movements (such as neighbourhood 
associations, women's groups, religious groupings, and international 
currents) and civic organizations from all classes (lawyers, journalists, trade 
unions, and entrepreneurs, among others) attempt to constitute themselves 
in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and 
advance their interests (1988:3-4). 
However, several observers have questioned the validity of such assumptions by 
arguing that, the trendy use to which the notion of ‘civil society’ exemplifies the 
pitfalls of mechanical importation of ideological conceptions by abstracting them 
from the context of the struggles, the socio-economic transformations and 
relations that gave rise to them in the first place (Mamdani, 1990:359).  Like 
Mamdani, Nyangabyaki’s comments on the West’s interest in civil society in 
Uganda implicitly point at the limitations of abstraction of ideological formulations 
from their original context.  He has notes that, '…the major thrust of the discourse 
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on civil society … has not been about the actual history of civil society in Uganda 
but on social engineering a new type'.223   Mostly emphasized is the extent of 
divergence in socio-historical conditions of bourgeois Europe and the largely pre-
industrial Sub-Saharan Africa.   This is what is seen to be the emergence of the 
category in the age of the bourgeoisie in Europe and the subsequent effort of this 
class to ensure empirical differentiation between the private and public spheres, 
and more specifically protecting the private arena against state action (Woods, 
1992: 78).   
Moreover, the assumption that the existence of a ‘private sphere’ with the 
wherewithal to curb the encroachments of the state is a universal phenomenon 
disregards the diversity of trajectories of state making across history.  State 
making in much of Europe was largely through a protracted process of bottom-up 
accretion involving bargains and compromises between emerging monarchs and 
nobles – be they dukes, counts or vassi dominici – and their vassals, or a lord who 
dominated a feudal principality; in a process was stretched over a period of four to 
five centuries (Strayer, 1970:57).  For most of the states in the underdeveloped 
world, particularly the former colonies, the process of state making has been 
predominantly top-down and precipitous, with the central state authorities 
retaining the organisational initiative at the disadvantage of the populace; with far-
reaching implications for the future emergence, character and efficacy of whatever 
it is that one can call civil society.  It is for such reasons that Riddell and 
Bebbington have observed that,  
Civil society' is a notoriously slippery concept. It has entered donor 
terminology without careful definition.... In many respects, the term is used 
as a code for a set of ideas related to participation, good government, 
human rights, privatisation and public sector reform (1995: 23). 
                                        
223 Cited in Hearn, 1999 p. 4. 
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 A distinction is made between thinkers like Hobbes and Locke who understood 
civil society primarily as a political society and those who from the eighteenth 
century start to describe civil society as a sphere of social activity distinguished 
from the state, conceptualised in the Weberian sense as the central government.  
Theorists, such as Ernest Gellner took consider civil society it to be a ‘natural’ 
condition of human freedom, yet others like Ferguson or Hegel question its utility 
and assert that it is a result of drawn out historical processes, especially those that 
result in differentiation of society into distinct socio-economic interest groups.  
Critics have based especially on the latter interpretation to argue that the 
undifferentiated socio-economic character of Sub-Saharan Africa imposes major 
structural limitations on the emergence and sustenance of civil society associations 
and risks to make civil society-dependent endeavours such as SSR ineffectual.  
Even for those with a strong belief in the power of norms, doubts over the utility of 
the term ‘civil society’ in the context of Sub Saharan Africa are not difficult to 
detect.  According to Callaghy, ‘...if used at all the concept should be used in a 
very restricted sense relating to the emergence of a consensus on norms defining 
a civil sphere’ (1994: 235).   
However, even without a detailed attempt at tracing the origins of the term, 
it is clear that both the leadership of civil society organisations in Africa and the 
much-criticised political and public sector elite have their roots in a common socio-
cultural milieu therefore have similar limitations.  (Adedeji, 2005:21).  Far from 
being conduits for strengthening governance or serving as agents of development, 
‘civil society’ organisations in present day Africa are but a manifestation of the 
phenomena that gave rise to the same entrenched political elites that continue to 
dominate the state sector.  Thus, according to Diamond, ‘civil society organisations 
in Africa too often are crippled by the same problems of poverty, corruption, 
nepotism, parochialism, opportunism, ethnicism, illiberalism and willingness to be 
co-opted that plague the society in general’ (1997:24).   
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As such, any initiative, SSR inclusive, that bets its success on the ability to 
utilise such structures is bound to yield very little.  In terms similar to Diamond’s, 
Darnolf has argued that,  
[N]ot until the internal operations of civil society’s various institutions are 
permeated by a democratic political culture can its members be patterned to 
behave in a democratic fashion.  Today civil society organisations of many 
African countries are relatively underdeveloped (1997:20-21). 
The underdevelopment Darnolf is referring to manifests as a deficiency in 
elementary information or tutoring on the basic workings of the state and 
government, the processes of policy formulation and decision-making, let alone 
specialised expertise on the essentials of security and strategy.  On their part, 
state authorities always try their best to mystify security and elbow off all matters 
to do with security.  The proponents of SSR accentuate this problem by pursuing 
the debate as a specialised subject in closed networks of expertise and 
pamphleteering.  Due to these limitations, memberships of civil society 
organisations are never sufficiently competent to engage in sober and constructive 
debate on the management of national affairs in general, and defence and security 
in particular.  
Nevertheless, not all within the SSR fraternity are overly sanguine about the 
potential of civil society in the successful implementation of reforms.  Some 
analysts have raised concerns over the utility of the concept and the 
wholesomeness of groups that are identified as such.  According to Caparini the 
SSR framework’s use of the term conflates an ‘empirical category’, specifically 
‘NGO’, with a ‘political project’, that is, the autonomous sphere of social activity 
that has the potential to improve governance, hold the state accountable (Caparini, 
2002/4).224   As a consequence of this, ‘civil society’ ‘...tends to mean all things to 
all people, and the analytical benefit from a more rigorous use of the concept may 
                                        
224 Cited in Peake and Scheye, p. 316. 
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be lost’ (Caparini, 2004:177).  Hendrickson contends that a dependence on civil 
society to achieve reform may be fundamentally misplaced, pointing out how they 
are often a product of foreign funding, thus questioning their independence.  
Highlighting the narrow focus by civil society groups - particularly human-rights 
organisations - on issues of governmental accountability rather than on how 
administration can be made more effective, he observes that ‘…the practice of 
denunciating without making practical suggestions for reform may undermine the 
processes of debate that generate support’ (1999: 31).  
Moreover, those that continue to romanticise civil society often overlook the 
reality that not all the organisations that would fall under that label are ‘civil’.  
Some of the organisations may be dedicated to racism and violence or, like the 
Mafia, may be illegal, or declared so.  Even the Interahamwe of Rwanda, the outfit 
that spearheaded the extermination of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu in 1994 was a 
civil society organisation.  It may therefore be reasonable to posit that the 
prevailing conception of civil society may be more part of the problem, than it is 
part of the solution to many of the daunting concerns that are placed on its 
shoulders.  Particularly, a case like that of Rwanda seems to highlight the need for 
caution on the part of those who view civil society as always a force for good and 
a saviour of society.  ‘It is not the existence of civic associations that strengthens 
civil society’, writes Uvin, ‘but their purpose and the extent of their freedom to 
operate’ (1998: 164). 
6.3 The Status of Civil Society and State Responsiveness: The Case 
of Contemporary Uganda 
Popular engagement in the policy process takes place within particular country 
settings which are in turn determined primarily by local social, economic and 
political realities.  As would be expected, countries have diverse political systems 
and forms of government in addition to being endowed with varying levels of 
socio-economic development.  It is this broad socio-political context that 
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determines the framing of issues, the setting of agendas, modes of popular 
engagement (if any) in the policy process and subsequently the policy outputs of a 
political system.  Of greater significance however are the effects of the level 
socioeconomic mobilisation on the inclination, interest and it can be argued, the 
competence of the broader masses to participate in political debates. To illustrate 
the limitations of a narrative on civil society that dispenses with empirical evidence 
in preference for generic norms, we give a rough sketch of a selection of Uganda’s 
socioeconomic indicators that are determinant of the civic capacity of the country’s 
wider society.   
Of those factors, the one that stands out as the axis around which all others 
revolve is the level of economic development so far attained.  While it is an 
established view that economic development has major consequences for many 
aspects of social and political life, references to civil society and political 
participation in the underdeveloped world tend to take the effects of quantitative 
socioeconomic transformation on institutional architecture and function as a given.  
Such categories as civil society and democracy, or even others such as fascism, 
authoritarianism are qualitative manifestations of historically specific quantitative 
realities whose universality ought not to be taken for granted.  Studies of social 
mobilization, for example, have demonstrated that economic development is 
associated with sharp increases in the general level of political participation (Black, 
1966; Huntington, 1968; Deutsch, 1961; Lipset, 1960).  Those studies – among 
many others – demonstrate a strong link between aggregate measures of socio-
economic change such as per capita income, literacy, and levels of urbanisation, 
on one hand, and aggregate measures of political participation, such as voting 
turnout, and disposition for involvement in civic activities in general, on the other 
(Nie, Bingham-Powell and Prewitt, 1969). Similarly, the social status, education, 
and organizational memberships, that is, membership to civil society organisations 
reveals a positive correlation with the likelihood of engaging in various types of 
political activity and the modes of such engagement (Almond and Verba, 1989).  
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The figure below outlines the causal pathway between economic development and 
the emergence/capability of civil society.   
Figure 7: Socio-economic Development and Civil Society’s Influence on 
Policy 
Adapted from: Nie and others, 1969, p.808 
These findings have major implications for the usefulness of some of the 
terminology commonly employed to depict the transactions between political 
systems and the populations over which they preside and specifically, the 
capability of the latter to engage meaningfully with the political process.  One of 
the terms commonly used in neoliberal reformist literature is state responsiveness, 
which, on one hand gauges the extent to which the public authorities defer to the 
preferences of their constituents, and on the other, the forcefulness with which the 
constituents articulate their policy preferences.     
 Whereas the debates on civil society involvement in the political process 
have tended to emphasize a static and one-sided notion of responsiveness, it is a 
relational, as much as it is a reciprocal phenomenon involving exchanges between 
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communities and the policy elites that preside over them.  The relationship is two-
way, entailing on one hand, the generation and transmission of demands and 
influences (stimuli) by the community, and on the other hand, responses to the 
‘stimuli’ by the policy elite.  Hence, the level of responsiveness is dependent on the 
nature and intensity of the influences reaching the policy elite.  In absence of 
those influences, responsiveness will depend on the level of self-drive of the elite 
in identifying and addressing the needs of their constituents.  By shaping the 
priorities of communities, socioeconomic underdevelopment stands out as one of 
the principal determinants of both the type and intensity of demands placed upon 
the policy elite by their populations.   
In a transitional and largely agrarian country like Uganda, not only is the 
character of demands radically different from what one sees in industrial settings, 
they are also channelled to the political system through dissimilar means.  The 
channelling of influence in more developed countries takes the form of interest and 
pressure group politics: influence is exerted before the passing of laws and 
formulation of policies.  On the contrary, in less developed countries individual and 
group demands (however the groups may be defined) are pressed at the 
enforcement stage (Scott, 1969:1142).  Scott further observes that, the latter form 
of channelling of demands is often disregarded especially by Western scholars on 
account that ‘...accustomed to their own politics, [they] have been looking in the 
wrong place’.225  Those differences in channelling influence have a bearing on the 
style and focus of responsiveness.  Moreover, the nature of demands of the 
majority of the populations of transitional nations is not amenable to the legislative 
process.  Even when such demands are made for a wider grouping, because 
society is not yet integrated into a homogenous nation-state, they are likely to 
refer to a ‘primordial’ grouping such as an ethnic or linguistic community, or at 
most a regional bloc.  For the term ‘responsiveness’ to be meaningful, it is 
important that it is applied with due consideration of the social, economic and 




political context of countries and regions being analysed.  The table below is an 
attempt to match the style of responsiveness with the level of socio-economic 
development the gray column represents the style of governmental responsiveness 




Figure 8: Socio-economic Development, Civil Society (CS) Capacity and 
State Responsiveness.226 
 STYLE OF STATE RESPONSIVENESS 














inducements play a very 
minor role except among 
a limited number of local 




(material rewards, jobs, 
licences, patronage, 
favours, welfare payments 
associated with 
‘corruption’) 
Indivisible rewards e.g., 
public works, schools 
(pork barrel or communal 
inducements). 
Broad policy and 
ideological concerns 
(defence and security, 





systems, very low 
income largely pre-
industrial, rural societies, 
non-monetised economy   
Low income countries, 
rapid socio-economic and 
political change, rising 
expectations, low levels of 
political 
institutionalisation, low 
integration of the socio-
political system 
Middle income countries High income, highly 
urbanised industrial 










Pleasing, placating or 
winning favours from a 
notable, landlord, 
prominent kith and kin or 
local official 
Mobilised participation, 
demands reach the 
political system at the 
implementation stage, 
predominance of ‘machine 
politics’, ‘contacting’ to 
solve individual problems, 





through electoral activity, 
lobbying, organisational 
activity based on regional 







lobbies), demands are 
channelled at the 





Political ties are 
determined by traditional 
patterns of deference 





family or small group 
focus, decision-makers 
and their supporters 
relate via personal loyalty, 
minimal overlap between 
the political, economic 
and social systems. 
Community or locality 
orientation, ethnic 
concentration 
Vertical or occupational 
and class ties (arising 






Absolutism Decision-makers have a 
high degree of latitude in 
determining policy. 
Conferral politics Predominance of policy 
processes and 




                                        
226 Adapted from Mutengesa and Hendrickson, 2008, p. 26. 
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6.3.1. General underdevelopment 
In any political setting, the priorities of the citizenry influence the nature of 
demands that they place upon the policy elites and correspondingly, the 
responsiveness of that elite.  The level of socioeconomic development, measured 
in terms of the education standard, income, levels of consumption and 
urbanisation among other indicators of socioeconomic mobilisation directly affect 
the demands and priorities of communities.  Moreover, central government 
responsiveness is a measure of, and the flip side of the extent to which significant 
sections of the population are involved in ‘activity by private citizens designed to 
influence governmental decision-making’ (Huntington and Nelson, 1976:4), or 
political participation.   
A population whose best part is afflicted by ill-health or lives in conditions of 
absolute poverty will be constantly engrossed in the daily struggles to meet the 
bare necessities of life and may not be concerned about policy issues.  Equally so, 
low levels of education are a barrier to popular engagement in matters of broader 
public policy concern, thus limiting the level interaction between governments and 
their constituents.  The age profile, especially the median age in addition to the 
standard of education of a population have a bearing on the level of participation 
of wider society in politics with a corresponding impact on state responsiveness.  
The higher those parameters are, the more likely that the average population will 
be politically attentive.  An older, more educated and more well-to-do population is 
likely to have a greater sense of belonging, community cohesion and awareness.  
An assessment of the style of government of the nature of transactions between 
the policy elite and the broader population would be incomplete without a broad 
survey of some of those parameters.   
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6.3.2. Low level of socio-economic mobilisation 
Uganda is ranked as the 161st out of 185 on the United Nations human 
development index making it one of the least developed countries in the world 
(United Nations, 2013).  The average Ugandan is a member of one of the country’s 
65 indigenous ethnic communities (Republic of Uganda, 1995: 214-215), living on 
average for just over 54.5 years (United Nations, 2013:146), with a gross annual 
per capita income of $1,168,227 compared to the $6,000, the threshold at which 
developing countries are known to make an irreversible transition to liberal 
democracy (Przeworski et al., 1997).  At 26.9%,228 the proportion of Uganda’s 
industrial production to total production is equivalent to England’s in 1849 (Mitchell 
and Deane, 1962: 271).  Economic factors such as the structure and output of 
national production hinted on above have a decisive influence on responsiveness: 
after all responsiveness boils down to matching ends with means.   
Uganda’s very low level of urbanisation places additional limits on how 
much the country’s population can be mobilised on a sustained basis to participate 
in politics, and to, thereby have a meaningful impact on government decision-
making and policy oversight as is envisaged in the discourse on the efficacy of civil 
society.  About 86 per cent of Uganda’s population live in rural areas (United 
Nations, 2012:121), about the same as the average European country at the turn 
of the nineteenth Century (de Vries, 1984:39).  The population of Uganda’s largest 
city, Kampala, is about the same as that of London in the first quarter of the 19th 
Century.229   Like in any other underdeveloped country, the population’s location 
                                        
227 Ibid. 
228 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/ug.html (Accessed on 12 November 2013) 
229 The population of London hit the 2 million mark in the mid-1830s (Greater London,  
Inner London & Outer London Population & Density History http://www.demographia.com/dm-
lon31.htm Accessed on 12 November 2013) out of a UK population of population of about 25 Million 
(Mathias, 1969:449); while the population of Kampala is only projected to reach 2 million out of a 
population of 38 million in 2015 (United Nations, 2012:230; The New Vision,  Jun 23, 2013, Uganda 
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in the rural countryside is closely tied to limited economic productivity and poverty.  
About 67 per cent of Uganda’s population are considered to be vulnerable to 
poverty,230 well above the 1688 proportion of the population of England and 
Wales that could not live on their income and had to depend on charity and poor 
relief (Mathias, 1969: 24-26).  As Huntington has noted,  
People who are really too poor are too poor for politics and too poor for 
protest.  They are indifferent, apathetic, and lack exposure to the media 
and other stimuli which would arouse their aspirations in such a manner as 
to galvanise them into political activity (1968:52). 
In that socio-economic reality, the daily efforts of the vast majority of the 
population are geared towards meeting the demands of basic subsistence leaving 
very little time for purposeful engagement in politics, excepting the seasonal 
participation in the electoral process.  The pressing needs of such populations tend 
to force them to privilege service responsiveness over broader issues of policy 
formulation and legislation as happens in countries whose reality informs prevailing 
notions of the debate on civil society (Figure 8, p. 282).  The majority of the 
demands of such a population tend to be channelled to the political system at the 
enforcement stage, but not before laws are passed.   Exertion of influence at the 
enforcement stage will often take the form of ‘corruption’, in contrast to pressure 
group politics in countries where populations live significantly above the poverty 
line and demand nothing else from their political representatives other than 
effective policy outputs.  The structures, methods and characteristics of 
competitive political organisations in Uganda bears very close resemblance to what 
has been dubbed as ‘machine politics’ in which the central mechanism is 
dominated by a single individual relating to political and social groups by 
                                                                                                                        
population at record 37 million http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/644270-uganda-population-at-
record-37-million.html Accessed on 12 November 2013).   
230 The New Vision, Mar 19, 2013, 67% of Ugandans vulnerable to poverty, 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/640813-67-of-ugandans-vulnerable-to-poverty.html (Accessed 
on 12 November 2013).   
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patronage.  It is not likely that such socioeconomic reality can foster the conditions 
in which complex policy issues can receive sustained attention from the population, 
with obvious implications for the capabilities of whatever it is that may be 
meaningfully be referred to as civil society.  
6.3.3. Lack of information  
‘Effective states require engaged societies that demand change and hold 
governments accountable for such delivery’ (World Bank, 2005: 3).  Like most 
underdeveloped countries, Uganda has unique demographic and informational 
characteristics that impose major limitations on societal engagement in civic 
activities and engagement in the policy process; with the effect of exaggerating 
the prominence of central state the policy process, while also limiting their capacity 
to make enlightened decisions.  Societal engagement is a critical measure of the 
robustness of civil society.  It is unattainable in conditions where large sections of 
the population are illiterate and live in physical isolation in inaccessible rural areas 
with restricted access to information on programmes and policies of the central 
government.   
As already pointed out, the majority of Ugandans live in scattered 
communities in the rural countryside, making the country one of the least 
urbanised in the world.  Isolation from the centres of power and the resulting lack 
of capacity to influence central government policy processes by such populations is 
compounded by their limited access to basic information.  The 2002 Uganda 
population and housing census estimated that 49 per cent of the population 
depend on word of mouth as their major source of information (Uganda 
Government, 2002:iv).   In line with that, a United Nations survey has established 
that Uganda is the 35th country from the bottom of the index of the number of 
radios receivers per thousand inhabitants; further showing that only 47.8 per cent 
of Ugandans own a radio, 0.7 per cent own a television and 0.7 per cent have 
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access to the print media.231  Additionally, the country’s circulation of newspapers 
and periodicals is one of the lowest in the world.  While every one thousand 
Ugandans have access to 2.7 newspapers or periodicals, the ratio in the developed 
industrialised countries with politically active populations is in excess of 200 pieces 
per thousand inhabitants.232   Access to information is further hampered by low 
levels of literacy.  Uganda’s literacy rate is about 68%, just about the rate for 
England and Wales in 1850.233   
6.3.4. Physical isolation of the population 
To further complicate the informational isolation of Uganda’s rural population, 
much of the countryside is neither accessible by road or rail this, for a country that 
is already constrained by being landlocked.  Uganda is approximately the same 
size as the United Kingdom but a comparison of the two country’s Aggregate 
Physical Accessibility Ratio of Territory (PART) by roadway measured as kilometres 
per square kilometre of territory reveals the level of inaccessibility of the country’s 
hinterland and its residents.  While for every one square kilometre of territory of 
the United Kingdom there is 1.6 Km of roads (all of which is paved), Uganda has 
only 0.29 Km, only 30 per cent of which is paved.    The commonly employed 
measure for accessibility is the length in kilometres of paved roadway per 1,000 of 
the population.  While the weighted average for the 184 countries assessed in 
2003 was 9.107; and that for the European Union countries standing at 9.107, 
                                        
231 For every 1,000 Ugandans, there are 121 radio receivers, compared to 2,084 receivers for the 
United States and 1,454 for the United Kingdom (UN Statistics Division website, 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm, Accessed 23 March 2013)  
232 Ibid 
233 Uganda’s literacy rate is close to Britain’s a century and a half ago. According to Stephens 
(‘Literacy in England, Scotland, and Wales’, 555), the adult literacy rate for England, Scotland and 
Wales in 1850 was 61 per cent, increasing to 88 per cent in 1870 (higher than Uganda’s projected 
85 per cent for 2009/10 [Republic of Uganda, Uganda Population and Housing Census, 30]) and 
100 per cent by 1900. 
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Uganda’s is 0.077, about 11,727 per cent below the global average.234  This 
reflects a similar trend for railroads, airports and inland waterways, making the 
country’s rural countryside even much more inaccessible given its landlocked 
status.   
A largely illiterate, predominantly rural and physically isolated population is 
limited on how much it can hold the political elite accountable for their actions and 
omissions.  Such a population can only either lull policy elites into complacence, or 
furnish fertile ground for the thriving of absolutism as indeed was the case say in 
mediaeval and early modern Europe.  A further point needs to be made regarding 
the isolation of the predominantly rural populations of pre-industrial countries such 
as Uganda.  Apart from their remoteness from the economic and political centres, 
many of those communities live in total isolation from each other to an extent that 
militates against even the most basic form of inter-communal interaction, a 
foundational dimension of the notion of civil society.  Purdue highlights the 
significance of that interaction when he notes that, ‘...civil society implies a level of 
mutual trust between strangers, who may therefore pass among each other in the 
physical space of cities and trade with another’ (2010:1).  At the heart of the the 
notion of civil society lies ‘mutual trust between strangers’.    In the language and 
social practices of the pastoralist Karimojong community of the remote Karamoja 
Province Northeast Uganda, there is no distinction between a stranger and an 
enemy.  Both words are referred to by the same term, emoit (amoit being the 
feminine form), and as a general rule, all those that are labelled as emoit attract 
the instant sanction of loss of their belongings – mainly cattle – and death,235 in 
keeping with a worldview that closely mirrors the Arab Bedouin political aphorism, 
‘My brother and I against my cousin; my cousin and I against the stranger’.   
                                        
234 Data on the transportation infrastructure is derived from the CIA, CIA World Fact Book, 2003. 
235 The same applies to the neighbouring Turkana in North-western Kenya and probably other 
related groups in the region.  To the Turkana, McCabe observes that ‘...those who are not 
Ngiturkan are emoit, strangers and enemies; and enemies should be killed’ (2004:56).  
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The political history of the countries that fall in the same category as 
Uganda, i.e., the former colonies did not help at all in the process of laying ground 
for the future evolution of the trait of mutual trust between strangers, and one can 
even argue, of an integrated national community.  Commenting on the long term 
impact of on national unity by the policy of indirect rule in Nigeria, Ali Mazrui has 
observed that, it:  
[A]ggravated the problems of creating a modern nation-state after 
independence.  The different groups in the country maintained their 
separate ethnic identities by being rules in part through their own native 
institutions.....Different sections of the population perceived each other as 
strangers, sometimes as aliens, increasingly as rivals, and ominously as 
potential enemies (1986:112).  
In the case of Uganda, Ibingira notes that as early as 1898, a proposal that there 
should be established a Central Council for Uganda, a device that would have 
fostered a national outlook and encouraged inter-communal communication was 
actively discouraged by the colonial administrators (1973:27).  In 1925, a proposal 
by the rulers of the four Kingdoms and the province of Busoga to hold regular 
meetings was vetoed by colonial Governor (Ingham, 1957).236  Commenting more 
generally on the process of founding local government in Uganda, Burke has noted 
that;  
The establishment of districts based wherever possible on tribal residence 
has contributed to a sense of tribal nationalism and separatism that in many 
cases did not exist prior to the arrival of the British and subsequent 
amalgamation of the parochial segments into single districts (1964:14).237 
                                        
236 Cited in Ibingira, 1973, p.27. 
237 Crawford Young makes reference to the case the creation of a sense of tribalism that in Nigeria 
in the 1950s of an Ibo leader and future Secretary General of the Ibo Federal Union who had to 
travel through Iboland as an ‘ethnic missionary’ to convince the rural folk that they were Ibos, 




Such are the historical and contemporary realities in the majority of countries and 
regions that are afflicted by chronic insecurity.  The rhetoric of normatively 
conceived notions of ‘civil society’ that continue to underpin neoliberal reform 
initiatives and peacebuilding will for years to come fly in the face of those realities, 
courtesy of the preference for prescriptions that are not based on a detailed 
empirical study of contexts that are targeted for reform.    
6.3.5. Unfavourable demographic profile 
The age distribution of a country’s population has a bearing on the extent to which 
that country’s political elite will be amenable to the views and preferences of the 
population, let alone the quality and volume of views that will issue from wider 
society.  Uganda currently ranks lowest in the world for some of the key 
demographic indicators that have a bearing on the levels of popular participation in 
politics, namely, median age, dependence ratio and the proportion of the 
population above the age of 65 years of age.   
With a median age of 14.9 years, Uganda has a smaller politically aware 
and active population than any other country in the world.  Uganda compares in 
no way with the average of 40 years for the developed industrial countries. Up to 
50.2% of the country’s population are below the age of 14.  The country’s ‘infant 
bulge’ narrows the active political audience and thus sets limits on representative 
democratic institutions and processes.   Uganda’s ‘infant bulge’ sets limits on 
politically eligible citizens, in addition to constricting the population base from 
which a vibrant civil society, interest groups, political parties and other civic 
organisations can emerge.  A low median age structurally constrains 
responsiveness by limiting ‘voice’, and autonomous political participation.  More 
than anything else, such a demographic profile can only breed aloofness and 
paternalism on the part of the political class.   
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The minority status precludes a large proportion of the citizenry 
Responsiveness is a function of ‘voice’ and the latter is directly proportional to the 
median age.  A young and transient population dominated by minors and 
dependants can only provide fertile ground for inertia and a limited impetus to 
decision makers to be responsive to popular preferences.  Related to the low 
median age is a high dependence ratio of 111 dependants per 100 workers, the 
highest in the world.  Apart from being an additional indicator of limited voice, a 
high dependency ratio is a reflection of limited economic potential.  
Responsiveness is above all else a relationship between ends and means: an 
agrarian country with a high dependency ratio is necessarily a country with limited 
economic means and major structural limitations to responsiveness.    
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 One-size-fits-all Reformism and its Critics 
7.1 Introduction 
Like the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s, the public sector 
reforms of the 1990s as exemplified by SSR have attracted relentless criticism from 
scholars in a range of fields including economics, sociology and political science.  
Implied by most of the critiques is the message neatly conveyed by Matt Andrews’ 
assertion that, most interventions ‘...result is a glut of square peg reforms in 
round-hole governments; laws that are not implemented, systems that are not 
used, in governments that still lack basic functionality...’ (2013:228). The critics of 
prevailing approaches to institutional reform advance several explanations for the 
poor record reform initiatives in developing countries, some of them on side of the 
reformers and others against.  The critics of reform point at the inappropriateness 
of the ideological assumptions and models of reform initiatives, lack of fit between 
reform designs and reform contexts and the imposition of one-size-fits-all models 
of institutional change; with the proponents citing a lack of political will on the part 
of the elites of countries targeted for reform, lack of buy in, lack of local 
ownership, among other issues.  This part of the study sheds more light on the 
arguments on both sides of the debate, particularly building further on the 
arguments advanced in the Chapters Five and Six on the social and political 
constraints within the countries targeted for reform, to externally derived reforms.   
Drawing on the writings of a selection of scholars in the fields of 
international development and the political economy of institutional reform in 
developing countries, this part of the study gives a broad-brush view of the key 
criticisms that have been voiced against an approach to reform that is adjudged as 
being one-size-fits all.  The limits that the lack of clearly-spelt out aims or a 
coherent theory of organisational development in current approaches to public 
sector reform is explored.  In the third section of this chapter, two forms of 
sensitivity are explored in conjunction with each other: The sensitivity to context 
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that features prominently in aid donor discourses on reform in developing 
countries and the sensitivity of the armed forces in countries emerging from violent 
conflict or those still experiencing protracted social conflict.  It is argued that the 
disregard for the latter form of sensitivity nullifies the claims regarding context 
sensitivity as they are presented in institutional reform advocacy.   
The chapter explores the motivations that drive the elite of developing 
countries to embrace externally-imposed ‘best practice’ reforms that they do not 
necessarily endorse or those that they consider to be intrusive.  It argues that 
while the ideal motivation for undertaking reform may be technical – ostensibly 
aimed at the improvement of performance – the key driver in most developing 
country settings is gaining material and moral support and short-term legitimacy 
from the powerful international actors who use implementation of institutional 
reform as a conditionality.  It is further argued that, in order to satisfy their 
benefactors, developing and dependent countries employ a range of strategies for 
going through the motions of ‘implementing’ reform without necessarily improving 
functionality.  The effect of those strategies is to invalidate some of the reform 
proposals.  
7.2 Boilerplate Reformism: The Issues 
Key critics include Ha-Joon Chan (2003a, 2003b); Bill Easterly (2001), Peter Evans 
(2004), Merilee Grindle (2004), Eric Scheye (2006, 2010) and Matt Andrews.  This 
is only a sample of critics who, though focusing on approaches to economic 
development nonetheless advance a general critique that applies equally well to 
other areas of development, given that the assumptions of neoliberal reform tend 
to span across many areas of public policy.  Grindle (2004), in the same vein as 
Doornbos (1995, 2000, 2001) questions the utility of ‘good governance’ as a 
criterion for measuring development more generally, but specifically, its 
employment as an imperative to institutional reform and poverty reduction in 
conflict-afflicted countries.  She observes that it is deeply problematic as a guide to 
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development and doubts whether prevailing approaches to good governance 
represent any sense of priority by the international development community on 
what needs to be done, when it needs to be done, and how it needs to be done.  
‘Among the governance reforms that “must be done” to encourage development’, 
Grindle observes, ‘there is little guidance about what’s essential and what’s not, 
what should come first and what should follow, what can be achieved in the short 
term and what can only be achieved over the longer term, what is feasible and 
what is not’.
238
   
Grindle highlights the potential pitfalls of such an approach, which, based on 
her reflections, lacks basic cognizance of the reality that ‘all good things cannot be 
pursued at once’.  A typical ‘good governance’ reform agenda pursues concurrently 
virtually all aspects of the public sector, ranging from economic institutions, 
political processes, to decision-making structures that determine priorities among 
public problems and allocate resources to respond to them, to organizations that 
manage administrative systems and deliver goods and services to citizens, to 
human resources that staff government bureaucracies, to the linkages between 
officials and the populace across the arena of public life.  The gap between 
expectations and realities ‘…can overwhelm the commitment of even the most 
                                        
238 Ibid, p.526.  The World Bank lists several characteristics of good governance covering 
institutions, laws, policies, services, and strategies for effecting reforms in those areas.  From within 
the World Development Reports of 1997-2002/3, Grindle cites 45 indicators that developing 
countries were advised to pay attention to in 1997.  By 2002 the number had shot to 116.  Before 
the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) can receive debt relief, their governments have to 
produce poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs).  PRSPs are an outline of wide-ranging 
commitments to extensive reforms affecting policies and institutions in all areas of public policy.  
They range from poverty monitoring and analysis, inequality and social welfare, monitoring and 
evaluation, development targets and costs, strengthening statistical systems, public spending, 
participation, governance, community-driven development, gender, environment, trade policy, rural 
and urban poverty, urban poverty, human development, social protection, health, nutrition and 
population, aids, debt relief, education, private sector and infrastructure, energy, transport, water 
and sanitation, information and communication technologies and mining.  To compile the PRSP, the 
World Bank has produced a 467-page PRSP Sourcebook outlining the reforms to be undertaken 
simultaneously.  To complicate matters for the HIPC which is in most cases either recovering from 
or experiencing severe conflict, the reforms are shared out in a number of combinations by multiple 
donors who have conflicting, and at times contradicting priorities. SSR too is undertaken those 





 leading to reform overload or ‘good governance overload’ 
(United Nations, 2009:25), and eventually, ‘reform fatigue’ (Grindle, 2004).   
While Grindle emphasizes the immediate pressures faced by developing 
countries, Chang’s critique focuses not so much on the overwhelming volume of 
reforms that must be implemented concurrently, but rather the appropriateness of 
those reforms in light of the stage of development of the majority of the countries 
that are targeted for them.  He argues that even at the most superficial level there 
is limited evidence to suggest that the policies and institutions that are currently 
being imposed on developing countries are those that were adopted by the 
developing countries when they themselves were developing, or when they were 
still at the same stage of development as the contemporary developing countries.  
The inattention to historical context by international development practitioners that 
Chang analyses has been termed by others as ‘premature load bearing’ (Pritchett, 
Woolcock, and Andrews, 2010:2).   
Chang makes several recommendations that can be summed up in four 
points.  First, there is pressing need for the actual facts of the historical 
experiences of the now developed countries (NDCs) to be made widely known; and 
not just for the sake of it, but to enable the developing countries to make their 
choices in an informed manner.  Second, he suggests a radical rethink of the 
conditionalities that are pegged to bilateral and multilateral loans and grants to 
developing countries with a particular focus on the practice of portraying certain 
policies as ‘best practice’ or norms applicable to all places and for all time.  Third, 
he notes that, as much as improvements in developing country institutions are 
necessary, the process should not be equated with the orthopaedic imposition of 
some fixed set of institutions abstracted from the recent experiences of the now 
developed countries.  Special care has to be taken in order not to demand 
excessively rapid upgrading of institutions by the developing countries, especially 




given that they already have quite developed institutions when compared to 
today’s developed countries when they were at a comparable stage of 
development, and given that establishing and running new institutions is costly.   
Chang’s critique is levelled against an approach to international 
development based on the double standards of an oblique interpretation of 
normativity according to which the powerful players seek to universalise their own 
(current) practices as a canonical standard, not just to be aspired for in the 
medium or long term, but to be adhered to in the immediate term, however 
historically irrelevant they may be.  The methods of work that the current 
generation of the elite of powerful countries find familiar are codified into ‘best 
practice’ and hawked across the globe through a process that Evans has called 
‘institutional monocropping’, or ‘…the imposition of blueprints based on idealized 
versions of Anglo-American institutions, the applicability of which is presumed to 
transcend national circumstances and cultures’ (2004:30).   
The fashioning of blueprints – already hinted at under the discussion on the 
sources of normativity in the third chapter of this study – is important for the 
‘…movement driven by international institutions, governments, consulting firms 
and a veritable industry of entrepreneurial academics and practitioners promoting 
change programs (of varying quality and integrity)’ (Punch, Hoogenboom and 
Williamson, 2005:268); particularly because they provide a replicable reform 
product that is easy to specialise in to cement the movement’s role in the 
institutional reform market (Andrews, 2013:70).  The shortcomings of this 
approach go beyond its noticeable insensitivity to history and prevailing reality and 
point to the basic impracticability of current approaches to reform, a situation that 
has been summed up by Richard Rose in his observation that:  
There are differences in kind in the resources required by best practice 
programmes. A best practice social security system will cost a lot of money; 
a high-quality university system requires able staff as well as money; and a 
programme for minority rights requires the honest and effective 
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administration of laws. An ample supply of laws, money and personnel is 
taken for granted in countries credited with best practices. But this cannot 
be assumed of governments in developing and especially low income 
countries.
240
    
Andrews’ (2013) critique of institutional reform draws on research and ideas about 
institutional logics, isomorphism and decoupling and follows the same lines as 
those discussed above.  He argues that reforms fail because they do not fit many 
developing country contexts, making them appear as inordinately large square 
pegs forced into settings where opportunities for change resemble small round 
holes.  He argues that many cases of reform are introduced as ‘signals’ and 
developing countries use those signals to instrumentally ensure that they attain 
and retain external support and legitimacy.  Such reforms, he argues, are designed 
with limited attention to context and centre on best practice interventions that may 
look impressive but are hard to reproduce, or as Schick has put it, lack portability 
(1998:123).  ‘They may produce new forms (like laws) but these typically have 
limited functionality.  Governments look better after reform but are often not 
better’ (2013:3).   
Mention has to be made also of the terms in which the principles and 
objectives of reform are expressed.  There are terms that Gallie has referred to as 
‘essentially contested concepts, ‘…concepts the proper use of which inevitably 
involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users’ 
(1956:169), similar also to what Shapiro has called ‘gross concepts’.  According to 
Shapiro, the use of gross concepts ‘…reduces what are actually relational claims to 
claims about one or another of the components of the relation’ (1989:51).  Shapiro 
demonstrates that, claims about such notions as accountability, transparency, 
effectiveness and efficiency as commonly referred to in the debates on institutional 
reform are relational.  Claims about them are meaningful only if they clearly 
stipulate their empirical content, namely, agents, actions (and factors that enable 
                                        
240 Cited in Andrews, 2013, p.71. 
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or constrain them), legitimacy and ends.  One can cite the example of efficiency a 
term that ordinarily refers to the extent to which the utilisation of a certain 
resource such as time, effort or treasure yields outcomes that are commensurate 
with the intended result.  One can indeed ask of each of those terms, how efficient 
efficiency can possibly be; or how transparent transparency can be.  The point is, 
without making any reference to the implied quantitative dimensions of ‘efficiency’, 
or transparency, those terms remain empty slogans.  Correspondingly, a practical 
initiative that is couched in those terms can only remain inconsequential. 
7.3 Inescapable Limits to Reformism: Hazy Mission, no Theory  
Stripped to its barest essentials, SSR – and other reformist initiatives of the 
neoliberal agenda – is about the development, the functioning, and adaptive 
change of formal organisations and the institutional framework within which they 
exist.  In the particular case of SSR, its presumed focus is the functioning, 
development and change of an even more highly specialised category of 
organisations and in exceptional circumstances.  In spite of SSR’s prominence as 
an approach to institutional change, there is little to show that in putting it 
together, any effort was ever invested in making it a beneficiary of existing 
knowledge of organisational science, as a result of which it is devoid of a theory or 
model of organisational development or change.  Brogden’s characterisation of 
community policing can be equally applied to SSR: ‘…whether as a philosophy or 
as a programme for implementation features not only an ahistorical rendering but 
also a theoretical nihilism...’ (1999:169).   
That latter point by Brogden brings to mind the leading American sociologist 
Reinhard Bendix’s counsel his readers that, ‘You know, a little theory goes a long 
way.’
241
 Rather than borrow from what is known about organisational 
development both as a science and an art, the promoters of neoliberal institutional 
                                        
241 Quoted in Bruneau, 2011, p.7 
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reforms have opted for what Peake and Scheye have described as ‘theoretical and 
generic constructs’ (2005:302) or, ‘truisms and boilerplate…dogma’ (2010:8).  In a 
statement that echoes Peake and Scheye, Derks has observed that much of the 
literature on SSR and allied approaches ‘…is more based on observations and 
intuitive assumptions than on a thorough understanding of the mechanisms 
underpinning these observations and assumptions’ (2008:24).  Those deficiencies 
notwithstanding, SSR and allied initiatives continue to be looked upon as major 
vehicles for recasting the critical institutions of countries undergoing major change 
and those faced with political upheaval.   
The current framework for dealing with those realities relies solely on a 
collection of evaluative terms and moral place holders whose practical, analytical or 
even semantic significance is at best questionable.  A survey of the policy and 
scholarly literature on SSR shows its principles to be, among others, ‘good 
governance’, ‘transparency, accountability, efficiency and the rule of law.  In line 
with such language, the objectives of SSR according to the OECD (2005, 2007) 
are, among others, establishment of effective governance, oversight and 
accountability in the security system, improved delivery of security and justice 
services, development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process, 
sustainability of justice and security service delivery, terms which only emphasize 
some idealised end state without showing clearly the path that is to be taken to 
reach that end state or the model for the planned change.  There are several 
models of organisational change, each with a distinct set of assumptions about 
why change occurs, how that the process of change unfolds, when such change 
should be initiated, for how long it should be undertaken and its outcomes.  While 
a detailed discussion of those models is beyond the scope of this study,
242
  it is 
                                        
242 Van de Ven & Poole (1995) and Kezar (2001)  list up to six models namely the evolutionary, 
which considers change to be a response to external circumstances, situational variables, and the 
environment faced by each organization; (2) teleological, according to which change must be 
always a planned, rational and linear process seen to be affecting purposeful and adaptive 
organizations; and that change occurs because leaders and change agents feel it is necessary (3) 
301 
 
necessary to point out the potential problems entailed in pursuing an ambitious 
reform initiative without reference to any known principles of change.   
The lack of a theory of organisational development is not helped at all by 
the haziness of the purpose for which SSR is intended, particularly when looked at 
from the perspective of the composition of the so-called security sector.  The very 
definition of the ‘security sector’ according to the leading advocates of SSR, such 
as the OECD and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
(DCAF) only serves to jeopardize the utility of the (SSR) framework and indeed 
raises serious concerns on how much care and thought went into its formulation.  
There is the lingering contradiction between on the one hand, the rhetoric on a 
‘holistic’ approach to security and how it is preferred to the ‘state-centric 
militaristic’ approach; and on the other hand, a definition of the ‘security sector’ 
that amounts to an endorsement of the ‘state-centric’ approach.  While, that 
contradiction can be disregarded, the inclusion among the ‘security sector’ of the 
‘non-statutory security forces’ but more particularly, the composition of that 
category puts to question the wholesomeness of the SSR framework.  The DAC 
guidelines on SSR (OECD, 2005) and the OECD DAC handbook on SSR (OECD, 
2007) list among the non-statutory security forces liberation and guerrilla armies.  
There is a problem with that claim, and this goes beyond the questionable 
                                                                                                                        
life cycle or developmental models share assumptions with evolutionary theories and focus mainly 
on the centrality of human beings in the process of organisational change, extrapolating from the 
changes that occur within the life cycles of people to the organizations they create; (4) the 
dialectical models refers directly to the Hegelian-Marxian interpretation in which organisational 
patterns, values, ideals and norms coexist  with their polar opposite in varying strengths influencing 
each other and through interaction, causing change over the long term; (5) social cognition models 
which assume that leaders shape the change process through framing and interpretation, and how 
individuals within the organization interpret and make sense of change (6) cultural models are a 
blend the social-cognition and dialectical theories and operate on the assumption that change arises 
naturally as the human environment undergoes alteration, emphasizing its non-linear, irrational, 
non-predictable, continuous and dynamic character.  
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taxonomy of armed groups that seems to imply that ‘liberation armies’ and 
‘guerrilla armies’ are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustible categories.243   
The term, ‘Non-statutory’ refers to formulations, processes and structures 
that are neither adopted through the legislative or parliamentary process, nor 
given a blessing by the executive branch basing on parliamentary statutes.  The 
key term here is ‘adoption’ and it directly implies legality.  The fact that a process 
or structure is non-statutory (i.e., not created by statute) does not necessarily 
imply that it is illegal (as guerrillas often are).  One can give the example of 
Common Law which is also called non-statutory law.  A framework that brackets 
together into the ‘security sector’, both the national armed forces and the groups 
that are sworn to subvert authority is a flawed framework that fails to grasp the 
antecedents and dynamics of the insecurity it purports to remedy.  By placing 
national armed forces and groups that are united by the common aim of 
overturning governments at par, the SSR framework explicitly and unambiguously 
sets out to undermine the same constitutionalism that it promises to uphold, if one 
is to go by the rhetoric on the rule of law.  Such a framework can only be suffered 
by governments on which it is imposed because its ‘implementation’ is a 
precondition for accessing badly-needed financial support, and not because of the 
positive change it professes to promote.   
Other issues that arise from the problematic framing of SSR include 
questions to do with what it is that ‘democratic governance’, or ‘civilian oversight’ 
or ‘good governance’ of the security sector can possibly mean when the latter 
includes brigands, social bandits, liberation Armies and other outfits that qualify for 
SSR just because they happen to employ guerrilla methods.  The classification of 
private security companies (PSCs) as non-statutory also overlooks the fact that 
those organisations are governed under specific legal statutes, in most cases the 
                                        
243 While being a liberation army refers to ends, being a guerrilla army relates to ends and 




respective police acts.  Two examples of countries where SSR programmes have 
been implemented will suffice.  In South Africa, PSCs are governed by the Private 
Security Industry Regulation 2001(Act 56 of 2001) while in Uganda they are 
regulated by the Police Act of 1949 and the Control of Private Security 
Organisations Regulation of 1997.   
Lacking a well-worked out theory of organisational development, let alone a 
well-defined mission, SSR activism has instead taken on the optimism of influential 
organisational theorists such as Thompson (1967) who generally assume that 
organizations are relatively malleable and amenable to reform and that they will 
easily adapt to imposed, changed or altogether unfamiliar circumstances.  This 
may be borne out of the supposition by those advocating for reform that the 
merits and potential benefits of their proposals for change are clear for all to see 
and should be obediently embraced.  The source of such a sentiment may simply 
be superciliousness on the part of those advocating for reform or the sanguine 
faith in what Huntington has called the unity of goodness, summed up by the 
sentiment that, ‘...all good things go together and that the achievement of one 
desirable social goal aids in the achievement of others’ (1968:5).   
But more than any other factor, a failure to anticipate objection to reform 
initiatives from actors that are required to implement those changes – who will in 
most cases have not been part of their conception – may go a long way in 
explaining the lack of realism that tends to pervade many externally-influenced 
reforms.  Hannan and Freeman's (1984) structural inertia theory offers a model of 
the process of organizational change that includes both internal and external 
constraints on organizational change.  In anticipating the probability of 
organisational change, Hannan and Freeman have argued that organizations justify 
their existence by their ability to perform and if questioned, to account rationally 
for their actions.  Ability to perform and accountability are high when 
organizational missions are institutionalized and patterns of organizational activity 
are routinized.  Those same attainments that imbue organisations with stability 
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also generate resistance to change and strong pressures against organizational 
reform.  Thus, it should be expected that the very characteristics that furnish 
organizations with stability also generate resistance to change and reduce the 
probability of change (Amburgey et al., 1993:52).   
7.4 Aid Donor Condescension: Hectoring the Turkey to Vote for 
Christmas  
A different but equally important factor relates to the rationale, and one can even 
suggest, the wisdom on the part of external actors in conceiving institutional 
reforms in conflict-impacted countries making the reform of the armed forces an 
entry point.  The armed forces of an acutely praetorian polity – whether in the 
midst of major hostilities or making a transition from major hostilities or merely 
prone to violence – are very central to the calculations of groups contending for 
political power.   Outside actors seeking to reconfigure armed forces in such 
settings can only do so purposefully only if they are fully aware that their 
involvement is fraught with the dangers of jumping into the deepest end of 
violence-prone polities or of polities in which institutionalised political action has 
not yet struck firm roots.  In such contexts, the armed forces are the most 
sensitive and most closely watched player which, in most instances tends to be 
located at the very pinnacle of power.   
Excepting for excessive idealism, one would expect an initiative that lays 
claim to context-sensitivity to have such realities as a foremost consideration.  One 
fact that cannot be disputed is, that the institutional design of the instruments of 
coercion is an exceptionally political process with implications not only for the 
stability of regimes, but in many instances also for the continued survival of 
countries as integrated units, in the short and long-term.  It is highly questionable 
whether external actors whose reform initiatives target that most delicate aspect of 
the politics of other countries are ever mindful of the associated sensitivity.   
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Commenting on the lack of realism of the SSR vision embodies in the United 
Kingdom’s 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR), one scholar has noted that,  
The idealism of the SDR suggests that the goal of SSR has developed in 
advance of sensitivity to the power structures which it must influence. For 
anecdotal evidence suggests that promotion of Western concepts of 
professionalism and accountability is undertaken in a manner that suggests 
it is divorced from the concerns of the …environment in which it is to 
operate (Hills, 2000:52).   
A closer look at the environment in which SSR is pursued and the concerns it is 
designed to address shows that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, countries 
whose armed forces are considered for reform will either be in the midst of an 
armed conflict and civil unrest, or they will have recently come out of a period of 
protracted violence.     The cessation of hostilities in the latter instance may have 
been enabled by the signing of a settlement or even a series of settlements whose 
specific provisions may have been shaped by the manner of termination of 
hostilities.  As often is the cases in Sub-Saharan Africa where sub-state conflicts 
tend to pit communal groups against each other, settlements involve ‘…paying 
particular attention to the ethnic composition of the armed forces, not least 
because the potential for destabilisation is particularly acute when there is an 
ethnic dimension to political tensions among ex-combatants’ (Berdal, 1994:54).  
Military forces of individual warring and former warring parties not only provide 
physical security for the group but are also ‘…the most obvious source of leverage 
vis-à-vis adversaries’ (Knight, 2009:13).  Any intervention that will threaten to 
upset the equilibria that derive from such bargains will either be viewed as unduly 
presumptuous or will be embraced very reluctantly.  As Fukuyama has pointed out,   
Holding on to a certain structure of political power is often a life-and-death 
issue for leaders of poor countries, and no degree of external public-goods 
financing from the donor community will be sufficient to offset losses of 




There are several examples where the timing of reforms or even the choice of the 
target country can be questioned.  In Uganda, defence-related reforms were 
mooted by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development and 
the British Development Division in East Africa (BDDEA) in November 1997 with 
the aim of ‘…identifying efficiency savings for redeployment to non-defence 
needs’’
244
 at a time when the country faced serious external threats and internal 
subversion, at the height of the counter-insurgency operations in the northern, 
north-western, western; and parts of central region.  The Uganda military, the 
UPDF was involved in operations in neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo 
and limited operations in Southern Sudan, and moreover, the operations against 
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the North of the country were a de facto 
interstate war, given that from as early as 1993, the LRA was being bankrolled by 
Khartoum.  Throughout that period like at other times since the ascendance of the 
NRM to power, the Ugandan authorities were pursuing a double-pronged strategy 
of peace talks with insurgent groups or factions thereof that were ready to 
negotiate their surrender, and military operations against those that were not yet 
ready to give up fighting.  Arguably, this may not have been the most prudent 
time for donors to press for institutional reform, at least from the point of view of 
the recipient government, particularly so while advancing reform as a precondition 
for the disbursement of badly-needed financial support.   
Similarly in the case of Southern Sudan, following the January 2005 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan (GoS) 
and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), United Nations Mission in Sudan 
(UNMIS) was set up to, among other things, serve the role of guiding and 
                                        
244 Uganda Defence Efficiency Study (UDES)—Main Study, July 1998, Annex A, Terms of 
Reference.  Although the TORs of the exercise called it the ‘Uganda Defence Expenditure Efficiency 
Savings Study’ (UDEESS) demonstrating the purely pecuniary and non-holistic focus and motivation 
of ‘security’ reforms, it was later renamed as the title of the report shows as the Defence Efficiency 
Study.   
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supporting SSR, in addition to police training and DDR.
245
  What is notable about 
Southern Sudan is that, at a time when it required all support that could be 
provided to build basic state institutions from scratch, including converting the 
SPLM’s armed wing, the SPLA into a regular military force, it was instead being 
turned into a busy destination for the promoters of SSR.  By June 2009, one month 
before declaration of Southern Sudanese independence and formal establishment 
of country’s armed forces, the Canadian North-South Institute in conjunction with 
the Centre for Peace and Development Studies (CPDS) at the University of Juba 
and with funding from Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and international 
Trade (DFAiT) was already carrying out preliminary studies on the reform of what 
was to be named the Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS) even before it came 
into formal existence (Lokuji et al., 2009).   The SSPS was being targeted for 
reform even before it was formed.  The DFID, operating within the framework of 
Joint Donor Team established the Peacebuilding Program for South Sudan in 2009 
with budget of £5.1 million for, among other activities, SSR.
246
   That same 
pattern of reforming structures that have hardly come into existence has been 
replicated in most other conflict-afflicted aid-dependent countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, casting doubts on whether the promoters of reform initiatives have any 
sense of conviction about their putative quest, or whether even they understand 
the import of their undertakings.   
Even where those structures are in existence, key politico-military players 
are always weary of attempts especially by outsiders to tinker with the delicate 
balance that attends to the process constituting of those structures.  The delicate 
balancing is always part of the process of forestalling the likelihood of security 
dilemmas and a likely resumption of hostilities (Salomons, 2005; Williams, 2005; 
                                        
245 Following the declaration of independence for Southern Sudan in July 2011, UNMIS became 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).   




Chuter, 2006; Spear, 2006).  The common approach to achieving this is by 
reassuring former fighting groups about the future utilization and configuration of 
the joint military forces with provisions for appointments to key staff and command 
positions and to ensure that peace settlements reflect those provisions.  This may 
also be the case for the apportionment of offices in government departments that 
are allied to security, including the ministries of the interior, defence and security.  
What is important to observe is that those arrangements are central to overall 
peace and security, given that they are formulated as a means of terminating or 
de-escalating hostilities.  As Hoddie and Hartzell have pointed out, for the all key 
parties to peace settlements, inclusion in strategic government positions, 
‘…ensures they are in a position to monitor the movement of troops and warn of 
policy decisions that might alter the future composition or use of a state’s forces to 
their detriment’ (2005:89), an observation that re-echoes Walter Barbara view 
that, ‘…combatants in civil wars will sign and implement a peace settlement only if 
they are confident that their military forces will be safely consolidated and that 
power will be shared once they relinquish their own political and military assets’ 
(2000:26).   
The preceding views emphasize one point: In general terms, the coercive 
arm of the praetorian polity (particularly one that is experiencing civil strife, or one 
that has just emerged from a period of protracted conflict) is the razor’s edge on 
which future peace stability balances precariously.  The composition of post-
conflict armed forces and the extent to which it caters for the interests of warring 
factions is a critical aspect of any post-conflict dispensation especially in societies 
that are deeply divided.  It lies at the heart of the protracted and contentious 
horse trading which precedes the signing of peace deals and is always a crucial 
concern to forestall the emergence of security dilemmas, ‘…the single most 
powerful explanation for the success or failure of negotiated peace settlements’ 
(King, 1977:73).  Although that fact is generally acknowledged, it is doubtful 
whether it ever receives consideration in the planning of externally-inspired 
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downsizing and radical reconfiguration of the armed forces, reducing all reference 
to context-sensitivity as a principle of SSR into mere lip service.   
Considering SSR’s potential for unhinging delicate settlements at the centre 
of the reconstitution of the ‘security sector’, it ought not to be surprising at all that 
local actors should have neither political will nor inclination to own externally-
conceived programmes that work against their own basic interests in upholding 
peace.  The triteness of the charge of ‘lack of political will’ against aid-dependent 
countries that for all sorts of reasons fail to take on board donor policy proposals 
has been neatly summed up by Grindle and Thomas in their observation that, 
political will is: 
[A]n explanation usually expounded by external analysts and donors who 
see countries not carrying out reforms they consider desirable.  In the 
absence of detailed knowledge about what goes on within another 
government and a capacity to analyse the decision process, lack of political 
will becomes a catch-all culprit, even though the term has little analytic 
content and its very vagueness expresses the lack of knowledge of specific 
detail (1991:124). 
Within the ‘post conflict’ context, what remains intriguing and probably worth 
investigating is what it is in the psyche of outside actors that makes them ever 
wonder that local actors should lack ‘ownership’, or that local actors should be 
devoid of the ‘political will’ to implement programmes that will, if successfully 
executed, precipitate a reversion to hostilities, or a relapse to the uncertainties of 
the period preceding the agreement or agreements for cessation of hostilities.   
Public Finance Management (PFM) is often cited as a key justification for 
reforming security institutions (Ball and Holmes, 2003: iv; IMF, 2007).  The IMF 
and the World Bank are insistent on fiscal data transparency requiring that military 
expenditure be included under the PEM framework. The IMF for instance adopted 
a ‘Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency’ to cover all sectors of 
government (IMF, 2007) requiring that governments publish a broad range of 
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fiscal data on their spending.  As such, what PFM achieves is indicative of the 
success or failure SSR in terms of general compliance to ‘existing good 
international practices’ (PEFA, 2006:5).  What continues to intrigue observers is 
the persistent gap between laws, regulations and other outputs of reform 
initiatives and practice.  Uganda is credited with the best anticorruption laws in the 
world, in recognition of which the think tank, Global Integrity rates the laws at 99 
out of a possible 100 points, while the Transparency International (TI) Corruption 
perception Index places Uganda at 130th out of 174 countries (Berlin: 
Transparency International).  ‘What you see from reforms, in the form of new laws 
and agencies’ writes Andrews, ‘is not what you get in practice’ (2013: 110).  
7.5 The Amnesia of Conservative Reformism: Institutions and 
Habits as Living Histories 
A reflection on the many factors that weigh heavily against the uptake and 
successful implementation of donor-driven public policy reforms remains 
incomplete if , like SSR has done, it overlooks the question of the credibility and 
moral mandate of some of the Western countries that are key promoters of those 
reforms, particularly in light of the historical role of some of those countries in 
systematically entrenching practices that are closely associated with the 
dysfunction that the reforms are intended to remedy.  Nowhere else in the public 
sphere of post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa have the legacies of pre-independence 
practices tended to be as visible as they have been in the ‘security sector’.   
Noticeably, the academic and policy discourse on reform of the ‘security 
sector’ has remained silent on the historical roots of its contemporary practices and 
traditions.  Equally noticeable is the manner in which the framing of initiatives for 
reforming the ‘security sector’ has characteristically tended to disregard or even 
discount those historical factors, thereby failing to acknowledge the true extent of 
the crisis that the reforms are intended to address.  The picture that emerges is 
that of a major ‘credibility gap’ at the heart of the reform initiatives, affecting the 
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standing of key donor countries that present themselves as the embodiment of 
morally framed reform drive, yet, seemingly disowning their historical role in 
consciously entrenching doctrines and institutional arrangements that have 
spawned the dysfunction that abounds in many post-colonial polities.   
We argue above that as much as there may be some merit in making 
general reference to such terms as transparency, accountability and efficiency, not 
much sense can be made of them without grasping their purely relational nature, 
therefore requiring that they be situated within the specific milieus of the countries 
to which they are being applied.  But, demanding of a prescriptive initiative to base 
its insights on context, whether contemporary or historical, may be asking for too 
much: The disregard for context in preference for familiar ideals is the defining 
trait of normative approaches.  When SSR policy practitioners finally elect to 
disabuse themselves of the proclivity to merely prescribe, they will learn that it is 
not be feasible to gain understanding on the characteristics of the armed forces of 
many former colonies without acknowledging at the outset their origins as 
instruments of occupation whose primary task was internal security and 
pacification; and not the protection of borders or citizens or acquisition of territory.  
The founding operational concept of the colonial military forces was structured 
around the ‘punitive expedition’ and this has tended to remain dominant feature of 
the operational methods of post-colonial military forces, a fact that Gutteridge 
captures well in his assessment of the ‘…unpredictable ways in which decisions 
taken to suit imperial purposes have contributed to the post-independence 
situation’ (1969:3).   
In recognition of the significance of historical factors, World Bank guidelines 
on pre-reform evaluations rightly stress that,  
Country context analysis is important because policy reform does not take 
place in an historical vacuum but takes place in a particular context.   
Understanding country context better means investigating the inherited and 
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evolving mix of….variables that influence policy agendas and change 
(2007:33). 
Regarding the reforms that target certain key sectors, the guidelines further 
suggest that, ‘[t]hose carrying out the analysis must also thoroughly understand 
the reform and the recent history in the sector.’
247
  Contrary to the approach that 
those observations would seem suggest, one instead notices a general preference 
for preconceived prescriptions that are in most cases not premised on an empirical 
assessment which if carried out, would necessarily account for the path taken by 
countries, regions or even institutions to get to a state that calls for reform, if 
indeed such reform is called for at all; or if a more radical intervention than mere 
reform is what may be required.  In spite of Kofi Annan’s exhortations to Sub-
Saharan political elites not to blame colonialism,
248
 the fact remains that ‘…pre-
independence policies and patterns set the framework for developments well into 
the period of independence’ (Horowitz, 1985:445).   
Colonial policies of interest would specifically have to include differential 
ethnic recruitment that either privileged the so-called ‘martial tribes’ or ‘martial 
races’, the recruitment of groups that were either deemed to be backward or 
geographically remote from the political or economic heartland of respective 
colonies; related to which was the enlistment of aliens that had no sentimental 
connection to the colony where they were assigned and the deliberate setting 
apart of armed forces apart from the general populace.  A detailed treatment of 
these phenomena is beyond the scope of this study but acknowledgement can still 
be made of the insights of among others, Driel-Murray (2003); Gutteridge (1969); 
Hansen (1977); Horowitz (1985); Killingray & Plaut (2010); Lewis (1969); Luckham 
(1974), Lwanga-Lunyiigo (1988) Parsons (1999) and Welch (1967, 1970).  The 
lesson that one derives from those writers is that of the significance of historical 
                                        
247 Ibid, p.165.  




precedents on contemporary practices.  The foremost consideration in crafting 
credible initiatives for the recasting of the ‘security sector’ in much of Sub-Saharan 
Africa is a point that has been aptly expressed by Horowitz in his observation that, 
‘…because individual careers may span twenty or thirty years, the composition of a 
government body is difficult to change without taking drastic, irregular, and 
sometimes provocative steps’ (1985:445).  What one has to question is whether in 
respect of the armed forces, neoliberal reformism as epitomised by SSR measures 
up to the steps alluded to by Horowitz. 
7.6 Isomorphism vs. Enhanced Functionality  
Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge (2007) have identified two opposing sets of factors 
that motivate organisational and institutional reform.  The first consists of ‘rational’ 
or ‘technical’ motivations according to which reform is undertaken in order to 
enhance efficiency and effectiveness, however defined.  Change may be 
necessitated by the need to respond to crisis, to plug performance gaps arising 
from shortfalls in the organisation’s ability to meet its objectives, to match 
objectives and practices to new or emerging technologies, to exploit other new 
opportunities or to respond to new threats.
249
   
It is such justifications for change that one commonly encounters in the 
literature on public management and organizational development.  According to 
that view, new rules are needed to ensure continued or improved functionality 
(Andrews, 2013:69).  Multilateral and bilateral development agencies including the 
World Bank, the European Union and the OECD tend to emphasise the technical 
view in noting that public sector reforms should focus on ‘…introducing merit-
based civil service and performance-oriented public management, agency by 
agency…’, this being the objective of so-called second-generation reforms that 
emphasize ‘…institutional development to promote better service delivery, policy 
                                        
249 Change may also be pursued just for the sake of change, particularly when there are major 
changes in the national political leadership, or it may be pursued simply because it sounds good.   
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quality and responsiveness, and accountability’ (World Bank, 2000: 41).  The 
technical approach assumes that ‘…innovations are prompted by disparities 
between existing conditions and preferred states’ (Dull, 2006:190).   
The second set of motivations for organisational change is summed up by 
the alternative explanation mainly associated with the institutional theorists.  
Unlike theories that seek to explain social processes basing on normative and 
rational actor models, institutional theory takes a supra-individual focus and 
attempts to shed light on the process and mechanisms by which structures, 
schemas, rules, and routines become established as authoritative guidelines for 
social behaviour.  It seeks further to develop understanding on how those 
elements emerge, how they become widespread, and the role they play in 
supplying stability and meaning to social behaviour; and how such arrangements 
go into decline and pass out of existence; and how their negators and remnants 
shape successor structures (Scott, 2004).   
Institutional theory suggests that, the primary objective of organizational 
change is not always the need to better substantive performance, but to seek 
greater legitimacy.  Using the example of adaptation and change in the security 
arena, the institutional theorists would go beyond the explanations such as those 
offered by Waltz (1979) or Taliaferro, (2006) or Horowitz (2006) that attribute the 
diffusion of a particular military model to the existence of a universal security 
imperative that may be common to the emulating country and the archetype; or a 
power contest in an anarchical international system.  The institutional theorists 
specifically contend that the original impetus by organisations to develop along the 
pattern of Weberian bureaucratisation premised on ‘…[p]recision, speed, 
unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict 
subordination, reduction of friction and material and personal costs…’ (1978:973) 
has long fizzled out.  In modern times, so they claim, public and private sector 
organisations do not become more rational and bureaucratic because of 
competition or functional need but rather, they are driven by mimicry.  By doing 
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so, ‘…organizations adapt their internal characteristics in order to conform to the 
expectations of the key stakeholders in their environment’ (Ashworth et al., 
2007:167).  This, we contend, is the predominant pattern of externally-inspired 
institutional change that continues to inform neoliberal reform initiatives in 
developing and transitional countries.   
Borrowing from the biophysical world, Hannan and Freeman (1977), Aldrich 
(1979) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983), have called this phenomenon 
‘isomorphism’, describing it as a process of conformity in which organizational 
change is sought not to better substantive performance, but for the purpose  of 
attaining greater legitimacy and acceptability.  The conforming agent is partially or 
wholly dependent on the external environment for political support and resources 
and is uncertain about internal means and ends.  It is under such circumstances 
that professional or quasi-professional groups anointed or appointed by 
benefactors and patrons of the entity targeted for reform will propose certain 
processes, practices and norms as best practice to be complied with mainly as a 
precondition  for receiving financial support from bilateral and multilateral donors 
and lenders (Andrews: 2013:70).  As Frumkin and Galaskiewicz have put the point, 
[o]rganizations do not always embrace strategies, structures, and processes that 
enhance their performance but, instead, react to and seek ways to accommodate 
pressures following external scrutiny and regulation’ (2004:285).   
Isomorphism centres around the influence of ‘best practices’ on the choices 
of dependent organizations in addition to the urge by such organizations to 
emulate forms and practices that appear desirable or accepted, though without 
necessarily developing the corresponding functionality; and in some instances 
there may never be the likelihood of developing such functionality.  Andrews’ 
rough sketch of the immediate factors that necessitate conformity mirrors the 
three forms of isomorphism identified by DiMaggio and Powell (1983:150), namely: 
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 coercive isomorphism, originating from the problem of political influence 
and the problem of legitimacy;  
 mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty;  
 normative isomorphism, associated with professionalization  
Coercive isomorphism involves the use by one organisation of legal and political 
means or control of access to resources to exert influence over another and to 
pressure it to adopt preferred practices, structures or institutions.   
 
Mimetic forces are pressures to copy or emulate other organizations’ activities, 
systems, or structures. Innovations that are deemed to enhance legitimacy are 
seen as desirable, especially under conditions of uncertainty where actors cannot 
be sure of the relationship between organizational means and ends. Ashworth et 
al. define mimetic pressures toward isomorphism as ‘…pressures to copy or 
emulate other organizations’ activities, systems, or structures’ (2007:167).  Such 
copying may be undertaken without any clear evidence of performance 
improvements. Mimetic forces explain the widespread adoption of management 
practices for which there is little empirical evidence of performance benefits or fit, 
but just an act of following of fads and fashions (Abrahamson 1996).  An example 
of this is the common practice of donor-supervised restructuring of military forces 
for land-locked countries that produces new orders of battle that include a naval 
infantry or marine force.  A case in point is the United Kingdom government driven 
defence review in Uganda in the early 2000’s.  Mimicry in the Uganda Defence 
Review went beyond the adoption of an inappropriate organisational structure, to 
production of Defence Policy by cut-and-paste from sections of the New Zealand 
Government Defence Policy Framework.   
Normative isomorphism relates to the pressure exerted by communities of 
professionals or other externally legitimated groups on thinking about what 
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structures or practices are better than others (Andrews, 2013:69).  It related to 
the ways in which organizations are expected to conform to standards of 
professionalism and to adopt systems, structures and techniques considered to be 
legitimate by relevant professional groupings, even when the drivers of the 
dysfunction that institutional reform is supposed to remedy may have little to do 
with whether or not the new standards are followed.    
7.7 Decoupling: Reform-Busting and Neutralization of Isomorphic 
Pressure  
To counteract what they consider to be intrusive outside influences, organizations 
and governments that depend on external resources and legitimacy adopt a range 
of strategies to uphold their autonomy.  Even when attempts are made to 
anticipate these strategies, the linear model of implementation that permeates 
most externally-inspired reforms in post-conflict countries shuts out the likelihood 
of advance countermeasures.  The linear model assumes that once a proposal for 
reform is put to a resource-dependent government, its adoption and 
implementation is automatic, the thin veil of the rhetoric on participatory 
approaches, local buy-in and ownership notwithstanding.   
‘All too often’ Grindle and Thomas have observed, ‘implementation is 
thought to be a matter of carrying out that which has been decided upon, and 
successful implementation is viewed as a question of whether or not the 
implementing institution is strong enough for the task’ (1991:122).  Unsuccessful 
implementation of institutional reform is explained away tautologically in terms of 
the need to strengthen institutional capacity as a prerequisite for effective 
institutional reform; or it is attributed to lack of political will.  There appears never 
to be any need to anticipate possible rejection of, or methodical resistance to 
reform proposals over the long term.  An analysis of the obstacles and limitations 
of reform has therefore to explore the responses of governments and 
organisations to pressures for reform and for conformity.   
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Organisations and governments in the developing world will most times 
enthusiastically accede to reform proposals and this is just as well given that it is 
always what is required of them by the actors promoting such reforms.   Matt 
Andrews uses the term ‘reform as signals’ to sum up the manner in which reform 
proposals are dispensed by external actors and embraced by countries that rely on 
outside support.  He observes that externally influenced institutional reforms are 
often adopted as hurried signals to assuage external demands with the aim of 
gaining short-term support, and not as long-term solutions to real problems 
(2013).  The behaviour of resource dependent countries in face of those pressures 
remains understudied.  Available insights into organisational conformity to external 
pressure have only come from theory and research on institutionalisation, more 
particularly from institutional theory.   
To sideline the proposals for reform from outsiders, dependent governments 
may delink the symbolically adopted policies and structures from internal operating 
processes and actual organisational practices through a process that institutional 
theorists have called ‘decoupling’ (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  In the face of pressures 
to adopt particular polices or procedures, decoupling allows aid dependent 
organizations and governments ‘…to signal compliance symbolically without 
changing their practices substantively (Scott, 2008: 171).  By means of decoupling 
the formal from the actual, actors maintain their latitude by warding off the 
intrusions of outsiders with whom they find themselves compelled to interact, 
while at the same time being able to access the tangible and intangible resources 
they need from those outsiders.  Decoupling is a strategy of choice particularly 
because of the potential normlessness and institutional disorientation that is bound 
to be a corollary of isomorphic compliance to the demands of multiple donors.  
Because they end up being targets of reform initiatives by a multiplicity of donors, 
‘…organizations in search of external support and stability incorporate all sorts of 
incompatible structural elements’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977:356).  Incompatibility 
may go beyond structures as Meyer and Rowan point out, to encompass other 
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aspects organisational doctrine and even ideological orientation.  Conflict-prone 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that are targeted for reform often host multiple 
delegations of training teams and evaluators from the foreign governments and 
international organisations involved in reconstruction; and often, as Melmot has 
remarked, ‘…engaged in sterile competition’ (2009:25).   
In the case of the military and police, trainers from different donor countries 
provide equipment and deliver instruction according to their own native doctrines 
independent of their peers.  Just as an example, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) is host to at least a dozen training arrangements for the same military and 
police force (Melmot, 2009:17).  The trainers’ concepts and equipment may be 
incompatible and doctrines may conflict or even be irrelevant to the needs of the 
host country.  The resulting work processes may not reflect formal structure or the 
institutional environment and there may even be evidence of unresponsiveness.  
The extreme form of delinking of structures is partly manifested by the kind of 
incoherence which among others, Melmot has taken note of in DRC by observing 
that,  
This lack of coherence stems partly from the security structures which do 
not make up a system, in the DRC or elsewhere. These structures are 
hardly linked, and are hostile to any attempts at coordination. They are 
marked by loyalties and animosities which are multiple and complex.
250
   
In part, that problem stems from what Melmot further identifies as incoherence 
among the reformers and a self-sustained confusion in which ‘…bilateral initiatives 
run alongside trilateral initiatives, within multilateral initiatives, none of which are 
exclusive.’
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The organisations and governments that are targeted by a deluge of 
initiatives as those that one witnesses in the DRC circumvent the resulting 
                                        




dysfunction by letting the external reformers carry on with their pet projects, 
allowing them photo opportunities as they inaugurate the disparate and hard-to-
amalgamate units that they have trained.  In the meantime, the military and 
political authorities of the host country proceed to constitute parallel units, such as 
party militias, presidential guards ‘…and other praetorian services’ (Bagayoko, 
2010:26) which are eventually trusted to do the actual work.  Since, as pointed out 
earlier, a typical ‘post-conflict’ country that is implementing SSR will also be 
implementing a multiplicity of other concurrent reforms, decoupling will turn out to 
be a government-wide phenomenon characterising a public sector wherein:  
Parliaments, parties, a military apparatus and other national institutions may 
well exist, but they cannot get their decisions implemented or are simply 
ignored.  They only have to do with part of the total function, the remainder 
being handled via other structures (Hansen, 1977:14).   
Research on organisational change shows that within the functional matrix of 
organisations, routine operating processes and structures as opposed to culture 
and strategy and deeper values will tend to be susceptible to change.  Other 
analysts within the institutional theory tradition have named the two aspects 
differently.  Pinnington and Morris have called culture and strategy the underlying 
‘interpretive scheme’ (2003), while Hannan and Freeman (1984) have used the 
terms ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ to refer to the routine processes and the interpretive 
scheme respectively.  Nevertheless, they all in agreement that while the periphery 





 Towards an Alternative View of the Security-
Development Nexus 
The diverse conceptions of security that underpin the SSR framework outlined in 
Chapter Three already point us in the direction of what we intend to focus on in 
this part of the study.  It is suggested here that, the general thinking behind much 
of the scholarly and policy commentary on the security and development 
challenges of those countries that emerged on the international scene after World 
War II – many of which are in the Third World – is based on the problematic 
assumption that the process that gave rise to those countries enshrined them with 
the attributes of what we are accustomed to calling nations, states or national 
states.  We argue that the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa are devoid of those 
attributes; and not because they are not trying, but mainly because the extremely 
brief tenure of their existence rules out even the remotest possibility that they 
could be in possession of those attributes.  False ascription of those attributes 
obscures the critical deficiencies in the capabilities of those countries and their 
structures; as well as denying them the opportunity of being evaluated objectively 
on their own terms and on the basis of their actual development needs.  It is 
suggested that the fundamental source of insecurity that those countries continue 
to experience lies with the inappropriate criteria that are used to evaluate their 
capabilities.   
In this final section of the study we propose an alternative conceptualisation of 
that insecurity as a way of accounting for the reality of those countries that 
typically presents with the challenges whose remedy is deemed to lie with 
interventions such as SSR.  We advance three principal claims to frame our general 
argument:   
 The insecurity that continues to plague Sub-Saharan Africa is largely related 
to the on-going processes of national differentiation and consolidation and 
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state making in the sub region’s countries, many of them hardly two 
generations old.   
 The history of other regions of the world demonstrates and as the recent 
history of Sub-Saharan Africa already has so far shown, the processes of 
nation building and state making are not only long-drawn out, but are by 
their very nature also fraught with instability and conflict, a fact that the 
pacifism and pseudo-liberalism of mainstream development thinking seems 
not be well disposed to acknowledge.   
 The general thinking of a significant proportion of academics, commentators 
and practitioners in the field of international development continues to take 
the statehood and nationhood of Sub-Saharan African countries as a given.  
That erroneous thinking not only goes against the grain of the need to focus 
on nurturing and supporting the mentioned critical processes underway in 
the countries in question; but worse still, it diverts all analytical and policy 
energy into the razzle-dazzle of passing self-righteous value judgments by 
way of demonstrably inappropriate yardsticks.   
8.1 Introduction: The Overlooked Political Content of the Security 
Predicament 
In our search for an alternative concept of Third World security, an attempt is 
made to revisit the earlier debates in comparative politics and on the political 
economy of development that focussed on the socio-historical processes that 
underpin the emergence of nations and states, for, as Ayoob (1984, 1991, 1992, 
1994) and Azar and Moon (1988) among other writers have argued, the Third 
World security predicament is neither primarily of a military nature nor does it 
necessarily derive from threats from outside the borders of affected polities.  A 
security concept that focuses exclusively on military capabilities and external 
threats is right at the outset beside the point in countries ‘…where the legitimacy 
of states and regimes is constantly challenged, and where demands for economic 
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redistribution and political participation perennially outrun state capacities and 
create major overloads on political systems’ (Ayoob, 1994:16).  The focus, 
therefore, has to be on the variables that lie at the heart of the ‘overloads on the 
political systems’, which the prevailing frameworks of security studies have tended 
to neglect.  The disregard for political variables has impoverished the approach to 
security studies being questioned by this study.   
By not giving due consideration to the deeper processes and phenomena 
that constitute the content of development, the conception of security under 
scrutiny becomes deficient on the grounds of narrowing the focus of development 
mainly on concerns of increased economic output; conceptualising the state in a 
manner that not only reduces it to some of its components; and taking for granted 
the existence of states with political communities sharing a common solidarity.   
The first deficiency, namely the conflation of development with the 
increased economic output comes in many guises but the questions that Seers sets 
out in his often-cited essay on the meaning of development and what ought to be 
considered as critical criteria for the assessment of a country’s development help 
to shed light on the problem.  In spite of the caution in his opening remarks 
against what he calls the slipshod tendency to confuse development with economic 
development and the latter with economic growth, he nevertheless goes on to set 
the parameters for development in terms that contradict his counsel by noting 
that,  
The questions to ask about a country’s development are therefore: What 
has been happening to poverty?  What has been happening to 
unemployment? What has been happening to inequality?  If all three of 
these have declined from high to low levels, then beyond doubt this has 
been a period of development for the country concerned (1972:124). 
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In pursuit of that notion of development, the United Nations, by a resolution, 
dubbed the 1960s and 1970s the ‘Development Decades’.252  Development was 
conceived in terms of attainment of 5 percent annual growth rate of gross national 
product (GNP) in the underdeveloped countries.  It would seem that at some stage 
in the intellectual evolution of the field of development studies, ‘...particular trends 
in the social sciences inhibited explicit concern about political, as distinct from 
economic, development’ (Pye, 1965:1).  However, the boosting of economic output 
is just one of several key questions to be addressed in thinking about 
development.  Indeed, it is not even the primary one.  As Organski has observed,  
[W]ithout stability of rule, effectiveness of government, and unity of 
purpose developed nations take for granted, economic advance is sure to be 
a halting matter, especially in an age when government does so much to 
push and guide the course of economic change (1965:20).   
Yet, even if economic development had been receiving its full share of attention, it 
would only be a necessary and not a sufficient condition for overall development.  
When all development is subsumed under the rubric of economic growth and 
when, worse still, economic growth is conflated with economic development then 
our understanding of security both as a practical goal and as an area of intellectual 
endeavour is bound to remain questionable.   
The foregoing observation has to be emphasized given that SSR has 
remained subordinated to the need ‘...to create the necessary stability and 
governance conditions required for sustainable growth and development’ 
(OECD/DAC, 2005:47).  Looked at from the perspective of International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) which maintain a leading role in institutional reform in the less 
                                        
252United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1710 of 19th December 1961 designated the 
1960s as a ‘Development Decade’ in which member states were called upon ‘...to sustain support 
for their efforts to mobilise and to sustain support and measures required on the part of the 
developed and developing countries to accelerate progress towards self-sustaining growth of the 
economy of the individual nations and their social advancement so as to attain in each 
underdeveloped country a substantial increase in the rate of growth, with each country setting its 
own target, taking as the objective a minimum rate of growth of aggregate national income of 5 
per cent at the end of the Decade...’ A similar development philosophy was to be pursued through 
the 1970s and the 1980s.  
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developed countries, SSR is ‘...less a consequence of their direct involvement in 
security sector reform than of their support for macroeconomic stabilisation 
measures’ (Hendrickson, 1999:37).  Arguably, the tendency of liberal political 
economy to conflate the development of Third World countries with increased 
economic output and the restricted focus on industrialisation, urbanisation and 
increased levels of consumption misses the point of what development is all about.  
Regarding those countries, Huntington has observed that,  
They suffer real shortages of food, literacy, education, wealth, income, 
health, and productivity…. Beyond and behind these shortages, there is a 
greater shortage: a shortage of political community and of effective, 
authoritative, legitimate government’ (Huntington, 1968:2).   
Economic growth – or even economic development – may redress the former 
shortages; however, the latter more fundamental ones are addressed by political 
development, ‘...the historical process by which nation-states ...have developed 
over time’ (Verba, 1971:283).  Important as it is as a key aspect of social 
transformation, it remains overshadowed by concerns of economic growth that 
partly informs SSR and allied reforms.   
It is also noticeable from the prevailing framework of security studies that 
there are strenuous attempts by some analysts to create a distinction between av 
notion of security that is ‘…militaristic, state centric and gendered…’ as Kayode and 
Musah have characterised the approaches of the Cold War era; and the one that  
‘…sees the human person, rather than the state, as the beneficiary of security.’ 
(1999:227).  As already pointed out, this particular view of security which seeks to 
deemphasize the state and to place the ‘human person’ on the pedestal is 
conceptually flawed, a typical case of what Gilbert Ryle (1990) has called a 
‘category mistake’.   States per se do not stand for anything if there are no people.  
The state is a historically specific form of social organisation in which a population 
occupying a certain territory is presided over by a political authority that claims 
sovereignty.  By definition, the population is a subset of the state.  The desire to 
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propagate a dogmatic form of individualism tends to disregard that fact as 
evidenced by the common references to ‘state-centric’ as opposed ‘human-centric’ 
security.  That quasi-liberal notion of the state informs the prevailing discourse on 
peace, security, conflict and development as commonly articulated by elements of 
the international development establishment, such as in the World Bank and the 
United Nations.   
The thinking behind rolling back the state, as embodied in debates about 
‘state-centric’ security is grievously at odds with what stands out as the pressing 
need of many conflicted-afflicted countries: state making.  The view of the 
overblown state derives from the historical experience of the developed countries 
where indeed the state is a fully developed institutional arrangement with the 
capacity to penetrate all aspects of the life of its citizens.  This is the idea of the 
state that colours the general perspective on the state the world over, even when 
there is a simultaneous discourse on ‘collapsing states’, ‘ungoverned spaces’, ‘weak 
states’, ‘fragile states’ and other references that if anything, only call for 
strengthening, or to borrow from Evans et al. (1985), ‘bringing the state back in’, 
and not rolling it back.   
The characteristically fleeting attention paid to such issues – of which the 
foregoing observations can only be a modest sample – may account for the 
endless terminological and conceptual flux in the discourse on development, to 
cope with both to emerging concerns and to new perspectives on recurrent 
concerns.  Pye has summed up the problem aptly and one can only do justice to 
his insight by quoting him lengthily.  He has prefaced one of his many exposes on 
political development by observing that,     
The language of public policy is always in flux, for new concerns produce 
new terminologies. Yet in the language of politics, in which sloganeering is 
the common currency of presumed dialogues, fluency in innovation rarely 
signals advancement in thought. At times fresh terms herald the awareness 
of novel problems, but more often they indicate merely frustration with 
intractable circumstance. When the language of politics seeks to define in 
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broadest terms the contemporary human condition, it tends to be sensitive 
mainly to the emotions of hope, anxiety, or frustration which are inherent in 
the mind’s erratic ability to either race ahead or fall far behind the tempo of 
substantive change. The political analyst in seeking the neutral ground of 
the observer inevitably faces the dilemma of being able neither to ignore 
popular terminology nor to use it as the hard currency of disciplined 
intellectual exchange (1965:2). 
Pye’s principal concern here is the semantic incoherence that characterises the 
discourse on the plight of the countries that are afflicted by intractable conflict and 
stagnation.  He correctly identifies that incoherence as a deluge of terms some of 
which are ‘…the pompous pretensions of calculating politicians…others are merely 
the euphemisms of people who think that they may be talking about delicate 
matters.’253   
It is not hard to notice that for much of the last four decades, most of the 
terminology and arguments that have gained currency in on-going debates on 
security and development are mainly gleaned from the bureaucrats of the United 
Nations bodies, Bretton Woods’ institutions and politicians.  It remains a fact that 
ever since the advent of so-called structural adjustment programming in the 
1980s, scholars specialising in development lost the initiative in concept formation.  
By not readying themselves for the demands of the drastic changes on the 
international scene over the five decades that followed the end of World War II, 
scholars – the natural custodians of orderly thought and communication – turned 
themselves into bouncing boards of the clichés of politicians and bureaucrats.  As 
already noted, when the scholarly community gets sucked into such a crucial 
debate as the one on development in the new states of the Third World, but with 
exclusive focus on economic growth, they are making nothing but a false start.  It 
was never going to be conceivable to successfully establish functional national 
economies, or where they already existed, to imbue them with dynamism and self-
sustenance without paying close attention to the role that broader political and 
social conditions were bound to play in impeding or facilitating economic 
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transformation.   By being subordinated to the purposes of narrow economic 
calculations, the discourse on SSR is rendered incapable of generating insights that 
can shape the broader debate on security and development.  
8.2 Thinking security ‘outside the box’: state of the debate    
It is not being claimed here that the criteria set out in the framework being 
proposed are in any way new or even exhaustive.  Several analysts have already 
commented extensively on the extent to which the level of socio-political 
development of the countries of the Third World and the expectations set for them 
by the international system goes a long way in explaining much of the insecurity 
that those countries continue to experience.  In their description of Third World 
countries as quasi-states, Jackson (1987, 1990, and 1992) and Jackson and 
Rosberg (1982, 1986) have pointed out the discrepancy between their juridical and 
their empirical statehood (1982, 1987 and 1990).  They argue that many of the 
states that emerged on the international scene after 1945 are ‘quasi-states’ devoid 
of the physical capability, institutional authority and functional capacity to hold 
their own as states and to ensure their own survival.  Despite their lack of the 
basic attributes of statehood, their existence continues to be guaranteed by 
collective agreements and behaviour patterns of the world community of states, 
especially the United Nations, in what has marked a reversal of the historical 
pattern in which states received recognition from without on the basis of their 
empirical capabilities.  Referring specifically to Sub-Saharan African States, Jackson 
and Rosberg have argued that those cannot claim sovereignty by a demonstration 
of inescapable reality.  ‘Their sovereignty derives far more from right than from 
fact.’ (1986:2).   
Ayoob’s extensive writings on the ‘security predicament’ and ‘…the 
pervasiveness of insecurity’ in Third World countries dwell mainly on their lack of 
unconditional legitimacy as physical political entities as defined by colonial 
boundary making, as well as their internal structures and regimes.  He reflects on 
the intractability of the insecurity in relation to the history and the process of state 
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making and the manner in which the pre-existing system of states has impinged 
on that process.  Echoing the views of Jackson and Rosberg, Ayoob argues that an 
international normative order that assures inalienability of juridical sovereignty 
once achieved is responsible for the sustenance of otherwise unviable entities 
which in an era when empirical sovereignty was the primary criterion of 
recognition would not have been allowed, or been able to survive.  ‘Since states, 
once established, have an open-ended guarantee on the part of the international 
system that their legal existence is assured’ Ayoob observes, ‘the traumas that 
they suffer in the process of translating juridical statehood into empirical statehood 
take on a garb of challenges to their security rather than threats to their existence’ 
(1991:77).   
Like Ayoob, Edward Azar and Chung-in-Moon (1988) highlight the question 
of state making by emphasizing the domestic political dimensions of Third World 
security, basing on three criteria: the security environment; hardware and 
software.  By the security environment they mean the external threat and alliance 
pattern while hardware refers to the physical capabilities, strategic doctrine, the 
arming and organisations of the armed forces.  In contrast to the security 
environment and the hardware, software refers to political legitimacy, socio-
political integration and overall policy capacity of the political systems.  They argue 
that the preoccupation by traditional approaches with the security environment 
and hardware side obscures the full dynamics of the security of Third World 
countries particularly its software side characterised by tenuous political legitimacy, 
disarticulated communal groups and inchoate policy formulation capacity and 
overall, and incomplete nation-building.  All these crucial parameters are taken for 
granted by traditional approaches.  By reducing the security predicament of Sub-
Saharan Africa to the bread-or-butter logic, SSR arguably follows the traditional 
pattern of security analysis that focuses on external/military threats, claims to its 
being holistic notwithstanding.  As Thomas observes,  
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[S]ecurity in the context of the Third World states does not simply refer to 
the military dimension, as it is often assumed in Western discussions of the 
concept, but to the whole range of dimensions of a state’s existence which 
are already taken care of in the more developed states especially those in 
the West (1987:1). 
8.3 The Critical Twin Variables: Nation Building and State Making 
The passage of time has not done much to diminish the import Karl Deutsch’s 
words to the effect that,  
[T]he making and breaking of nations is a process that is now occurring in 
most parts of the world and it is a process which must be studied in its 
general and uniform aspects, especially if the unique features of each 
country and epoch are eventually to be understood better than they have 
been so far (1963:2). 
The major challenge for those countries which in modern times remain low on the 
scale of nationhood and statehood is having to live side-by-side with the more 
‘mature’ states which enjoyed the luxury of dealing with the major crises of 
political development over a period ranging from four centuries, according to Tilly 
(1975b), to seven centuries, according to Strayer (1970).  There have been many 
attempts to map out the process of nation building and an overview of the schools 
of thought that have emerged from the debate is in order to shed light on the 
content of the process.  Even in outline form, it is evident that in spite of the 
prevailing loose employment of the term,254 it has been the subject of 
longstanding debate; and it is underpinned by a body of elaborate theory that in 
recent times has been eclipsed by the short-term and quick fix approaches that fall 
under the general heading of peacebuilding.  The more common schools of 
thought of nation building include the developmental, functional, historical and 
sequence and stage theories.   
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8.3.1. Developmental, functional and historical theories 
Developmental theories of nation building stand out as the main alternative to 
stage, trajectory and sequence models by identifying interdependences or other 
relationships between a spectrum of changes without necessarily deriving from 
them regularities, paths or priorities.  An oft-cited example is the interdependence 
between a specialised governmental staff and a strong executive without laying 
out a sequence in which they appear (Fischer and Lundgren, 1975).  Cutright 
(1963, 1965) and Parsons (1971) stand out among the developmental scholars 
who emphasize interdependence.  Basing on that approach, Cutright has 
concluded that ‘...national political, economic, and social systems are 
interdependent.  Changes in the complexity of organisation in one sphere are 
followed by changes in organisation in other areas’ (1965:548).  As Tilly 
demonstrates,255 the major limitation of that approach is that it takes the 
existence of nations for granted and mere focusing on factors that determine their 
durability, strength and effectiveness, in addition to situating most analysis in the 
era of industrialism.   
Functional theories, like developmental theories do not posit stages or 
sequences, their difference being that that the former gives an outline of the 
requisites for the existence national states thereby not taking the existence of 
nation states as a given.  In Tilly’s view, functional and developmental theories 
differ ‘mainly by subtraction: they do not propose any standard stages, sequences 
or trajectories but they state what must be present if a nation state is to exist’.256  
Functional theories include the views of anthropologists like Fried (1967),257 
whose thesis dwells mainly on linkage between the degree and type of political 
organisation of society and the system of stratification, a line that is also pursued 
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farther by Lenski (1966)258 who makes comparisons between nation building in 
agrarian and industrial set ups.  Functionalism makes extensive use of cross-
sectional comparisons which by their nature are logically inappropriate for the task 
of analysing change over a long period of time.   They are inherently static and 
unable to account for social change and evolution, diffusion of political forms 
across social systems.  This is indeed evident Lenski’s work in which he ascribes 
historical finality and a self-contained status to the modes of productions – 
industrial and agrarian modes of production – at the heart of his study.  James 
Rosenau explores how societies adapt to a changing world environment; 259  and 
within the general limitations of the functionalist approach he employs, he 
successfully sheds light on the interdependence of national and international 
affairs, thereby introducing international relations perspectives (1970).  By 
concentrating on existing states, functional comparisons are unable to show how 
states emerge where none existed before.  It is questionable, as Tilly claims, that 
they can shed much light on the variable strength, durability, effectiveness and 
responsiveness of existing states.   
Historical theories include those of Bendix (1964) who sketches the 
transformation of the countries of Western Europe from estate societies of the 
Middle Ages through the absolutist regimes of the eighteenth century to the 
elective democracies in the nation states of the twentieth century. 
8.3.2. Sequence and stage schemes of nation building 
A range of analysts have described political development using sequence and 
stage theories.  Prominent among these are Black, Organski and Rustow.  For our 
current purposes, we shall focus on the former two.  Organski (1965) spells out 
what he calls the four stages of political development consisting of (1) the politics 
of primitive unification; (2) the politics of industrialisation (3) the politics of 
                                        




national welfare (4) the politics of abundance.  According to this scheme, the first 
stage of primitive unification ‘...attends the birth and the childhood of nations’ 
(1965:7).  It is not very clear from Organski’s scheme whether the ‘birth’ of Ghana 
in 1957 or Nigeria and Somalia in 1960, is in any sense comparable with what is 
generally considered to be the founding of England in the 10th Century of France in 
the 12th; and whether indeed, the two generations over which Ghana, Nigeria or 
Somalia have existed are analogous to the more than 500 generations over which 
England and France have navigated through their ‘childhood’ and maturity.  The 
implications of those temporal variances for our thinking on the development 
realities and challenges of the former set of countries cannot be overstated.  The 
other three Organski’s other three stages reduce the post-unification phase of the 
life of nation-states to the resolution of what, in the scheme we propose later are 
the challenges related to the ‘distribution’ crisis.  Tilly rightly takes issue with 
Organski’s scheme pointing at that, by overemphasizing the nineteenth and 
twentieth century it becomes unhistorical.  Tilly further observes that the scheme 
is unhelpful because it ‘...brushes all our state-making materials into the basket of 
“unification”’ (1975:607).   
Black (1967: 67-89) identifies four critical concerns of political development 
setting them out as the ‘phases of modernisation’ which draw attention to most of 
the shortcomings of modernisation theory as outlined by among others, Gusfield 
(1971) and Leys (1977).   The four phases of modernisation are: (1) The challenge 
of modernity, the phase in which society, steeped in the traditional framework of 
knowledge is supposedly confronted with modern ideas and institutions in a 
process that is related with the emergence of modernising leadership  (2) the 
revolutionary and protracted transfer of power from traditional to modernising 
leaders and the consolidation of the latter’s hold (3) economic and social 
transformation involving the transition from a predominantly agrarian and rural 
social structure to an industrial and urban one (4) integration of society in which 
economic and political transformation produces a fundamental reorganisation of 
the social structure. 
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8.3.3. ‘Crises of development’ and the software of security: Physical 
Safety Sector Reform or Security Sector Reform? 
Of particular interest to this study is the long-neglected scheme developed by Pye 
laying out what he called ‘crises of political development’ (1966:62-67).  The 
scheme identifies transitions and historical changes faced by any unit undergoing 
political development.  It has been has been put to use in subsequent analyses by 
among others, Binder et al. (1971), Tilly (1975b: 608-611), Johari (1982:184-186), 
Rokkan (1975), Grew (1978) and Ayoob (1994, 1995); and less explicitly by Azar 
and Moon (1988).  The scheme lays out six key imperatives of state making, 
namely (1) Participation; (2) Integration; (3) Distribution; (4) Identity; (5) 
Legitimacy and (6) Penetration (7) Institutionalisation.  The literature on political 
development dwells mainly on the first six, the seventh being an additional that in 
our view cuts across all the rest.  It is clear that, from whatever angle the security 
challenges of the underdeveloped countries are looked at, they all centre on those 
crises dimensions of state making and it is for that very reason that in Figure 9 
(below), the ‘crises of development’ are presented as the ‘critical dimensions of 
Third World security’, in the sense that, the resolution of each of those crises 
results in the enhancement of security, understood not merely as the immunity 
from violent attack – the notion that lies at the heart of SSR – but as the 
‘sustainable and stable existence of groups and individuals’, as pointed out in the 
justification for this study (Section 1.2).   
As argued further on, the ‘security sector’ – which in the SSR debate has 
been reduced to the instruments of coercion – is only a sub-aspect of a much 
larger picture, being merely one of the many instruments for resolving the 
penetration crisis.  Therefore it can be stated that, as a category, ‘security sector’ 
is a fallacy, especially if it is understood that immunity from violent attack (physical 
safety) is not synonymous with security as understood by this study.  Physical 
safety is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for security.  Equally so, reform 
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of the physical safety sector cannot be logically construed as reform of the 
‘security sector’, whatever the latter may be deemed to be.   
The actual linkage between security and development as presented here 
continues to receive limited attention in the debates on peace, security and 
development at the risk of further exacerbating the security of the affected 
countries.  There are many reasons for the inattention, not least because of the 
epistemic marginality of the underdeveloped countries; but more so because the 
debates and intellectual production in the field of security and development are 
dominated by policy entrepreneurs, researchers and scholars from the developed 
parts of the world whose present generations are not inclined to draw lessons from 
the histories of their own countries and regions, making it ever so hard to grasp 
the development challenges that would probably have been thoroughly 
comprehensible for a Bismarck or a Garibaldi; a Wolsey or a Richelieu; or a captain 
of any of the Zaibatsu of Tokugawa Japan.  To borrow from Leslie P. Hartley’s 
semi-proverbial remark, as far as the most audible participants in the 
contemporary security and development debate are concerned, ‘[t]he past is a 
foreign country: they do things differently there’ (1951:5).   
Some brief comments on each of the first five crises, followed by a more 
detailed discussion on the penetration crisis; and institutionalisation to which is 
handled in the final section of the study.    
 Integration is the establishment of allocation rules equalizing the shares of 
public offices, benefits, resources among all the culturally and politically 
distinct sectors of the (emergent) national community. 
 Participation is the extension of suffrage to hitherto under-privileged strata 
of the population and protection of the rights of organised opposition. 
 Identity is the measure of the effectiveness of the processes of socialising 
individuals and groups into accepting themselves as citizens of the 
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emergent national community (achieved by means of schools, literary 
media, institutionalised rituals and symbols such as myths, flags, anthems 
and songs and popular heroes and inculcating a sense of ‘national rivals, 
adversaries and enemies).   
 Legitimacy is the culmination of the creation of loyalty to and confidence in 
the established structure of political institutions in the given system; which 
also ensures regular conformity to rules and regulations issued by 
authorities within the system.   
 Distribution deals with the establishment of a functional economy to 
undergird social services and social security measures, income generation 
and equalisation through progressive transfers between the less endowed to 
the more endowed groups, localities and members of society. 
Penetration or the crisis of governmental capacity is the establishment of a rational 
field of administration for resource mobilisation and extraction in form of taxes and 
manpower, the creation of public order, and the co-ordination of collective efforts 
in infrastructure development, emergency action and collective defence.  The 
literature gives several characterisations of penetration, but all of them tend to 
agree on what it entails, both as a process and as a condition, namely, the 
establishment of effective presence by the central state authorities in the territory 
over which they preside.  In its most basic formulation, attainment of penetration 
is looked at as ‘…the need for governments of new states to make their authority 
effective throughout their territorial jurisdictions’ (Doornbos, 1971: 98), similarly 
described by Eisenstadt as ‘…the extension of the activities of the central 
administrative and political organisations and their gradual permeation into all 
spheres and regions of the society’ (1963:99).   
In terms similar to the foregoing,  Lapalombara refers to ‘…effective 
presence of a central government throughout a territory over which it pretends to 
exercise control’ or ‘…the ability of a political elite to hold the real estate together’ 
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(1971:207).  At a minimum then, penetration is the sum total of the requirement 
not only to establish authoritative structures in the geographical expanse presided 
over by the authority in question, but also to ‘…inculcate attitudes of compliance 
toward these structures among the populace’ (Doornbos, 1971:98).  As alluded to 
above, it can be understood either as a static measure or as a process.  The latter 
would include Pye’s claim that penetration ‘…involves the problems of government 
in reaching down into society and effecting basic policies’ (1966:64).  Viewed that 
way, penetration it becomes a matter of process, similar to Binder’s interpretation 
that ‘…penetration is brought on by the several pressures to increase 
governmental capabilities.’  From the foregoing, it is clear that the so called 
security sector is only an aspect of the penetration function.  The framing of the 
peacebuilding debate conflates the ‘security sector’ with the penetration function, 




Figure 9: Critical Dimensions of Third World Security 
 
Synthesized from Tilly, 1975, pp. 608-609 and Binder et at, 1971 
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It is these same processes that Ayoob sums up as he makes the point that 
‘...the early modern states of Europe had adequate time at their disposal to 
complete the process of state-making’ (1995:30).  Making reference to the 
resolution of the legitimacy/penetration, identity and participation, he notes that, 
the early state makers carried the process through three phases namely, the 
establishment of the centralised absolutist state at the expense of a feudal order; 
creation of a national identity by merging subjects of the centralised monarchy into 
a community with a common history, legal system, language and often a common 
religion, culminating in the transformation of the monarchical state into a nation-
state; and gradual extension of representative institutions to co-opt into the power 
structure emerging social forces.260   
The countries which emerged on the international scene in the nineteenth 
and 20th century have had to face a rapid succession of state-making challenges 
over very short periods of time.  Rokkan notes that for older, slowly developing 
states, issues of national cultural identity, participation and economic inequality 
were dealt with over a long stretch in contrast to the countries of the Third World 
where those same issues and more are telescoped into a single phase.  The later 
state-makers were: 
[L]eft with little or no time to reach even temporary institutional solutions to 
one set of challenges before they were forced to cope with the next 
set...the late comers were not only late in achieving sovereign status, they 
were faced with disruptive pressures from outside as well as from inside 
(1975:574).261      
                                        
260 Ibid. 
261 To underline the straitjacketing of multiple crises into a brief spell of time, Cyril Black (1966, 
89-94) has compiled a chronology to show the differences in the rates of modernising change 
measured in terms of how long, depending on the era under which intensive state making was 
undertaken, a selection of countries took to consolidate modernising leadership.  He considers 
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Huntington stresses the destabilising influence of the ‘demonstration effect’ that 
early state makers have on the later modernisers.  He notes that, state-making in 
Europe and North America was over a period of several centuries, stressing that, 
‘...in general one issue or one crisis was dealt with at a time’ (1968:46).  On the 
contrary, Huntington correctly notes, later state makers do not have the luxury of 
dealing with the problems of centralization of authority, national integration, social 
mobilization, economic development, political participation, social welfare one at a 
time, but rather, they are confronted by those problems simultaneously.  ‘What is 
important’ writes Rokkan, ‘is that the Western States were given a chance to solve 
some of the worst problems of state making before they had to face the ordeals of 
mass politics’ (1975:598).   
Other analysts support this view as Verba does in pointing out that, ‘[w]hat 
Britain took centuries to do – solve the problems of identity, legitimacy, 
participation, and distribution – the new nations have to do in the briefest span of 
time’ (1971:314).  Focussing on the resolution of the integration crisis, Goldman 
takes note in a similar vein of the luxury of time that England was endowed with in 
her early state making.  He has observed that ‘nominally the English became a 
nation in the eighth century but did not achieve political integration until the 
seventeenth century, a thousand years later’ (1969:719).  Stressing the short and 
medium term implications on security, of the attempt by underdeveloped countries 
to replicate those processes but basing on a fixed timetable of very short duration 
with premeditated goals, Ayoob has perceptively observed, 
[F]itting an evolutionary historical process into a series of deadlines is a 
difficult and dangerous exercise.  It distorts the process of natural evolution 
and raises hopes for and fears of the final goal, thereby increasing the load 
                                                                                                                        
England to be the first moderniser and confines the consolidation of modernising leadership to the 
period from 1649 to 1832, a phase that lasted 183 years; the United States as the second 
moderniser lasting a much shorter period of 89 years, from 1776 to 1865; while for the 23 
countries that launched into intensive state making during the Napoleonic period (1789-1815), it 
lasted 73 years and for the majority of the countries that entered this phase in the first quarter of 
the twentieth century it lasted only 29 years.   
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on affected political systems to such a degree that they are threatened with 
serious disequilibrium (1995:32).   
 
8.4 Institutionalization as the Master Imperative: Praetorianism or 
Militarism?  
Institutionalisation has been highlighted above as one of the seven crises of 
political development, as an addition to the scheme that arose out of the 
comparative studies of scholars on political development as already shown, 
whether it is viewed as a process or an end state.   Institutionalisation is given 
prominence here because as a process, it underpins all the other sic criteria of 
political development.  To take the analogy of ‘security software’ a bit further, 
institutionalisation can be considered to be the background software or the 
operating system whose lack will result in the hardware being redundant or whose 
dysfunction will result in frequent system crashes.  The defectiveness or deficit of 
institutions, or deficiencies in the process of institutionalisation is what Huntington 
has called the ‘political gap’ (1968:11).  The political gap can be understood to be 
the discrepancy between, on the one hand, the accelerating mobilisation of new 
social forces into political action, and on the other hand, the gradual development 
of organisations and procedures for mediating, moderating and disciplining the 
interaction of those social forces.  As Huntington has noted, ‘[i]n a complex society 
community is produced by political action and maintained by political 
institutions.’262   
The use of the term institution, and with it, institutionalization, has become 
commonplace in the social sciences reflecting the growth of institutional economics 
and development studies.  As a concept, it enjoys widespread usage in a wide 
range of disciplines including philosophy, politics and sociology, a fact that 




accounts for the endless controversies over its definitions vis-à-vis other key terms 
such as organisation, controversies that will least concern us here.  What remains 
a major challenge is that even when institutions (and the process of 
institutionalisation) are given the attention they deserve, it is not unusual for them 
not to be distinguished from social forms that fall above and below them.  On a 
lower level, institutions tend to be conflated with simpler social forms such as 
customs, rituals, conventions, norms, roles and rituals that are constitutive of 
them; and on a higher level, they tend to be conflated with the more complex 
socio-political forms such as societies and cultures which institutions together with 
other elements, combine to constitute.   
Several definitions of the term related to the general one above have been 
proffered that capture the notion that reflects the general argument of this study.  
The more common of those definitions include Veblen’s ‘…settled habits of thought 
common to the generality of men’ (1909:626); Gidden’s that looks at institutions 
as ‘…the more enduring features of social life’ (1984: 31), all of which are captured 
by Jonathan Turner in his definition of institutions as:     
[A] complex of positions, roles, norms and values lodged in particular types 
of social structures and organising relatively stable patterns of human 
activity with respect to fundamental problems in producing life-sustaining 
resources, in reproducing individuals, and in sustaining viable societal 
structures within a given environment (1997: 6).   
For purposes of this study, we define institutions as structures, procedures, 
functions and frameworks for mediating and moderating the interactions between 
the diverse social and political forces that constitute any one society.  Institutions 
are the ‘software’ of political systems, while interactions and transactions between 
political and social forces constitute the content of political participation.  The 
wider system will malfunction if the ‘software’ is missing, corrupted, incompatible 
or outdated and this will be directly reflected in the commonly preferred 
approaches and traditions of political participation.  Huntington defines institutions 
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as ‘stable, valued, recurring patterns of behaviour’ (1968:12), and 
institutionalisation as ‘the process by which organisations and procedures acquire 
value and stability.’263  Migdal describes institutions similarly as ‘… the established 
systems of rules and roles within which people deal with one another’ (1988:90).  
Despite its slight circularity, Huntington’s definition brings out all the elements that 
would be considered central to any study of institutions.  Nevertheless, that does 
not devalue at all his wider analysis.  The rest of the comments in this part of the 
study, dwelling on institutionalisation as an aspect of political development and 
building block of security will draw extensively on the Huntington’s observations in 
his Political Order in Changing Societies.  Institutionalisation – understood as ‘...the 
capacity to create public interests’264 – spans across all the major spheres of 
public life: political, cultural, social and economic.  For purposes of the analysis 
here, we focus narrowly on the ‘security sector’ and its relationship with the 
political system.  Institutionalisation both as a drawn-out process and a state of 
affairs arising from that process is probably the single-most concern whose 
disregard in the debate on security and development has contributed most to 
diminishing the usefulness of reform initiatives that have dominated the post-Cold 
War era; and it becomes ever more important particularly because much of the 
persistent fallacious accounts of the reasons why the military continues to cast a 
long shadow over the politics of underdeveloped countries.   
The important question is, if institutions are the medium through which 
social forces relate both to each other and to the rest of the political system, what 
becomes the case when they (institutions) are lacking in absolute terms, or if they 
are deficient in ‘adaptability, coherence, autonomy and complexity’, the time-
dependent criteria Huntington uses to assess the extent to which procedures and 
organisations are institutionalised?  In answering this question, Huntington 
classifies political systems into those that are highly institutionalised and those 
                                        
263 Ibid. 
264 Ibid p. 24 
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which are minimally institutionalised and disorganised, the civic and praetorian 
respectively and places the political systems of the underdeveloped countries in 
the latter category.  This classification translates directly into a classification of the 
preferred modes of political participation, namely, civic participation and 
praetorianism.  Those two provide the context for mapping the character of civil-
military relations and the efficacy (or their lack) of reform interventions aimed at 
placing those relationships on a sound civic footing.   
There have been many attempts especially by experts on civil-military 
relations to shed light on the proclivity of military forces in underdeveloped 
countries either to intervene in politics or to otherwise exceed the capacities of the 
civil authorities in keeping them under check.  Among the many explanations, the 
commons ones are:  
 The training of military officers of underdeveloped countries in 
foreign military academies has in the past been credited as a 
deterrent to almost the same extent that it has been blamed for 
causing military intervention in politics. 
 The class origins of the officer corps of the military, with many 
references to the middle and lower middle class.   
 The skill levels of the military.  
 The internal cohesiveness of some military forces. 
 Ethnic composition of the officer corps. 
 Contagion from successful intervention in politics by the militaries 
of other countries. 
On the basis of some of those accounts policy recommendations and academic 
hypotheses have been formulated to the effect that the most effective way of 
countering the intervention of the military in politics was by ‘coup-proofing’ as a 
preventive strategy,  instituting measures for ensuring civilian control and 
nurturing cultures that promote democratic control of the armed forces.  In spite 
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of the well-laid out counsel particularly by Huntington (1968), Finer (1962) and 
Perlmutter (1969, 1977, and 1982) on the limitations of those assumptions, they 
have more recently resurfaced as ‘security sector’ governance, with SSR as a 
means of its attainment.   
As Huntington has observed, military explanations do not explain military 
interventions in politics.  ‘The most important causes of military intervention in 
politics’ he emphasizes, ‘are not military but political and reflect not the social and 
organisational characteristics of the military but the political and institutional 
structure of society.’265   Military interventions and military pre-eminence instead 
explains the reality that the countries affected by the phenomenon lean towards 
the praetorian end of the praetorianism-civic continuum.  Praetorianism is a 
referred pain that is perceived in an organ other than the actual site of the painful 
stimulus.  Attempting to remedy such pain by tinkering with the locus where it is 
remotely projected serves no tangible purpose.  In praetorian polities, due to the 
feebleness or inappropriateness of existing institutions, the political system lacks 
the medium for mediating, modulating and moderating group action.  As a result, 
Each group employs means which are peculiar to its capabilities.  The 
wealthy bribe; the students riot; workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the 
military coup....The techniques of military intervention are simply more 
dramatic and effective than the others.’266  
The fact is that, in a situation where the functioning of a political system has 
drifted towards the Darwinian jungle, a contest in which a cardinal sings from a 
bible and a colonel slings a rifle favours the latter only because of the 
appropriateness of his means, and not because his motivation differs from that of 
the former.  Singling out for rebuke and for reform, the actor with the most 
dramatic means is very much a case of what psychophysiologists call ‘attentional 
                                        
265 Ibid, p.194. 
266 Ibid, p.196. 
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bias’: the tendency to focus exclusively on emotionally dominant stimuli in the 
environment and to neglect other relevant or primary data when making 
judgments of a correlation or association (Sass et al., 2010).  By disregarding the 
broader question institutionalisation, the promoters of SSR have in the process 
reduced praetorianism to militarism, thus conflating a syndrome with one of its 
components, albeit a dramatic one.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This study begins with a set of arguments that outline the contours along 
which the rest of the research was expected to unfold.  The arguments touch on 
the philosophical underpinnings of the normative framing of the SSR debate, the 
post-Cold War theoretical debates on security, the relationship between SSR and 
civil military relations, the arguments and concepts that continue to structure the 
implementation of SSR and suggestions regarding an alternative conceptualisation 
of the security of Sub-Saharan African countries.  The picture that emerges is that 
for some time to come, the pressing concern for international statesmen, 
bureaucrats of world bodies and generals – not to mention scholars and 
campaigners – will remain the task of effecting fundamental socio-economic and 
political transformation in the less developed, conflict-prone countries particularly 
in Sub-Saharan Africa.  That task will not be made any easier by the complexity of 
the multiple manifestations of what can be called ‘the underdevelopment 
syndrome’, nor will it be helped by the exacting demands, the competing visions 
and conflicting interests of those that may have the wherewithal to act, as can be 
seen from the themes that emerge from the study.   
The first theme that relates to pressing the need for realism regarding what 
Berdal (2009: 173) has called ‘...the multiple and overlapping sources of 
violence...’ in countries that may be classified as ‘post-conflict’ and even those that 
may have previously been at peace.  The pacifism that is implied by such idealistic 
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references as ‘peace-building’, ‘post-conflict’ and ‘sustainable peace’ often diverts 
attention from the ‘multiple and overlapping sources of violence’ and protracted 
conflict whose remedy may not lie with the short term and quick fix policy options 
that are characteristic to the interventionism of the post-Cold War era.  As this 
study shows, SSR stands out as one of the leading examples of such 
interventionism.  It is argued in this study that there may be need for a sense of 
realism a keen sense of history and acknowledgment that some of the processes of 
political evolution and state making under way in most countries that are targeted 
for institutional reform are by their very nature fraught with conflict and instability 
like they have been in the past in other parts of the globe.  As Tilly has observed, 
for many of the developed countries of the modern world, state making, ‘...cost 
tremendously in death, suffering, loss of rights and unwilling surrender of land, 
goods or labour’ (1975a).  The challenge for the less developed parts of the 
contemporary world, the study shows, is how to consolidate territorial and 
demographic control, maintain order in places where control has been imposed 
and establish systems of resource extraction and redistribution more peacefully 
than history shows those processes to often be, and as peacefully as is often 
required of them by the now developed countries particularly those of the West.   
The second theme relates to sensitivity both to history and to the diverse 
cultural settings within which policy interventions such as SSR have to be 
implemented.  It calls for keen awareness of the enduring impact of both the 
distinct colonial experiences and the diverse forms taken by anti-colonial struggles 
in Sub-Saharan Africa on the character and robustness of post-independence 
states and institutions and crucially, on the diversity of the resulting formats of 
civil-military relations and the obstacles they can impose on one-size-fits-all 
institutional reform initiatives such as SSR.  Yet, even when such issues are taken 
into account, it remains that SSR is not a new initiative, but a reincarnation of civil-
military relations theory of the 1960s and 1970s; and as such, it is handicapped by 
the same limitations that invalidated CMR, the parent theory, namely the 
normative bias towards liberalism and the disregard for the realities in pre-liberal 
348 
 
and transitional political systems or those whose historical experience that were 
not in accord with the socio-political contexts that influenced the original 
formulation of the theory.  Those limitations do not portend well for SSR.   
The theme of sensitivity to history ties in with one of the key arguments of 
this study regarding the broader question of sensitivity to context.  Sensitivity to 
wider context – whether historical or contemporary – continues to feature 
prominently in the statements of principle and declarations of intent of 
international development agencies, but as this study shows, all it seems to attract 
is lip service.    Claims about context-sensitivity in the inception and 
implementation of international development initiatives contrast sharply with the 
normative orientation of those initiatives.  This accounts for what Lakhdar Brahimi 
has called ‘“template”’ missions....to carry out the same laundry list of tasks in 
dramatically different post-conflict settings’ (2008:10),267 or what Andrews (2013) 
has described aptly as ‘square pegs in round holes.’  
Underlying the point sensitivity to history is the question humility on the 
part of some of the countries and coalitions that play a leading role in 
peacebuilding interventions.  This particularly relates to the historical responsibility 
of key developing countries for emplacing, entrenching and on many occasions, 
reproducing the structures and processes that predispose underdeveloped 
countries to intractable conflict.  Any reference to historical context that disregards 
or betrays any hint of being dismissive of those historical factors can only 
undermine the credibility of those proposing reforms provoke resentment for 
peacebuilding initiatives, however well-intentioned or potentially beneficial they 
may seem to be.   
This study directly relates to the practical ramifications of that stark choice 
that is made across the world on a daily basis; in halls of ivy, in boardrooms of 
world bodies and in military command centres of major powers.  This is the choice 
between, on the one hand, grounding scholarship, advocacy and policy in the field 
                                        
267 UN Security Council 5895th Meeting, 20 May 2008, S/PV.5895, Cited in Berdal, 2009, p.171. 
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of international development in rigorous empirical analysis of the lives of real 
people, in the real world in its historical specificity; and on the other hand, basing 
those crucial activities on prescribing what are considered to be ‘best practices’ and 
‘international norms’, which, though desirable as ideals, may bear no relation 
whatsoever with prevailing realities; and whose enforcement, however well-
intentioned, always ends up turning international development policy and 
scholarship into an exercise of strapping wings on caterpillars.  The reference to 
‘Antoinettian complacency’ in the study’s title relates directly to that entomological 
metaphor which sums up our practical concerns here.  The logic of the implied 
practice is unmistakable: If they have no government, give them good governance 
and if they have no political community give them the political party.  If they have 
no functional economy give them the free market and if they no monopoly over 
the instruments of coercion, reform their ‘security sector’.  As this study 
demonstrates, that remains the dominant trait of international development as it is 
currently practised in conflict-afflicted regions of the world such as Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  As this study has attempted to show, understanding the pitfalls of such 
approaches will be a starting point in coming to grips with the apparent futility of 
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